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**THE DHVANI THEORY
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS**

By

MUKUNDA MADHAVA SHARMA,

M. A., D. Phil., Kāvyaśīrtha

*Reader of the Department of Sanskrit,
Gauhati University, Gauhati (Assam).*

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FOREWORD

OF

Dr. SATKARI MOOKERJEE, M. A., Ph. D.

Quondam Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calcutta
and Whilom Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara.

I feel flattered by the request of Dr. Mukunda Madhava Sharma for writing a foreword to his work "The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics." This work removes the facile impression that the *Dhvani* Theory has been exhausted by modern writers. The contour and the main signposts have been surveyed. But the hidden resources lying in the unplumed depths are to be rediscovered and the implications and suggestions have to be worked out. This has been done in the present work to a large extent. After all, as Ānandavardhana has said in the *Dhvanyūloka*, "An old thing may present itself as surprisingly new in the words of a man of genius. Nature assumes a new form in the spring after shading its withered leaves." In fact, the new is the old regenerated. Dr. Sharma's treatment is not along the stereotyped lines. He has presented the familiar topics of the *Dhvani* Theory in a new garb with its irresistible charms of novelty. The perusal of this book even by Veteran Professors will be rewarding. I wish that not only students of Sanskrit Poetics but of literary criticism should make time to read this book and read between the lines.

The present situation in India charged with melancholy tensions which find frequent vent in violent explosions does not leave scope for suitable intellectual climate for serious study. But I think that this must be a passing phase and may prove to be a kind of labour pain for the production of a new lease of life. A nation cannot live in tension for ever. In that period of emergency and peace concentrated study of old works and these words of genius of a creative climate which will be ushered while intellectual will receive their mead of appreciation. Meanwhile intellectual activities cannot acquiesce in a moratorium of their technicians for acquisition of power in spite of the devious moves of politicians and justification of acquisition of power and pelf. This is the warrant of a silent protest against such intellectual enterprises which contain at sordid games of Politics.

FOREWORD

OF

Dr. GAURINATH SASTRI, M. A., D. Litt.,
VICE-CHANCELLOR,
VĀRĀNASEYA SANSKRĪTA VIŚVAVIDYĀLAYA,
VARANASI,

In the evolution of Ālaṃkāra Literature, *dhvani* or *vyañjanā* occupies a paramount place. *Abhidhā* as a *śabdavyāpāra*, is recognised by different Indian philosophers, but there is a difference of opinion amongst them, with regard to *lakṣaṇā*. Though the Mīmāṃsaka recognises it as *vākyavṛtti* and not as *padavṛtti*, yet he does not accord the same status to it as *abhidhā*. Whatever it may be, it took quite a long time to recognise *vyañjanā* as a separate *padavṛtti*. Indeed, there have been attempts to maintain that whatever sense, is conveyed by *vyañjanā* may be expressed by *abhidhā*. Similarly, it has been contended, that *vyaṅgyārtha* may be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, and there is no justification for admitting *vyañjanā* as a separate *vṛtti* to express what may be called *vyaṅgyārtha*.

It may be observed in this context that the medieval ālaṃkārikas felt that for the purpose of esoteric experience (*rasānubhūti*) the aid of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* must be sought, for rasa experience is never possible on *vācya-bhūmi*, the plane of denotation. So long as we are concerned with *vācyārtha*, there is no occasion for rasa experience. It is why Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta have said that though *dhvani* is of three types, *vastu*, *ālaṃkāra* and *rasa*, yet it is *rasadhvani* with which the ālaṃkārika is chiefly concerned, as it is the *rasadhvani* which is the soul of poetry.

It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things that the present author has set himself to the task of unfolding the concept of *dhvani* as recorded in Ālaṃkāra literature from the time of Ānandavardhana. It is very gratifying that he has been able to present the view of the Ālaṃkārikas with as much precision as possible.

I would only hope that the author would undertake a comparative study of Sanskrit poetics and western aesthetics sometime in future which will enable us to realize the value and importance of the contributions of the Indian mind to the subject.

Dedicated to the Sacred Memory

of

MY FATHER

DR. RUCHINARAYAN SHARMA,

who inspired me for Sanskrit studies

and

MY UNCLE

PRINCIPAL TULSINARAYAN SHARMA,

who initiated me into the realm of Sanskrit learning

*Ūrdhvordhvamāruhya yadarthatattoam
Dhīḥ paśyati śrāntimavedayanti |
Phalaṁ tadādyaiḥ parikalpitānām
Vivekasopānaḥparamparāṇām ||*

"The truth, which is perceived by our tireless intellect, climbing higher and higher, is the result of the ladder of thought designed by earlier thinkers." (Abhinavabhāratī, VI).



P R E F A C E

Speculations on poetics in India reached the zenith with the promulgation of the dhvani theory by Ānandavardhana. The essence of the theory, however, was already present in a tradition handed down by the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and, as is usually the case with other Indian śāstras, the germs of the theory can be traced even in the Vedic literature. But this theory found the first systematic expression only in Ānandavardhana's *magnum opus*, *Dhvanyāloka*. That, Ānandavardhana's theory caused a great commotion in the entire atmosphere of Indian intelligence, can be gathered from the reference to a host of opponents who fought an ineffectual fight even before the theory was put in the form of a treatise. Later on, thanks to the dhvani theory, India also saw the rise of a galaxy of intellectual giants like Abhinavagupta, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Maṃmaṭa. And in the present age we can realise the far-reaching implications of the dhvani theory if we make even a casual comparison with the modern western thoughts on literary criticism.

In the present work I have tried to explain and analyse the most salient features of this great dhvani theory with a special reference to the text of *Dhvanyāloka*. While doing so, I have deliberately avoided the longer discussions on chronology. But I have tried to show the development of the theory in a precisely chronological order up to its probable impact on the modern creative talents. In explaining the topics of the *Dhvanyāloka* I have devoted more space only to those which seemed to require some fresh critical comments. But yet I cherish a feeling of discontent in respect of the extent of the treatment of some of the topics of my own choice. Here is an instance. I gave the work to the publishers as early as in 1964 and in course of these four years I have come to realise that my treatment of the relation of the dhvani theory with the western thoughts on poetry in general and symbolism in particular, should have been

more comprehensive But I am happy, that it is not so premature now, to announce the completion of an all comprehensive study of symbolism, pertaining to the different media of expression, wherein I have applied my best efforts to make up the short-comings of the present work

I am extremely grateful to the modern scholars, whose works I have studied and utilised for explaining the dhvani theory in a new way It is, however, a matter of regret for me that I could not utilise and accommodate in this work my belated acquaintance with two important works, viz., Dr V Raghavan's *Bhoja's Śrngāraprakāśa* and Krishna Chaitanya's, *Sanskrit Poetics*

Though I had occasions to differ from the views of some of the modern scholars, I have an unmixed respect and admiration for them and I hope, my attitude towards all of earlier authorities can be understood from the preamble verse of this work that I have quoted from the *Abhinavabharati*

I have really no words to express my gratitude to my guru Professor Narenda Chandra Bhattacharya, M A , Vedānta Sāmkhya Mimāmsā-tīrtha, Tattvaratna Shāstri, now Curator, the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, who guided me in my research work that culminated in my getting admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Calcutta in 1963 The present work is a retouched version of the thesis that I prepared under his kind supervision

I consider myself extremely fortunate to have come to a close association with as great a scholar as Professor Dr K C Pandey, M A , Ph D , D Litt , M. O L , Shāstri, U G C Professor of Sanskrit, Lucknow University, through this very humble work. Professor Pandey was one of the adjudicators of the present work in its thesis form and this has offered me the rare privilege to find him as one of my very kind gurus, since then

With all my heart melting with devotion, I also remain extremely grateful to my gurus Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M A , Ph. D , quondam Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit,

Calcutta University and whilom Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, and Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, M. A., D. Litt., Vice-Chancellor, Varanaseya Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, for their kind and learned forewords.

It is also my pleasant duty to offer my thanks to Shri Aswini Kumar Barua, B. A., now a Journalist of the P. I. B., New Delhi, Shri Dharmeswar Chutia, M. A., an Assam Government Research Scholar working for his Ph. D. under my guidance, and my wife Sm. Elima Sharma for their untiring help in preparing the type-script, putting the diacritical marks and preparing the Index.

I am also highly thankful to the celebrated family of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office for their courtesy and the interest they took in bringing the work to light. The work was lying with them since 1964. But the delay in getting it out of the press is only because of my unsparing preoccupations with the Department of Sanskrit, Gauhati University as its Head, till July 1967.

1-5-68.

M. M. S.

32, GAUHATI UNIVERSITY
GAUHATI-14, ASSAM.



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**Select Names of Works Referred to with
Abbreviations Preceding them**

1. A. Bh. Abhinavabhāratī on NŚ, GOS. Vol. I, 1956, Vol. II, 1934.
2. A Critical History of English Poetry, by Grierson and Smith. Chatto & Windus. 1950.
3. Ādhunik Baṅglā Kāvya Paricaya (Bengali) by Dr. Dipti Tripathy.
4. Ādhunik Hindi Kavitaṁmen Prem Aur Saundarya (Hindi) by Dr. Rameswarlal Khandelwal, National Publishing House, Delhi 1958.
5. A E The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta by Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1956.
6. Amarakośa.
7. Appreciations by Walter Pater.
8. A S Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka, NSP. 1939.
9. Aspect of Sanskrit Literature by Dr. S. K. De. Calcutta 1959.
10. A System of Logic by J. S. Mill.
11. A T S E The Achievement of T. S. Eliot by F. O. Matthiessen. Oxford University Press. 1947.
12. Avaloka. Com. on DR by Dhanika.
13. A V C Aucityavicāracarccā by Kṣemendra. Haridasa Sanskrit Series. Chowkhamba. 1933.
14. A V M Abhidhāvyrttimātrkā of Mukula Bhaṭṭa. N.S.P. Bombay 1916.
15. Bhavabhūti and His Place in Sanskrit Literature by Anundoram Borooah. Calcutta 1878.
16. Bhāṣāpariccheda of Viśvanātha. Edited by Pañcānana Śāstri. 1st. edn. Calcutta 1358 sāl.
17. Cārudatta of Bhāsa.
18. Collected Poems by William Empson. Chatto & Windus. 1955.
19. C. M. Citramīmāṁsā of Appayadīkṣita, Kavyamala 38. N. S. P. Bombay 1926.
20. Contemporary French Poetry by Joseph Chiary.
21. C. S. The Chequer'd Shade by John Press. Oxford University Press, London 1958.

22. De Poetica of Aristotle, Trans. by Ingram Bywater, Oxford 1946
23. Dhv. Dhvanyāloka with Locana and Bālapriyā and Divyāñjana commentaries. Edited by Pandit Pattabhirama Sastri Also called Benaras edition or Chowkhamba edition or KSS edition, 1940 References to Dhv. are references to this edition unless otherwise specified.
- 24 Dhv. Trans 'Theory of Suggestion in Poetry' being the English translation of Dhv by Dr. K Krishnamoorthy, Poona 1955
25. DR Daśarūpaka of Dhananījaya with Avaloka of Dhanika with Hindi exposition by Dr Bhola-shankar Vyas Chowkhamba edition, Banaras 1955
- 26 East and West (of the Is M. E. O , Rome) year VI No 4 Jan' 56
27. English Literature of the Twentieth Century by A. S. Collins, 1956.
28. Foundations of Educational Psychology by Peter Sandiford Longmans, Green and Co , 1940
29. Palgrave's Golden Treasury Book IV. Macmillan, 1950
- 30 Hindusthan Standard, Puja Annual, 1959.
31. H S L A History of Sanskrit Literature by Dr. A. B. Keith, London 1920 (and 1941).
- 32 History of Sanskrit Literature by S. K. De , Calcutta University, 1947.
33. HSP. De Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr. S K. De Vol. I. London 1923, Vol. II, London 1925.
34. HSP. Kane History of Sanskrit Poetics by MM P V. Kane, Bombay 1951. (Roman numerals for page numbers refer to the 1923 edition).
35. I. Acst. Indian Aesthetics by Dr. K. C. Pandey, Chowkhamba, Benares 1950.
- 36 I P F The idea of Poetry in France by Margaret Gilman, Harvard University Press, 1958.

37. I T M Indian Theories of Meaning by Dr. K. Kun-
junni Raja. Adyar Library, 1963.
38. KD. Kāvyaḍarśa of Daṇḍin. Edited by Pandit
Rangacarya Reddi Shastri. Poona, 1938.
39. KL, Kāvyaḷaṁkāra of Bhāmaha, Chowkhamba,
Bhāmaha 1928.
40. KL, Rudraṭa Kāvyaḷaṁkāra of Rudraṭa, NSP. 1909.
41. KP. CSS. Kāvyaṭrakāśa, Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. VI,
1933.
42. KP. Jhal. Kāvyaṭrakāśa with Bālabodhinī of Jhalakī-
kara, Poona 1950.
43. KP. Saṁ. (or
KP. Saṁketa) Kāvyaṭrakāśa with Saṁketa of Māṇikya-
candra. Edited by Dr. R. Shama Sastry.
Mysore, 1922.
44. Kāvyaṭrakāśa. Ullāsa X. Edited by S. S.
Sukhtankar, Bombay, 1941.
45. KSS Kāvyaḷaṁkārasārasaṁgraha of Udbhaṭa with
Laghuvṛtti of Pratīhārendurāja edited by
Narayana Daso Banahatti. Bombay 1925.
46. Kṣemendra Studies by Dr. Suryyakanta,
Poona 1954.
47. KSV Kāvyaḷaṁkārasūtravṛtti of Vāmana (NSP.).
48. KTS Kāvyaṭattvasaṁkṣā by Dr. N. N. Choudhury,
(1959).
49. The Locana com. of Abhinavagupta as in the
Benaras edition of Dhv.
50. Manu Saṁ. Manusāṁhitā.
51. MB. Chow-
khamba Mahābhāṣya (Navāhnikāṁ). Chowkhamba
1954.
52. MB. NSP Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (vidhiśesarūpaṁ
dvitīyaṁ khaṇḍam) NSP. Bombay 1935.
53. New Bearings in English Poetry, by F. R.
Leavis. Chatto & Windus (1932), 1959.
54. NM Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, Kashi Sans-
krit Series, Benares 1936.

55. NR The Number of Rasas by Dr. V. Raghavan, Adyar Library, 1940
56. NS Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata with A. Bh. GOS. Vol I 1956, Vol. II, 1934
57. Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathimīśra, GOS 1937
58. Prof P K Gode Commemoration Volume, Oriental Book Agency, Poona 1960
59. Poetry Direct and Oblique by E M W. Tillyard Chatto & Windus 1948
60. PLM Paramaśighumanjūṣā by Nāgeśabhaṭṭa. Chowkhamba Benares, 1917
61. P S R Psychological Studies in Rasa by Dr Rakesh-gupta, B H U Press 1950
62. RG Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha (1st Ānana) edited in Bengali by Dr. Smti. Sandhya Bhaduri, Calcutta 1953
63. Śastradīpikā of Pārthasārathimīśra Translated by D Venkataramiah, GOS 1940
64. Selected Essays of T. S. Eliot
65. SD Śāhityadarpana of Viśvanātha.
66. Soviet Literature, 1961 (No. 9)
67. SP 'Selected Prose of T S Eliot' in Penguin Books 1953
69. SSP Śabdaśaktiprakāśika of Jagadīśa, Kāshī Sanskrit Series, Benares (1934), with the Kṛṣṇa-kānti commentary.
70. SVV Śabdavyāpāravicāra of Mammāṭa in the same Vol with AVM, NSP 1918
71. The Sacred Wood by T. S. Eliot, Methuen & Co London, 1953
72. Tattvapradīpikā of Citśukha
73. The Renaissance by Walter Pater
74. The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism by T. S. Eliot, Faber & Faber.
75. TMP The Trend of Modern Poetry by Geoffrey Bullough Oliver and Boyd, London, 1949

6. TRD Some Aspects of literary criticism in Sanskrit or The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani by Dr. A. Sankaran.
77. TTD Trends in 20th century Drama, by Frederick Lumley, Barrie and Rockliff, London 1960.
78. URC Uttararāmacarita of Bhavabhūti.
79. VJ. De. The Vakroktijvita of Rājānaka Kuntaka. Edited by Dr. S. K. De. Calcutta, 1922.
80. VJ. Hindi Hindi Vakroktijvita. Edited by Dr. Nagendra. Delhi 1955.
81. VKPD. Vākyapadīya (Brahmakāṇḍa) of Bhartṛhari with Bhāvapradīpa com. of Pandit Śrī Sūrya-nārāyaṇa Śukla. Chowkhamba, 1937.
82. V. Vārttika Vṛttivārttika of Appayadīkṣita. Kavyamala 38, N. S. P. Bombay 1926.
83. VV. Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares 1936.
84. VVV. Vyaktivivekavimarśa on VV by Ruṃyaka occurring in the said edn. of VV.
85. Vṛtti Vṛtti portion of the Dhv. Benaras edn.
86. Veṇṇīsaṃhāra of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa.
87. Word Word, Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York, Vol. 17. No. 2. (August 1961).

Some other Important Abbreviations

1. A. G. Abhinava gupta.
2. Com. Commentary.
3. GOS. Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
4. K. Kārikā.
5. NSP. Nirnayasagara press.

Select names of books consulted but not mentioned in the body of the text

1. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning by Gaurinath Sastri, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1959.
2. Towards a Theory of the Imagination by S. C. Sen Gupta, Oxford University press, 1959.



THE DHVANI THEORY
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What is Poetics : Poetry has been a very precious possession of the mankind from a very primitive period. Poetical productions, obviously, led to the development of a literary taste and the origin of the "science of poetics." It is, however, not to be understood as a mathematical science like physics and chemistry. In poetics we are concerned with the effects of poetry in the mind of the man of literary taste and, as such, we are to examine certain mental states. The merits of a poetical work is determined by this science on the basis of these mental states. It will be observed that the man of literary taste may vary in temperament and, as such, the assessment of the merits and the nature of appeal of a certain poetical work may not be the same in case of all the readers. Thus, poetics, in so far as it has the states of mind as the subject of study, falls at par with introspective psychology, the claim of which to be called a science is very insecure in contrast with modern psychology.¹ But the ideal of investigation in poetics is essentially the same as in physics or chemistry. In poetics also the general rules and principles hold good universally. Thus, poetics is useful in so far as it embodies certain broad generalisations on the nature of poetry and suggests some precisely proved means and techniques for the production of better poetry.

Indian poetics : India claims the distinction of having a long and glorious literary heritage. Sanskrit kāvyas were composed from as early a period as that of the Rāmāyaṇa (c. 400-200 B. C.) which marked the beginning of a more

1. Vide, Foundations of Educational Psychology, pp. 4-11.

illustrious literary tradition² Even Rgveda, the earliest of all the extant literary compositions of the world, had a good amount of poetic element and even now claims a good degree of poetic appeal³ This long literary heritage resulted in a standard literary taste and consequently there was a very large number of works on poetics⁴ These works had the already existing kavyas as the objects of criticism or they formulated certain rules for composing good type of kavyas and presented a theoretical discussion on the fundamentals of kāvyā There is a purpose in using the word "kavya" here The word kāvyā has a much broader connotation than the English word "poetry" The question as to what kāvyā is, will be discussed by and by, but it will be sufficient to remember here that, the word kāvyā means not only poetical compositions in verse but also fictions, dramas and campus (romance composed in mixed prose and verse) etc⁵ In English the term "literature" is often used to mean technical literatures also⁶ and the term "poetry" is used in a much restricted sense to mean only the literary compositions in verse Hence, the term 'kāvyā' is used here more conveniently to cover all the varieties of the type of fine art based on words and meaning The two monumental works viz., The History of Sanskrit Poetics by MM P V Kane and the Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr. S K. De have already given the history of the glorious tradition of Sanskrit poetics at such a length that an elaboration of the

2 HSL. Keith, pp 42-45

3 HSP Kane, pp 314-317

4 Ibid Index of works

5 KD I 11

6 Phāmaha also understands a broader meaning of the word kāvyā like the broader meaning of the English word literature Compare

vr̥ttadev̥d caritasamā cotpādyā bāstu ca /

kalīśāstrārayam ceti caturdhā bhidyate punaḥ // (KL. I. 17)

vide also Laghubhūti, pp 83-84 for Indurāja's comment on this view Compare Banabhatti's notes on KSS, p. 155 in which he says that works dealing with arts and sciences are one of the four varieties of kāvyā " etc

same here would be a repetition of repetitions. Yet for the convenience of understanding the dhvani theory there is the necessity of referring here to some theories which dominate the main schools and trends in Sanskrit poetics without entering deeper into the controversial questions of chronology, etc.

Schools of poetics : Of the traditional writers, Samudrabandha, commentator on Ruyyaka's AS, classified the schools after the latter in a interesting way. He observed "iha viśiṣṭau śabdārthau kāvyaṁ tayośca vaiśiṣṭyaṁ dharmamukhena, vyāpāramukhena, vyaṅgyamukhena veti trayah pakṣāḥ ādye'pyalamkārato guṇato veti dvaividhyam dvitīy'epi bhaṇīti-vaicitryeṇa bhoga-kṛttvena veti dvaividhyam iti pañcaṣu pakṣesvādyā udbhaṭāḍibhirāṅgīkṛtāḥ, dvitīyo vāmanena, tṛtīyo vakrokti-jīvitakāreṇa, caturtho bhaṭṭanāyakena, pañcama Ānandavardhanena." (An association of word and meaning having a speciality is kāvya. They owe their speciality to three factors, viz., an attribute, a function and a suggested sense. The first source of speciality has two varieties, viz., alamkāra (figure of speech) or a guṇa (quality). The second source has two varieties, viz., strikingness of speech and the function called bhogakṛti. Of these five alternatives the first one is followed by Udbhaṭa and others, the second one is followed by Vāmana, the third is followed by the author of Vakrokti-jīvita, the fourth by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and the fifth by Ānandavardhana.) Samudrabandha here recognises the (1) alamkāra school, (2) the guṇa school, (3) the vakrokti school, (4) the bhojakatva school and the (5) dhvani school. The guṇa school refers to the rīti school of the modern classification but the latter may be called guṇa school also as according to that school the essential nature of kāvya depends on the qualities (guṇas) that bestow speciality upon the styles (rītis) designated as the soul of poetry. In the modern classification there is no mention of a vakrokti school or a bhojakatva theory and the pioneer advocate of the theory, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, is better known as a strong opponent of the

dhvani school and his theory as the dhvanīdhvamśa theory.⁷ Samudrabandha was anterior to Viśvanātha and Ksemendra and as such the (6) rasa theory and the (7) aucitya theory do not occur in his enumeration. Samudrabandha's classification is defective in so far as it does not accommodate Mahimabhatta's anumiti theory and also does not leave any scope for recognising Bharata's contribution to the field of poetics.

Modern scholars enumerate the following schools and theories—(1) rasa school, (2) riti school, (3) alamkāra school, (4) dhvani school, (5) vakrokti school, (6) Anumiti theory and (7) aucitya theory.⁸ This classification leaves scope for the inclusion of all the known writers in one school or the other. In the following lines we are examining the schools and theories in their outlines.

The Rasa School This school is characterised by a partiality for rasa. The followers of this school advocated that rasa is the most essential and indispensable element in a kavya. Poetry owes its being to the depiction of rasa and in a characteristic Indian way they call rasa the atma (soul) of poetry. Bharatamuni the author of the NŚ was the ancientmost propounder of this school. Bharata observes—"na hi rasādrte kaścidarthah pravarttate" (No meaning proceeds from speech without any kind of sentiment)⁹. The NŚ is primarily a work on dramaturgy. But Bharata had the occasion to discuss the different aspects of kāvyā also since the text of the drama, presented verbally (and thus involving the vā īka abhinaya) is at par with non-dramatic kavya. Dr Keith has rightly observed, "the topics which were to engage writers on poetics, however, appear in elementary, though not undeveloped, form in the

7 KTS p 7

8 S S Sukthankar, KP X Introduction. For only the schools vide HSP, Kane, p CXLVII

9 NS, VI-31.

Nāṭyaśāstrā.”¹⁰ But Bharata's partiality for rasa is very clearly betrayed by his declaration that the propriety of the use of the different types of the elements like vṛtti, lakṣaṇa, guṇa, alaṃkāra, etc., is determined by rasa.¹¹ Compare—“etacca rasāditātparyeṇa kāvyanibandhanaṃ bharatādāvapi suprasiddhameveti pratipādayitumāha” etc. (Dhv. p. 401). The poetics portion of the Agnipurāṇa also claims an affiliation of its unknown author to this school by the declaration “vāgvaidagdhya pradhāne'pi rasa evātra jīvitam.”¹² Of the writers of regular works on poetics Viśvanātha may be singled out as the foremost advocate of this school since he gives the very definition of poetry in terms of rasa, recognised as the soul. Compare : “vākyaṃ rasātmakam kāvyam.” Modern writers would include Abhinava, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭanāyaka also in this school. It is quite meet and proper, when S. S. Sukthankar includes Abhinava—for Abhinava not only believed that rasa is the soul but he had also given the most appropriate explanation of the term rasa. Dr. N. N. Choudhury associates the names of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa also with this school.¹³ Since Mahimabhaṭṭa also recognises rasa as the ātmā (soul) of poetry by saying “Kāvyaśya ātmani saṃjñini rasādīrūpe na kasyacid vimatiḥ.”¹⁴ we can include him safely. But as we do not have the full text of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Hṛdayadarpaṇa we cannot be sure of his position. Regarding Bhaṭṭanāyaka we are to depend on whatever information is supplied by

10. HSL. p. 373.,

11. NS (Trans.) pp. 308 (XVII-42), 320 (XVII-107, 108, etc.), 401 (XXII).

12. Agnipurāṇa, 337, 33.

13. KTS. p. 6.

14. VV. I. Also compare, “kavivṛttopāro hi vibhāvādīsaṃyojanātmā rasābhivṛtyavyabhicārī kāvyamucyate taccābhineyānabhineyārthatvena dvividham.” VV. p. 95. and “rasātmakam ca kāvyamiti kutastatrānucityasamsparsaḥ sambhāvyaḥ, yannirāsārthamittam kāvyalakṣaṇamcakṣīran vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ.” VV. p. 126.

writers like Abhinava, Ruyyaka and Jayaratha Bhaṭṭanāyaka recognises superiority of rasa by observing *

vāgdenurdugdha etam he rasam yadbalaṁrsnayā /
tena nāsyā samah sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yah //

(Locana, p 92)

We will have an occasion to study Bhaṭṭanāyaka's position in greater detail, but for the present it will be sufficient to note that Abhinava himself included Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the rasa school by pointing out that he himself recognised rasadhvanī as the soul of poetry—"rasadhvanistu tenaivātmatayāṅgīkṛtaḥ " (Locana, p 52) Ānandavardhana also had no little partiality for rasa. Hence, we shall have to examine more carefully why he is to be relegated to an independent dhvani school in the following pages

The Alamkāra School According to this school the most essential element in kavya is alamkāra (the figures of speech) None of the followers of this school ever called alamkāra the soul of poetry. But the fact that they recognised alamkāra as the most essential element is gathered from an examination of the emphasis they put on alamkāras. They, however, knew about rasa and guṇa, but relegated rasa to a subordinate position by including it as the essential element of some type of alamkāra and they seldom maintained a distinction between guṇa and alamkāra. Compare, Dr. Keith's remarks on Bhāmaha that, 'he has, however, no clear marking line between qualities and figures' ¹⁵ and Ruyyaka's statement "udbhatādibhistu guṇālamkāranām prāyaśah samyameva suṣṭutam " ¹⁶ In the opinion of the followers of the dhvani school - guṇas may occur only in relation to the rasa. But the followers of the alamkāra school put guṇas at par with the figures by conceiving them without any invariable relation with rasas. Bhāmaha (7th c. A D) was the pioneer of the alamkāra school. His partiality for the alamkāras is evidenced by the

statement—"Its (kāvya's) adornment like Rūpaka and others is propounded by others in several ways. Even the charming face of a damsel does not shine stripped of ornament."¹⁷ His partiality for alaṃkāra is further betrayed by the fact that "he insists that there is a common element in all poetry, Vak-rokti (i. e. figurative speech), while he denies, accordingly, to Svabhāvokti the right to be styled a figure at all."¹⁸ But it requires to be very carefully noted here that, Bhāmaha recognises rasa and instructs that the Mahākāvya embodies the different rasas.¹⁹ In the Ākhyāyikā also he seems to recognise the presence of rasa because of saying that it deals with 'separation of lovers' (vipralambhodayānvitaḥ).²⁰ But what is most interesting is that, in Abhinava's opinion Bhāmaha recognises the association of rasa as the jīvita (life) of kāvya. Vide Locana, p. 401, "vṛttayaḥ kāvyamātrkāḥ iti bruvāṇena muninā rasocitetivṛttasamāśrayaṇopadeśena rasasyaiva jīvitatvamuktam. bhāmahādibhiḥca—

svādukāvyarasonmiśra-vākyārthamupabhuñjate /²¹
prathamālīdhamadhavaḥ pibanti kaṭubheṣajam //
ityādinā rasopayogajīvitaḥ śabdavṛttilakṣaṇo vyavahāra
uktah."

17. ".....na kāntamapi nirbūṣaṁ vibhāti vanitāmukham"
(KL. Bhāmaha, I. 13)

18. Keith, HSL. p. 383.

19. KL. Bhāmaha, I. 21. "yuktam.....rasaiśca sakalaiḥ pṛthak."

20. KL. Bhāmaha, I. 27

21. In the pariśiṣṭa I (Index, p. 2) the Chowkhamba edition referring to Abhinava's quotation reads the verse as given here. But the same edition reads in the body of the text (32) : svādukāvyarasonmiśraṁ śāstramapyupayūñjate. (Even a technical treatise, i. e., śāstra, may be presented when mixed with the sweet sentiment of kāvya). This reading seems to be more appropriate when the verse is read along with the earlier and latter verses. Abhinava possibly had the other reading and conveniently utilised that to strengthen his own doctrine.

MM. Kane begins his account of the alamkāra school with the statement—"The foremost representatives of this school are Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa ; Dandī, Rudraṭa and Pratihārendu-rāja belong to this school." (HSP. Kane, p. CL). Of these writers Udbhaṭa does not give any definition of kāvya. He begins his KSS abruptly with the treatment of alamkāras. He recognises rasas and bhāvas but relegates them to a subordinate position by including them all in the alamkāras—rasavat, preyasvat, ūrjasvat and samāhita. Udbhaṭa holds that rasas like śṛṅgāra are manifested also by their sthāyibhāvas expressly mentioned by name (rasavat... svaśabdasthayaśācārī-vibhāvābhinayāspadam KSS IV 3, p. 52). Thus it appears that Udbhaṭa does not recognise rasa as a state of the mind of the man of taste developing to an unperturbed bliss through the cognition of and rumination on the emotions of the characters. Vivṛṭtikāra very rightly observes that, when the words, expressive of the sthāyibhāvas, are used, they are capable of indicating them generally, but are not powerful enough to develop them as emotional conditions in the mind of the men of taste. If such were the case, relish of all the rasas by the verse śṛṅgārahāsyā, etc., will be an accomplished fact. Cf. "yatra svaśabdastadyācakastadvācakaḥ sāmānyena na tu tada-bhivyaktaḥ śaktaḥ. evam hi śṛṅgārahāsyetyādiślokānnāṭyādiva sakalarasapratīpatīḥ syāt." (KSS. Notes, p. 101). It will be helpful to remember that the author of Vivṛtti, a commentary to KSS, was later than Abhinava and followed the latter in the matter of rasa realisation.

We cannot very happily agree with the observation that, "Rudraṭa must be regarded as a representative of the alamkāra school. Although he knows the rasa theory propounded by Bharata and although he says that kāvya must be endowed with rasa (tasmāt tat kartavyam mahīyasā rasairyuktam / chap. 12. 2) still he looked upon alamkāras as very important " (HSP. Kane, p. LVI) Because, a proper analysis of the contents of Rudraṭa's Kāvyaalamkāra would show that he

should better be ascribed to the rasa school. Rudraṭa declares in the verse 1.4 that kāvya should have rasa to fetch an endless fame for the poet. Compare—

“jvaladujjvalavākprasaraḥ sarasaṁ kurvan mahākaviḥ
kāvyam / sphuṭamākalpamanalpaṁ pratanoti yaśaḥ parasyāpi //

By recognising the arthadoṣa, viz., Virasa, he instructs that the rasas should be delineated in an appropriate manner. (KL. Rudraṭa, XI. 12, 13, 14). He introduces the question as to why kāvya should have rasa again in the chapter XII. He says that, “instructions on caturvarga may be imparted to those who have a taste for rasas in an easy and wholesome manner with the kāvya, whereas they are afraid of the śāstras lacking in rasa.” Compare—

“nanu kāvyena kriyate sarasānāmavagamścaturvarge /
laghu mṛdu ca nirasebhyaste hi trasyanti śāstrebyaḥ //

(XII. 1.)

“Hence, kāvya should be endowed with rasa with all care, otherwise it will be as teasing as the śāstras.”

“tasmāt tat kartavyaṁ yatnena mahīyasā rasairyuktam /
udvejanameteṣāṁ śāstravadevānyathā hi syāt //

(XII. 2.)

Then he proceeds to give an elaborate information regarding the nature and varieties of rasa in as many as four chapters viz. XII, XIII, XIV and XV. Then he introduces the final chapter viz., XVI with the verse :

jagati caturvarga iti khyātir dharmārthakāmamokṣāṇām /
samyaktānabhidhādhyādrasasammiśrāṁ prabandheṣu //

(XVI. 1.)

once again emphasising on the delineation of rasa in kāvya. Another point that we should remember is that unlike most of his compatriots and contemporaries Rudraṭa does not include rasas, etc., in one or the other type of the alaṁkāra. He not only advocates in favour of rasa as indispensable, but also gives it a distinct status by treating it in distinct chapters.

The celebrated commentators Namisādhu has rightly observed [under XII 2, "athalamkāramadhyā eva rasa apī kim noktaḥ / ucyate—kāvyasya hi śabdārthau śarīram / tasya ca vakroktivā-stavādayaḥ kaṭakakundalādaya iva kṛtrimā alamkārah / rasāstu saundaryādaya iva sahaja guṇāḥ iti bhinnastatprakaraṇa-rambhah' (KL Rudrata, p 150) Ruyyaka prior to his general statement that 'according to the earlier rhetoricians alamkāra are the most important element in the kāvyā (tadevamalamkāra eva kāvye pradhānamiti pracyānām matam, AS p 9) observed that 'Rudrata also recognised two varieties of the bhāva alamkāra' (rudratena tu bhavalamkāro dvidhaivoktah, AS p 6) But this statement need not lead us to include Rudrata in the alamkāra school since Ruyyaka's intention here, was to show how the suggested matter of fact (vastu) was included in an alamkāra irrespective of its importance or lack of importance by the earlier rhetorician Rudrata also This was meant to show that Rudrata did not recognise dhvani but not that he did not recognise the importance of rasa

Pratīhārendurāja, author of *Laghu vṛtti*, com to Udbhaṭa's KSS, had a peculiar loyalty for the alamkāra school In fact it will be more precise to recognise him as a bundle of confusions In the capacity of a commentator of Udbhaṭa he had to uphold the cause of the alamkāra school, whereas, in the heart he was a devoted follower of the rasa school This conflict of outlook caused confusion not only of Pratīhārendurāja but also of the modern scholars We have already seen how MM Kane has associated Pratīhārendurāja with the alamkāra school This is because of Pratīhārendurāja's observation that, Udbhaṭa did not discuss the question of dhvani separately because of the fact that the dhvanis may be included in the alamkāras themselves Compare, "nanu yatra kāvye sahrdayahrdayāhlādinah pradhānabhūtasya svaśabdavyapārāśprstatvena pratiyamanākarupasyārthasya sadbhavastatra tathāvidharthabhiḥvyaktihetuh kāvyajīvitabhūtaḥ kaiscit sahrdayair dvanīrnam vyañjakatvabhedaṭma kāvyadharmo'bhūtaḥ sa kasmadīha nopadiṣṭah/ ucyate/ eṣveva-

laṁkāreṣvantarbhāvāt" (KSS, p. 85). This would have been enough to ascribe him to the alaṁkāra school; but, there is a good amount of evidence to prove his devotion to the rasa school and a disguised loyalty for Ānandavardhana. Hence, observe the following points. (1) For Pratiḥarendurāja, the consonants employed in the three types of vṛttis should be helpful for suggesting rasas, compare : "evametāstisro vṛttayo vyākhyātāḥ/ tāsu ca rasādyabhivyaktyānugūṇyena prṭhak prṭhaganuprāso nibadhyate." (KSS, p. 6). This interpretation of kārīkā 1/7 of KSS, (which does not have any reference to rasa) seems to be much after the heart of Ānandavardhana, since we can safely compare Pratiḥarendurāja's quoted vṛtti with Ānanda's kārīkā :

rasādyānugūṇatvena vyavahāro'rtha śabdayoḥ/
aucityavānyastā etā vṛttayo dvidhāḥ sthitāḥ // (Dhv 3/33)

(2) There is enough evidence to show that Pratiḥarendurāja has been much charmed by Ānanda's theory. For we see Pratiḥarendurāja actually declaring once that rasa is the soul of poetry although it was never warranted by the text commented on by him. cf. 'na khalu kāvyasya rasānām cālaṁkāryālaṁkārabhāvaḥ kintvātma-śarīrabhāvaḥ/ rasā hi kāvyasyātmātenāvasthitāḥ śabdārthau ca śarīrarūpatayā/ (KSS, p. 83). Because of this conviction Pratiḥarendurāja finds much difficulty in compromising with the conception of the alaṁkāra rasavat. If rasa is the soul of kāvyā, then why should rasa be counted as an alaṁkāra (embellishment) in case of rasavat ? He gives the reply to himself that in time of calling rasa alaṁkāra this aspect of rasa was not intended to be referred to. cf. 'yattu rasādīnām pūrvamālaṁkāratvamuktaṁ tadevamvidhabhedāvivaksayā' (KSS, p. 83). But evidently it has never been the intention of Udbhaṭa to recognise rasa as the soul of poetry. Only Pratiḥarendurāja, being under the overwhelming influence of Ānanda could not help cherishing rasa as the soul of poetry and consequently he had a face conflict of ideas as evidenced above. The learned

editor of KSS rightly observes on the line "yattu rāsādīnām", etc., "But this, after all, is a meagre satisfaction and it shows the more clearly that Udbhaṭa did not know or atleast did not accept the theory that rasa was the soul of poetry" (KSS Notes p 159)

Discussing about the suggested sense in the verse 'cakrābhīghāta' etc., an illustration of paryāyokta, Pratīharendurāja says that the pratiyamāna, i.e., suggested vastu does not render the piece a dhvani, since the suggested vastu is an embellishment to the express sense which is rendered charming by it. Then he finally concludes that the suggested vastu is decidedly subordinate to the vira rasa with relation to Vāsudeva. But, as regards the position of the suggested rasa itself he is silent and he seems to admit that very rasa as the soul of kavya (cf. ato'trāpi pratiyamānasya satyapi pradhānatve svagunabhūta-vacyasaundarya sādhanakata-matvādālamkāravapadeśo na virudhyate/yadi vā bhāgavad-vāsudevavartitayā yo'sau virarasovagamya tadapeksayā tasya mukhyayaiva vṛtyā gunabhūtadvādālamkāratā / KSS p 86). Thus Pratīharendurāja sufficiently betrays his weakness towards the dhvani theory newly and very admirably propounded by Ānandavardhana, who was anterior to him.

MM. Kane is not prepared to identify Pratīharendurāja, the author of Laghuvṛtti with Bhaṭṭendurāja, Abhinava's teacher. Narayana Daso Banhatti, on the other hand, advocates the identity of the two authors (vide, KSS Intr. pp XXV-XXVIII). Among other arguments, MM. Kane observes "We do not know the parentage of the latter (Pratīharendurāja). But we know this that the latter did not approve of the theory of dhvani and included dhvanikāvya under ālamkāras, while Bhaṭṭendurāja seems to have approved of it and explained the Dhvanyāloka to Abhinavagupta" (HSP, Kane, p LXX). But our observation as to Pratīharendurāja's weakness for the dhvani theory shows that there was hardly any improbability in Pratīharendurāja's explaining the Dhvanyāloka in the

capacity of Abhinava's teacher, although, he had occasions to observe that Udbhaṭa included dhvani in alaṅkāras in the capacity of Udbhaṭa's commentator.

The Rīti School : The chief exponent of this school was Vāmana (c. 800 A.D.).²² According to Vāmana the soul of poetry is style (rīti), 'which is a specified arrangement of words, the term specified referring to distinction according to the qualities possessed which are the cause of charm in poetry, while the figures are ranged as things which add to the charm.'²³ Vāmana's own words in the KSV are :

rītirātmā kāvyasya (1. 2. 6),
 viśiṣṭapadaracanā rītiḥ (1. 2. 7.),
 viśeṣo guṇātmā (1. 2. 8),
 kāvyasobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ (3. 1. 1.),
 tadatiśayahetavastvalaṅkārah (3. 1. 2),

guṇanirvṛtyā kāvyasobhā/tasyāśca atiśayahetavo'laṅkārah / (beginning of 4. 1.). Daṇḍin (c. 750 A. D.)²⁴, who used the term mārga for rīti, also was to some extent an exponent of the rīti school.²⁵ Daṇḍin did not specifically mention rīti as the soul of poetry, but recognised the ten guṇas as the vitals of the vaidarbhī mārga (iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāṇā daśaguṇā smṛtāḥ. KD. 1.42). Thus Daṇḍin also deserves with Vāmana, the credit of probing deeper into the essential element (soul or ātman) of poetry. The guṇas were recognised also by Bharata. But the definitions of the individual guṇas varied from writer to writer.

Vāman establishes the essential nature of the guṇas by saying that "kāvyā is appreciated because of embellishment" (kāvyam grāhyamalaṅkārat 1. 1. 1) and "embellishment is another name for charm" (saundaryam alaṅkārah 1. 1. 2). "The guṇas are the essential cause of charm in poetry" (kāvyasobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ 3. 1. 1.). Vāmana

22. HSL, Keith, p. 381.

23. Ibid.

24. HSP. Kane, XXVII.

25. Ibid, p. XXI.

recognises *rasa* also. *Kānti*, as one of the qualities of sense, is defined as the quality of having a prominent *rasa*. (*diptarasatvam kāntih* 3 2 15. *diptā rasāḥ śṅgārādiyo yasya sa diptarasaḥ tasya bhāvo diptarasatvam kāntih*) Vāmana also recognised some amount of suggested *vastu* in the *alamkāra* called *vakrokti* (KSV 3. 48) In KD 1 93 and 1 94 we find the definition of the *saṁādhi* *guna* and an example which is almost similar to Vāmana's definition of *vakrokti* and contains a suggested matter of fact. Thus both the prominent exponents of the *rīti* school recognised the presence of the two types of suggested sense (viz *rasa* and matter of fact, i.e., *vastu*)²⁶ and had room for them in their scheme. Hence, Ānandavardhana observes that the exponents of the *rīti* school had to promulgate the *rīti* theory as a result of their attempt to explain the essentials of the *dhvani* theory which they vaguely understood. (Dhv. III 46 and HSP Kane, p CLIII and compare *vāmanena tu sādṛśyanibandhanāyā laksanāyā vakroktyalamkāratvam bruvatā kaściddhvanibhedo'lamkāratayavoktaḥ*, AS. pp 8-9) But, there is one technical defect with Vāmana's theory that he recognises *rīti* in general as the soul of poetry, whereas, of the three kinds of *rīti*, viz, *Vaidarbhī*, *Gaudī* and *Pāñcālī*, the *Vaidarbhī* is strongly insisted on, the other two disparaged. Ānandavardhana, the chief exponent of the *dhvani* theory was possibly influenced by Bhāmaha, in recognising only three *gunas*. Of the later writers Mammaṭa, a devoted follower of the *dhvani* school, shows, how the twenty *gunas* (i.e. ten *gunas* of sense and ten *gunas* of word) may be reduced to only three and a *guna* like *saṁatā* of Vāmana is in fact a fault of *kāvya*. Whatever be the fate of the *rīti* school in later times and whatever be Ānand's attitude towards Vāmana, there can be no gain saying of the fact that

26. The third variety of the suggested sense viz, *alamkāra* is also in fact a *vastu*, i.e., matter of fact, but the only distinction is that the former is more imaginary.

Vāmana also contributed largely to the origin of the dhvani theory in the hand of Ānandavardhana.

The Dhvani School: The founder of this school was Ānandavardhana, the author of Dhvanyāloka. Ānandavardhana, belonged to the court of king Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. C.). "This date agrees well with what we know from other sources. He quotes Udbhaṭa and so is later than 800 A. C. ; while he is quoted by Rājasekhara (about 900 A. C.). Therefore the period of his literary activity would lie between 840-870 A. C."²⁷ In the Dhvanyāloka for the first time we hear the word dhvani used in a technical sense of "a particular type of poetry." Amarasimha, who is definitely earlier than 700 A. C.,²⁸ reads the word dhvani twice and gives the meaning as sound. (cf. śabde nināda ninada dhvani dhvāna, etc., p. 45 and, dhvanau ta madhurāspṛṣṭe kalo, p. 47 in Amarkośa). According to Ānandavardhana's theory, the words can convey also a suggested meaning in addition to their conventional primary meaning. In the domain of poetry the suggested meaning occurs in three forms, viz., vastumātra (mere matter of fact), alaṃkāra (figures of speech) and rasādi (rasa and other such mental states). A composition where a suggested sense predominates is called dhvani. In other words, the suggestive aspect of poetry is called dhvani. This suggestive aspect of poetry is its very soul in so far as all ideal compositions embody a predominant suggested sense. Of the three types of the suggested sense the rasādi type is considered to be the best and the very propriety of the guṇas and alaṃkāras and other such elements depend on their assistance to suggest the rasādi variety of the suggested sense. The theory also attributes new meanings to the guṇas and ritis and the alaṃkāras like rasavat of the earlier theorists.

For explaining the phenomenon of the words conveying the suggested sense Ānandavardhana introduces a new func-

27. HSP. Kane, p. LXVIII.

28. HSL, Keith, p. 413.

tion of the words called *vyañjanā* in-addition to the *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā* of the earlier theorists. For defending his novel view Ānanda seeks an analogy of the *vyañjanā* function with the *spṛṣṭa* theory of the grammarians. The conception of *vyañjanā* was already there, but it is discovered in the domain of language for the first time by the *dhvani* theory.

The *dhvani* theory has been propounded for the first time in the *Dhvanyāloka*, which 'is an epoch-making work in the history of *alamkāra* literature' because of a very intelligent analysis of the suggestive potentiality of the language and particularly because of helping development of a new outlook of the poets in respect of the content of their composition. As it is very rightly observed by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy in his preface to the English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, the *dhvani* theory had been promulgated at a day when the Sanskrit literature has already been subject to a tendency towards decadence and a moribund literary acrobatic to produce more and more crude figures of speech relegating the most appealing and essential element of poetry, viz., *rasādi* to an insignificant position. Ānanda, by laying greatest emphasis on the suggested sense and particularly the *rasādi* variety tried to rejuvenate the decaying genius of the days of Valmiki and Kālidāsa and to give a new fillip to the creative impulse of the Indian poets.

The *Dhvanyāloka* has been commented on by the great Kashmirian scholar philosopher Abhinavagupta whose literary activity falls between 990 A. C. and 1020 A. C. (HSP. Kane, p. LXXI). This commentary is known as *Locana* and Abhinava himself informs us of another commentary named 'Candrika' the author of which belonged to the same family as that of Abhinava.²⁹ By now the *Dhvanyāloka* has been issued in several Indian and foreign editions, some of them

²⁹ For more informations about *Candrikākṛa* vide HSP, Kane, p. LXXI

also bearing new commentaries. Of the Indian editions the more important ones may be indicated as follows :

(1) The editio princeps of the text with the commentary of Abhinava, edited by Pt. Durgāprasāda, NSP, 1891.

(2) Chowkhamba Edition with a modern commentary by Badarīnātha. (1937).

(3) Kāshī Sanskrit Series Edition with Locana and Balapriyā (1940) edited by Pt. Paṭṭābhirāma Shāstrī.

(4) The Calcutta Sanskrit Series Edition (No 25. B) with a modern commentary by Madhusūdana Miśra (1931), edited by Prof. Narendra Chandra Bhattacharya Vedāntatīrtha.

(5) The first chapter only with Locana and Kaumudī Commentaries and Upalocana on Locana by MM. Kuppuswami Shastri, issued by K. S. R. Institute, Madras (1940).

(6) First two chapters (in 2 vol. s) with English exposition by Prof. Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Calcutta (1956-57).

The Dhvanyāloka is divided into four chapters, called uddhyotas. From another angle of view it may be divided into two portions, viz., the kārikās (main verses, which are serially numbered) and a running vṛtti (commentary) on it. The vṛtti consists of prose explanation of the kārikās, illustrative verses and some more verses which are not numbered like the kārikās nor explained by the prose vṛtti, nor meant for illustration but for summarisation of the deliberations of the vṛtti or for supplementing the view expressed in a kārikā. These are sometimes called parikarāślokas, sometimes saṁgrah-ślokas and sometimes saṁkṣepaślokas.

The authorship of the Dhvanyāloka : There is no division of opinion as regards the fact that Ānanda was the author of the prose vṛtti with illustrations. But Dr. De believes that the kārikās were composed by an earlier kārikākāra, whose kārikās were explained by Ānanda with the prose vṛtti. He further believes that the saṁgraha, parikara and saṁkṣepaślokas were also composed by a scholastic tradition earlier to Ānanda, and

the latter simply incorporated them into his own work. For the sake of convenience let me quote a few lines from HSP De vol I p 114. "If, on the other hand, we place the Dhvanikāra in the time of Kāḥana's Manoratha, this would only leave a bare margin of two generations between the Kārikākāra and Vrttikāra, which does not seem to be enough to make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the former, of which undoubted traces are preserved to us in the few memorial verses—parikaraśloka (pp 34, 130, 137, 147, 163)³⁰ saṁgrahaśloka (pp 87, 223) samkṣepaśloka (pp 44, 74, 243)—incorporated by Ānanda in his vṛtti, which itself, therefore, is not likely to be the first of its kind. These śloka are a sort of recapitulation-stanzas which are adduced by the Vrttikāra from unknown sources sometimes to explain the meaning of kārīka but more often to amplify and supplement them."

Author of the parikaraśloka etc. Now, my contention is that the so called memorial verses were also composed by Ānanda, the unquestionable author of the vṛtti himself. My arguments are as follows:

(1) Abhinava is very particular about the distinction, be it numerical or formal or functional between Kārikākāra and the Vrttikāra, as will be shown below. But he is silent about the distinction in the authorship of the prose vṛtti and the memorial verses.

(2) When occasion arises, Ānanda does not fail to name the predecessor. Thus, for example, he names Bhāmaha in p 119. Even when Ānanda simply refers to a predecessor as 'anya' as in p 26, 'tathā cānyena kṛta evatra ślokaḥ yasmin naṣṭi na vastu' etc., Abhinava is prompt enough to name the predecessor (cf granthakṛtsamānakalabhāvinā manoratha nāmnā kavina)

30 Here the references are to the Kāvyaśāstra edition 1891, 1911

(3) When in p. 107. Ānanda presents a parikaraśloka saying “parikaraślokaścātra-vyaṅgyavyaṅjakasambandha,” etc., Abhinava remains silent about the author, but simply comments “parikarārtham kārīkārthasyādhikāvāpam kartum ślokaḥ parikaraślokaḥ.”

Again in p. 192, Ānanda says “tadayamatra saṁkṣepaḥ” and introduces three saṁkṣepaślokas. Abhinava comments there “tatra sarvatra sādharmaṇamuttaram dātumupakramate-tadayamatreti” which rather implies an identity in authorship.

(4) From the comments or absence of any comment by Abhinava it seems to be clear that parikaraśloka is given by the Vṛttikāra to tell something with the force of a kārīkā, a saṁkṣepaśloka is meant as a brief summary of a longer argument in prose, and the saṁgrahaśloka³¹ are systematic recapitulation of the views expressed in the prose vṛtti.

(5) The saṁgrahaślokas, or saṁkṣepaślokas or even the parikaraślokas need not necessarily imply an author different from the Vṛttikāra, inasmuch as we have instances of the Vṛttikāra himself composing the saṁgrahaślokas elsewhere. The verses occurring in the text of the Vyaktiviveka, by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who belonged to the middle of the 11th century A. D.³², are mostly named as saṁgrahaślokas or āntaraślokas or āntarāryās. Should we suppose the Vyaktiviveka also to have been composed by more than one author? If not, what is the propriety in taking a different stand in case of the Dhvanyāloka?

(6) The only apparent reason which led the learned Doctor to imagine authors other than the Vṛttikāra for saṁgrahaślokas, etc., is the hypothesis that the kārīkās were composed by a fictitious Kārīkākāra, who is supposed to have

31. It will be interesting to find the terms kārīkā and saṁgraha defined in the Nāṭyaśāstra also. Vide, NŚ (VI/9, 11) and NŚ (Trans.) p. 101.

32. I. Aesthetics, p. 271

flourished two generations earlier than Ānanda. A scholastic tradition, in the form of the composition of the samgrahaślokaś, etc., by several unknown writers, is supposed to have been there to fill up the gap of two generations. But it will be presently shown that the said hypothesis is not secure and the consequent theory of unknown authorship for the samgrahaślokaś, etc., also fails along with the theory of a different Kārikakara.

(7) Moreover, a careful study of the parikaraślokaś, etc., would show, that a good number of the vital aspects of the dhvani theory are revealed by them. Under such circumstances how could Ānanda claim the entire credit of revealing the theory for the first time? (cf. *vṛtti* pp. 35-38, "tāsyā hi dhvaneh svarūpaṁ . sahrdayānāmānando manasi labhatām prati-
sthāmīti prakāśyate," also *Locana* p. 41, 'Ānanda itī ca gran-
thakṛto nāma,' etc., and also the last verse of *Uddyota* IV by Ānanda and *Locana* thereon). If there were earlier thinkers and also makers of the theory in part, why should then Abhinava, the learned commentator, give the unquestionable appellation of Śāstrakara to Ānanda alone?

(8) Dr. De, further argues that 'in course of time the Kārikākara receded to the background, completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder, and people considered as the Dhvanikāra not the author of the few memorial verses but the commentator Ānandavardhana himself who for the first time fixed the theory in its present form.' This quotation has a connection with the question of the parikaraślokaś, etc. In the said quotation it is observed that in course of time people forgot about the Kārikākara but why should Ānanda himself have forgotten his entity? As the definition of a parikaraśloka, given by Abhinava (*Locana* p. 107), would show, these verses, supposed to have been taken by Ānanda from unknown sources, were later in time than the kārīkās. It is simply unbelievable that the name of the Kārikākara and the names of the supposed unknown authors

of the parikaraślokaś, etc., were all forgotten by or unknown to Ānanda. We also cannot believe that, Abhinava, who had a family tradition of studying the Dhvanyāloka and a line of preceptors (guruparamparā), knew nothing of the authors of the kārīkāś and the parikaraślokaś, etc., if there were really any such authors.

Kārīkākāra and Vṛttikāra : The most fascinating of the problems related with the authorship of Dhvanyāloka is about the distinction between the Kārīkākāra and the Vṛttikāra. This problem has given rise to a good deal of controversy among the leading Sanskritist Scholars during the last sixty years or more. Dr. Buhler (Kashmir Report p. 65) and the learned editors of the Kāvya-mālā edition of the Dhvanyāloka conjecture that the kārīkāś have been written by some one different from Ānanda, the author of the vṛtti. A large group of scholars consisting of Prof. Jacobi,³³ Prof. Keith,³⁴ Dr. De,³⁵ MM. Kane,³⁶ Mr. Sovani,³⁷ etc., supported this contention and the last went to the extent of propounding that Sahṛdaya was the name of the author of the kārīkāś. But another group of scholars consisting of Dr. A. Sankaran,³⁸ Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy,³⁹ Dr. S. K. Mookerjee,⁴⁰ Raniero Gnoli,⁴¹ etc., opposed the view of the former school and advocated in favour of a numerical identity of the Kārīkākāra and Vṛttikāra.

33. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.

34. HSL. p. 386.

35. HSP. De. Vol. I. chap. IX.

36. HSP. Kane. pp. 152-190 etc.

37. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1910. pp. 165-67.

38. TRD. pp. 50-60.

39. Authorship of Dhvanyāloka. Indian Historical Quarterly, XXXIV/3 & 4 ; Dhv. Trans. Preface, p. XVII.

40. B. C. Law. Vol. Part-I. pp. 179-194.

41. East & West. (Journal of the Is. M. E. O., Rome) Year VI, No. 4, Jan. 1956. pp. 203-94.

{ Few arguments in favour of identity If I enter into a fresh discussion of the views for and against the theory of identity of the authors of the vṛtti portion and the kārīkā portion, that would merely be a boring repetition Yet, I cannot resist the temptation to present a few arguments which may not be quite insufficient to show the identity of the Vṛtti kāra and Kārīkākāra This labour will not be fruitless, for, if we be sure of the authorship of the different parts of the Dhv, there will be less of confusion in interpreting and understanding the intriguing portions of it

(a) Tradition records the name of Ānanda alone as the author of the Dhvanyāloka MM Kane says on p LXIII, 'I feel inclined to hold (though with hesitation) that the Locana is right and that Pratihārendurāja, Mahimabhaṭṭa Kṣemendra and others had not the correct tradition before them' I also feel inclined to add here that it could have been likely on the part of Mahimabhaṭṭa and Ksemendra to have a wrong tradition before them as they were still later than Abhinava in time But Pratihārendurāja—who was none other than the preceptor of Abhinava in my opinion and who was contemporary to the latter in the opinion of MM Kane—must have had the more correct tradition being anterior to Abhinava and nearer to the author (or authors) of the Dhvanyāloka

(b) It is simply unbelievable that people totally forgot about the distinct Dhvanikāra (HSP De Vol I p 109), when even as early a writer as Bhāsa lives in so many references

(c) The name Sahrdaya for the so-called Dhvanikāra suggested by Mr Sovani, is simply fictitious inasmuch as Ānandavardhana himself is called —sahrdayacakravartī by Abhinava (Locana, p 41)

(d) On p 259 of Dhv vṛtti says 'iyatpunarucyata eva, then follows the kārīkā II/27, alamkāṛāntarasyāpi etc Abhinava supplies the corrective to the vṛtti as '—iyaditi / asmābhiriti

vākyaśeṣaḥ". 'asmābhiḥ' joined with the 'ucyate' occurring in the vṛtti, spoken by the Vṛttikāra means—by us (or by me, the bahubacana being in the sense of gaurava) it (the following kārīkā) is said. This implies, on the strength of the corrective of the Locana itself, an identity of the Vṛttikāra with the Kārīkākāra.

(e) In TRD. p. 51., Dr. A. Sankaran quotes a reference of Abhinava to Ānanda as "etadevopajIvyānandavardhanācār-yenoktaṁ suptiṇvacanetyādi (Abh. bh. Vol. II. chap. XIV. p. 367)". This 'suptiṇvacana' begins a kārīkā of the Dhv. III-16, (p. 347) and nowhere in the vṛtti of that work does this expression occur. Now the same Abhinava, who is relied upon to establish the difference between Kārīkākāra and Vṛttikāra, unmistakably assigns the authorship of the kārīkā to Ānanda.

(f) It seems that in the capacity of the commentator to Dhv. Abhinava had to draw the distinction between the Kārīkākāra and had to justify a case which seemed apparently to be an utsūtravyākhyāna (p. 165. Banaras edn.); but as a commentator of the N Ś., free from the capacity of the commentator of the Dhv., he did not hesitate to attribute the said kārīkā to Ānanda, who was known to Abhinava as the real author of the kārīkā portion also.

(g) In "mayā vṛttikāreṇa satā" of Locana the word 'satā' is redundant unless it implies the otherwise numerical identity to the Kārīkākāra and Vṛttikāra (Dhv. p. 165).

(h) Abhinava, no doubt, distinguishes between the Kārīkākāra, and that is a formal distinction, but, he nowhere distinguishes the Kārīkākāra (or Dhvanikāra or Shṛdaya) from Ānandavardhana.

(i) In the learned opinion of Abhinava, Ānanda is the śāstrakāra; it is simply unbelievable that Abhinava means only the vṛtti portion by the terms śāstra.

(j) Under kārīkā II. 5. Vṛttikāra saying '.....māmakīnaḥ pakṣaḥ' seems to identify himself with the Kārīkākāra. But

this is not a sure case of identification inasmuch as in the *kārikā* itself the expression 'me matih' occurs. So, to take a surer case, I refer to the *vr̥tti* on *kārikā* II/21 saying " . *dhvanirityasmakam vivakṣitam* ' Dr De conjectures Kuntaka alone to be the author of both the *kārikās* and the *vr̥tti* of *Vakroktijivita* on almost similar grounds (Vide, VJ D- intr p VI)

In this way arguments may be multiplied to as many numbers to show that Ānanda was the author of the entire *Dhva-nyaloka* consisting of the *kārikās*, *vr̥tti* and the *parikarāśloka*s, etc

Fourth-uddiyota-*kārikās* are not apocryphal. Strangely enough some scholars are suspicious in respect of the genuineness of some of the *karikas*. Prof Siva prasad Bhattacharyya who believes the *karikās* not to have been composed by Ānanda himself says in the article 'Dhvanyaloka and the text of the *Dhvanikarikas*' (Proceedings of the sixth Oriental conference, p 621)—"It appears to us that the entire fourth uddyota is more likely than not an apocryphal work so far as the Original *Dhvanikarikas* are concerned' I have gathered this peculiar view of Prof S Bhattacharyya from a quotation in the 'Dhv of Ānanda' by Prof B P Bhattacharyya, Intro p XXVII As it appears to me from the extract Prof S P Bhattacharyya believes that Ānanda, who is in his opinion distinct from the genuine *Karikākāra*, is responsible for the interpolations. And he remarks "Ānanda has tried to escape detection by explaining the words in the *kārikās* in the *vr̥tti* following, exactly as if they are other's compositions in the manner as we find illustrated e g in the *Vakroktijivita* " But I am sure that any body studying all the uddyota carefully and with a critical eye, would hardly find any difference in Ānanda's manner of explaining the words of the *karikas* in the *vr̥tti*. Instead of maintaining a difference as the *Vrttikāra* from *Kārikākāra*, he shows signs of identity. Example 1, Vide *vr̥tti* on p 527, *taduttham rasabhā vādyāśrayena*, etc, followed by the *karika*, *dr̥ṣṭapūrvā apī hya-*

rthā etc. (Dhv. IV. 4), followed by no word for word commentary, but only illustrations. This is a deviation from the usual way of the vṛtti and is tending more to show an identity of the Kārikākāra with the Vṛttikāra. Example 2. Vide vṛtti on p. 529 “tattu granthavistarabhayānnalikhyate svayameva saḥṛdayairabhuyam atra ca punaḥpunaruktamapi sāratayedamucyate—vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvesmin, etc. (kārīkā No. IV. 5).” Taking into consideration “na likhyate” and ‘idamucyate’ directly connected with the following kārīkā, we become more convinced of the identity of the Vṛttikāra and Kārikākāra. When there is no difference between Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra, when Ānanda is the author of both the portions, when Ānanda is genuine, then the question of interpolation and Ānanda’s conceit does not arise. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharyya points out another evidence that the fourth uddyota kārīkās are in varied and novel chandas ; hence, these are not by the same Kārikākāra, but interpolated by Ānanda. My argument against this view is that Ānanda is the author of the whole Dhv. If the introductory kārīkā could be in Mandākrāntā chanda, then what is the harm in Ānanda’s (who is a poet himself) taking to Mālīnī, Rathoddhatā, and Śikharīṇī in the fourth uddyota ? Just as the introductory kārīkā is introductory the fourth uddyota is also the concluding uddyota. Hence the distinct feature of it.

By now we are on firmer ground to take the whole of the Dhvanyāloka to have been composed by one single author, namely Ānandavardhana. Hence, we need not be accused of using the kārīkā and the vṛtti together, like Wilson who has been accused by Hall of “using together the Daśarūpa and its exposition.”⁴² There is reason to believe that before propounding the theory of dhvani in the said book Ānandavardhana had discussions about the same with the contemporary scholars, some of whom did not approve of it. After the composition

42. Bhavabhūti and his place in Sanskrit Literature, p. 15.

was out, the theory was strongly opposed by the theorists like Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa. But the arguments of such rivals were either too weak and faulty or hushed up by stronger criticism of the followers of the dhvani school and the theory had a long line of robust supporters like Abhinava, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha who accepted the theory with slight modifications and advocated for it with the greatest zeal. In the following pages we will see how the theory of Ānanda influenced the later writers and why the modification had to be incorporated in

Antiquity of the theory : From Dhv. kārikā I 1, it is gathered that the doctrine 'dhvani is the soul of kāvya' was introduced by the learned persons in an unbroken tradition, although the same has not been written in a definite textbook before the Dhvanyāloka. In this respect we are enlightened by Abhinava who says "avicchinnen pravāhena tairtaduktam vināpi viśiṣṭapustakesu viniveśanādityabhīprāyah" (p 11) But, I doubt if the vṛtti actually means to say this. In my opinion Budhah (kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ) means the great poets who flourished in a paramparā, i.e., avicchinnapravāhah, who knew (i.e., recognised) the essential element in a kāvya, the very soul of a kāvya so to say, now termed as dhvani by Ānanda for the first time (kāvyasyatma dhvaniriti samjñitah), and duly exhibited it in their compositions (prakaṣitah). The vṛtti⁴³ on p 10, must be understood in this way. Otherwise if we follow Abhinava's interpretation, we cannot compromise the same with the vṛtti⁴⁴ on pp 35-38. The word 'budhah' does not mean the theorist on the essence of kāvya, because the traditional theorists are called kavyalakṣanavidhāyins (vṛtti on p 35) whose intel-

43 Paramparayā yā samamnītapūrvā samyak śāmantīd mñītaḥ prakaṣitah

44 "Tasya hi dhvaner svarupam cīrantanakāvyalakṣanavidhāyīnām buddhibhīranunmīlitapūrvam" p 35 'attha ca rāmayanamahābhārataprabhīrtiṃ lokṣye sarvatra prasiddhavyavahāram lakṣyayatam", etc p 38

lect could not reveal the very subtle element of dhvani. Then how can they be supposed to have told about dhvani as the soul of kāvya ? It has not been explained or revealed before Ānanda (anumīlitapūrvam) but it was only exhibited (prakāṣita); and, Ānanda, finding dhvani to have been profusely present in Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, etc., reveals it for the first time to please the men of taste.

Now, in the very body of the kārikā I. 1., he refers to the views of those who opposed the idea of dhvani. Of these some views were apprehended by himself in the manner of Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, and it is quite plausible, that, Ānanda who considers the grammarians as foremost amongst the learned men, read the Mahābhāṣya and was impressed by its mode of arguments. Some views of the opponents are, of course, real. As for instance, Manoratha, who is said to have been a contemporary of Ānanda did not find anything novel in the theory of dhvani and composed a satirical verse addressing only one (not many to give the theory a hoary antiquity) advocate of dhvani as jaḍa, “yasminnasti na vastu.....dhvaneḥ,” Dhv. pp. 26-27. The verse of Manoratha certainly had Ānanda alone as the object of aspersion. The view “bhāktamāhustamanye”, at least, is imagined on the basis of earlier theories (cf. vṛtti pp. 21-32. yadyapi.....parikalpyaivamuktaim ‘bhāktamāhustamanye’ iti). But the expressions (a) kecidācākṣīraṇ (p. 16), (b) bhāktāmāhuḥ (p. 28), (c) saḥṛdayaḥṛdayasamvedyameva samākh-yātavantah (p. 33), (d) and the reference to Manoratha (p. 26) need not necessarily mean that the theory was current for a pretty long time among the budhas—and the opponents also formed their adverse opinion against the views of the budhas, advocating for the dhvani theory, flourishing long before Ānanda. Because, Ānanda was a poet and critic of the later half of the ninth century in Kashmir. He wrote in addition to Dhvanyāloka, Devīśataka, Viṣamayāṇalīlā, Arjunacārīta, and Tattvāloka. The scholar certainly had an association

with a learned circle and when he expressed his ideas about dhvani before starting to write the Dhv, he was very likely to get a rebuff from the contemporaries like Manoratha.⁴⁵ And

45. Identification of Manoratha has presented a problem to scholars like Dr. De. Abhinava says that Manoratha was a poet contemporaneous with the grāthakrt. As informed by Kalhana in Rājataranginī (IV. 497 and IV. 671 HSP De Vol I. p 112) Manoratha was associated with kings Jayāpīḍa and Lalitāpīḍa of Kashmir between C. 780 and 831 A D Ānandavardhana is associated with king Avantivarman of Kashmir who ruled between C 855 and 884 A D , by the following reference

*Mukṣikanah śvasāmi kavirānandavardhanah /

Prathām ratnākarasāgāt śimrājye'vantivarmanah //

(Rājataranginī V 34. as in KSS. Int. p X)

On the strength of Kalhana's reference, Ānanda is placed between C 855 and 884. and Manoratha is placed between C 780 and 831. Thus it appears to Dr De, that, Kalhana's Manoratha cannot be the same as one referred to as contemporaneous with Ānanda by Abhinava. Again in the opinion of Dr De grāthakrt cannot mean the Kārikākāra, supposed to be different from and earlier than Ānanda by them, also. So, Dr De. concludes that Manoratha referred to by Abhinava is later than and different from Kalhana's Manoratha.

In my opinion there is no difficulty in understanding Kalhana's as Manoratha contemporaneous with Ānanda. Kalhana's Manoratha was a poet. Possibly he supported some pre-dhvanī school of poetics. We do not know when the literary career of this Manoratha came to an end. We simply gather that he avoided the company of the voluptuary Lalitāpīḍa. (mānī manoratho mantri param parijahāra tam, IV 671). Hence it is very likely that he continued to live for a still longer period of time. MM. Kane also thinks that since this Manoratha should have seen the kārikās for a strong criticism 'kārikās were composed between 800-825' (HSP. Kane. p 189). Hence it is clear that Manoratha flourished at least up to 825. Now, Ānanda is said to have 'attained fame' in the time of Avantivarman. (prathām agāt). Hence, in order to attain fame by 855 A. D , Ānanda must have begun his literary activity much earlier.

starting confidently to write his own work, with the mirth of triumph, he refers to the views of all his contemporary opponents.

But Ānanda's statement "tathaivānyaistanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvyatattvārthadarśibhīrvācyavācakasammiśraḥ..... dhvanirityuktaḥ" (vṛtti, pp. 133-135) seems to go against my views expressed above because of the 'plural sūribhiḥ and the past participle uktaḥ' (Vide, TRD. p. 61). Yet I have a humble say. As gathered from the vṛtti. pp. 132-135, 'sūribhiḥ,' here refers to the grammarians and the kāvyatattvavits of the vṛtti on kārīkā, 1. Now 'dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ' means 'grammarians called dhvani and the poeticians also called dhvani. But, inasmuch as the grammarians called only the varṇas

We may suppose that he wrote the Dhv. some 20 years earlier in about 835 and in the earlier 10 years or more, in the twenties of that century he had occasions to discuss about the dhvani theory with senior contemporaries like Manoratha.

It is Ānanda who referred to Manoratha as 'any.' (cf. vṛtti. p. 26). But, he did so only by way of illustrating the view of the abhāvavādins. (vide vṛtti pp. 12, 13, tadabhāvavādināṃ cāmī vikalpāḥ sambhavanti). And the Kārīkākāra (whoever he might not be) himself had the abhāvavādins in mind. (Kārīkā I. 1.). As I hold that Ānanda himself was the Kārīkākāra, we need not think that, the kārīkāś themselves were composed in the time of Manoratha. Even if the Kārīkākāra is taken as completely distinct from Ānanda, he does not himself make any reference to Manoratha in his kārīkā to show a contemporaneity with Manoratha. And the conjecture of Dr. De is unwarranted since Kalhana's Manoratha himself can be supposed as a senior contemporary of Ānanda. Moreover, Ānanda's manner of referring to Manoratha as 'anyā' also shows that possibly he had bitter occasions of arguments with the former on dhvani Udbhaṭa, the author of KSS, who is said to have been the sabhāpati of Jayāpīḍa (Rājatarāṅgīni, IV, 495) also, need not be taken as a contemporary of Ānanda, inasmuch as he is not associated by Kalhana with Lalitāpīḍa—since he seems to have been already too old and venerable to get a lac of diṇāra every day in time of Jayāpīḍa.

as dhvani and they did not recognise any dhvani in kāvya, the support received by Ānanda in propounding the dhvani theory is only to the extent of an analogy, or at best, he finds the anticipation of the vyañjanā vṛtti (resident in pada, padāṁśa, padārtha, etc) in the vyañjanā function of the varnas recognised by the grammarians. Yet Ānanda declares that the very conception of dhvani is based on the views of the grammarians. (cf. also, pariniścita nirapabhramśa, etc Dhv. vṛtti. p 443) It is very natural that Ānanda who seeks the support of the grammarians for the sake of dignity of his theory, would also try to associate the theory with a great antiquity. That is why he uses 'sūribhiḥ' to give the abrupt idea of a large group of scholars talking of dhvani or it can be very well explained as used in bahuvacana in the sense of gaurava. 'Kathitah' is also meant to make the theory look age-long and hence dignified "Tathaiva tanmatānusāribhiḥ" is more an intellectual stunt. It has been the practice of most of the ancient Indian masters to give their own views a tinge of a hoary antiquity by associating them with a long line of teachers or with a mythological origin. For example, the Carakasamhitā recounts a long line of teachers and the kavyamīmāṃsa gives a mythological origin of the sāhityavidyā. This "sūribhiḥ kathitah" must not be accepted in its face value as we have no scientific evidence of the term dhvani being used for kāvya even for once before the Dhv., and it must be supposed as simply justifying Kalluka's remark 'prāyena hi ācāryānam iyaṁ śailī yat svābhīprāyamapi parābhīprāyamivāmananti' (Manu Sam I) Dr. Keith observes that "The Kārikās assert that the doctrine is old, but if so we must assume that it had not won much success, and it may be that the author referred really to some not distant predecessor, justifying himself by the view that the doctrine was implicit in the older writers." (HSL. p 387) We will presently see, in course of discussing the sources of the theory, the justification of Dr. Keith's observation in the portion italicized by me above

Sources of the theory : It is seen above that although the term dhvani was newly introduced to the field of poetics and although Ānanda claims to have propounded the theory of dhvani for the first time, he inherited the fundamental idea from a long series of predecessors : and it will not be fruitless to make an attempt here to trace the theoretical background of Ānanda's ideas.

(1) The most important factor in the dhvani theory is the vyañjanā function of the words and meanings of poetry. Bharata called the phenomenon of the suggestion of the sthāyī-bhāva developing into a rasa vyañjanā, since he used the expression vyañjitān (suggested) in the extract quoted below. 'Vyañjanā,' for Ānanda, precisely means 'revelation.' The analogy of the lamp and the jar is drawn between the suggester and the suggested sense in Dhv. III. (p. 421). Cf. "tasmād ghaṭapradīpanyāyastayoḥ, yathāiva hi pradīpadvāreṇa ghaṭa-pratītvutpannāyām na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate tadvadvyañgya-pratītau vācya-vabhāsaḥ." The analogy implies that, the suggester exhibits its own self while revealing the suggested element. Cf. also "svarūpaṁ prakāśayanneva parāvabhāsako vyañjaka ityucyate" (Vṛtti. p. 431). Ānanda also recognises and demands in strong terms an order in understanding the suggester and the suggested. (Dhv. pp. 405-431. Cf. tasmāda-bhidhānābhidheyapratītyoriva vācya-vyañgya-pratītyornimittanimitti-bhāvānnīyamabhāvaḥ kramāḥ / sa tūktayuktyā kvacillakṣyate kvacinna lakṣyate //) Such a definite meaning of vyañjaka or vyañjanā seems to have been derived from Bharata's own explanation of the sūtra, "vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ," running as—"ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ / atrāha yathā nānā-vyañjanauṣadhidravysaṁyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ tathā nānā-bhāvopagamād rasaniṣpattiḥ // yathā hi guḍādibhirdravayair-vyañjanair-oṣadhibhiḥca.....nānā-bhāvābhinaya-vyañjitān vāgaṅgasattvopetān sthāyībhāvānāsvādayanti sumanasāḥ prekṣakāḥ harṣādīmścādhigacchanti / tasmān-nātyarasā ityabhi-vyākhyātāḥ"

(NS pp 287 289) The sentiment is produced (rasa n spatih) ⁴⁶ Now one enquires, 'What is the meaning of the word rasa?' How is rasa tasted?' (In reply) it is said that just as well disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spices enjoy (āsvadayanti) its tastes (rasa) and attain pleasure and satisfaction so the cultured people taste the Dominant States (sthāyibhāva) while they see them represented⁴⁷, by an expression of the various States with Words Gestures and the Temperament⁴⁸, and derive pleasure and satisfaction Thus is explained (the Memorial Verse ending with) tasmān nātyarasā iti (NS Trans p 105)

It is to be noted here that while Bharata used the term vyañjana only with reference to the suggestion of the sentiments (rasa) Ānanda had also matters of fact (vastu) and imaginary ideas (alamkāras) as suggested (vyañjita) by the words and primary meanings in poetry

(2) Ānanda uses also the terms 'avagamana', 'pratyayana and 'dyotana', etc., in the sense of vyañjana (suggestion) The grammarians also conceived of the upasargas and nipātas as suggestive (dyotaka) The upasargas and nipātas cannot express their own meaning themselves but they reveal the meanings (dyotakā bhavanti) of the expressive words, used side by side, in a special form Cf nāmakhyaṭayostu karmopasamyogadyotakā bhavanti ' (Nirukta, 1 1 4)

46 Although very literally translated as 'produced' here the expression nispatti may have different implications according to different explanations of the sūtra

47 Literally 'suggested' (vyañjita)

48 These three refer to the three types of abhinaya viz vācika āṅgika and sāttvika It may be noted that words gestures and temperaments are directly influenced by the Dominant States whereas the costumes have a remote relation with the Dominant states in the subjects and hence there is no reference to the āhārya type of abhinaya

and “sa eṣa nāmākhyātayorevārthaviśeṣa upasargasam̐yoge satī vyajyate / yathā pradīpa-sam̐yoge dravyasya guṇaviśeṣo-bhivvyajyamāne dravyāśraya eva bhavati, na pradīpāśrayaḥ” // (Durgācārya’s com. on the same). Ānanda does not refer to these dyotaka (suggestive) particles. But, yet, it will not be unjust to believe that Ānanda had these conceptions of the grammarian in his mind in time of promulgating his theory of vyañjanā function of poetry. In this connection we may also compare the following words of Nāgeśa, who points out that the grammarians also have to recognise the vyañjanā function of the ālām̐kārika since it has already been recognised by them in case of the nipātas and the sphoṭa “ata eva nipātānām dyotakatvamākara uktam sphoṭasya ca vyañgyatā haryādibhiruktaiva, dyotaktvaṁ ca samabhivvyāhṛtapada-śakti-vyañjakatvameva iti vaiyākaraṇānāmapyetatsvīkāra āvaśyakaḥ.”⁴⁹.

(3) For designating the suggestive type of kāvya as dhvani Ānanda endeavours to find a sanction in the doctrine of the grammarians. The grammarians do not recognise any suggestive function of the expressive words but they hold that the syllables that we hear suggest an eternal and complete word within the heart of the hearer, which is called sphoṭa and which alone is associated with the meaning. The words that we hear consist of certain evanescent sounds represented by the letters constituting the said word. Such sounds, called srūyamānavarṇas, can never get together to convey the corresponding meaning. What the succeeding sounds (srūyamānavarṇas) do is that they reveal (suggest) the eternal undivided word bit by bit so that by the time the last sound of the word is heard the entire word gets revealed to convey the idea.^{49a}

49. ‘Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañ’Uṣās, p. 156.

yaḥ’ pended to V. Vārttika, pQuoted from the vyañjanānirṇa-

49a. The process of the revelation of the sphoṭa is illustrated by the grammarians by means of various analogies. For these Vide ITM, p. 124.

Thus the *śrūyamanavarnas* which suggest the *sphoṭa* and the *kāvya* have one thing in common and that is their suggestive capacity, i.e., *vyāñjakatva*. These *śrūyamanavarnas* are also called *dhvani* by the grammarians. Compare, “*athavā prati tapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate*” (M B Chowkhamba, p 12) and “*sphoṭaḥ śabdah dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇah*” of Patañjali (quoted in Bhavapradīpa com., VKPD p 67). The relation between *dhvani* (suggestive sound) and *sphoṭa*, as it is conceived by Patañjali, can be very clearly understood from the following lines of the Bhāvapradīpa commentary. Hence, compare, “*etadeva taparasut্রে bhasye uktam—*

dhvaniḥ sphoṭaśca śabdānām dhvaniḥ khalu lakṣyate

alpo mahamśca Kesāmṛidubhayam tatsvabhavataḥ

atra Kaviṭāḥ 'dhvaniḥ sphoṭaśca vyangyo vyañjakaśca sta iti śesah śabdānām vyañyānām sambandhi vyañjako yo dhvaniḥ sa eva mahānalpaśca lokṣyate vyangyastvabhinna kala eva'” (VKPD p 48). Dr K Kunjunni Raja observes that Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* is different from that developed by Bhartrhari in the *Vākyapadīya*^{49b}. But Ānanda is concerned not so much with the nature of *sphoṭa* as he is with the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. Yet while Ānanda's acquaintance with MB can never be ruled out, it is more reasonable to seek in Ānanda's outlook a more direct influence of the *Vākyapadīya*. This conjecture may be warranted also by Bhartrhari's temporal proximity to Ānanda and by the epoch making nature of the *Vākyapadīya*. Bhartrhari calls the *śrūyamānavarna nāda* (VKPD, I 84 p 73). That the *nāda* and the *sphoṭa* also stand in the relation of the suggester and the suggested (*vyangyavyañjakabhāva*) in the theory of Bhartrhari may be gathered from such statements as

grahanagrāhyayoh siddhaḥ niyatā योगyatā yatLa /

vyangyavyañjakabhāvena tathaiḥ sphoṭanādayoh //

(VKPD I p 83)

We may also consider the following points to trace how Bhartṛhari might have contributed to Ānanda's conception of vyañjanā.

1. It is advocated also by Bhartṛhari that the suggested element, viz., sphoṭa (also called śabda) is nitya and that the phenomenon of suggestion is not restricted to the anitya objects alone. (VKPD. I. 95. p. 82)

2. According to Bhartṛhari there is an order (kramanīyama) of realisation of the suggester and the suggested. Compare :

yathānupūrviniyamo vikāre kṣīrabhījayoḥ /

tathaiva pratipattirñām niyato buddhiṣu kramaḥ //

(VKPD. I. 91. p. 79)

That Ānanda also demands this order of realisation in Dhv. pp. 405-413 is already pointed out.

3. A very important factor in the phenomenon of vyañjanā is that the suggester reveals itself along with the suggested. Compare, “vyañjakatvamārge tu yadārtho'rthāntaram dyotayati tadā svarūpaṁ prakāśyannevāsāvanyasya prakāśakaḥ pratiyate pradīpavat. yathā līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatī ityādaḥ.” (Dhv. p. 424). In the example, referred to, ‘the counting of the play lotus by Pārvatī’ is cognised by us as the express (vācya) sense while the same suggests also the idea that ‘Pārvatī was feeling shy’. The behaviour of the lamp revealing itself while suggesting something else is relegated to the śabdaḥ also by Bhartṛhari. Compare :

grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā /

tathaiva sarvaśabdānāmete pṛthagiva sthite //

(VKPD. I. 55. P. 54).

Here the word ‘tejas’ stands for the lamp of the analogy, the word ‘śabda’ stands for the śrūyamāṇavarṇas in which form it reveals itself. What is supposed to be suggested by the śabda revealing itself in the form of the śrūyamāṇavarṇa is the sphoṭa, which is also called the nity śabda and which

alone is maintained to be meaningful. This position can be more clearly understood by studying the *kārikās* I 44 & I 56

(4) That Ānanda had the idea of *dhvani* actually from Bhartrhari may be gathered from the following statement, betraying his unstinted allegiance to the grammarians, as “*pariniścitanirapabhramśaśabdabrahmanam vipaścitām matamāśrityaiva pravṛtto’yam dhvanivyavahāra . kim virodha virodhau cintyete*” (Dhv III pp 443-444) Here he refers to the grammarians as those who have duly established the conception of the Brahman identified with the pure (nirapabhramśa) word. This is undoubtedly a reference to Bhartrhari for Brahman is conceived as the eternal (anādinidhanam) word by him in the very first *karikā* of the VKPD

anādinidhanam brahma śabdātattvam yadaksarm /
vivartate’rthabhāvena prakṛiyā jagato yatah //^{49c}

(4) Of the writers on poetics Bhāmaha largely contributed to the shaping of Ānanda’s views regarding a sense other than the universally recognised and commonly understood express sense. Ānanda observes that, all the *alamkāras* are often seen to have a touch of either another figure or another idea which happen to be suggested. In case of the association with an additional *alamkara* he notices that all *alamkāras* have at least a touch of exaggeration (*atīśayokti*). This *atīśayokti* sometimes merges with other figures expressly and as a suggested content at other times. When suggested the *atīśayokti* may appear either as the principal sense or as the subordinate sense. When it is the principal sense we have a *dhvani* on that score and when it is secondary we have a *guṇibhūta-vyangya* type of *kāvya* (i.e., a poetry with an unpredominant suggested content). In propounding this position Ānanda expressly makes a reference to Bhāmaha’s view on the invariable presence of *atīśayokti* with all *alamkāras*. Compare *tathāhi dīpakasamāsoktyādivadanyepyalamkarāḥ prāyena*

vyāṅgyālaṁkāraṅtarasāṁsparśino dr̥śyante.....bhāmahenāpya-
tiśayoktilakṣaṇe yaduktam—

saiśā sarvaiva vakroktiranayārtho vibhāvyate /

yatno'syām kavinā kāryaḥ ko'laṁkāronayā vinā // etc.

(Dhv. III, pp. 464-470).

In respect of the presence of an additional meaning (anyā-
rtha) in some of the kāvyas, which was recognised later on as
the suggested sense by Ānanda, Bhāmaha's definition of
samāsokti—"yatrokte gamyatenyorthastatsamānaviśeṣaṇaḥ"
with the word 'gamyate' is also significant.

It is also to be noted that Ānanda accepted in name and
number the same three guṇas of Bhāmaha, although he reorien-
ted the conception of the same.

(5) Ānanda does not deal with the definition of the
different alaṁkāras. When there is an occasion to refer to any
alaṁkāra he simply refers to the views of the earlier ālaṁkā-
rikas, particularly Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, his compatriots.
In Ānanda's śabdaśaktimūla variety of dhvani (Dhv. II. 21)
homonyms suggest some figure. The phenomenon of the
alaṁkāras being suggested by express figures seems to have
occured to Ānanda from a study of Bhāmaha's atiśayokti
and the idea of śabdaśaktimūla-alaṁkāradhvani appears to
have come to him from a study of Udbhaṭa's definition of śleṣa.
Śleṣa, according to Udbhaṭa, is a composition of (i) homo-
nyms which are pronounced in the same manner and of (ii)
words which appear to have the same pronunciation but
which really differ in some attributes such as—svarita, etc.⁵⁰
The alaṁkāra also conveys the idea of an additional alaṁkāra
(alaṁkāraṅtaragatām pratibhāṁ janayatpadaiḥ). The alaṁkāra
is divided into two varieties, viz., śabdaśleṣa and arthaśleṣa.
(vide. KSS. IV, 9-10). In śabdaśaktimūla variety of dhvani

50. Theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha would recognise this
latter variety of homonyms only in the Vedas and not in kāvya, (vide
KP. II. 19).

also we have an invariable suggestion of some *alamkāra* (*ākṣipta eva lamkaraḥ śabdaśaktyā prakāśate Dhv II 21*) It may be conjectured that Ānanda derives the idea of his *śabdaśaktimūla-dhvanī* from Udbhata's śloka and that is why he feels it necessary to draw a line of demarcation between the two on the very outset in the words *nanvalamkarāntarapratibhāyāmapī ślesavyapadeśo bhavattīti darśitam bhāṭṭodbhātene, tatpunarapī śabdaśaktimūlo dhvanir niravakāśa ityaśankyeda muktam 'ākṣiptaḥ' iti* (Dhv p 235)

(6) It is already observed that Vamana's KL contained the germs of the *dhvanī* theory to a great extent and Ānanda remarks that the *ritavadins* propounded their theory only as a result of their ineffectual effort to analyse *dhvanī* (cf Dhv III 46) Presence of a meaning other than the express meaning in words and sentence has been known to Vamana also Vāmana recognises a suggested sense in the *ākṣepa alamkāra* and hence explaining the sūtra "*upamanaksepāśca ksepah*" in a second way says "*upamānasyākṣepataḥ paratīpatī rītyapī sūtrathah yatha, andraṁ dhanuḥ .. atra śaradveśyeva indum nāyakamiva, rāveṇ pratīnayakasyeva ityupamanāni gamyante* iti The words in the italicized portion seem to mean, "the standards of comparison are suggested The expressions 'ākṣipta' and 'gamyate (gamyante)' are very frequently used by Ānanda to refer to the suggested sense Ānanda might have had the idea of a meaning other than the express one from literary elements of this nature in Vamana's work It may, however, be questioned that similar ideas regarding a meaning other than the express one are met with in the KD of Dandin also, and it may be clear from a quotation like the following illustration of the *ākṣepa alamkāra*

na ciram mama tapaya tava yātra bhaviṣyati /
yadi yāsyasi yātavyam alamaśankayatra te //
ityanuṣṭhānukhenaiva kantasyākṣipyate gatiḥ /
maranam sūcayantyaiva so'nuṣṭhāṅkṣepa ucyate //

(KD IL 135-136)

Here the idea of *maraṇa* (death) is a suggested meaning of the verse—*na ciraṁ*, etc. That according to Daṇḍin also the 'suggested meaning' is different from the express may be gathered from his own expression "*sūcayantyaiva*". But it would have been more after the heart of Ānanda to use the word '*ākṣepa*' in the sense of 'suggestion' and not in the sense of 'obstruction' in the manner of the present context. At any rate the possibility of Ānanda being influenced by Daṇḍin is remote and in the matter of an 'additional meaning' he is more likely to have been influenced by Bhāmaha and Vāmana and Udbhaṭa since there are more positive references to these writers. In this context we may also contrast Daṇḍin's definitions of *samāsokti*, *paryāyokta* and *ākṣepa*, etc., with those of Bhāmaha, with profit.

(7) We have already seen how Rudraṭa cherished a great partiality for *rasa* and anticipated its being given the foremost importance by Ānanda. In the case of *vastuvyañjanā* (i. e., the suggestion of a matter of fact) also, he had enough to contribute to the moulding of the *dhvani* theory of Ānanda-vardhana. As very rightly observed by Ruyyaka, Rudraṭa includes *vastuvyañjanā* in the two types of his *bhāva-alaṁkāra*, recognised by Rudraṭa for the first time. Definitions and examples of both the types of *bhāva alaṁkāra*, as quoted below would clearly show the recognition of a meaning other than the express one by Rudraṭa. First variety is defined as :

yasya vikāraḥ prabhavannapratibandhena hetunā yena /
gamayati tamabhiprāyaṁ tatpratibandhaṁ ca bhāvo'sau //
(KL, VII. 38)⁵¹.

Here the word '*gamayati*' means, 'suggests'. The example '*grāmataruṇam.....mukhacchāyā*' is given by Mammaṭa himself to show the presence of a subordinate type of the suggested sense. (KP., I.). The second variety is defined as :

51. Locana reads, '*prabhavannapratibandhastu hetunā*' and gives the verse '*ekākinī yadavalā*' as the illustration, whereas it is intended as the example of the second variety.

abhidheyamabhidadhānam tadeva tadasadrśasakala
 gunadosam /
 arthantaramavagamayati yadvākyaṁ so'paro bhavaḥ //
 (KL , Rudrata, VII 40)

Here it is explicitly stated that there may be a meaning standing as quite opposite to the express sense in respect of all the qualities and faults of the latter (tadasadrśasakalaguna dosam) and this meaning is had through suggestion and not expression ('agamayati and not 'abhidadhāti') Its example "ekakīṇī yadavala pāṇtha" (Locana, p 130) is recognised by Abhinava to have a suggested sense but he shows that it is not a case of dhvani only because the suggested sense is not predominant We may possibly be justified in recognising Rudrata's treatment of the bhāvalamkāra as the intellectual background for Ānanda's arguments for establishing the distinction of the express and the suggested senses

(8) By now it is sufficiently clear to us that in respect of the suggestion of rasa Ānanda had the idea from Bharata As regards the suggestion of figures he took the clue from Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa And as regards the suggestion of matters of fact he had the impetus from a number of alamkāras and their illustrations given by Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Rudrata and Vāmana The definitions of the alamkāras like samāsokti, paryayokta and aprastutaprasamsā demanded an invariable presence of some suggested content in the illustrations, some of which could even be interpreted as cases of dhvani Hence Ānanda takes great pains to establish a distinct status for the dhvani type of kāvya by asserting boldly that in dhvani the suggested content must be unquestionably predominant Compare

(a) paryayoktepi yadi prādhānyena vyaṅgyatvam tadbhā
 vatu nāma tasya dhvanāvantarbhāvaḥ / na tu dhvanestatranta
 rbhavaḥ / tasya mahāviṣayatvenangitvenā ca pratipadayiṣya
 manatvat / na punaḥ paryayokte bhamahodāhrtasadrśe vyaṅ
 gyasyaiva pradhanam / vācyasya tatropasarjanibhavenāviva
 ksitatvat / (Dhv pp 118-119)

(b) samkarālamīkārepi yadā...../ atha vācyopasarjanībhā-
vena vyaṅgyasya tatrāvasthānamīdadā so'pi dhvaniviṣayo'stu,
na tu sa eva dhvanirīti vaktum śakyam / paryāyoktanirddiṣṭa-
nyāyāt / (pp. 120-124)

(c) yadā tu sārūpyamātravaśenāprastutapraśamsāyāmapra-
kṛtaprakṛtayoh sambandhastadāpyaprastutasya sarūpasyābhi-
dhīyamānasya prādhānyenāvivakṣāyām dhvanāvevāntaḥpātaḥ /
itarthā tvalamīkārāntarameva. (pp. 126-129)

Thus Ānanda's efforts to distinguish his own position
themselves would show his intellectual indebtedness to his
predecessors.

(9) In Dhv. III, Ānanda observes : "Conceding to the
fact that sentiments, etc., can be suggested only by specific
senses, a classified treatment of suggestive elements would be
useful, since specific senses are inseparably connected with
suggestive words. Such a classification regarding the charm
attained by particular kinds of words in particular contexts,
which has been proposed also in other works, becomes justifi-
able only when we understand it to be based on the suggestive-
ness of words." Compare : "śabdaviśeṣāṇām cānyatra ca cāru-
tvam yadvibhāgenopadarśitam tadapi teṣām vyañjakatvenai-
vāvasthītamityavagantavyam". (Dhv. p. 358). Abhinava
informs us that anyatra refers to the Bhāmahavivaraṇa of
Udbhaṭa. Abhinava illustrates a classification of senses by
the statement : "srakcandanādayaḥ śabdāḥ śṛṅgāre cāravo
vibhāse tvacārava tu rasakṛta eva vibhāgaḥ / rasam prati ca
śabdasya vyañjakatvamevetyuktam prāk." This information
from Abhinava renders it clear that Ānanda derived some
clue regarding the suggestivity of senses from Udbhaṭa's Bhā-
mahavivaraṇa also.

(10) It is interesting to note that while Ānanda remains
silent about the contributions of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa to the
development of his own theory, he recognises Vāmana's efforts
to approach to the conception of dhvani in at least two places.
Compare :

- (a) dhvanimārgo manāksprṣṭopi na lakṣita, etc (Dhv p 32).
 (b) asphuṭasphuritam, etc. (Dhv. III. 46).

The reason for this preferential reference may be conjectured as follows. Bhāmaha and Udbhata also talked of an 'anyārtha' but did not point out its ontological difference from the express sense. But Vāmana talked at least of the laksanā function in his definition of the figure vakrokti, thereby, delving deeper towards the nature of dhvani.^{51a} In Ānanda's point of view, even this much reference to a function of the words is very significant since his entire theory rests on the recognition of a new function of words called vyañjanā. With this intellectual background Ānanda wrote his Dhv, for propounding the dhvani theory. In the next chapter, we shall see the contents of the theory in greater detail and the references to the later writers henceforth, are expected to reveal the course of development of the theory in the hands of the later critics and supporters of the theory.

The Vakrokti School : Kuntaka, author of the Vakroktijivita, was the founder of this school. The salient features of Kuntāka's theory are as follows :

(i) Kāvya becomes lively in association with vakrokti. Cf śarīram jīviteneva spuriteneva jīvitam / vinā nirjivatām yena vākyamyāti vipaścitām // (under Kārikā I 17, VJ Hindi, p 63)

(ii) Vakrokti is otherwise called 'kavivvyāpāravakratva' or 'Vakrakavivvyāpāra'. Vakrokti is defined as 'vaidagdhyabhangībhanitī' (I 10) It is also recognised as the alamkṛtī, i. e., embellishment of śabda and artha, the physical constituents of a kāvya.

(iii) The importance of vakrokti is also emphasised by way of stating its invariable association with kāvya so much so that an unembellished kāvya can never be conceived of. (I 16).

^{51a} For an elaborate discuss on vide Dhv. Uddyota I (edited by Prof. B. P. Bhattacharyya) pp 17-18

(iv) To constitute a kāvya words and meanings occur in a composition which is a source of an unworldly delight to the man of taste. (I. 7). The capacity of kāvya to delight, causes a natural elevation or consummation of rasa. “tasya ca.....kācideva svabhāvamahattā rasaparipoṣāṅgatvaṁ vā vyaktimāsādayati”. (under K., I. 9. VJ. Hīndī, p. 44)

(v) Whatever renders the poetry charming must be recognised as an alaṁkāra. Compare : I. 10 and “kintu vakratāvai-citryayogitayābhidhānamevānayoralāṁkāraḥ / tasyaiva śobhā-tisāyakāritvāt”. (VJ. Hīndī, pp. 51-52). By the term vakrokti Kuntaka designates all the charming elements of kāvya like guṇa and dhvani and not only the already well known alaṁkāras like upamā and rūpaka. The alaṁkāra, that he discusses in his work, is unlike the well known alaṁkāras, by dint of its being capable of bringing an unworldly charm to the kāvya. (I. 2.)

(vi) In kārikā I. 7., Kuntaka defines kāvya as an indiscernible association of śabda and artha. In the vṛtti he adds “śabdārthau kāvyam, vācako vacyaśceti dvau sammilitau kāvyam” (VJ. Hīndī, p. 18). But by ‘vācakaśabda’ he means the ‘vyañjaka śabda’ also. The artha (vācya) must have ‘svabhāvamahattā’ or must be helpful to the delineation of rasa, so that the artha may be capable of delighting the sahrdayas.

(vii) As an example of kāvya being instrumental to the delineation of rasa he cites the poem “tamabhyagacchat” which results in suggesting karuṇarasa and as such presents a case of rasa-dhvani, if not by itself, atleast in association with the neighbouring verses. As an example of svabhāvamahattā Kuntaka cites the verse “daṁṣṭrāpiṣṭeṣu” which does not have any alaṁkāra. It cannot be said to have svabhāvokti ; for, svabhāvokti is not an alaṁkāra for Kuntaka. What then is the source of appeal ? A careful examination would show that a devaviṣayakarati (sentiment of love for the god) or the information regarding the poet’s devotion to the god, conveyed

to us by suggestion prominently, is the sole source of appeal. Thus we may see that according to Kuntaka also, the *kāvya* may be appealing either because of its being instrumental to the suggestion of *rasa* or because of suggesting a matter of fact.

(viii) Although Kuntaka recognises only that *kāvya* which has *alamkāra*, yet a *kāvya* having no *alamkāra* of the ordinarily known types like *upama* and *rūpaka* also may be an ideal *kāvya* if the matter under description possesses an inherent beauty or if the piece is instrumental to the delineation of *rasa*. Even when it possesses *alamkāra* the same must be duly appropriate and must occur in proper quantity. We cannot say that the bare description is *kāvya* and the beautiful aspect of the object described presents a case of *svabhāvokti* inasmuch as the beautiful alone makes the 'bare *kāvya*', which may be embellished later on. Compare *kārikā* III, 1. and *vṛtti* noticing particularly—"tasmādatyantaramanīyasvābhāvi kadharmayuktam varnamīyam vastu parigrahanīyam / tathā-vidhasya tasya yathāyogamaucitvānusārena rūpakādyalamkāra yojanayā bhavitavyam / etāvamīstu viśeso yat svābhāvikasundaryaprādhānyena vivakṣitasya na bhūyasā rūpakādyalamkāra upakārāya kalpata / vastusvabhāvasaukumāryasya rasādiposānasya vā samācchādanaprasaṅgāt" / In such cases the *kāvya* cannot bear the burden of embellishments in the manner of a damsel, fond of putting ornaments, discarding ornaments in time of bathing, separation, austerity and the gratification of the sex. A man of taste relishes only the natural beauty of poetry. Compare "tathā caitasmin visaye sarvākāramalamkāryam vilāsavattva punarapi snānasamaya virahavrataparigraha suratāvasānāḍau nātyantamalamkāranasahatām pratipadyate / svābhāvikasaukumāryasyaiva rasikahrdayāhlādakāntvāt" / (VJ Hindi, p. 297)

(ix) The position revealed just above is quite after the heart of Ānanda who desires that the *alamkāras* should be appropriate to the *rasas* and at times the delineation of the *alamkāras* should be abandoned. Vide, Dhv. *Kārikās* II, 14-19,

and particularly “kāle ca grahaṇatyāgau nātinirvahaṇaiṣitā” (Dhv. p. 223). Mammaṭa also maintained almost the same position by holding that ordinarily poetry should always be embellished but in places (i. e., where there is a rasa, as it may be gathered from his examples) the kāvya may also occur without any alaṃkāra. (Vide, KP. I).

(x) Examples of matters of fact having inherent charm (vastu-vakratā) would show that either they present charming ālambana or uddīpanabibhāvas and thereby become instrumental to the suggestion of rasa and present cases of dhvani-kāvya or they present cases of vastudhvani themselves. In the verse ‘tām prāṇmukhīm tatra niveśya tanvīm,’ etc., an excess of beauty of Pārvatī is wanted to be conveyed. Compare : “atra tathā-vidhasvābhāvikasaukumāryamanoharaḥ śobhātīśayaḥ kaveḥ pratipādayitumabhipretaḥ” (VJ, Hindi, p. 298), which reveals the fact that the idea of excess of beauty is conveyed by suggestion. Hence, here we may discover a vastudhvani and from the standpoint of Ānanda the appeal of the verse may be due to that vastudhvani. And as regards rasadhvani there is a recognition by Kuntaka himself.

(xi) Possibly the Vakroktijivita would be the best example to show how far-reaching the influence of Dhvanyāloka was. Kuntaka does not adversely criticise the dhvani theory but it is clear that in the VJ. he wants to present a parallel theory and not a rival one. Dr. Keith observes : “a poem attains at best a transcendental charm (lokottaravaicitrya) which can be judged in the long run only by the man of taste, a result in which Kuntaka agrees largely with the theory which he attacks” (HSL. p. 392). Kuntaka recognises the vyañjanā vyāpāra and refers his readers to the Dhvanikāra himself in respect of the same. Compare : “pratīyate iti kriyāpadavaicitryasyāyanabhiprāyo.....yasmād dhvanikāreṇa vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvo’tra sutarām samarthitastat kiṃ paunaruktyena.” (VJ. Hindi, p. 196). Kuntaka never had the occasion to refute the idea of dhvani. On the contrary, he equated some of the

varieties of vakrokti with some sort of dhvani. Compare his remark under the context of paryāyavakratā "esa eva ca śabdaśaktimūlānu-ranana rūpavyangyasya padadhvanirviśavaḥ (p 211) Ānanda recognised the suggestive capacity of the words, syllables, sentences and the prabandhas, etc., and Kuntaka also recognised vakratā in the different aspects of the composition as enumerated above, and this fact led Ruyyaka to remark "upacaravakratādibhiḥ samasto dhvanipripaṭcaḥ svikṛtaḥ (AS p 10)

Kuntaka's attitude towards rasa was also almost the same as that of Ānanda. Hence, we may compare with profit,

nirantararaso'lgāragarbhasandarbhānirbharah /
gīrah kavīnām jīvanti na kathāmātramāśritah //

(VJ. IV, 11)

with "kavīnā kāvyamupanibadhnatā sarvātmanī rasaparatan-trena bhavitavyam na hi kaverī vṛttamātranirvahanena kiñcidprayojanam itihāsādereva tatsiddheh". (Dhv III, p 336)

(xii) The major point of difference between the two theories is that the vakrokti theory recognises vakrokti as the jivita (life) of poetry while dhvani theory recognises dhvani as the soul of poetry. But in final analysis we observe that both the theories demand that in kāvya there must be a lokotta ravaicitrya as so very rightly pointed out by Dr. Keith.

So far we have seen how Kuntaka has been a subject to the intellectual sway of Ānandavardhana. But his own work has been of very little consequence. It may be supposed that Mammata adopted his principle in accepting citrā as a genuine (though the worst) variety of kāvya. But Kuntaka also did not appreciate an alamkāra of sound for alamkāra's sake. The meaning must have adequate appeal. We gather it from his observation on the verses "bhana tarunī, etc., (VJ Hindi, pp 18-19) as "pratibhādāridryadainyād", etc. This position of Kuntaka was adopted and appreciated by Mammata by saying "atra vacyasya vicintyamānam na kiñcidapi cātutvam pratīyate ityapustarīhataivānuprāsasya vaiphalyaḥ" (KP X.)

and by Viśvanātha by quoting the verse “ananuraṇan” as an illustration of “anuprāse vaiphalasyāpuṣṭārhatvam” (SD. VII.).

In this manner we find some of the views of Kuntaka being adopted by later ālaṃkārikas but his conception of vakrokti lost all its width and has been reduced to the position of a mere śabdālaṃkāra. Ruyyaka recognised vakrokti as the designation of ālaṃkāras in general but ultimately adopted the term to designate a variety of arthālaṃkāra in his own work. Cf. “vakroktīśabdaś-cālaṃkārasāmānyavacanopīhālaṃkāra viśeṣe samjñitah” (AS. p., 222). Vidyānātha in Ekāvalī and Appayadīkṣita in CM also took it to designate a variety of arthālaṃkāra. But Mammaṭa’s vakrokti is only a śabdālaṃkāra and Viśvanātha also considers vakrokti as a figure of words. Moreover, Viśvanātha criticised Kuntaka’s theory on the strength of the argument that vakrokti being simply an ālaṃkāra can never be the jīvita of kāvya. But it will be fair to Kuntaka to note here that Viśvanātha’s arguments against the theory of Kuntaka is not justified in so far as the latter’s conception of vakrokti was quite different from that of the former.

Of the later critics of the theory Mahimabhaṭṭa was possibly most correct in making the assesment that the vakrokti theory was nothing other than the dhvani theory in disguise. Mahima quotes the definition of vakrokti and questions that vakrokti should mean a statement distinct from the ordinary speech either because of (1) a propriety in the use of words and senses or because of (2) the statement being suggestive of a prāṭhya-māna (suggested) sense. Now, (1) if the former alternative is understood then we must hold that the vakrokti is suggestive of rasa in so far as there can be a question of propriety only with reference to a contextual rasa. If indeed vakrokti thus pre-supposes an invariable presense of rasa then there is no novelty in the theory of vakrokti. (2) If the second alternative is understood then the definition of vakrokti is nothing other than a definition of dhvani itself and Mahima suspects

that it is because of this fact the classification of vakrakti and the various examples are entirely modelled on the scheme of dhvani. Compare

yat punah "śabdārthau sahītau tadvidāhīlādakāraṇi
 "ityādīnā śāstrādīprasiddhaśabdārthopanibandhavyatirekī yad
 vaicitryam tanmatralakṣaṇam vakratvam nāma kāvyasya jīvita
 mīti dvitīyapaḥṣaṇaḥ punardhvanerevedam lakṣaṇam
 anayā bhaṅgyabhīṣitam bhavati abhinnavādvastunah / ata eva
 cāsyā ta eva prabhedāstanyevodaharaṇāni tārtupadārśitāni /
 (VV pp 124-126)

The anumana theory The anumana theory has been propounded by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his illustrious work called Vyaktiviveka. We have seen that although Kuntaka tried to develop a parallel theory he had very little dispute with Ānanda. But writers like Bhaṭṭanāyaka, author of Hrdayadarpana and Mukulabhaṭṭa, author of Abhidhavarṭumātrka wrote with the express purpose of demolishing the dhvani theory. Commenting on Mahimabhaṭṭa's reference to Hrdayadarpana in the verse, VV, I, 4, Ruyyaka says that the Hrdayadarpana was meant for demolishing the dhvani theory (darpano hrdaya darpanākhyo dhvanīdhvamsa-grantho'pi). The Hrdayadarpana is not yet discovered, but we know from Ruyyaka's references that he was fully acquainted with the work. Mukulabhaṭṭa wanted to include the vyañjana function in lakṣaṇā. But it will be seen that his was a meagre doctrine and Mammaṭa very ably met his challenge in the SVV and the KP. Dhanañjaya, the author of DR and Dhanika the author of Avaloka on DR, were the other notable critics who tried to prove the redundancy of the vyañjanā function and argued that the tālparya is enough to convey the so called vyangya (suggested) sense.

Of all the later critics of the dhvani theory the most notable was, however, Mahimabhaṭṭa. Mahima wrote a full length book called Vyaktiviveka to examine afresh the true nature of the vyangya sense and found out that all the varieties of dhvani

may duly be included in the scope of anumāna (inference).
 anumāne'ntarbhāvaṁ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum /
 vaaktivivekaṁ kurute praṇamya mahimā porāṁ vācam //
 (VV, I, 1).

Mahima criticised not only the conception of dhvani but also every word and syllable of the Dhv., wherever he found a fault. But it may be observed that, Mahima had in the core of his heart a great amount of admiration for Ānanda and had agreement with Ānanda's views in most places as regards the causes, effects and the essence of kāvya. Mahima also expressly recognised Ānanda's greatness and like Bhāravi saying "varaṁ virodho'pi satāṁ mahātmabhiḥ" he said :

"iha sampratipattito'nyathā vā
 dhvanikārasya vaco'vivecanaṁ naḥ /
 nityataṁ yaśase prapatsyate
 yanmahatāṁ saṁstava eva gauravāya //
 (VV. I. 3).

We may now note the salient features of Mahima's theory as follows :

(i) Mahima does not disagree with the view that the soul of poetry is rasa. He says :
 "kāvyasyātmani saṁjñini rasādirūpe na kasyacidvimaṭiḥ".

(2) Mahima recognises the phenomenon of vyañjanā in case of the lamp and the jar. But such a natural vyañjakatva is not recognised in the dhvani kāvya. There is only an artificial vyañjakatva as in the case of dhūma (smoke) and agni (fire).

svābhāvikaṁ dhvaneryuktaṁ vyañjakatvaṁ na dīpavat /
 dhūmavat kintu kṛtakaṁ sambandhāderapekṣaṇāt //

(VV. p. 133).

(3) Mahimabhaṭṭa does not recognise any dyotakatva (i.e., vyañjakatva) even in case of the upasargas and the nipātas. For example, the sense of prakarṣa' (excess) depends on the use of the upasarga 'pra' and as such the sense of prakarṣa

should be understood as a vācya sense of 'pra'. These so called dyotakas are as good as the viś-saṁpadas and have vācakatva all right as in the case of the word nila in nilotpala. The upasargas and the nipātas are called dyotaka in a figurative manner because of a wrong observation of simultaneity in the cognition of the nipāta or the upasarga and the associate word. Cf. "prāḍiprayogānugama vyatirekānusārini bhramo bhakteribandhanam // (VV p 134) This being the position regarding dyotaka upasargas and nipātas, an analogy with the suggestive dhvani cannot be established

(4) Mahima does not recognise a relation of the suggester and the suggested between the audible letters and the sphoṭa. Hence, according to Mahima, the application of the term dhvani on the basis of a similarity of the suggestive kāvya with the audible sounds (śrūyamāna varṇas), otherwise called dhvani, is not justified. Compare "ata eva śrūyamānānām śabdānām dhvani vyapadeśyānām . gamyagamaka-bhāvasyopagamāt "

(V V P. 57)

(5) Mahimabhaṭṭa recognises abhidhā alone as a function of the word. According to him there is no Lakṣanāvṛtti and the lakṣyārtha also can be had through a process of anumāna. He argues that there cannot be more than one śakti (power) of the word. If at all there be more than one śakti they should all operate at a time just as in the case of fire we find both the śaktis, dāhakatva and the prakāśikatva (i e , powers of burning and revealing), operating simultaneously. Hence if we recognise both the abhidhā and the lakṣana śaktis in the word then there should not be an order of cognition of the senses conveyed by the two powers. Hence, the lakṣanā function must belong to some different substratum and that is none other than the vācyārtha (express sense) . If the vācyārtha is supposed to be the substratum of lakṣana then that function must be identical with inference. In 'gaurbahika' the primary meaning of the word 'gauh' which appears to have identity with 'bāhika' leads to the inference of a partial identity

(similarity) between 'gauḥ' and 'bāhika' because of its failure to have any congruity in respect of its identity with Bāhika. Compare : "yat punarasyānekaśakti...../ tathāhi gaurbāhika ityādau tāvadgavādayo'rthā bādhitabāhikādyarthāntaraikātmyāstādrūpy-avidhānānyathānuyapattiyā kenacidamśenatattra tattvamanumāpayanti na sarvātmanā." (VV. pp. 108-110). Just as a case of anyathānupapatti leads to inference here, we have the case of avinābhāva leading to an anumāna in "kṛśāṅgyāḥ santāpaṁ vadati visinipatraśayanam." For Mahima anumāna is defined as the arrival at the knowledge of some other thing from the knowledge of some thing on the strength of avinābhāva (i. e., invariable concomitance or the relation of non-separation). Wherever there is the act of speaking (vadana) there must be an expression of an idea (prakāśa) and as such 'prakāśa' is the invariable effect of 'vadana'. Compare :

"avinābhāvāvasāyapūrvikā hyanyato'nyasya pratītir anumānamityanumānalakṣaṇamuktam / tathā hi vadatītyādau vadanāderarthāntaraśya prakāśādeḥ pratītiḥ.....na cāyam svārthameva pratipādayati tasya bādhopapatteḥ" (VV. p. 111). That the word 'vadati' conveys not only its express sense which is to be discarded as incongruous, is the opinion also of the supporters of the vyañjanā and the lakṣaṇā functions.

(6) If it is argued that the idea of prakāśa is had by a process of 'arthāpatti' then also that is none other than a case of anumāna since arthāpatti is included in the scope of anumāna. Compare :

"tarhyanyathānupapattiyā..... arthāpatteranumānāntarbhāvābhyupagamādityuktam". (VV. p. 112).

(7) Mahima explains and designates the phenomenon of suggestion (vyañjanā) as poetic inference (kāvyānumiti), which is defined as follows :

vācyastadanumīto vā yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati /
sambandhataḥ kutaścīt sā kāvyānumitirityuktā //

(VV. I. 25. p. 125).

Mahima tries to explain all the varieties of dhvani as cases of kāvyānumiti. In śabdaśaktimūla dhvani he must have some reason to arrive at the non-contextual meaning and as such the instances present kāvyānumiti. Even in case of ślesa Mahima demands that there must be an adequate reason for conveying more than one sense and as such whatever additional meaning is had must be derived as an inferred meaning. If there be no adequate reason for arriving at a further meaning the very effort of the poet to present a ślesa will prove only a fruitless strain. Compare

tasmadarthāntaravyaktihetau kasmimścacasati /

yah ślesabandhanirbandhah kleśāyaiva kaverasau //

(VV I 86, p 348)

(8) Just as Ānanda believes that the meaning had through suggestion has a greater appeal, Mahima thinks that the meaning that is arrived at through anumāna is more appealing. Cf. “vacyo hyartho na tathā camatkāramātanoti yathā sa eva vidhinīṣedhādih kākabhīdheyatāmanumeyatām vavaturṇa iti svabhava evayamarthhānām / ” (VV I p 54)

(9) But even then the poem must have the invariable association of rasa. In absence of rasa even a series of anumeyārthas will not render it a kāvya and the composition will be as condemnable as prahelikā. For instance, in the verse, vivarīṣa sura a smae, we have a good number of anumeyārthas, but the mental process of the numerous inferences itself obstructs any relish of rasa. Compare ‘ tadīyamupāyapāramparoparoḥa nissaha kavyamityatīvyaptih // (p 86), ‘ kavivṛyāpāro hi kāvyamucyate (p 95), and ‘ isyate cāsau tatrāpi prahelikadau ca nirase syāt anumīyate (p 100)

(10) According to Mahimabhaṭṭa the permanent mental states of love, sorrow, etc., belonging to poetical characters are inferred through the cognition of the vibhava, anubhava and the vyabhicārībhavas described in the kāvya. A pleasurable rumination over the sthāyībhāva (permanent state), thus

inferred is called *rasa*. It is the inexplicable magic of the poetry that the inferred *sthāyibhāvas* lead to the exquisite pleasure of rumination whereas in ordinary life the *sthāyibhāvas* as belonging to others do not lead to any such pleasure. Compare :
 “*āstām vā ratyādirnityaparokṣaḥ / pratyakṣo’pi hyarthaḥ sāk-
 ṣāt samvedyamānaḥ sacetasām na tathā camatkāram-ātanoti
 yathā sa eva satkavinā vacanagocaratām gamitaḥ / yaduktam—*

*kaviśaktyarpitā bhāvāstanmayibhāvayuktitaḥ /
 tathā sphurantyaṁi kāvyānna tathādhyakṣataḥ kila // iti /
 so’pi ca teṣām na tathā svadate, yathā tairevānume-
 yatām nīta iti svabhāva evāyaṁ na paryanuyogamarhati /
 (VV. I. pp. 73-74).*

(11) Mahima accepts almost all the cases of *dhvani* and explains them in terms of *kāvyānumiti*. But wherever he finds difficulty in applying the process of inference he discards the case altogether. According to Ānanda there is *śabda-śaktimūla dhvani* in the verse “*unnataḥ prollasaddhāraḥ*” (Dhv. II. p.241). But as Mahimabhaṭṭa finds it difficult to admit a process of *anumāna*, he contends that in the said verse no additional (suggested) meaning is cognised at all. Cf.

*“unnataḥ prollasaddhāraḥ kālāgurumalīmasaḥ /
 payodharabharastanvyāḥ kaṁ na cakre’bhilāṣiṇam //”
 ityatra tvanantaroktaḥ prakāro na sambhavatīti kuto’rthā-
 ntarapratītiḥ /
 (VV. III. p. 417).*

(12) In the matter of *aucitya* and *doṣa* Mahima is fully after Ānanda, since *aucitya* and *doṣa* owe their origin to the relative position of the contextual *rasa*. (Vide, VV. II).

That *vyañjanā* may be confused with *anumāna* has been apprehended by Ānanda himself, and in the proper place we shall see how to reconcile the *dhvani* theory with the bold arguments of Mahimabhaṭṭa. But, despite Mahima’s intellectual wealth he hardly succeeded in having any follower and the only commentary, supposed to have been composed by

Ruyyaka and recovered only partially, also defends the *dhvani* theory against his bold criticisms

The *aucitya* theory This theory has been propounded by the Kashmirian polymath Ksemendra (2nd & 3rd quarter of the 11th century) The plain meaning of *aucitya* is propriety The theory claims that *aucitya* is the very life of *kāvya*, which is in intimate relation with *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra*, etc (‘‘*aucityam rasasiddhasya sthiram kāvyasya jīvitam*’, k 5) This *aucitya*, i e., appropriateness is desired to be present in as many as twentyeight places like the word, sentence, meaning of the composition, *guṇa* and *ālamkāra* and, indeed, in every limb of the *kāvya* (karikās, 8-10) *Aucitya* is so very important that it infuses life to *rasa*, the very soul of *kāvya* (‘‘*aucitya sya rasajīvitabhūtasya vicāram kurute’dhuna*,’’ k 3)

A sketch of the development of the conception of *aucitya* from the days of Dandin through Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa is given in full length by Dr Sūryakānta It is observed by him that of all the writers Ksemendra alone gave *aucitya* the status of the very soul of poetry Dr Sūryakānta also regrets that Ānanda does not give any definition of *aucitya* (Ksemendra Studies, p 67). Ksemendra, on the other hand, defines *aucitya* as follows :

ucitam prahurācaryāḥ sadṛśam kila yasya yat //
ucitasya ca yo bhāvastadaucityam pracaksate //

‘‘The great masters have called that to be proper which is verily suited to a certain thing The abstract idea of being proper, goes by the name of propriety (*aucitya*)’ But in this definition also ‘a certain thing’ with reference to which alone the *aucitya* is determined remains uncertain An analysis of Ānanda’s treatment of *aucitya* shows that an element of *kāvya* may be proper or improper only with reference to the contextual *rasa*. Ānanda declares ‘‘Except impropriety, there is no other cause for the abatement in the relish of poetry. A composition containing the well known propriety is the very secret

of rasa " (Dhv. III. 3). An analysis of the Aucityavicāracarcā will show that Kṣemendra also determines propriety or impropriety with reference to the contextual rasa. Let us have some examples : In the verse "magnāni dviṣatām" (AVC. p. 2). the word 'mugdha' is admired as rendering the meaning more appropriate. But the meaning, in fact, is rendered more suggestive of the simplicity of the nāyikā and thus renders the piece more effectively suggestive of rasa. Again, compare vṛtti under the verse "lāvaṇya draviṇa" (AVC. p. 2), where a better word is suggested for being more appropriate to the love-lorn lady under description, which surely indicates the determination of propriety by the contextual vipralambhaśṛṅgāra rasa. Or, we may compare the vṛtti under the verse "devo dayāvān" (AVC. p. 3) running as "atra bhīmasya.....padairunnidraraud-rarasasvarūpānurupo vakyārthaḥ sajīva ivāvabhāṣate" where there is a direct reference to a rasa as the factor regulating the aucitya of the words (padas). In this manner examples may be multiplied to a good number to show that the word 'yasya' in Kṣemendra's definition of aucitya means nothing other than rasa although it is not explicitly stated in the definition. To be brief, Kṣemendra in his whole thesis echoes what has been very briefly stated by Ānanda in—

"anaucityādṛṭe nānyadrasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
prasiddhaucityabandhastu rasasyopaniṣatparā //
(Dhv. III.)⁵²

It may be noted that Kṣemendra does not have any occasion to criticise Ānandā; rather he follows Ānanda as by quoting the kārīkā,—


"avirodhī virodhī vā raso'ṅgini rasāntare /
paripoṣaṁ na netavyastathā syādavirodhitā //
(Dhv. III, 24)⁵³

Thus we have a brief sketch of the principal trends in the

52. Also vide, HSP, Kane, p. XCVIII.

53. In AVC. p. 14. the kārīkā is read as "virodhī vāvirodhī vā"

development of Sanskrit poetics. By now we can also see what a strategic position the dhvani theory occupies in that course of development and as the first propounder of the same theory Ānandavardhana occupies the most important position amongst all the ālamkārikas. Ānanda's influence over the later writers is recognised by Jagannātha, the last of the most notable writers in the expression—"ānandavardhanena sarvālamkārikasāranivyavasthāpakatvāt." Hence, we are led to discuss in the following pages, some of the more important contents of the dhvani theory in general and the Dhvanyāloka in particular. We will also try to assess its value by way of referring concurrently to some of its western and modern parallels.



CHAPTER II

DHVANYĀLOKA AND THE DHVANI THEORY

The basis of the theory : The dhvani theory is based on the postulate that the most important element in poetry is its import. In Dhv. I. 2, Ānanda states that, the meaning of poetry, which is recognised as the soul of poetry when it can appeal to the men of taste, has primarily two aspects, viz., the 'expressed' and the 'suggested'. Compare :

“yo'rthaḥ saṁśayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthitaḥ /
vācyapratīyamānākhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau // (I. 2).

In Dhv. I. 1, and in several other places Ānanda propounds that dhvani is the soul of kāvya, or in other words, the suggested meaning alone is the most essential element. Hence, the meaning in general being called the soul of kāvya in I. 2, may cause a confusion and, indeed, it has been much objected to by Mhimabhaṭṭa. But in fact Ānanda's stand is not vitiated by the kārikā I. 2. Ānanda in this kārikā propounds for the first time that in kāvya the meaning (artha) alone is the most important factor; and the meaning being appealing to the men of taste may even be designated as the very soul of kāvya. In the second kārikā itself it is not convenient for Ānanda to state that the more predominant pratīyamānārtha is the soul of kāvya, because he is yet to introduce a variety of meaning called the pratīyamānārtha. The kārikā I. 2, is only an adequate fore-word to the introduction of a pratīyamānārtha as distinct from the express sense which is commonly known and already set forth in various ways by the earlier ālaṁkārikas. (I. 3.). In the vṛtti of kārikā 1, 4 Ānanda ably shows that in poetry there may be a meaning other than the commonly understood express sense. Such an implied meaning is altogether different from the express sense and in no case liable to be confused with the latter. For example, the verse “bhama

dhammā¹ expressly conveys the idea of an injunction (vidhi), but the men of taste gather also the additional idea that the intelligent girl is prohibiting the pious man from going to the bank of Godāvarī. Prohibition (nisedha) being just the opposite of injunction (vidhi) need not be confused with the express sense. More examples and arguments are presented by Ānanda himself to show as to how the suggested sense claims a sharp distinction from the express sense in the first and the third uddyotas.

Varieties of the pratiyamānārtha: The pratiyamānārtha (i.e., suggested sense) may be of three types. In one of these types we get it as a vastumātra, i.e., a mere matter of fact. Such a matter of fact is had in the verse 'bhama dhammā' in the form of the information that the girl is prohibiting the pious man. The second type is alamkāra, i.e., a figure. The figures of speech, which are defined in so many words, have certain single ideas at their base. In case of upamā we have a basic idea of similarity, in case of vyatireka we have the basic idea of superiority of either the upameya or the upamāna over the other. When such ideas are presented in a charming manner we have an alamkāra. If the charming idea is expressly conveyed then we have a vācya alamkāra and if the charming idea is suggested we have a suggested alamkāra. For example in the verse,

virāṇam ramat ghusinarunammi na tadā piāthanucchaṅge /
dīṭhī riugaakumbhatthalammi jaha bahalasindūre //(sic.)²

The express meaning is that the temples succeed better than the breasts in drawing attention of the heroes. Hence, there is

1. Dhv p 52. "O pious man, now you roam with all confidence, for, the dog has been killed to-day by the fierce lion which resides on the bank of the river Godavari."

2. Dhv p 262. "The sight of heroes does not so delight in their beloveds' breasts red with saffron anointment as in the temples of enemies' elephants, painted deep in vermillion."

an express vyatirekālaṁkāra. The suggested idea is that, there is a point of similarity between the breasts and the temples. The breasts are as large as the temples and hence attractive. But this idea of similarity is not expressly conveyed and hence we have a suggested alaṁkāra. The suggested alaṁkāras are also matters of fact in a sense. But while vastumātra is a bare statement of fact the suggested alaṁkāra happens to be more charming and involves some of the basic ideas underlying the different vācya alaṁkāras.

An outline of the rasādi variety : The third variety of the pratiyamāna sense is called rasādi. 'Rasādi' means 'rasa and others like rasa'. The list of 'rasa and others like rasa' is not given completely by Ānanda. Ānanda names only rasa, bhāva rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and bhāvaprasānti (Dhv. II. 3), Abhinava presents a very long discussion on the nature of rasa. Abhinava's conception of rasa will be discussed at length later on. It will suffice to remember here that it is an exquisite joy caused by the rumination of a sentiment³ felt by the reader with sympathy for the hero of the kāvya. The feeling is suggested to be belonging to the poetical character but because of an identification of the sympathetic reader with the poetical character the reader experiences the feeling as belonging to himself also. But yet it is not precisely like a personal feeling of the ordinary life. Since the reader shares the feeling with the poetical character and the sentimental poet and also the other readers like himself the feeling is said to be experienced in a generalised state. The reader's capacity to identify himself with some literary character or the poet is called 'hṛdayasaṁvāda'⁴ and that such a case of identification is necessary for the realisation of rasa is explicit from the following extracts.

3. Here sentiment means a sthāyibhāva or a permanent mental state like that of love or sorrow.

4. According to Ānanda 'saṁvāda' means 'anyasādṛśya'. Significance of the term may be had from Dhv. iv, 11-13,

(a) tannīdanabhūtāyā hrdayasamvadādyupakṛtaya vibhāva
 dīśāmagrya lokottararūpatvāt (Locana p 187) (b) rāma
 dīcaritam tu na sarvasya hrdayasamvadīti mahatsāhasam
 (Locana p 187) (c) hrdayasamvādatanmayibhavana
 kramādāsvādyamanatām pratīpannah (Locana pp 85 86)
 Hence, the realisation of rasa consists in an intense experience
 of a sentiment and the resultant exquisite joy. For example,
 a verse is said to have the suggested meaning as karuṇa-rasa
 (i.e., pathetic sentiment) when from the reading of its con-
 tents the sentiment of pathos develops also in the heart of the
 reader. It is the unworldly way of the world of poetry that a
 continued experiencing of the same feeling of pathos itself leads
 to an exquisite joy.

Abhinava defines bhāvadhvani as follows 'tatra yadā
 kaścīdudrīktavasthām pratīpanno vyabhicāri camatkārātīśaya
 prayojako bhavati, tadā bhāvadhvaniḥ' (Locana, p 175)
 Here 'udrīkta' may mean 'increased', 'excessive', 'distinct' or
 'evident' or 'abundant'. It is not clear from Abhinava's words
 if the vyabhicāri is to be simply recognised or it is to be ex-
 perience by the sahrdaya (i.e., man of taste) as belonging
 to himself. But as bhāva is treated in the same footing as rasa
 and as both are said to be suggested instantaneously, being ter-
 med as asamlakṣyakramavyangya (i.e., suggested through an
 unnoticeable sequence) we may conclude that in bhāvadhvani
 also the relevant vyabhicāribhāva is experienced by the reader
 himself. For example, if in a piece the vyabhicāribhāva lajjā
 (shame) is to be taken as suggested instantaneously, thus present-
 ing a case of bhāvadhvani, the same feeling of lajja must be
 experienced by the readers themselves.

To define rasabhāsa Abhinava says, "yada tu vibhavābhāsa
 dratyābhasodayastada vibhāvanubhāsaccarvanābhāsa iti rasā
 bhāsasya viśayah" (Locana, pp 177-178). This means
 that the rasabhāsa is the relish of a sentiment from a semblance
 of vibhava (and anubhava) for, in order to explain the signi-
 ficance of the term ābhasa Abhinava says—"anukṛtiramukhy-

atā ābhāsa iti hyeko'rthaḥ" (p. 179). Vivhāva has two aspects namely, (1) ālambana or the object (or person) in respect of which the emotion of the dramatic character arises, and (2) uddīpana or the entire surrounding, which enhances the emotion towards the object which primarily stimulates emotion. In case of rasābhāsa semblance of vibhāva means semblance of ālambana vibhāva, and we have such a vibhāva when the relation of the poetic character with the object of emotion is not genuine or when such an emotion, although it is duly stimulated, is not proper towards the object in hand.

Abhinava does not define bhāvābhāsa, but, it can be inferred that a suggestion of vyabhicārī on the strength of a semblance of vibhāva's is meant by bhāvābhāsa. Once we understand what is 'bhāva' there need not be any difficulty in understanding bhāvodaya, bhāvaprasāma and bhāvasandhi which are its different aspects only. (Cf. "rasabhāvaśabdena ca tadābhāsataḥprasāmāvapi saṁgrhītāveva, avāntaravaicitrye'pi tadekarūpatvāt" (Locana. p. 90).

Importance of rasādi : This rasādi variety is the most important variety of the suggested sense. With the enthusiasm to assert it Ānanda says : "That very rasādi variety is the soul of poetry. That is why in the days of yore, sorrow of Vālmīki at the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a śloka," (Dhv. I, 5). In this statement there are two parts, viz., (1) 'that very rasādi variety is the soul of kāvya' (kāvyasyātmā sa evārthaḥ) and (2) 'the sorrow of the first poet, caused by the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a verse' (ādikaveḥ purā krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvamāgataḥ). From the first part we learn that although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, although the suggested sense in general should be recognised as the soul of poetry because of the general statements 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' (I. 1) and 'arthaḥ saḥṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmēti vyavasthitaḥ' (I. 2) yet rasa and bhāva are specifically

mentioned because of their importance. (cf "pratiyamānasya cānyabhedadarśane'pi rasabhāvamukhenaivopalakṣaṇam prādhānyāt" Vṛtti, pp 89-90) It is also to be noted that the expression 'rasābhāsa' stands for all the varieties of 'rasādi'. Elsewhere Ānanda recognises the importance of either the suggested or the express sense on the strength of its appeal (cf cārutvotkarsanibandhanā hi vācyavyaṅgyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā Vṛtti p 114) Even if we suppose the prādhānya of rasādi over the other varieties of the pratiyamāna (viz vastu and alamkāra) to be on account of greater appeal, we may recognise vastu and alamkāra also as the soul of kāvya in their own capacity. Interpreting Ānanda's expression 'prādhānyāt', Abhinava says — "prādhānyaditi / rasaparyavasānādityarthah / tāvanmātraviśrāntāvapi cānyaśabdavailakṣanyakāritvena vastvalamkāradhvanerapi jivitatvamaucityāduktamiti bhāvah" / (Locana p 90) This observation asserts that vastu and alamkāra even occurring as the suggested sense only help delineating the rasa. Abhinava also observes that bhāvadhvani, etc., also simply help the delineation of rasa. So the most important and appealing factor in kāvya is rasa. Even then there is propriety in considering vastudhvani and alamkāra dhvani also as the life of kāvya because of their superiority over ordinary expressions. But yet there is the scope for the doubt that if rasa is the most important element and bhāvadhvani and others simply contribute to its suggestion then what is the propriety in recognising dhvani in general, having all the varieties of the suggested sense, as the soul of kāvya? In fact, Mahimabhatta posed this question and even Viśvanatha, himself a supporter of the conception of dhvani, objected to the indiscriminate statement "kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ". In my opinion the reply to all this is implicit in the words of Ānanda and Abhinava themselves. The whole of the Raghuvamśa is a kāvya and even a single verse also may be supposed to be a kāvya. Sometimes an entire kāvya and sometimes even a part of it may be considered a kāvya and their respective merits may be subjected to assessment separately. In most of the varieties of

kāvya we find *rasa* as the most essential element of the entire composition. In some verses or parts of the longer *kāvya* we may be charmed by the suggested *vastu* or the *alaṅkāra* also. At times we single out verses from the body of a longer composition.⁵ In such cases the charm of the composition may be due to a *bhāvadhvani* or due to the presense of a predominant suggested sense of any variety other than the *rasa*. That even parts of an entire composition are taken into consideration is evident from the following observations.

(i) *sa ca rasādīdhvanirvyavasthita eva.....tathāpi tasya rasasyaikaḥ ghanacamatkārātmano'pi kutaścidaśmātprayojakībhūtādadhiko'sau camatkāro bhavati.* (*Locana*, p. 175).

(ii) *evāṁ rasadhvanerevāṁ bhāvadhvni prabhṛtayo niṣyandā āsvāde pradhānaṁ prayojakamevamaśaṁ vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate.* (*Locana*, p. 179).

(iii) *yadi vā prabandhe'pi muktakasyāstu sadbhāvaḥ, pūrvaparanirapekṣeṇāpi hi yena rasacarvaṇā kriyate tadeva muktakam / yathā — 'tvāmālikhya praṇayakupitām' ityādislokaḥ.* (*Locana*, p. 326). The verse 'tvāmālikhya' occurs in the *Meghadūta*; but *Abhinava* is prepared to consider it as a *muktaka* (i. e., a poem comprising of a single verse) free from the entire context. Thus the verse 'tvāmālikhya' may stand as a piece of *dhvani* on its own merit.

This very principle of relative charm and isolation is followed in time of considering the *citra* and the *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* type of *kāvya* also. *Citra* is conceived as a variety of composition having no *rasa* or any suggested sense but only an appeal due to its figures. The *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* type is conceived as a type of *kāvya* having a suggested sense *sans* predominance. In this connection we may consider the following points. (i)

5. *Rājaśekhara* also favours the idea of assessing the merits of a verse in isolation from the context. cf. "The subject of description may be in an isolated verse or in a *prabandha*, each of which is of five kinds."

(*HSP. Kane*, p. LXXIII).

Dhv III, 39 states that we should not be very hasty to call that *kavya* a *dhvani* when it appears more reasonable to apply only the designation of a *gunibhūtavyaṅgya kavya* to it (ii) But with reference to the contextual *rasas* even isolated cases of *gunibhūtavyaṅgya* also should be considered as *dhvani*. (Dhv III 40) (iii) In *gunibhūtavyaṅgya* the suggested sense is subservient to the *vācya* sense. But that superiority of *vācya* is only relative. It is also subordinate in relation to the *rasa* suggested by the larger extent of the composition where the *gunibhūtavyaṅgya* occurs. Compare

‘ata eveyati yadyapi vācyasya pradhānyam, tathāpi rasadhvanau tasyapi gunateti sūtrasya gunibhūtavyaṅgyasya prakaramantavyam / ata eva dhvanerevatmatvamityuktacaram bahuśah’ (Locana p 461) (iv) But, yet there may be stray and singled out instances where we may find unalloyed cases of *gunibhūtavyaṅgya* also. For this we are to examine very carefully as to whether there is an intention of the poet to delineate *rasa* with the help of the singled out passage. Compare ‘yatra tu vākya rasādītatparyam nāsti gunibhūtavyaṅgyaṅ padairudbhāsite pi tatra gunibhūtavyaṅgyatraya samudāyadharmah’ (Dhv p 485) ⁶

Significance of the episode of Valmiki. Coming to the second part of the *kār kā Dhv* I, 5, we question, how does the episode of Vālmiki help in establishing the fact that *rasa* is the most important element in *kāvya*? The reply is that Ānanda here lays bare the fact that the *Rāmāyana* is an ideal *kāvya* because of *rasa* and that it is rich in *rasa* can be established by a reference to the way of its origin itself. What Ānanda means to say is that a sorrow has been caused in the heart of Vālmiki

6 For a correct assessment of the attitude of Ānandavardhana towards the *kāvya* having a subordinate suggested sense see VVV p 103

laksya ca dvaita dham kavyam dśa e mukhyaṅ gaunam ca / ita ra mukhyaṅ ya ra vyaṅgyasya pradhānam aśaṅgam gunibhūtavyaṅgyaṅ gaunam / ullāṣam ca grīyama cā līlāvā al ra dīta va

by the pitiful wailings of the curlew whose beloved has been killed and Vālmiki burst into the verse “mā niṣāda”, etc., It cannot be known if Ānanda meant that there is karuṇa rasa in the verse “mā niṣāda”. Ānanda says “nihatasahacarivirahakā-tarakrauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva ślokatayā pariṇataḥ/śoko hi karuṇasthāyibhāvaḥ/” (Dhv. pp. 88-89). From this it is clear that there was an intimate relation between the phenomenon of the spontaneous composition of the poem “mā niṣāda” and a sense of sorrow (śoka) in the heart of the poet. Ānanda further asserts that śoka is also the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa rasa. The verse ‘mā niṣāda’ is the beginning of the whole Rāmāyaṇa which has karuṇa as its principal rasa (Dhv. pp. 529-530). Ānanda believes that in order to delineate sentiment in poetry the poet himself must be sensitive. The feeling to be depicted must already run through every vein of the poet. It is very desirable for the poet himself to be suffused with emotions. To assess this position of Ānanda we may compare the following also.

(i) Figures come in a competitive manner to the composition of a poet suffused with emotion. (“...rasasamāhita cetasaḥ pratibhānavataḥ kaverahampūrvikayā parāpatanti.” Dhv. pp. 221-222).

(ii) śṛṅgārī cetkaviḥ kāvyē jātām rasamayaṁ jagat /

sa eva vitarāgaścennīrasaṁ sarvameva tat //

(Dhv. p. 498).

It is also severally stated that the reader also must have a heart sufficiently sensitive to feel the sentiment depicted in a piece of composition. Note the significant term—“sacetasām” in Dhv. I. 12. Ānanda, indeed, explains ‘sahṛdayatva’ as the aliveness to the depicted sentiments. cf. “rasajñataiva sahṛdayatvamiti” (Dhv. p. 359).

All these extracts clearly show that according to Ānanda, poetry owes its very origin to an intense feeling of sentiment in the heart of the poet and any composition of such a poet im-

bubed in sentiment is destined to be rich in the suggestion of rasa.⁷ Thus with the help of the episode of Vālmiki, Ānanda tries to bring home the idea that rasa is the most important element in kāvya. Rāmāyana is great because of its rasa, and it is an instruction from Ānanda to the would be poets that in order to make the kāvya rich in sentiment the poet himself must have an intense feeling as Vālmiki had. Moreover, Ānanda believes that the poet and the reader and the poetical character must all experience the same sentiment, and this is nothing other than what has been more precisely stated by Bhāṭṭatauta, Abhinava's teacher, in the extract "rāyakasya kaveh śrotuḥ samānonubhavastīti" (quoted in Locana, p. 92).

It requires to be noted here that in some of the places referred to above Ānanda does not use the term rasa in its technical sense of a sentimental experience or relish of the reader but in a loose sense to mean a sentiment in general. In fact we cannot help using the term rasa in a general non technical sense also. Rasa as an experience belongs to the reader but yet the kāvya which stimulates the experience of permanent state is also said to have rasa. Hence, Dhanañjaya observes that we should have a secondary implication of the expression 'rasavat

7. cf. "Given the same natural qualifications he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing, distress and anger, for instance are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence, it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him, the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beset himself with emotion" De Poetica, Chapter XVII.

That a sentiment similar to that of the poet is evoked in the heart of the reader is observed by the most modern critic also. Hence, compare :
 " . . . a poetry which by means of myths and symbols seems to convey rather than to describe the extremely complex emotional and intellectual state whence an experience similar to that of the poet will arise." Contemporary French Poetry, p. 1.

kāvyaṃ' as a 'kāvyā capable of arousing a sentiment (in the heart of the reader)' and not as a 'kāvyā possessing a rasa', just as we have a secondary significance in the expression 'āyurghṛtam' because of a cause and effect relation. ⁸

Abhinava, commenting on kārīkā, I. 5, seems to tell us something different from what has been intended by Ānanda. ⁹ In Abhinava's estimate the śoka which has been the source of the verse 'mā niṣāda' and its sentiment, already became a rasa in the heart of the ādikavi. In order to be delineated in the kāvyā the śoka experienced by the poet no longer remains a personal feeling, but it gets duly universalised. ¹⁰ This universalised feeling of śoka causes druti (melting) in the heart of the poet and gets manifested in the form of a verse in the manner of the waters flowing over the brink of a jar. Quoting Bhaṭṭanāyaka's 'yāvatpūrṇo na caiteṇa tāvannaiva vamatyamum' Abhinava wants to assert that in order to give vent to it in the form of a kāvyā the poet must experience a sentiment with all his heart. The experience of the sentiment should be so intense and sincere that the poet's experience of the sentiment would be much different from the experience of an ordinary man. Cf. "krauñcadvandvaviyogena.....karuṇarasarūpatām laukikaśoka-vyatiriktām.....pratipanno ślokarūpatām prāptaḥ", etc. (Locana, p. 86). Up to this Abhinava does not appear to have any difference from Ānanda. But Abhinava's observation "na tu muneḥ śoka itī mantavyam" appears to run counter to the plain words of Ānanda as, "ādikaveḥ śokaḥ slokatvamāgataḥ." But Abhinava's words may be interpreted to mean that the muni being a sympathetic heart, his śoka does not remain a

8. DR. IV.

9. Dhv. Trans. pp. 156-158.

10. The emotions of the poetical character shared also by the reader is experienced in a universal form neither strictly belong to the character nor to the reader. The phenomenon of universalisation will be discussed in the next chapter.

śoka of the ordinary personal nature. Abhinava himself desires that rasa in its technical sense may be had only when it is suggested by the vibhāvas etc., as delineated in the kāvya which is a piece of art and hence, the feeling of śoka by the muni caused by an worldly scene should not be considered as a rasa. Yet we may suppose that the designation of rasa is applied to the said feeling of rasa only to show its distinction from the ordinary personal feelings of the men of non-poetical nature. It is said not to be 'a śoka of the muni' to mean that the feeling of sorrow is not strictly personal. But with all these confusing observations Abhinava sincerely tries to tread the very path laid by his predecessors in Ānanda, Bhaṭṭatṛta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka.^{10a}

Types of kāvya and position of rasa - Ānandavardhana finds different varieties of kāvya before him. Some of those varieties have rasa and others are devoid of rasa. Ānanda proposes to discuss as to what type of composition (samghaṭanā) should be employed in the different types of kāvya. Types of composition are understood in terms of the length and frequency of the compounds (i.e., samāsas). The criterion for choosing a type of composition for a particular variety of kāvya is the presence or absence of rasa in the said variety. Such varieties of kāvya are named in the vṛtti as follows :

"yataḥ kāvyasya prabhedā muktakam saṃskṛtaprākṛtāpabhra-
mṣaṇibaddham/ sandānitakaviśeṣakakalāprikakulakāni/ paryāya-
bandhah parikathā khandakathāsakalakathe sargabandhobhine-
yārthamākhyāyikakathe ityevamādayah /" (Dhv. p. 323) ¹¹
Ānanda observes that muktakas (single self-sufficient verse poems) may or may not have rasa. cf. "tatra muktakesu rasa-
bandhābhiniveśinah kavestadāśrayamaucityam/ anyatra kāmā-
cārah/" (p. 324). Any type of composition is allowed in 'parikathā' because rasa is not very sincerely desired to be depicted there. cf. "parikathāyām kāmācārah.. nātyantarasa-bandhā
bhinnasīti" (p. 325). Even in the epic there may be or may not

10a. See 'Poet and the Poet' in Chap. III, below

11. Vide Locana for definitions

be the intention to delineate rasa. It is however, more desirable to have rasa in the epics. cf. "sargabandhe tu rasatātparye... sādhiyah" (p. 325-26) Abhinava also illustrates "Bhaṭṭajayantaka's ^{11a} Kādambarīkathāsāra as an epic having the intention of simply telling facts and the Raghuvamśa as an epic having the intention of delineating rasa. (Locana, p, 326). In case of kathā and ākhyāyikā also the poet or the poetical character may or may not be suffused with sentiment. cf. "tathā hyatrāpī.....pūrvoktamevānusartavyam". (Dhv. p. 326). In this manner Ānanda recognises a good number of kāvyas virtually devoid of rasa. But yet he instructs that it should be the sole intention of the poets to depict rasa in all the varieties of kāvya. He further declares that the very purpose of the work Dhvanyāloka was not only to explain what dhvani is but also to instruct that the poet should solely intend on depicting rasa. cf. "kavinā kāvyamupanibadhnatā tatsiddheḥ" (p. 336) and "...rasādirūpavyaṅgyatātparyamevaiṣāṁ yuktamiti yatnosmābhīrārabdho na dhvanipratipādanamātrābhīniveśena"

(pp. 363-364).

A most important factor determining the presence or absence of rasa is the intention of the poet. Ānanda discusses the citra type of composition only on the basis of lack of intention to depict any rasa. Even in a citra there may be a flimsy flash of rasa but that does not deserve to be counted. cf. "vācyasām-arthyaavaśena...vyavasthāpyate" (pp. 497-497) Ānanda finally observes that after his instructions are imparted only the beginners may be found to indulge in citra but the matured hand would compose dhvani alone. (cf. "tadevamidānīmāna..... sthitametat", pp. 499-500). But it is to be noted that as soon as we say 'dhvanireva kāvyam' we revert to the old position

11a. By the expression Bhaṭṭajayantaka Abhinava means to refer to Abhinanda, (son of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the celebrated logician of Kashmir) who was the author of the Kādambarī Kathāsāra. (vide, S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 324.)

that even vastu and almkāra may be honoured when presented in a form of dhvani. This position is further clarified by the samgrahaśloka's following the above extract running as

vasmin raso vā bhāvo va tātparyena prakāśate /
samvṛtyābhīhitam vastu yatrālmkāra eva vā //

kāvyaādhvani dhvanirvyangyapradī ānyat anibandhanah /
sarvatra tatra viśayajñāyah sahrdayairjñanah //

Possibly this very catholicity vouched to Ānanda's partiality for rasa allows us to recognise a dhvani school as distinct from the rasa school.

Utility of the dhvani theory Proposing to examine the utility of the dhvani theory we are instantaneously reminded of Abhinava's observation under kārīkā 1.5 as 'anyaśabdavailaks anyakāritvena vastvalimkāradhvanerapi jīvitatvamaucityādakt amiti bhāvah' (Locana p. 90) which points out that even matters of fact when suggested endow the composition with a distinction (vailakṣṇya). Ānanda also shows on several occasions that even a vastu (a matter of fact) when conveyed through suggestion becomes more appealing. In this connection we may observe the following points

(1) In kārīkā 1.25, Ānanda says that in dhvani's suggeston conveys such a charming meaning which cannot be conveyed by the ordinary speech. If normally expressed the same matter of fact will not be as charming as when it is suggested.

(2) The ideas which are suggested by a few words will require many more words to be denoted. Suggestion helps conveying such volumes of ideas that it is almost impossible to convey the same by express statements. More charming ideas are conveyed in a compact manner through suggestion with a great economy of words. cf. 'vyangy madharmīn' ram prayojit rūpam rājvanirvāsanādyasam hīnyam / taccāsarīrahyaat vādabhidhāvyaṣpā enīśakya amarpinam' (Locana, under Dhv II.1, P. 169)

(iii) We may also compare Abhinava's comment on the verse "ravisamkrāntasaubhāgya" as "asādhāraṇavicchāyatvānup ayogitvādidharmajātamasamkhyam prayojanam vyanakti." Hence an amazing economy is also another source of appeal.

(iv) What is implicitly observed in I. 25 and expressly stated by Abhinava is believed by the modern western critics also. Through suggestion the poet may communicate the incommunicable and volumes of ideas at a time. cf. "By reducing semantic and grammatical redundancy to an unusual level, by relaxing linguistic and social restrictions, the poet attempts to communicate the incommunicable. This is the essence of poetic licence. The thought expressed is accompanied by several other thoughts which are merely suggested" (Word, p. 211). Modern poets of the west and also of India following the ideal of the poets like T. S. Eliot, use the suggestive language for conveying greater volume of ideas and feelings in a compressed form. Compare, "By means of such references and quotations Mr. Eliot attains a compression, otherwise unattainable, that is essential to his aim; a compression approaching simultaneity—the co-presence in the mind of number of different orientations fundamental attitudes, orders of experience" (New Bearings in English Poetry : p, 107). According to E. M. W. Tillyard, suggestion through the employment of allusion (i, e., quotation from earlier poets) results in even economy of space and enrichment of texture. Compare : "...The reference is a true obliquity; it implies without a word of statement : and the result is economy of space and enrichment of texture." (Poetry Direct and Oblique, p. 63).

(v) Utility of composing kāvyas in the form of dhvani lies in the fact that the more appealing idea can be presented only as the suggested content and never as the expressed sense, as it has been observed by Ānanda again and again. Compare : "prasiddhiśceyamastyeva... yadabhimatatarām vastu vyaṅgyatvena prakāśyate na sākṣācchabdavācyaatvena." (Dhv. p, 533). This principle is accepted also by Mahimabhaṭṭa who would,

however, designate the suggested (*vyangya*) as inferred (*anumeya*), for, he observes, "vācya hyartha na tathā camatkāramā tanoti yathā sī eva vidhinis-dhādhī lākvabhidheyatāmanumey- atam vāvatīna iti svabhāva evāyamarthānām" (VV p. 54)

(vi) The theory of *dhvani* had its utility also in bringing a rejuvenation to the old and hackneyed poetical ideas. In course of the development of certain literature certain ideas get stereotyped and labelled as poetical and begin to lose the inherent charm on account of being much commonplace. Hence, the same ideas require to be given a new expression, and indeed novelty is the greatest secret of beauty as it has been so very rightly observed by Māgha in the statement "kṣaṇaḥ kṣaṇa- yannavātāmupaiti tadeva rūpam ramanyatāyāḥ" The more familiar and the easily accessible have less appeal whereas the new and the cryptic attract us more¹². The pioneers of the modern poetry in the west also are alive to such a problem of old and worn out ideas. We find signs of a reaction of the new poets to the hackneyed poetical expressions in the following extract from the New Bearings in English Poetry : ' On the next sentence—'we have become accustomed to the idea that certain things are not poetical'—our commentary runs : Worse, we have become accustomed to the idea that certain things are poetical, e. g. flowers, dawn, dew, birds, love, archaisms and country place names ; 'that a poet can mention a rose but not a

12 Abhinava also observes that the suggested meaning being not conveyed by the words as the direct express meaning becomes more attractive like the breasts of a young lady, half hidden from the eye, and there lies the necessity of conveying a matter of fact through suggestion. Compare, "tallalāraprayo anam śurakṣavidyāvakṛtīm prāśastyaṁ aśabḍavācya- veragopyamānam saṁvīkīkucakalāyam va mahāghaṭṭmu, ayaddhvaryata i)" (*Locana* p. 128) Also compare "nādhāpāyodhara ivāṣṭarīm prāṣṭāḥ do gūṇarāna ivāṣṭarīm nigūṇāḥ / artho gūṇmapṭiḥ pṛ- ṭhaxa kṛtī subhāṣṭarīm mātāḥ avāṣṭarīm // (Quoted by Pt. Pa. tathārama Sastri in *Dhv.* p. 128)

Rolls-Royce'—suspicious" (p. 23). Ānanda also introduced the theory of dhvani for a re-orientation in the poetical expressions. Compare Dhv. IV. 1. and 2. He further observes, "ato dhvaneruktaprabhedamadhyādanyatamenāpi prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā satī vānī purāṇanakavinibaddhārthasaṁsparsāvatyapi navatvāmāyāti." (The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by atleast a single variety of suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned.) ¹³ This position is very convincingly illustrated by the distinction in the appeal of the verses 'evaṁ vādinī' and 'kṛte varakathālāpe' (Dhv. p. 528).

The suggested meaning itself is supposed to be charming, and if at the same time it occurs as the predominant content it renders the composition all the more beautiful. That is why Ānanda advocates in so strong terms in favour of dhvani (i.e., a kāvya having a predominant suggested sense). The modern critic also desires that the suggested content, in order to be more appealing and effective must occur as the predominant meaning of the composition. Compare —"Lastly it must be borne in mind that the common place, to be of the highest effect, must be powerfully and consistently dominant." (Poetry Direct and Oblique , p. 49).

(vii) The most important purpose served by the dhvani theory was to lay the greatest emphasis on rasa. It is already observed that by the time of Ānanda the Sanskrit literature was degenerating to a very regrettable extent and it became a slave to the fad and fashion of stereotyped figures. Poetical ideas required to be presented in a new manner and that is why every idea and every object of description was desired to be given a tinge of rasa. Even the old and hackneyed ideas assume new values and charms in association with rasa. This utility of rasa is brought to a bold relief in the kārīkā.—

dr̥ṣṭapūrvā api hyarthā kāvyē rasaparigrahāt /
sarve navā ivābhānti madhumāsa iva drumāḥ //

(Dhv. IV. 4)

But rasa can never be denoted. It must be suggested and that is how we cannot help having dhvanis. In this connection it will be interesting to refer to the following observation also. "Sensibility, then, we may expect to be a very frequent subject of oblique expression, and it is likely to be most truly present when least is said about it—manifestations." (Poetry Direct and Oblique p. 39)

Other devices for novelty. Ānandavardhina was, however, a realist, and as such being less stubborn about the use of dhvani for novelty, enumerated also other devices for effecting novelty in the expressed content. Those devices are namely, the effecting of distinction in respect of the circumstances (avasthā), place and time, etc. (Dhv. IV. 7). Distinctions in circumstances may mean description of the same object in different situations. Distinction in circumstances may be effected by personification of nonsentient objects like the rivers and the hills. The nonsentient objects are all supposed to have a second sentient personality and novelty in poetry may be obtained by delineating their personality with propriety. Ānanda observes, "ayamaṣṭrascāvasthāthedaprakāro yadacetanānām sarveṣām cetanam dvitīyam rūpamabhimānitvaprasiddham" ¹⁴ himavadgaṅgādīnām / taccacetanaviśiṣṭyavarūpayojanayopanibadhyamānamaryadeva sampadyate" (Dhv. p. 539) Distinction in respect of place is reckoned, for instance, in case of the description of the women belonging to different regions. Compare :

"tathā hi mānuṣānāreva . . . viśiṣṭo yoṣitām" (p. 541)

In this connection we are very naturally reminded of the al-

¹⁴ The art of personification is in fact as old as the figured literature and it is philosophically sanctioned by the śūtra "abhimānivyapadāśru v aśānuga bhyaṁ" (Brahmaṇḍa sa, 2. 1. 5) which seems to be echoed by Ānanda here.

ready quoted verse, 'nāndhrīpayodhara'. Distinction in respect of time may be noticed in case of the different seasons.

The definition of dhvani : The definition of dhvani is given in the kārikā I. 13, which runs as—'yatrāthaḥ śabdaḥ vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau / vyaktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ //' (That kind of poetry, wherein either the conventional meaning or the word renders itself or its conventional meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the implied meaning is designated by the learned as DHVANI or suggestive poetry.)

This definition has been subjected to severe criticism by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who pointed out as many as ten defects, (VV. p. 104). The ten defects are duly discussed and a proper reply from the standpoint of Ānanda is also given in the KTS (pp. 38-47).¹⁵ Commenting on the expression "kāvyaviśeṣa" Abhinava writes, "kāvyam ca tadviśeṣaścāsau kāvyasya vā viśeṣaḥ / —syāditi" (Locana, pp. 104-105). According to this explanation "kāvyaviśeṣa" may mean "either a kind of kāvyā" or a "speciality of kāvyā". In "kāvyagrahaṇād," etc., Abhinava takes the second meaning, i. e., 'a speciality of kāvyā which belongs to a kāvyā, consisting of śabda and artha and embellished by guṇa and alaṅkāra, as its soul (ātmā).' This meaning very agreeably accommodates itself with Ānanda's observation "kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti" in kārikā I.1. If 'kāvyasya viśeṣa' or a 'distinction of kāvyā' is called dhvani we should naturally have the desire to know, what this distinguishing factor is ? Now, as pointed out by Ruṣṣaka 'viśeṣa' should mean either a variety or 'a speciality'. ("atra viśeṣaśabdaḥ prabhedaparyāyotiśaya-paryāyo vā syāt." VVV. p. 92). But "sa kāvyaviśeṣa" has a direct relation with 'yatra' (where), which means a substratum or a domain, lying wherein the word and the meaning suggest the pratiyamānārtha (tamartham). If kāvyā-viśeṣa means a speciality, it cannot have the relation of identity with what is

15. Vide. I. Aest pp. 313-332.

referred to by 'yatra' Hence at least in this *kārikā*, 'kāvyaviśeṣa' means a kind of *kāvya* (taking *viśeṣa* as *prabheda-paryāya*) Abhinava understands as many as five meanings of the term *dhvani*, viz., (i) the function of suggestion, (ii) suggestive expression (iii) suggestive meaning, (iv) the suggested content and (v) poetry with predominantly suggested sense In case of the present *kārikā* he desires us to take the last sense of the term *dhvani* (Locana pp 105-106) But if we understand a variety of *kāvya* from the expression *kavyaviśeṣa* then we are sure to have the doubt as to how 'a kind of *kāvya*' may be called 'the soul of *kāvya*' Understanding *dhvani* as a kind of *kāvya* Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that we cannot call a variety of *kāvya* a *dhvani* we must call *kāvya* in general a *dhvani* since it is desired that all the *kāvyas* should have *rasa* cf *apīca kāvyaviśeṣa ityatra rasatma katvopagamāt* (VV pp 92-93) *Dhvani* even being understood as a type of *kāvya* may be called the soul of *kāvya* It may be seen that *dhvani*, *gunibhūtavyaṇeya* and *citra* are only grades of *kāvya* whereas the different varieties of *kāvya* are *muktaka*, *kulaka*, *khandakathā* etc as seen above Such complete *kāvyas* are referred to as *prabandha* (whole composition) *kāvya* in general is supposed to be a collection of words ¹⁶ Ānanda calls the 'whole composition' a *prabandha* (cf *idāni malakṣyakramavyangyo dhvaniḥ prabandhātmā rāmāyaṇamaḥ-ābhāratalādau prakāśamānaḥ prasiddhaḥ eva* Dhv pp 328-329) Abhinava shows that the *prabandha* is constituted of words (cf 'varnasamudāyaśca padam prabandhaḥ' Locana, p 302) Ānanda tells us that the *kāvya* is a collection of words in the expressions like, 'śabdātmā kāvyam ti vyapadeśyo' (Dhv p 105) In such a *kāvya* a particular portion also may be sugges-

tive and the same suggestive portion being constituted of śabdas may technically be called a kāvya. This kāvya, occurring within a longer kāvya may be designated as dhvani because of the predominant suggested sense. In this way, we may have an easy justification for calling a kind of kāvya a dhvani and at the same time recognising dhvani as the soul of poetry in so far as even an entire prabandha should have at least a portion suggestive of any one variety of the pratiyamānārthas and the rest of the prabandha should, as a rule, be helpful to the suggestion of that sense.¹⁷ This principle of considering even a portion of a whole composition as dhvani is at the root of considering even individual words as dhvani. Compare : "kiṁ ca kāvyānām...cārutvapratītiranvayavyatirekābhyām bhāgeṣu kalpyata itī padānāmapi vyañjakatvamukhena vyavasthito dhvanivyavahāro na virodhi." (Dhv. p. 301). Even for them who consider rasa as the soul of poetry, there must be some portions which do not have the instantaneous suggestion of rasa but may claim to have rasa as their soul by virtue of being helpful to the suggestion of rasa as the description of the appropriate situation, location, etc. (or in other words, of vibhāvas, etc.). Portions lacking in immediate suggestion of rasa will be consi-

17. Tillyard desires also some non-suggestive poetry for putting the suggestive poetry into bolder contrast and for preparing the ground for the suggestive portion. Compare, "It is doubtful if we can get the full force of the best verse without having the humble kinds as a standard of composition. A long poem like the Illiad supplies within itself its own background; Pinder gained by the discovery of Bacchylides; Chaucer gains if Gower is not forgotten. Direct poetry will thus correspond to sheer observation of manners and of mind that fills the bulk of some of the greatest novels and which prepares for their crucial episodes. Ever since Poe pronounced that a long poem was a series of short genuine poems united by long stretches of stuff that was not poetry at all, people have been apt to slight this humble but necessary function of direct poetry". (Poetry Direct and Oblique, P. 24).

dered as having rasa by virtue of the rasa of the entire composition. That is why Viśvanātha had to observe 'anu tīrthi pr bandhāntarvartinām keśām-inīrasānām padyanām kāvyatvam na syāditi cet na rasavatpadyāntargatānīrasapadānāmiva padyarasaṇa prabandharasenaiva teśām rasavatāṅgikīrīt (SD 1). Hence it is quite plausible that the expression yatra in kārīkā I 13 refers to the suggestive portion of a kāvya as a whole. For a similar implication of 'yatra' we may compare Dr V. Raghavan's observation on 'bhāvikaivamiti prītiḥ prabandhaviśayam guṇam/ pratyakṣā iva drśyante yatrārthā bhūta bhāvinah //'' of Bhāmaha as 'the term 'prabandha' may be rendered here as 'that part of the poem on the force of the word 'yatra' and on the basis of the Jayamangalā which points out only one canto in illustration of this Bhāva itva' (Some concepts of the Alīmkāraśāstra, pp 117-118). We may now understand 'kāvyaviśeṣa' in the sense of 'a speciality' of kāvya, i.e., the suggestive portion (called dhvani) may prove a speciality of the entire prabandha.

Other meanings of the word dhvani. It is already pointed out that according to kārīkā, I 13 dhvani is a type of kāvya and according to Abhinava the word dhvani may have five senses, viz., (i) vyañjaka artha (suggestive meaning), (ii) vyañjaka śabda (suggestive word) (iii) vyañjanā vyāpāra (the function of suggestion), (iv) vyangya (the suggested content) and (v) samudāya kāvya (i.e. kāvya as a whole). It is also already seen that Ānanda applies the term dhvani to kāvya on the strength of the analogy of the suggestive kāvya with the audible sounds, which are successive of the sphoṭa and are designated as dhvani in the VKPD. Abhinava also quotes further verses from the VKPD to show the justification of having the five different senses of the term dhvani, enumerated above. Abhinava also tries to show that, the term dhvani may be used in the five different senses on the strength of certain indications.

18. V. d. 1. Aes. (p. 231) for an explanation of the relevant portion of the Locana.

had from the following words of the *vṛtti* : “tathaihvānyaistanmatānusāribhiḥ...vācyavācakasammiśraḥ śabdātmā,kāvyamiti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvanirityuktaḥ.” But in my humble opinion, it is difficult to derive all the five meanings of the term *dhvani* from this passage of the *vṛtti*. Abhinava wants to connect (i) *vācyavācakasammiśraḥ* and (ii) *śabdātmā* and (iii) *kāvyamiti vyapadeśyaḥ*, separately with the clause ‘*dhvanirityuktaḥ*’. The aggregation (*samuccaya*) of the three objects, viz., *vācyavācakasammiśraḥ*, etc., is to be understood even without the use of the particle ‘*ca*’ as in the verse ‘*gāmaśvam*’¹⁹. The expression ‘*vācyavācakasammiśra*’ itself means the three elements, viz., ‘*vācyārtha*’, ‘*vācakaśabda*’ and ‘*sammiśra*’. Hence, (i) *vācyārtha* and (ii) *vācakaśabda* are called *dhvani*. According to Abhinava the expression ‘*sammiśra*’ refers to the *vyañgyārtha* and hence, (iii) *vyañgyārtha* is also *dhvani*. But the exposition of the term *sammiśra* is not very convincing. For, if we follow the words “*sammiśryate vibhāvānubhāvasamvalanayeti vyañgyo’pi dhvaniḥ*,” then we should understand only one variety of the *vyañgya* viz., *rasa*. Explaining the expression ‘*śabdātmā*’ Abhinava observes, “*śabdanaṁ śabdaḥ śabdavyāpāraḥ...api tvātmabhūtaḥ*, so’*pi dhvananaṁ dhvaniḥ*”. Thus, (iv) the *vyañjanāvyāpāra* is also *dhvani*. But here we question, why should the *vyañjanāvyāpāra* be supposed to be *ātmabhūta* ? Abhinava’s reply would possibly be like this—*vyañjanāvyāpāra* is called *ātmabhūta*, because it is called *dhvani* and because *dhvani* is called the *ātmā* in ‘*kāvyaśāstrātmā dhvaniḥ*’ (K. I. 1). But this would involve a logical see-saw. Because, if at all the *vyāpāra* is called *dhvani*, it would be known to us only from the present passage of the *vṛtti* duly understood. That (v) *kāvya* is to be called *dhvani* is intended to be instructed by Ānanda himself.

The plain meaning of the present portion of the *vṛtti* may be as follows : Grammarians call the *śrūyamāṇavarṇas dhvani*.

19. This refers to the verse,—*aharaharnayamāno gāmaśvam puruṣaṁ paśum / vaivasvato na tṛpyati surayā iva durmadī* // (MB. NSP. p. 463).

The śrūyamānavarnas suggest the invisible eternal sphoṭa²⁰. The ālamkārikas also call kāvya, which consists of words (śabdātmā), dhvani when it possesses suggestiveness (vyañ-jakatva). The audible sounds (śrūyamānavarnas) suggest sphoṭa and the suggestive kāvya suggests the different types of the suggested sense. And this is the basis of the analogy (vyañ-jakatvasāmyāt). For making the analogy between kāvya and śrūyamānavarnas more precise it is pointed out that kāvya consists of words. But in l. 13, it is observed that artha also may suggest. (yatrārthah śabdo vā vyanktah). That is why Ānanda points it out clearly that in kāvya, made of words, the meaning and the words remain duly mingled up (vācyavācaka-sammīś-rah). Hence, when we conceive of a kāvya we conceive it in terms of some meaningful words. So, of the five meanings of the term dhvani, we may accept three meanings, viz., śabda, artha and samudāyakāvya, also on the strength of this passage of the vṛtti. Yet, we question why did Abhinava have the fascination to call the vyangya artha and the vyañjanavyāpāra dhvani? The reason may be like this: In kārikā l. 1, dhvani is called ātmā. Again Ānanda calls the appealing artha ātmā in l. 2 and the rasādi variety of the suggested sense ātmā in l. 5. Possibly because of these expressions Abhinava thought it necessary to interpret the vyangya artha also as dhvani, even with some apparent difficulty. In the expressions (1) anye tam dhvanīsamjñitam kāvyātmānam guṇavṛttirnyāhuḥ (p. 28) and (2) yadyapyuktam bhakturdhavanīriti (p. 141), Ānanda seems to conceive dhvani as a śabdavyāpāra, which may be confused with another vyāpāra, viz., lakṣaṇā. Such expressions, it may be conjectured, led Abhinava to interpret the vyañjanā function also as dhvani. But, in my humble opinion, the opponent is intentionally presented by Ānanda to be confusing dhvani as a function. By way of refuting the view

20. For a full treatment of sphoṭa, vide, "Sphoṭa and the Spoken Word" by T. V. Kapali Shastri in 'Śrī Anandabhai Māndar Annual,' 16 Augus. 1953

of the opponent confusing dhvani as bhakti, Ānanda clearly says that bhakti and dhvani are quite different in form. The former is nothing other than guṇavṛtti (i. e., secondary function) and the latter is something where the vācya and the vācaka suggest a predominant vyaṅgya artha. Compare, “vācyavyatiriktasyārthasya vācyavācakābhyām tātparyeṇa prakāśanaṁ yatra vyaṅgyaprādhānye sa dhvaniḥ/upacāramātraṁ tu bhaktiḥ” (Dhv. p. 141), and Abhinava’s words “upacāro guṇavṛttirlakṣaṇā”. (Locana, p. 141).

But whatever be the merits of our present contention regarding the five meanings of the term dhvani, proposed by Abhinava, we must not fail to notice that the later tradition has accepted the said meanings of the term almost invariably. As observed by MM. Kane, “the commentary of Abhinavagupta occupies in the Alaṁkāra literature a position analogous to that of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya in grammar or Śaṅkarāchārya’s bhāṣya on Vedāntasūtras.”²¹ Abhinava has to be recognised as the chief exponent of the dhvani theory, without however, minimising the importance of Ānandavardhana, “but for whom probably there would have been no Abhinavagupta’s theory of meaning”.²² That is why Abhinava influenced the notion of the latter supporters of the theory to a great extent as it may be evidenced from the case of Māṇikyacandra. Māṇikyacandra, commenting on Mammata’s sūtra defining dhvani, observes,—“nanu dhvanyate iti vyaṅgyam, sa ca kāvyātmā, tat katham kāvyam dhvanirityāha ? ātmātmavatorabhedenopacārāt/yadā tu dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ iti kartṛvyutpattiḥ tadā nopacārah/...kārikāyām śabdārthasamudāya eva kāvyarūpa mukhyatayā dhvanināmnā prakhyāpitaḥ yathoktaprakāradhvanimayatvāt.” (Kp. Saṁ. p. 12). This passage very distinctly echoes the Locana. Compare, for instance, (1) “sa iti/.....kārikayā tu prādhānyena samudāya eva kāvyarūpo mukhyatayā dhvanirīti pratipāditam/” (Locana, pp. 105-106); (2) “kāvyamīti vyapadeśyaśca yo’rthaḥ so’pi

21. HSP. Kane, p. LXIX.

22. I. Aest. pp. 215-216.

dhvaniḥ, uktaprakāradhvanicatuṣṭayamayatvāt" (Locana, p 135) and (3) "dhvaniṛeva kāvyamṛti/ātmātmīnorabheda eva vastuto vyutpattaye tu vibhāgaḥ kṛta ityarthah" (Locana, pp 500-501)

Views of the opponents Like Patañjali Ānanda apprehends his own opponents. In kārikā I 1, he enumerates all the possible views of the opponents and the same kārikā also serves the purpose of stating the reasons for composing the very work. The opponents may be classified in three broad groups, viz, (1) Those who claimed a total absence of any thing called dhvani, (2) Those who wanted to identify dhvani with lakṣaṇā and (3) Those who believed that there is something worth called dhvani but beyond the scope of any description or analysis.

The first group itself may be supposed to maintain various views as follows (1) The earlier theorists have completely taken into account all the sources of beauty in poetical compositions. Hence, there cannot be anything more to be called dhvani. (ii) If at all some element of poetry is discovered newly to be termed as dhvani, that must be discarded as no source of beauty. (iii) If at all it is a source of beauty it is sure to be something within the scope of the guṇas or alamkāras or other such elements already recognised by earlier theorists. It is very likely that, only a variety of the already recognised elements is newly named. Even if it be claimed as an entirely new element of poetry, never before recognised by earlier theorists, there need not be a great clamour for it. Since, numerous sub-varieties of the different figures are being discovered every day and this dhvani is nothing more than a sub-variety of some figure.

We may assume that there were some contemporary scholars who actually raised the objections, pointed out above. We are told of such a contemporary poet, who is identified by Abhinava as Manoratha, by Ānanda himself. But that the second group of opponents, who claimed that dhvani is identical with lakṣaṇā, is imaginary is also told by Ānanda of "yadyapi ca -pāṅkalpyaivamuktam-'bhāktamāhastamanye' n." "

(Dhv. pp. 31-32). And those “whose minds were not astute enough to frame a definition, simply gave out that the true nature of dhvani was beyond all words and that it was discernible only to the minds of the sahrdayas” were also real contemporaries. According to MM. Kane, Bhaṭṭanāyaka also maintained such a view regarding dhvani. Cf. “the principal point on which he differs from the Dhvanyāloka is that he regards dhvani as transcending definition and as purely svasaṁvedya. So he was a follower of whom the Dhvanikārikā says, ‘kecidvācām sthitamaviṣaye tatvamūcustaḍīyam’ or as the Dhvanyāloka says, ‘kecitpunarlakṣaṇakaraṇaśālinabuddhayo dhvanestattvaṁ girāmagocaraṁ sahrdayahrdayasaṁvedyameva samākhyātavantaḥ.’ ” (HSP. Kane, p. LXXVIII). We, however, know at least of one theorist, viz., Jayantabhaṭṭa, who tried to refute the conception of dhvani but had to declare that the essential nature of it is quite indiscernible. Compare :

athavā nedṛśī carccā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate /
vidvāṁso’pi vimuhyantī vākyaṛthagahane’ dhvani // and,
paramagahanastarkajñānābhamirayaṁ nayaḥ. (Nyāya-
mañjarī, p. 45).

Ānanda’s reply to the opponents: (1) Ānanda gives a sharp reply to his opponents that, the view, viz., “there is no dhvani; because, a type of poetry additional to all well known varieties will necessarily cease to be poetry” is unsound. Because, when poetry is subjected to a proper analysis, as is done in the Dhvanyāloka, the conclusion that dhvani is the essential element of poetry can never be resisted. cf. “yadyapyuktaṁ...lakṣye tu parīkṣyamāne sa eva...kavyatattvaṁ/” (Dhv. pp. 106-107).

(2) Ānanda further argues that dhvani cannot be included in one or the other variety of the figures of speech. Because, the figures generally depend on the relation of the expressed and the expression, whereas dhvani depends on the relation of the suggester and the suggested between poetry and its content. Cf. “vyaṅgyavyaṅjaka...kutaḥ” (p. 107).

(3) There are, however, some figures which owe their very origin to the presence of some suggested content, e g , samāsokti, paryāyokta and ākṣepa. Ānanda shows that in all such alamkāras the suggested content is either equal in importance with or subordinate to the express sense. But the very definition of dhvani demands that the suggested sense must be predominant over the express sense. A case of equal predominance of the vācya and the vyangya senses is had in case of samdehasamkarālamkāra. Abhinava gives the verse "śaśivadanā" as its illustration (Locana, p 121). And Ānanda with reference to the samkarālamkāra observes, "almkāradīpayasambhāvanāyām tu vācyavyangyayoh samam prādhānyam" (p 123). A case of the suggested sense being subordinate to the express sense is illustrated by the verse "upodharāgena", which is an example of samāsokti. Here nīlā and śaśin are expressly described and their description is rendered more beautiful by the suggested idea of the behaviour of a couple of lovers (pp 109-111). This and similar cases are included under the purview of gunibhūtavyangya by Ānandavardhana. If there be stray examples of any of these alamkāras involving a more predominant suggested meaning they will be called dhvani, but dhvani itself would not be included in the scope of the alamkāra concerned. The criterion for considering either of the vācya and the vyangya as more predominant is a greater amount of charm of "cāruvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācyavyangyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā" (p 114). To sum up the arguments Ānanda gives three samkṣepaślokaś (on pp 130-131 as "vyangyasya saṁkarojjhitah") and Abhinava more precisely gives us the cases where in spite of the presence of a suggested sense we cannot have dhvani, in his observation "tena caturṣu prakāreṣu na dhvanivyavahārah sadbhāve'pi vyangyasya (i) aprādhānye (ii) mliṣṭapratītau (iii) vācyena samapraādhānye (iv) asphuṭe prādhānye ca" (Locana, p 131).

It may be interesting to note here that, Mammaṭa, who for the first time presents a classification of gunibhūtavyangya

variety of *kāvya*, derived much of his ideas from this observation of Abhinava. Compare :

agūḍhamaparasyāṅgaṁ vācyasiddhyaṅgamasphuṭam /
 saṁdigdhatulyaprādhānye kākṣīptamasundaram //
 vyaṅgyamevaṁ guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasyāṣṭau bhidāsmṛtāḥ /
 (KP. V. 1. 2).

Mammata's conception of the *agūḍhavyaṅgya* variety is based on the *Vṛtti* "yatra hi vyaṅgyakṛtaṁ...kavayo drśyante" (pp. 142-143) and the *Locana* thereon as "vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ ...uktyantareṇāśakyaṁ yaditi" (pp. 143-144) which desire that the suggested content also must not be very easily cognizable. *Prasiddhi* referred to by Ānanda is due to frequent use of the symbol and is the cause of rendering the suggested content less clandestine. This is very ably observed also by E. M. W. Tillyard. "Any very wide use of the fixed symbol in poetry is not likely to succeed. It is peculiarly liable to abuse. Excessively easy to invent, the fixed symbol risks becoming aridly mechanical on the one hand and fraudulently suggestive on the other. But capable as it is of powerful effect when used with economy it will always be valuable as a minor means of poetical obliquity." (*Poetry Direct and Oblique*. p. 67).

Bhakti is not dhvani : Replying to the view that *dhvani* is identical with *bhakti* Ānanda says that *dhvani* (i. e., suggestive poetry) cannot be identified with *bhakti* (i. e., indication) because they are different in nature. *Dhvani* is (a type of poetry) where a sense other than the express is communicated by the express sense and the expressive words, being intent on communicating the same suggested sense which is exclusively important. But *bhakti* is simply a metaphorical expression. (*Dhv.* p. 141).

Bhakti also cannot define *dhvani* because of the fallacies of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. There will be *ativyāpti* because there may be cases of figurative expression where the suggested sense had through the implication (*guṇavṛtti*) is very easily discernible

and as such does not have any beauty. The suggested sense in such a case does not assume any predominance because of the absence of any special charm. A composition may be called dhvani only when it suggests such a beautiful meaning which is incommunicable in a way other than suggestion. Cf., "uktyantarena visayibhavet" (p. 146)

Hence, the mere association of a suggested sense with the use of an upacāra (metaphor) will not present a case of dhvani. This corresponds to the saṃkṣepaślokaś "vyangyasya pratibhā-mātre", etc. (Dhv. p. 130). There may even be cases of lakṣaṇā which do not convey any suggested sense at all. Such cases of nirūdhā lakṣaṇā²³ also occur without any dhvani and hence there is the fallacy of ativyāpti when bhakti is taken as the definition of dhvani. Moreover, it cannot be claimed that the beautiful suggested sense which comes in the wake of the implied meaning is also had through implication (lakṣaṇā). Implication depends on the failure of the primary meaning to have a syntactical relation with the meanings of the other words in the sentence. That is why lakṣaṇā (implication) is said to be the tail of abhidhā (denotation). But dhvani is solely dependent on the suggestivity of the words which occurs irrespective of the consistency or inconsistency of the primary meaning (Dhv. I 17, 18). If we propose to define dhvani with lakṣaṇā the fallacy of avyāpti also will occur. Because, there

23 Vide Dhv. I 17. In 'līvanya' the etymological meaning is taken to be the primary meaning. Etymological 'saltiness' (i. e., līvanarya blīva) being incompatible mukhyārthavādhā is conceived and the common meaning of 'grace' is taken as the lakṣyārtha. Mammaka also does so in case of the word 'kufala'. But Viśvanātha's arguments in this connection appear to be more convincing. Like the word 'gauḥ', līvanya' is also a vācaka word. In the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhaṭṭapariśeḍha such words are considered as vācaka-padas of the rūḍha varieties. Hence, what we observe here is that conception of the different varieties of lakṣaṇā was still in the formative stage in the days of Anandavardhana.

is the presence of lakṣaṇā only in the avivakṣitavācya type of dhvani. The other varieties are free from the presence of lakṣaṇā. Lakṣaṇā may at best be recognised as a variable associate of dhvani but that is not enough for defining dhvani or identifying dhvani with lakṣaṇā (kārīkā I. 18). In the Uddyota III Ānanda very clearly distinguishes between guṇavṛttī and vyañ-jakatva whereby the distinction of dhvani from bhakti is more clearly established.

Dhvani is not indefinable : The view that, "dhvani is that kind of poetry wherein some indefinable charm is brought about both in words and in meanings, the same charm being discernible only to select critics like the preciousness of rare gems" is untenable. Because, all the sources of such a rare charm including the suggestivity of the poetry are duly explained and may surely be fully explained. There cannot be any other unique charm which is indefinable. If it is supposed that 'indefinability' means 'inexpressibility by all words' then such a supposition also will not stand; because, what is taken to be indefinable, (anākhyeya) may be referred to by the word 'indefinable' itself. If the expression 'indefinable' is supposed to mean an 'indeterminate experience of something which eludes determinate usage of words' ²⁴ then it may be pointed out that, the experience of such a unique charm is duly expounded by the writers on poetics. The Buddhist logicians, however, claim that everything in the world is indefinable and on the strength of their postulate one may argue that dhvani is also indefinable. But such a view of the Buddhists also require to be duly examined. It is indeed subjected to a proper examination by Ānandavardhana in his Dharmottarī, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavinīścaya. Ānanda, however, concludes that their definition of dhvani will be at least on par with the definitions of perception, etc., proposed by the Buddhists themselves.

24. cf. "sāmānyasaṃsparsīvikalpaśabdāgocaratve sati, prakāśamānatvaṃ tu yadanākhyeyatvamucyate kvacit..." (Dhv. p. 519).

According to a definition proposed by the Buddhists, perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the unerring cognition of given sensum in complete isolation from all ideata, or " *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoddhamabhrāntam* " (*Nyāyavindu*, 1) In perception the object of cognition is a unique individual (*svlakṣaṇa*) and the process of cognition is a mere sensing without any element of ideation (*kalpanā*) in it According to Dignāga perception is a cognition which is not at all subjectively determined and is not modified by ideas or concepts (*kalpanā*)²⁵ The concepts of name, class, quality, action and relation do not enter into the perception of an object The perceived object is a unique individual which does not admit of any description by concept and words It is just what it is immediately sensed to be (*tatorthā dviḥjñānam pratyakṣam*) Words and concepts express such aspects of things as are general or common to many things²⁶ But a thing is an individual in so far as it excludes all other things from within itself²⁷ Hence a perceived individual cannot be expressed by words or concepts From this it follows that, perception is a pure sensation which cannot be properly described or embodied in verbal judgements But yet we have a definition of *pratyakṣa* Similarly *dhvani* also may be a unique charm supposed to be beyond the description of ordinary expression but yet having a definition like the definition of *pratyakṣa*, proposed by the Buddhists²⁸

Varieties of *dhvani*: One of the arguments of Ānanda against the opponent who want to include *dhvani* in some variety of the figures is that *dhvani* itself can be divided and subdivided into so many varieties and as such *dhvani* having a much wider domain can never be included in the scope of any *alaṃkāra* Compare " *na caivamvidhasya dhvanerakṣyamāṇa pra-*

25 *Pratītiśāstramūlaka*, I

26. Such words are referred to by Ānanda as ' *sāmānyarāmāparī-vikalpaśabdā* ' (*Dhv* p. 519)

27 ' *apohavida* ' referred to in K.P. II

28 Also vide *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 40

bhedatadbhedasaṁkalanayā mahāviṣayasya saṁrambhaḥ” (Dhv. pp. 135–136). As proposed in this quoted statement Ānanda duly endeavours to classify dhvani into so many varieties and sub-varieties and finally declares that it is not possible for any one to enumerate all the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani and hence he simply indicates the direction for classification. (Dhv. III. 44). The tendency of classifying dhvani into innumerable varieties is found to be inherited also by the later theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. But instead of engaging ourselves with all the varieties of dhvani, it will be necessary for us to discuss only the major varieties for understanding the essentials of the theory.

Dhvani is firstly divided into (1) the avivakṣitavācya and (2) the vivakṣitānyaparavācya types. In the former, the primary meaning is not desired to be conveyed at all. The primary meaning being discarded, a secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha) occurs to our mind and a suggested meaning appears in the wake of the same. In the latter variety the primary meaning (vācyārtha) is not undesirable. Even remaining consistent the primary meaning suggests any one of the three types of the suggested sense, viz., vastu, alaṁkāra and rasādi by virtue of being different from the ordinary statements of fact. Let us now study these two varieties in greater detail.

Avivakṣitavācya type : The primary meaning (vācyārtha) in this type may either be atyantatiraskṛta (absolutely incongruous) or arthāntarasamkramita (i. e., requiring partial modification). In both the cases, however, the words are used to convey a secondary meaning only with the purpose of suggesting further ideas. When such suggested ideas become the source of a greater appeal we have a dhvani. The verse “ravisamkrānta”²⁹ is given as an example of the former type, where the primary meaning of the word andha (blind) is to be totally suppressed (atyantatiraskṛta) as it is not at all applicable to a

mirror as an adjective. The word 'andha' means the mirror itself through implication based on its incapacity to reveal (reflect) things in the manner of a blind eye. The purpose of 'implying' the mirror by the word 'andha' is to suggest a lot of ideas like that of failure of the mirror to reflect things. Compare, 'andha śabdo tra ādarśam lakṣanayā pratipādayati / asamkhyam prayojanam vyanakti/ (Locana, p 172) Here the word andha means the mirror and hence its primary meaning (i.e., blind) is said to be absolutely suppressed.

The verse *snigdhaśyāmala* ³⁰ may be cited as an example of the second variety where the word 'rāma' with its primary meaning as Rāma the son of Daśaratha is redundant. In fact such an apparently redundant word is used only to convey a meaning much different from what it expressly means. Here through implication the word 'rāma' means a 'Rāma' who is mature or seasoned (i.e. *parinata*) with a good number of virtues that are conveyed to us through suggestion (e.g., the experience of being exiled). Hence, the primary meaning is not fully discarded but it is remoulded (Vide Dhv. p 169 and Locana thereunder).

Vivakṣ tānyaparavācya. Now in contrast with the above examples we may take up an example of that type of dhvani where the primary meaning is not to be discarded. Let us refer to the verse 'śikharinī kva nu nāma' (Dhv. p 138). Here a young lover says in the presence of his young beloved—O young lady, I wonder in what mountain for how long a time, of what name a penance this young parrot underwent in order to have the fortune of chewing the bimba phala as red as your lower lip. Here all that the young nāyaka says is intended to be expressly stated and the express meaning suggests the idea that the speaker is flattering the nāyikā so that she may be attracted towards her admirer. Here the suggested content is a matter of fact (i.e., *vastu*). Some body may think that the

very question of the nāyaka regarding the practising of penance by a parrot is incongruous, since a parrot is not supposed to be competent for the same. If the primary meaning is thus supposed to be illogical, we shall have to admit a lakṣaṇā function in this verse also. In fact, Abhinava talks of such a possibility. Compare, “atra ca traya eva vyāpārāḥ—adhidhā tātparyāṁ dhvanānam ceti/...yadī vā kasmikaviśiṣṭaprasānārthānupapatter mukhyārthabādhāyām sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā bhavatu madhye/”, etc. (Locana, p. 140). But in my opinion, Ānanda does not find any incongruity here. He may recognise the express sense of the verse “śikhariṇī” as unfailing, because the ideas of the poets and of the peculiar poetical characters are supposed to be naturally of a mature and more imaginary nature. The meaning which suggests further ideas in this type of dhvani is shown to be of two types in kārīkā II. 24, and accordingly, the suggestive meaning of the verse “śikhariṇī” is supposed to be the more mature statement of a poetical character in a peculiar state of the mind, in whose world of imagination even a parrot may practise penance. If thus we understand the verse as admitting of no incongruity (and as such of no lakṣaṇā) we are more justified in calling it vivakṣitānyaparavācya. We must not discard the primary meaning involving an artificial wonder of the speaker and that alone would lead us to the suggested content that, the speaker is flattering the nāyikā.

But yet, what Abhinava seems to mean is that while in avivakṣitavācya type the lakṣaṇā function is the very basis of the suggested content, in the vivakṣitānyaparavācya type the suggested content does not depend on the lakṣaṇā function as such. There may, however, be noticed the casual presence of some words or expressions used with secondary significance.

The vivakṣitānyaparavācya type is sub-divided into two varieties, viz., asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya and saṁlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya.

Asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya : In this type of dhvani we have the suggestion of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and

bhāvaśānti, etc., which appear as the predominant meaning of the composition (Dhv. II. 3). As we have already noticed, rasa and bhāva, etc., refer to certain states of the mind of the reader. These mental states, forming the suggested meaning of the composition occur almost simultaneously with the understanding of the express meaning of the piece and hence in this type of dhvani the suggested sense (vyangya) is said to be realised after the express sense (vācya) without any noticeable sequence. For example, the reader is supposed to be instantaneously infused with the feeling of anger (krodha) and to have an exquisite joy from ruminating over the same, while reading the verse "cañcadbbhuja";³¹ through an identification of himself with the dramatic character i. e., Bhīmasena. All the process of identification, experience of a permanent mental state and the relish of the exquisite joy runs very rapidly and lasts only so long as the situation as depicted in the poem is an object of cognition. That is how we have the suggested content in this type of dhvani. In the verse referred to above we are said by Abhinava to have the relish of the raudra rasa which has krodha (anger) as its permanent mental state. In this manner we have the relish of all the nine rasas and the bhāvas in their different forms. The psychological process involved in the realisation of rasa will be further discussed in the next chapter.

In the opinion of Abhinava, a bhāvadhvani is the conspicuous suggestion of a vyabhicāribhāva, which being experienced serves as the source of exquisite joy. But this is only a means to the realisation of rasa which is also the experience of a sthāyi developing into an unperturbed joy. While heading towards the relish of rasa we relish in a certain phase the bhāvadhvani also. Hence, bhāvadhvani is only a subordinate aspect of the all paramount rasadhvani. Cf. "evam rasadhvanerevām bhāvadhvaniprabhūṭayo niṣyandā āsvāde pradhānam prayojat-

kamevamainśam vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate.” (Locana, p. 179). While experiencing the bhāvadhvani we recognise its prominence; but when we take the contextual rasa into account it is once again relegated to a subordinate position. The temporary importance enjoyed by the bhāva is like the importance of the servant on the day of his marriage, when he is followed even by the king. But the supremacy of the king is hardly diminished by the casual importance of the servant. This idea is very clearly conveyed by Mammaṭa in the words : “mukhye rase’pi te’ṅgitvaṁ prāpnuvanti kadācana/ te bhāvaśāntyādayaḥ / aṅgitvaṁ rājānugatavivāhapravṛttabhṛtyavat.” (KP. IV). It may be pointed out here that the analogy of the king and the servant is introduced for the first time by Ānanda in connection with the relative importance of rasādi and the express sense in rasavadalaṁkāra which will be discussed presently. Hence, cf., “rasādirūpavyaṅgyasya guṇibhāvo rasavadalaṁkāre darśitaḥ; tatra ca teṣāmādhikārikavākyaāpekṣayā guṇibhāvo vivahanapravṛttabhṛtyānuyāyirājavat/” (Dhv. III. p. 462).

In the saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya type we are not instantaneously overwhelmed by any feeling or idea. In this type of dhvani we pass on from the expressly conveyed idea to the suggested idea through a noticeable sequence as we did in the case of the verse ‘śikharinī’. This type of dhvani is said to be of three types, viz., śabdaśaktyudbhava, arthaśaktyudbhava and śabdārthaśaktyudbhava. Let us treat them one by one.

The śabdaśaktyudbhava type : This variety of dhvani is defined in kārikā II, 21. It owes its origin to the use of certain homonyms (i. e., anekārthakaśabdas). The homonyms convey more than one primary meaning wherefrom we gather the suggested meaning. In order to have two primary meanings as the basis of the suggested meaning we must have only the homonymous words. If we change the order of the words or if we try to substitute other words of meanings suitable to the context we do not have more than one primary meaning and the very basis being absent we also fail to have the suggested

meaning. Since the words do not allow any alteration the words are taken to be chiefly responsible for conveying the suggested sense. That is why this type of dhvani is called śabdaśaktimūla, i. e., based on the power of words. It may be noted that the criterion for classifying the figures as 'figures of words' and 'figures of sense' is the possibility or otherwise of altering the words (i. e., śabdapariṇāmasahamānatva and śabda-pariṇāmasahamānatva). This type of dhvani is said to be based on the capacity of the words because of the suggested sense being dependent on the use of words capable of conveying two primary meanings at a time, although the primary meanings also contribute to the rising of the suggested content. That, śabdaśakti means the peculiar capacity of the words to convey more than one conventional meaning at a time is clear from the vṛtti—"ārthyapi ca pratipattistathāvidheviṣaya ubhaya-arthasambandhayogyāśabdasāmarthyaprasāvitetī śabdaśaktimūlā kalpyate." (Dhv. p. 412)

Śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla. But it may be noticed that in śleṣa also there is the use of homonymous words. Then how can we distinguish śabdaśaktimūladhvani from śleṣa? To give an adequate reply Ānanda says—

ākṣipta evālamkārah śabdaśaktyā prakāśate /

yasmīnnanuktaḥ śabdena śabdaśaktyudbhavo hi sah // (II. 21).

The points of difference between śleṣa-alamkāra and śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani are as follows. (1) In śleṣa we have two matters of fact from the same set of words which do not brook any alteration. In other words, in śleṣa we have two matters of fact due to power of word (śabdaśakti) but in the śabdaśaktimūla we have a suggested alamkāra (and not a matter of fact) based on the śabdaśakti of "yasmādalamkāro na vastumātram śleṣah" (Dhv. p. 235). These words have the further purpose of classifying the point that in śabdaśaktimūla we have a suggested alamkāra but not a suggested matter of fact. The expression 'na vastumātram' need not be translated as 'not only a matter

of fact' because the word 'mātram' does not have the usual sense of restriction here. Here and also elsewhere Ānanda uses the term 'vastumātram' in a technical way to mean the matter of fact variety of the suggested sense. Cf. "sa hyartho vācyasāmarthyākṣiptam vastumātramalamkārarasādayaścetyanekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate." (Dhv. p. 50). Pratibārendurāja also seems to have understood the expression 'vastumātram' like this. Hence, compare his own classification of dhvani where vācakaśaktyāśrayavyaṇjakatva corresponds to śabdaśaktyudbhava of Ānanda. There he remarks—"tatra vācakaśaktyāśrayamalamkāraṇāmeva vyaṅgyatvāt ekaparakāram / tatra hyalamkāra eva vyajyante natu vastumātram nāpi rasādayaḥ / ...vācyasaktyāśrayam tu rasādivastumātrālamkāraḥbhivyaaktihetutvāt trividham." (KSS. p. 89). If we are to understand the word 'mātram' of the vṛtti as a restrictive particle we should also have an inclusive 'ca' or 'api' after 'yasmādalamkāra'.

But it is said by earlier theorists like Udbhaṭa that in case of śleṣa also a further alamkāra may be discerned. Udbhaṭa's definition of śleṣa demands the use of homonymous words and points out that śleṣa invariably gives rise to the idea of an additional alamkāra. (KSS. IV. 9-10). Hence, Ānanda observes that in śleṣa we have the additional alamkāra also as vācyā; but in śabdaśaktimūla the alamkāra is suggested but not expressly stated. For example in the verse—

"tasyā vināpi hāreṇa nisargādeva hāriṇau /
janayāmāsatuḥ kasya vismayam na payodharau //

(Dhv. p. 236)

the word 'hāriṇau' is homonymous. In one case it means 'attractive' and in another case it means 'having a neck-lace.' Connecting the second meaning, i. e., 'having a hāra' with 'vināpi hāreṇa' we have the figure 'virodhābhāsa' which is expressly conveyed because of the particle 'api'. Thus we have a 'vācyā śleṣa' and a 'vācyavirodhābhāsa' on account of the same śleṣa.

Example of śabdaśaktimūla In contrast with śleṣa, we have a case of śabdaśaktimūladhvani in—"atrāntare kusumasamaya yugam upasamharan ajrmbhata grīṣmābhīdhānah phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso mahākālah" (Dhv p 241) Here we have two portions, viz the viśeṣya portion (mahākāla) and the viśeṣana portion (kusumasamayayugamupasamharan, etc) Mahākāla means the great season, i e, summer ³²

It may also mean the Lord Śiva The viśeṣana portion also has two meanings which may be differently applicable to the two meanings of the word mahākāla An example of śleṣa is "yena dhvastamanobhavena" (Dhv p 235) Here the whole verse is homonymous (śleṣa) and it may be applicable as a benediction soliciting the favour either of Mādhava (i e, Viṣṇu) or Umādhava (i e Śiva, the consort of Umā) Thus we have two completely different meanings from the same words as differently applicable to Viṣṇu and Śiva So far we have no difference between śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla in respect of having more than one primary meaning But the point of difference is that in śleṣa both the meanings are contextual (prākaranika) Since 'yena dhvastam' is a mangala verse, it may be equally applicable to Śiva and Viṣṇu But in "atrāntare", etc., where we should have only the description of the summer season, we are confronted with a meaning applicable to Śiva mahākāla The meaning applicable to Śiva is not contextual

Whereas in case of śleṣa we easily accept both the primary meanings of the homonymous words, in case of śabdaśaktimūla we search for a relation of the non-contextual meaning with the contextual The idea of any such relation is not expressly stated, but conveyed to us as the suggested content of the piece When the relation of similarity between the contextual and non-contextual content is suggested we have a suggested upamā When the suggested relation is that of identity we have rūpaka When the relation is that of superiority

we have the figure *vyatireka* as suggested. That is how in *śabdaśaktimūla* we have a suggested *alaṅkāra*, whereas in *śleṣa* we need not as a rule have a suggested *alaṅkāra*. Compare : “eṣūdāharaṇeṣu.....dhvanerviṣayaḥ” (Dhv. p. 244).

If, however, the *alaṅkāra* which is suggested like this be pointed out by some other expressive word in the same instance we cannot call it a case of *śabdaśaktimūladhvani*. There we will have some *alaṅkāra* like *vakrokti*. For example, in the verse, “*dr̥ṣṭyā keśava*”, the expression ‘*śaśam*’ (i. e., with equivocal words) lays bare the whole trick and as such we cannot consider the present verse as a case of *śabdaśaktimūladhvani*.

Samāsokti and *śabdaśaktimūla* : There is also scope for confusing *śabdaśaktimūla* with *samāsokti*. In *samāsokti* also there is the use of homonymous words. For example, in the verse :

upoḍharāgeṇa vilolatārakaṁ
tathā gṛhītaṁ śaśinā niśāmukham /
yathā samastaṁ timirāṁśukaṁ tayā
puro’pi rāgādgalitaṁ na lakṣitaṁ // (Dhv. p. 109).

Almost all the words of the verse are homonymous and the *viśeṣaṇapadas* are applicable not only to the *niśā* (night) and the *śaśī* (moon) but also to a *nāyaka* and a *nāyikā* as the case may be. Thus we have the suggested idea of the behaviour of a couple of lovers (i. e., *nāyakanāyikā-vyavahāra*). Then why should it not present us a case of *śabda-śaktimūladhvani* as in the case of ‘*atrāntare*’, etc. ? Udbhaṭa gives the definition of *samāsokti* as :

prakṛtārthena vākyena tatsamānairviśeṣeṇaiḥ/
aprastutārthakathanam samāsoktirudahṛtā //

(KSS. II. 10).

Just as the meaning applicable to ‘the great season’ is *prastuta* and the meaning applicable to ‘Lord Śiva’ is *aprastuta*, we have the meaning applicable to ‘*niśā* and *śaśī*’ as *prastuta* and that applicable to ‘*nāyaka* and *nāyikā*’ as *aprastuta*. More-

over, Mammaṭa expressly demands the use of homonymous words in samāsokti. Cf. "paroktirbhedākāṣṭh śliṣṭaiḥ samāsoktiḥ" (K. P. X) That is how the cases of samāsokti may be confused as śabdaśaktimūla. The distinction is, however, more clearly stated by Mammaṭa himself. In śabdaśaktimūla the viśeṣya is also presented through a homonymous word; whereas in samāsokti only the viśeṣanas are had through homonyms. From the word 'mahākāla' itself we can have both the meanings 'Lord Śiva' and the 'great season' without any reference to the adjectives whereas the idea of a couple of lovers in 'upodharāgena' is had only through a reference to the adjectives presented by the homonyms.

By the by, it may be pointed out that in Mammaṭa's "nirupādānasambhāra", given as an example of śabdaśaktimūla, we should have a vācya samāsokti since the viśeṣya portion is free from pun (śleṣa) and the same alamkāra suggests a vyatireka and as such it does not appear to be a sure case of śabdaśaktimūla.

Only alamkāra is suggested in śabdaśaktimūla : As desired by Ānanda in śabdaśaktiyudbhava we have only an alamkāra as the suggested content and never an ordinary matter of fact. Pratiḥarendurāja also recognises only an alamkāra as the suggested content in this variety of dhvani as it can be gathered from the few lines quoted a little earlier (vide. p 97). But the theorists, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha would have a suggested vastu also in the śabdaśaktiyudbhava type. As the example of such a variety the verse,

panthā na ettha satharamatthi manam pattharattihale gāme /
unna paoharam pekkhiṇṇa jai vasasi tā vasasu // is given both by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. Here the suggested sense as pointed out by Mammaṭa is "yadyupabhogakṣīmo'si tadāssva." In this verse the word 'payodhara' at least is homonymous and means either 'clouds' or 'breasts'. The suggested meaning is had because of the latter meaning. Since the word 'payodhara' does not allow any alteration,

the suggested sense is said to be based on the power of word. It cannot be gainsaid that the matter of fact as pointed out by Mammaṭa is suggested here. Hence, in order to accommodate this and similar cases, it appears necessary to recognise a śabdaśaktimūlādhvani with a suggestion of vastu also.

Scope of abhidhā in śabdaśaktimūlādhvani : In 'atrāntre,' etc., we have three meanings, viz., the contextual (prākaraṇika) description of the 'great season', the non-contextual (aprākaraṇika) description of 'Lord Śiva' and the suggested alaṃkāra (i. e., the idea of similarity between the season and the Lord Śiva). Here the meaning relating to the great season is decidedly abhidheya (i. e., conveyed by abhidhā) and the alaṃkāra is decidedly vyaṅgya (i. e., suggested). But there is difference of opinion regarding the status of the non-contextual meaning relating to 'Lord Śiva'. According to the latter theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha the aprākaraṇika sense is also suggested. Cf. śabdaśaktimūle tu abhidhāyā niyantraṇenābhidheyasya arthāntarasya tena sahopamāderalaṃkārasya ca nirvivādaṃ vyaṅgyatvam." (KP. V) and SD. II, 21. Their argument is that, once abhidhā is restricted to one of the many senses of the homonyms, it cannot function once again to convey another sense because of the rule "śabdabuddhikarmaṇām viṛamya vyāpārābhāvaḥ". But according to Ānanda both the prākaraṇika or aprākaraṇika senses had from the homonyms both in śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūla are conveyed by abhidhā. Even the theorists like Mammaṭa have more than one meaning from the homonyms in śleṣa as abhidheya, all of them being prākaraṇika. As for Ānanda the non-contextual meaning is also abhidheya, there is the scope for confusion of śleṣa with śabdaśaktimūla and the necessity of clarifying the point of difference. That, for Ānanda the non-contextual is also abhidheya is clear from his expression "vākyasyāsaṃbaddhārthābhidhāyakatvaṃ mā prasāṅkṣīdityaprākaraṇika-prākaraṇikārthayorupamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ" (Dhv. p. 244). Ānanda is not

confronted with the maxim "Śabdabuddhikarmanām" etc., because of a reason conjectured below. It is sure that he did not have an occasion to refer to this maxim. That, Viśvanātha and others followed this maxim may be because of an influence of Abhinava who observes "na kramena viramya vyāpārābhāvāt abhidhānat" (Locana, p. 55)

In between Ānanda and Abhinava there were already many theorists to cherish different opinions regarding the function involved in conveying the non-contextual meaning. These varying views are properly introduced by Abhinava with the expressions, 'atra kecinmanyante', 'anyetu', 'eke tu' and 'itare tu' (vide, Locana, pp. 241-244). Abhinava's own view is that the meaning applicable to 'the great season' alone is abhidheya. All the additional meanings are had by the suggestive function (dhvanana vyapāra). Cf. "mahām-śāśau dinadairghya śabdaśaktimūlāt" (Locana, p. 241). And it may be noted that this was enough to tinge the views of latter writers beginning from Mammata.

Ānanda's view is, however, duly expounded in the following lines of the Locana—"itare tu ata evālam kāradhvanirīyamitī yuktam / vakṣyate ca 'asambaddhārthā bhidhājakatvam mā prasāṅkṣit' ityādi / nirākṛteḥ itāparjam" (pp. 243-244). That Ānanda considers the aprākaraṇika artha also as abhidheya and that alamkāra alone is suggested may be gathered also from the expressions like the following ones: (a) 'śabdaśaktimūlānurananarūpa-vyangye tu dhvanau paurvāparyam" (Dhv. pp. 410-411) (b) "pūrvavadabhidheya tatsamarthyākṣiptālamkāramātrapraṇītyoh", et. (Dhv. p. 411)

Mahimabhaṭṭa on śabdaśaktimūla. From his mode of argument it appears that Mahimabhaṭṭa possibly understood that, Ānanda wanted to have both the prākaraṇika and aprākaraṇika senses with abhidhā function. Compare "dattānandah prajānām nirmūlamevetyavagantavyam" (VV III p. 417-419). It may also be conjectured from the

fact that, Mahimabhaṭṭa puts the śabdaśaktimūla an a par with śleṣa. Cf. “tatra dharmyarthasya śleṣādabhinnatvaṁ yathādevatāviśeṣavācino.....vakśyate” (VV. II. pp. 344–345). Here the expression “devatāviśeṣavācinah” is quite significant in respect of the abhidhā function for conveying the aprākaraṇika sense. But this is not Mahimabhaṭṭa’s final observation. In his firm opinion there cannot be a homonymous word in the true sense of the term and as such the question of having two abhidheya arthas from the same word does not arise. Under such circumstances the question of having the aprākaraṇika sense as abhidheya is remoter still. Mahimabhaṭṭa’s argument is that the same word (homonymous) cannot convey two meanings in the manner of a lamp which may reveal two objects at a time. The word will convey only one meaning as required by the context. The lamp may reveal a further object either by ‘tantra’ or by ‘prasaṅga’.³³ But the word cannot convey a second meaning without a parāmarśa on the part of the cogniser (pratipattī). Hence, the so called śliṣṭa (homonymous) word may convey a second meaning only when there is adequate reason to serve as the liṅga. If this position is conceded then the second meaning must be recognised as inferred. Compare :

ekonekāṛthakṛdyatra svabhāvenaiva dīpavat /
 samayasmrṭyanākāṅkṣastantrasya viśayo hi saḥ //
 śabde tvasiddhamekatvaṁ pratyartham tasya bhedataḥ /

 tasmādarthāntaravyaktiḥetau kasmīnścanāsaṭi /
 yaḥ śleṣabandhanirbandhaḥ kleśāyaiva kaverasau //
 (VV. II. pp. 347–348).

Even where more than one meaning seem to be understood from a homonymous word the same word must not be taken as the cause of both the meanings. For, if both are to

33. “tulyapradhānatvena siddhāraṇyam tantram, atulyapradhānatve tu prasaṅgaḥ.” (VVV. II. p. 347)

(VV. II. p. 337). Thue we see that, according to Mahimabhaṭṭa the second meaning is had from a repetition of the word 'mahākāla' and the same repetition is encouraged by the adjectives (samānaviśeṣaṇa) equally applicable to the 'great season' and the 'Lord śiva'. But it may be noticed that although 'phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāsa, etc., are not labelled as anekārthaka-śabdas yet for connecting with the great season and the god Śiva they must be differently understood. In case of the season it means "phullamallikā eva dhavalāṭṭahāsaḥ" and in case of the god it means "phullamallikā iva dhavalāḥ aṭṭahāsaḥ yasya." Thus these expressions are also as good as homonyms. But in so far as the reason for understanding these expressions differently is not independent of a knowledge of the two meanings of the word 'māhākāla' itself, Mahimabhaṭṭa's way of exposition involves the fallacy of a logical see-saw.

The grammarian's view on homonyms : Mahimabhaṭṭa literally follows the grammarian's maxim "arthabhede śabdabheda." But it may be observed that Ānanda also does not seem to disregard the same. Hence, let us trace the reason of their difference. The grammarians themselves recognise anekārthakaśabdas capable of conveying more than one meaning. Bhartṛhari tells us of the factors—saṃyoga, viprayoga, etc., for distinguishing one of the many vācya senses of a homonym. Nāgeśa refers to the sentence 'akṣā bhajyantām bhakṣyantām dīvyantām' having akṣa (meaning sense organ, vibhītaka tree and dice respectively) as an anekārthaka and all its senses as abhīdheya. (vide, Uddyota, MB. NSP. p. 73). Nāgeśa observes in PLM also that the words vary with the meanings. The words having different meanings are identified as anekārthaka only because of similarity in form. "arthapadayostādātmyātattadarthatādātmyāpannaḥ śabdo bhinno iti hetorarthabhedāc-cabdabheda iti vyavahāraḥ/ samānākāramātreṇa tu eko'yaṁ śabdo bahvartha iti vyavahāraḥ" (PLM. p. 12). Patañjali says—
 "iṣyate ca ekeṇāpyanekasyābhīdhānam syāditi taccāntareṇa

yatnam na siddhyati" (MB NSP p 73) Thus in śleṣa we must repeat the homonymous word to have its various meanings. Because of this repetition of the same word in two different constructions of the sentence, at least within the mind, the objection of the same abhidhā functioning for two senses(i e , viramya vyāpāra) does not arise. Since by repetition there are two words, there are also two abhidhās which may be interpreted as 'yatna' of Patañjali. In my opinion Ānanda can have also the non-contextual meaning of the śabdaśaktyudbhava as abhidheya because he is already prepared to have the same meaning from a repeated word having a new abhidhā. We are informed by Pratiṣarendurāja that Udbhata also maintained the doctrine of 'arthabhede śabdabheda. Cf "iha khalu arthabh-
dena tāvacchabdā bhidyanta itī bhāṭṭodbhaṭasya siddhāntah/", et (KSS p 58) We know that Ānanda had great esteem for Udbhata and adopted his ideas in many cases and as such it may be conjectured that this doctrine was in Ānanda's mind also. We have already seen that this view is held by Mahima also. But the repetition of the word is determined by some factors and as such the second meaning is anumeya. In reply to this contention of Mahima it may be pointed out that what is supposed to be the abhidheyārtha by Mahimabhāṭṭa also depends on the factors like samyoga, viprayoga, etc , as pointed out by Bhartṛhari. But yet the abhidheyārtha is not taken to be anumeya. At that rate the second meaning also should not be considered as anumeya. Hence it seems quite likely and reasonable on the part of Ānanda to take both the contextual and non-contextual meanings as abhidheya.

Appayadīkṣita also in his Vṛttivārttika takes the aprākaranika sense in śabdaśaktimūla as conveyed by abhidhā (pp 6-15) According to him the prākaranika is distinguished by prakarana (context) and the aprākaranika is distinguished by its co-existence (samabhivyañhāra, i.e., 'śabdasyānyasya sannidhi' of Bhartṛhari) with the other senses of the words, logically connected with it. From a perusal of Appaya's

words we are led to conclude that, in śleṣa the prakaraṇa cannot distinguish the two senses, both being prākaraṇika, but they are to be distinguished with the help of śabdasyānyasya-sannidhi, etc. In śabdaśaktyudbhava, however, the prākaraṇika sense may occur to the mind earlier. That does not deprive the aprākaraṇika of an abhidhā śakti for it, because even in śleṣa we cannot have both the senses at the same instance. We have either of the two indiscriminately earlier. It may also be remembered that even in śleṣa a strict simultaneity of the two meanings or a literal repetition of the same word is never demanded.

Scope of anumāna in śabdaśaktimūla : A very vital point in connection with śabdaśaktimūla that requires our close examination is the expression “kalpayitavya” in Ānanda’s words——“aprākaraṇikaprākaraṇikayorupamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ”. Kalpanā means inference also. In Mīmāṃsā ‘kalpanā’ also means ‘arthāpatti’ (vide, Apte’s Dictionary) and as a matter of fact here the process of arriving at the so called suggested meaning should be recognised as a case of śrutārthāpatti. According to Naiyāyikas, arthāpatti is included in anumāna itself. Hence we are naturally confronted with the question as to whether anumāna is also involved in śabdaśaktimūla. Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha also repeat the very words——“upamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpanīyaḥ” without any question. Hence, we will have an occasion to examine whether anumāna is also responsible for the suggestion of the alaṃkāra in the śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani in later sections.

Arthaśaktyudbhava type : We have seen that in śabdaśaktyudbhava we must have some select homonymous words which do not brook alteration. Hence, the suggested sense in that type of dhvani is said to be based on the capacity of words. But in arthaśaktyudbhava we need not have such unchangeable words. The peculiar primary meaning is itself competent to give rise to the suggested content. The suggested content of the piece does not have any conventionally

expressive word for it. Hence, Ānanda says, that arthaśaktyudbhava type of dhvani is that where such an express meaning shines which suggests with all intention (svataḥ tātpariyena) another matter of fact (vastu) which does not have expressive words corresponding to it in the said piece (uktim vinā). Compare

arthaśaktyudbhavastvanyo yatrārthah sa prakāśate /
yastātpariyena vastvanyad vyanaktyuktim vinā svataḥ //

On the expression "svataḥ tātpariyena" Abhinava says— "svataḥ tātpariyenetyabhidhāvyāpāranirākaraṇaparamīdampadam dhvananavyāpāramāha na tu tātpariyāśaktim". In the fourth chapter we will see that Ānanda possibly did not conceive of any tātpariyāśakti, but by the time of Abhinava it was quite commonly talked of. On the strength of certain other expressions of Ānanda we understand that 'tātpariyena' means *being intent on it*. Since it is a variety of dhvani the suggested sense must be invariably predominant and the suggested sense may gain predominance only when the express sense is intent on suggesting the same. Hence, compare (1) tatparāveva śabdārthau yatra vyangyam prati sthitau / dhvaneh sa eva viśayo mantavyah samkarojjhataḥ // (Dhv I p 131) and (2) alamkāraṇtarasyāpi pratitau yatra bhāṣate / tatparatvam na vācyasya nāstu mārgo dhvaner mataḥ // (Dhv II 27. p 259), etc.

Example of Arthaśaktyudbhava . evam vādinī davarṣau pārśva pituradhomukhiḥ / ilākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatiḥ // (Dhv p 248) (When the celestial sage said this, Pārvati, who was near her father, began counting petals of the play-lotus)

This is a verse from the sixth canto of Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa. The verse gives us an express sense which is in no way incongruous. Hence the vācya is viśakṣita. But the same vācya leads us to a suggested sense through noticeable stages (i. e., samlakṣya-krama). After we cognise the express sense telling us of Pārvati's counting the petals of the play-lotus

we remember Pārvatī's earlier austerities for winning Śiva's love and thus take Pārvatī's weakness for Śiva into account. Thus finally we arrive at the idea that Pārvatī, who is engaging herself in the act of counting the petals, is feeling shy to hear a proposal regarding her marriage with Śiva. This information (i. e., vastu) regarding Pārvatī's feeling of shyness is conveyed by the capacity of the peculiar description of the situation which is had as the express meaning and not because of an unalterable set of words and hence, it is a case of arthaśaktyudbhava.

In this connection a few words of Ānanda deserve our close examination. Commenting on the above quoted verse Ānanda writes : "atra hi līlākamalapatragāṇanam upasārjanīkṛtasvarūpaṁ śabdavyāpāraṁ vinaivārthāntaraṁ vyabhicāribhāvalakṣṇaṁ prakāśayati." (p. 248). Ānanda says that a vyabhicāribhāva is suggested here. It is not simply a case of rasa dhvani. Ordinarily we have the suggestion of rasa from the expressly described vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. But here we have the vyabhicāribhāva itself as the suggested content. When we take account of the vyabhicāribhāva thus suggested and the ālambana Pārvatī herself, we have the relish of rasa. Hence, in between the express sense of counting petals and the suggested information regarding lajjā, there is a krama (i. e., order of understanding); but in between the knowledge of the vyabhicārī and the further suggestion of rasa there is no krama. Thus the suggestion of rasa yet remains instantaneous. Abhinava observes, "rasastvatrāpi dūrata eva vyabhicārisvarūpe paryālocyamāne bhātīti tadapekṣayālakṣyakramataiva, lajjāpekṣayā tu tatra lakṣyakramatvam." (Locana, p. 250).

We have seen earlier that when a vyabhicāribhāva is predominantly suggested it gives us a bhāvadhvani. A bhāvadhvani is called alakṣyakramavyaṅgya-dhvani. But here we have a vyabhicārī-bhāva as predominantly suggested and yet it is classed under saṁlakṣyakrama variety. Hence, we

are to understand the difference between the suggested *vyabhicāri* in its two aspects. In my opinion the *bhāva* of the *alakṣyakramavyangyadhvani* is a feeling felt by the *sahṛdaya* along with the poetical character to whom it primarily belongs. But here the *vyabhicāribhāva* is gathered to be belonging to the poetical character alone and it is not equally felt by the *sahṛdaya*. Hence it remains an 'information regarding the *vyabhicāribhāva*.' Ānanda's '*vyabhicāribhāvalakṣanam*' literally means '*vyabhicāribhāvaviṣayakam*'.

The confusion caused by Ānanda's expression "*arthāntaram vyabhicāribhāvalakṣanam prakāśayati*" has been worse confounded by Abhinava's observation—"etaduktam bhavati yadyapi rasabhāvādirartho dhvanyamāna eva bhavati na vācyaḥ kadācidapi, tathāpi na sarvo'lakṣyakramasya viśayaḥ" (Locana, p. 248). These few words of Abhinava have often been quoted by later writers like Appayadīkṣita and Jagannātha to give us the confusing idea that the *bhāva* is in these two types of *dhvani* are same except in the matter of having a *krama*. Hence, compare : (1) "*nanu rasādīdhvanirasamalakṣyakrama itū prasiddham, kathamatra tīsyānurānanena vyangyatocyate/ matvam/ taduktam abhinavaguptapādācāryaḥ—*"yadyapi rasabhāvādirartho " etc (CM p. 26) (2) "*upapādayiṣyate ca sthāyyādīnāmapi samalakṣyakramavyangyatvam*" (RG p. 29) (3) Raising an objection to Abhinava's observation "*rasabhāvādirartho,*" etc., Jagannātha says that "it is not possible to have *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., as *samlakṣyakrama*, for, in such a case we should have eighteen varieties of *samlakṣyakrama* variety of *dhvani* leaving scope for *rasādi* also to be suggested through a noticeable order. Yet we have a consistency of the words of Abhinava if we understand that *raṭi*, etc., being suggested through a noticeable order become matters of fact (*vastu*). But the possibility of such an interpretation is doubtful." Cf "*na khalu dharmigrāhakaṃśāsiddham ratyādīdhvaneralakṣyakramavyangyatvam/ samalakṣyakramatayaḥ vyajyamānasya ratyādestu vastumātrataiva, na rasādīvarūti teṣāmāśayasya*

varṇanena na taduktīnām virodhaḥ/ upapattistvarthe'sminvi-
cāraṇīyā." (RG. p. 248).

Abhinava's position clarified : If we read Abhinava's words more carefully we can learn that there is nothing to cause any confusion. Abhinava's words seem to refer to Ānanda's state-
ments—".....abhidheyasāmarthyākṣiptatvameva rasādīnām/ na
tvabhidheyatvaṁ kathaṁcit" (pp. 78-84) and kārīkā II. 3 (p.
175), where rasa, bhāva, etc. are said to be a-krama. But
these two statements of Ānanda seem to run counter to his
vṛtti on "evaṁ vādinī", saying "...vyabhicāribhāvalakṣaṇaṁ
prakāśayati", where a vyabhicāribhāva is said to have krama.
To bring a compromise between the apparently vying views of
Ānanda, Abhinava says that although rasa, bhāva (i. e.,
vyabhicāribhāva), etc. are always suggested (as alakṣyakrama)
yet some of them (say some vyabhicārbhāvā) may also be
conveyed by saṁlakṣyakrama (and thus may be matters of
fact). So the heart does not immediately rest in lajjā, i. e.,
the heart does not get the relish which is experienced in
case of alakṣyakrama by experiencing and ruminating over
lajjā. (na lajjāyām viśramayati hṛdayam). The lajjā in ques-
tion is not a feeling to be felt by the saḥṛdaya, but it is the
matter of fact which the saḥṛdaya thinks about. (....vyābhicā-
risvarūpe paryālocyamāne bhātīti....). That Abhinava himself
takes "evaṁ vādinī" as an illustration of vastudhvani is again
clear from his observation—"evaṁ arthaśaktyudbhavo dvibhe-
do vastumātrasya vyañjanīyatve vastudhvanirūpatayā nirūpi-
taḥ", etc. (Locana, p. 257).

In fact Ānanda does not tell us that a vyabhicāribhāva
is suggested. What he says is that the express idea of counting
petals "reveals another meaning relating to a vyabhicāribhāva"
(arthāntaraṁ vyabhicāribhāvalakṣaṇaṁ prakāśayati). More-
over, "evaṁvādinī" is not the only instance of saṁla-
kṣyakramārthaśakutyudbhava. In other instances we have vastu
and vastu alone. In kārīkā II. 22. Ānanda clearly says that
another matter of fact is suggested (vastvanyad vyanakti).

From II 24 also we learn that Ānanda recognises only a vastu as suggested (vastuṇo'nyasya dīpakah) We must not argue that in II 22 and II 24 the term vastu is used to mean all the three varieties of the suggested sense as is done in I 4, because in contrast with the contents of II 22 and II 24 Ānanda tells us in II 25 that in arthaśaktyudbhava type alamkāra also may form the suggested content

But we are once again confronted with Abhinava's words— "yo rasādirarthah sa evākramo dhvanerātmā na tvakrama eva sah/ kramatvamapi hi tasya kadācidbhavati / tadā cārthaśaktyudbhavānusvānarūpabhedaletī vaksyate /" (locana, p 174) where bhāvas of the two types of dhvani are distinguished only on the basis of krama and without any reference to the state of the mind of the reader But our doubt may be solved by referring to a few latter words where vastudhvanī is distinguished from rasa and bhāva, which are said to be states of mind Hence bhāva of samlakṣyakrama which is recognised to be a vastu, as seen above, automatically becomes distinguished from bhāva recognised as a state of mind being put on a par with rasa Hence compare, "nanvevam vibhāvadhvanīranubhāvadhvanīśca vaktavyah/ maivam / taccarvanāpi cittavṛttiṣveva paryavasyitī rasabhāvebhyo nādhikam carvanīyam/ yadā tu vibhāvānubhāvāvapi vyangyau bhavatastadā vastudhvanīrapī kim na sīhyate" (Locana, p 177)

Śabdārthaśaktyudbhava type In the vṛtti on kārṇkā II 23, Ānanda informs us that there may also be a variety of samlakṣyakrama where both śabda and artha together suggest the additional meaning. Since, unlike the earlier two varieties, this variety owes its origin to the capacity of both the meaning and the word, we may designate it as ubhavaśaktyudbhava But Ānanda does not give us any example of this variety specifically He simply says : "śabdaśaktyārthaśaktyā śabdārthaśaktyā vākṣipto'pi vyangyo'rthah kavīnā punar yatra prakāśikriyate' etc., where from we take the clue to the present variety

Mammaṭa says that there is only one variety of ubhayaśaktyudbhava and gives us the verse—"atandracandrābharaṇā samuddīpitamanmathā/ tārakātaralā śyāmā sānandaṁ na karoti kam/" as illustration where we have an upamālaṁkāra as the suggested content. Here 'śyāmā' means either a 'woman' or 'the night'. The other words are also all homonymous. The expression 'sānandaṁ na karoti kam' is not homonymous, strictly speaking. But yet it is equally applicable to both the meanings of 'śyāmā.' If we consider the non-homonymous nature of 'sānandaṁ,' etc., the verse presents us a case of ubhayaśaktyudbhava. But just as in 'atrāntare,' etc., we have the non-homonymous expression 'atrāntare' as equally applicable to both the meanings of 'mahākāla' we have 'sānandaṁ,' etc., in the verse under consideration. Hence, Māṇikyacandra seems to be quite justified in observing—"tathātra. yadyapyartha'pi vyañjakastathāpi śliṣṭaśabdaśaktireva vyaṅgyamunmīlayati nārthaśaktirīti śabdotthadhvanireva na dvyyuttha iti tattvam" (KP. Sam. IV. p. 119). In fact here also we have an alaṁkāra, owing to the use of homonymous words exactly as we have in śabdaśaktyudbhava. Viśvanātha also hardly finds any illustration as different from that of śabdaśaktyudbhava. His illustration also gives us only an alaṁkāra as the suggested content and the same verse may easily be passed as an illustration of śabdaśaktyudbhava. Hence, in order to find a justification for recognising this variety Pandit Durgāprasāda remarks that when in a verse changeable words and unchangeable words occur in equal quantity we should call that a case of ubhayaśaktimūla. Cf. "yatra tu kāvyē parivṛttiṁ sahamānānāmasahamānānāṁ ca śabdānāṁ naikajātiyaprācuryaṁ, api tu sāmyameva, tatra śabdārthobhayaśaktimūlakasya vyaṅgyasya sthitirīti dvyyuttho dhvaniḥ/ na cāyāmanyataraśaktimūlakatayaiva vyapadeṣṭuṁ śakyaḥ/ vinigamakābhāvāt." (SD. NSP. IV. p. 210). Ānanda's own idea of ubhayaśaktimūla is best illustrated by the verse "dṛṣṭyā

keśava"³⁵ which had every claim to be treated as an example of ubhayaśaktimūla variety of dhvani but does not happen to be designated as a dhvani because the very suggested sense is also referred to by an expressive word. Ānanda tells us in II 23, that if the suggested sense conveyed by the powers of śabda, artha or both is referred to in the same context by another expressive word then that would not present a case of dhvani but an embellishment. In the present verse the expression 'saśaṁ' (i.e. with significance) reveals the whole trick of suggestion. Happily, commenting on Ānanda's words—"ubhayaśaktyā yathā 'dr̥ṣṭyā keśava goparāgaḥṭayā' ityādaḥ"³⁶ Abhinava ably says that we have to recognise śabdaśakti in the expressions, 'goparāga,' etc., and an arthaśakti because of the context, which is helpful for giving rise to suggested ideas. The additional idea may be suggested to us only when we gather as a meaning from the context that Kṛṣṇa is the object of secret love for all the young women. Hence, compare, "śabdaśaktistāvadgoparāgādīśabdaśleṣavaśāt / arthaśaktistu prakaranavaśāt / yāvadatra rādhāra manasyākhilatarunījanacchannānurāgagarimāspadatvam na viditam tāvadarthāntarasyāpratītiḥ, saśaṁu cātra svoktiḥ" (Locana, p. 254). This is how we are told that the basis of recognising ubhayaśaktimūla is the instrumentality of both the context and the use of homonyms for suggestion and not the mathematical calculation of equal quantity of variable and non-variable words.

Type of the suggestive meaning. It is observed that in arthaśaktyudbhava type of dhvani, a meaning suggests a further meaning. The meaning which is thus responsible for giving rise to the suggested content is said to be of two types, viz., (1) prajdhoktimātranīṣpannaśarīra, i.e., possible only in a mature (i.e., poetical) expression, and (2) svataḥsambhavi, i.e., common to the ordinary speech (vide Dhv II 24).

³⁵ Dhv II p. 240

³⁶ Dhv II, p. 253

The mature poetical expression may belong either to the poet or to the character delineated by the poet. The poets and the poetical characters depicted to be endowed with peculiar states of the mind are supposed to have more imaginary ideas and more poetical expressions. Hence what is impossible in the ordinary world may simply be possible in their world of imagination. In the verse "sajjehi surahimāso"³⁷ the month of spring is said to be making the arrows of Cupid ready for use. That is how the non-sentient month or season is conceived as capable of an action similar to that of a sentient being. In the ordinary imagination it is incongruous; but in the poet's world of imagination there is not even an iota of inconsistency in conceiving the month or the season like that.

In the mature expression of the poetical character also, ordinarily impossible things are accepted as possible, without any question. Hence, so far it is mentioned by the hero, there is no inconsistency in the parrot's practising penance, as expressly stated in the verse "śikhariṇi kva nu nāma."³⁸

The svataḥ saṁbhavī type of meaning is always consistent, be it in the poetical speech or in the ordinary expression. For example, in the verse "evam vāḍini" we find such an express meaning, which does not require any poetic licence for being passed as consistent.

We may notice that this recognition of a mature way of expression (prauḍhokti) facilitates the recognition of certain such expressions as based on poetic convention (i.e., kavisamayakhyāta) which would have otherwise caused the poetic defect of khyātaviruddhatā. That is why, when there is a reference to the "drinking of the moonlight by the cakora bird"³⁹ we should neither take it as a case of khyātaviruddhatā,

37. Dhv. p. 255.

38. Dhv. p. 138.

39. "jyotsnā peyā cakorairjaladharasamaye mānasam yānti haṁsāḥ"
(vide, SD, VII. 23-25, for some of the kavisamayas.)

nor, in my opinion, as a case of lakṣaṇā. That there is no question of lakṣaṇā in case of the praudhoktis is indicated by Ānanda himself by treating them under the context of vṛkṣa-tānyaparavācya

Suggestion of alamkāras. It is already seen in the first chapter,⁴⁰ that earlier ālamkārikas like Udbhaṭa recognise also the presence of a suggested alamkāra in dīpaka, sasamdeha, etc. Compare

ādīmadhyāntaviṣayāḥ prādhānyetarayogināḥ /
antargatopamādharmā yatra taddīpakamviduḥ //(KSS I, 14), and
ālamkārantaracchāyām yatkṛtvā dhīṣu bandhanam /
asamdehe'pi samdeharūpam samdeha nāma tat // (KSS VI 3)

With reference to such a position of the earlier theorists Ānanda says that in arthaśaktyudbhava we can have an alamkāra also as the suggested content. But only when the suggested alamkāra is more predominant, on account of greater appeal, we have a case of dhvani (Dhv II 26-30). Since there is a reference to an express alamkāra suggesting an additional alamkāra, we gather that in arthaśaktyudbhava the express sense suggestive of the vastu or alamkāra may itself be embellished. Hence, we may have either the suggestion of a (1) vastu or an (2) alamkāra from a vastu and the suggestion of a (3) vastu or an (4) alamkāra from an alamkāra. These four varieties may appear to be twelve fold on the basis of the three types of the suggestive sense referred to in II 24. That is how we have twelve varieties of arthaśaktyudbhava in KP.

Factors governing suggestion in arthaśaktyudbhava : Another very vital question discussed by Mammaṭa is regarding the factors which govern the suggestivity of the express sense. Some of the factors are found in the 'speciality' (i.e., vaiśiṣṭya) of the speaker, the addressee, the modulation of the voice, the sentence, the content of the speech, the proximity of

another person, context (*prāstāva*), locality, and time. For example in the verse “*evam vādini*” we pass on to a suggested sense only because of the speciality of the context which relates to as special a thing as Pārvatī's proposed marriage with Śiva, for whom she already cherishes a weakness. The suggested sense, indeed, occurs to us because of a consideration of all these factors. Compare :

vaktṛboddhavyakākūnām vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ /
prastāvadēśakālādervaiśiṣṭyātpratibhājuṣām /
y'orthasyānyārthadhīheturvyāpāro vyaktireva sā // (KP. III.) ;

The speciality of intonation : Of all the factors named by Mammata, *kāku* or intonation requires our closer examination. Bharata speaks of two varieties of *kāku*, viz., *sākāṁkṣā* and *nirākāṁkṣā*.⁴¹ This intonation occurs in the form of certain modulations of the voice which are called *alaṁkāras* (i.e., notes). They are six in number and are named as, *ucca* (high note), *dīpta* (excited), *mandra* (grave), *nīca* (low), *druta* (fast) and *vilambita* (slow). The *sākāṁkṣā* *kāku* belongs to a *sākāṁkṣa vākya* and the *nirākāṁkṣā* *kāku* belongs to a *nirākāṁkṣa vākya*. That *vākya* (i.e., sentence) is called *nirākāṁkṣa*, where only the conventional meaning is conveyed by the words. In the *sākāṁkṣa vākya*, the words convey more than what appears as the conventional meaning of the words. The meaning additional to the conventional meaning arises due to the speciality of intonation. Such a *kāku* is indicated by Abhinava as *arthakāku*. (A. Bh. Chap. XVII. Vol. II. 392). The modulation of voice (*kāku*) attached to the *nirākāṁkṣa vākya* also suggests certain conditions of the speaker like surprise, intolerance, joy and lamentation. But

41. “*dviividhā kākūḥ sākāṁkṣā nirākāṁkṣā ceti, vākyasya sākāṁkṣa-tvanirākāṁkṣatvāt,*” (NS.) Rājasēkhara defines *kāku* as a quality in the mode of utterance which is employed with the purpose of conveying a special sense. “*abhiprāyavān pāṭhadharmah kākūḥ.*”

here we are concerned only with the *arthakāku* of the *sākāmkṣa vākya* which alone conveys the suggested meaning as the intended content of the statement for expressing which the expressive words are not adequate

Mammaṣa gives the verse “*tathābhūtam drṣtvā*” of Veni sambhāra, where Bhīmasena says with a modulation of the voice, “*guruh khedam khinne mayi bhajati nādyāpi kuruṣu*” The express meaning of the words appears as follows, “The master gets angry with me but not yet with the Kauravas” Due to *kāku*, the statement suggests the meaning—“The master (Yudhiṣṭhira) should not be angry with me, he should rather be angry with the Kauravas” This suggested meaning arises only because the words are uttered with a *dīpta* (excited) intonation and not in an ordinary manner (*atra mayi na yogyah khedah kuruṣu tu yogya itī kākṣvā prakāśyate*) It appears that the ‘*dīpta* (excited) aspect’ of the statement itself is referred to as the speciality of *kāku* by Mammaṣa But we will presently see that Mammaṣa’s intention is something different.

The *kānkā* Dhv III, 38, where Ānanda refers to the use of *kāku* is variously interpreted⁴² According to Abhinava, *kāku* gives rise to a suggested sense which is bound to be subordinate Because, *kāku* is a conspicuous speciality of the word (*śabda*) itself and hence, the suggested sense is as good as one referred to by expressive words as in the verse “*drṣṭvā keśava*” where the word “*śaṣam*” reveals the whole trick So the suggested sense conveyed by *kāku* invariably gives us a *guṇabhūtavyangya kāvya* The same express sense aided by the suggested sense conveyed by *kāku* may once again give rise to a more predominant suggested sense like *rasa* In the portion—“*svasthā bhavanti mayi jivati dhārtarāṣṭrah*” of a verse of Veni sambhāra, quoted by Ānanda for illustration, the suggested sense due to *kāku* is that “it is quite impossible for the sons of Dhārtarāṣṭra to remain alive yet while I am

42 Compare—“*anye tvībhāḥ*,” c c., in Locana, p. 478

living.” This suggested sense augments the force of the express sense, which serves as an *anubhāva* for the suggestion of the contextual *raudrarasa*.⁴³ Because of Abhinava’s conviction that the suggested sense conveyed by *kāku* is bound to present a case of *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* Mammaṭa names a variety of *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* as *kākvākṣipta*. (Vide, KP. V.). The suggested meaning of ‘assertion’ in the verse “*mathnāmi kauravaśataṁ*” is said to be *guṇibhūta* as it is as good as the express sense being simultaneously intelligible with the expressly stated ‘*niṣedha*’ (i.e., negation). Because of this relation of *kāku* with *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* Mammaṭa adds in connection with the verse “*tathā bhūtāṁ*” that what is immediately suggested by *kāku* is a question which may be as follows— “*kuruṣu kiṁ na khedo guroryanmayi khedaḥ*” (as suggested by Māṇikyaçandra). This immediately suggested sense, serving as the speciality of *kāku*, gives rise to such a suggested sense (i.e., *mayi na yogaḥ*, etc.) which need not once again be treated as *guṇibhūta*. Hence, finally, we have a *dhvani* in the verse “*tathābhūtāṁ*” also.

Abhinava points out that *kāku* is an attribute of the word itself (*śabdasyaiva kaściddharmaḥ*). Yet Mammaṭa is justified in counting it as a factor for suggestion in the *arthaśaktyudbhava* inasmuch as Ānanda points out that it is in fact the express sense which suggests the additional meaning with the help of *kāku* and as independent from the express sense the *kāku* cannot suggest the meaning itself.

Strangely, Mahima also recognises an additional meaning conveyed by *kāku*. (Vide. VV. p. 54). For instance, he recognises the idea of “assertion” conveyed by *kāku* in the verse “*mathnāmi kauravaśataṁ*.” It is not *vācya* (i.e., express), since he illustrates the verse only to show the greater charm of the meaning on account of being different from the express sense. But, yet he would recognise the meaning conveyed

43. Vide Locana, pp. 478-479.

by *kāku* not as suggested but as conveyed by *abhidhā* (i.e. *kākvabhidheya*). The *dhvani* theorist would possibly say that it is a difference only in name. What is *kākvabhidheya* for *Mahima* is *vyangya* for the *dhvani* theorist.

Mammaṭa quotes yet another verse from *Venīsaṃhāra* itself for illustrating a case of *guṇibhūtavyangya* owing to the use of *kāku*⁴⁴. Illustrations of *kāku* are all quoted from a drama because of the fact that the *kāku* is discernible only in the acting of a drama. Hence, Aristotle does not think it to be strictly belonging to the realm of poetry. In this connection he observes—"As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turn given to the language when spoken; e.g., the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry." (*De Poetica*, chapter, 19)

Position of *alamkāra* in the *dhvani* theory. We have already observed that in *śabdaśaktyudbhava* and *arthaśaktyudbhava* type of *dhvani* an *alamkāra* also may be predominantly suggested. But in such a case it is not to be understood as an *alamkāra* in the true sense of the term. An *alamkāra* always presupposes an object more important than itself which is embellished by it. But the *alamkāra* which occurs as the principal suggested content of a variety of *dhvani* can never be subordinate. It is the principal object which deserves to be embellished by other so called *alamkāras*. Yet it is called an *alamkāra* according to "*brāhmaṇa-śramaṇanyāya*". A *śramaṇa* does not have any caste distinction and as such if a brahmin takes to the way of a *śramaṇa* (i.e., a buddhist monk), he ceases to be a brahmin. Yet with reference to his earlier identity the *śramaṇa* may be identified as *brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa*.

44. "mathaṃl kauravaśaṃ" etc. in KP. V.

Similarly the ideas of 'sādrśya,' 'ādhikya,' etc, which are principally suggested are designated as alaṃkāra only because they could have been called so had they been conveyed as the express sense. This distinction requires to be carefully noted because in the dhvani theory alaṃkāras do not generally occupy a very honourable position. The alaṃkāras are adored and appreciated only when they are depicted with the intention of suggesting rasa and bhāva etc. Cf.

rasabhāvāditātparyamāśritya viniveśanam /

alaṃkṛtīnām sarvāsāmalāṃkāratvasādhanam //

(Dhv. II. p. 197).

The poet must not indulge in depicting an alaṃkāra for alaṃkāra's sake. There should not be any special effort for depicting an alaṃkāra. Alaṃkāras occur automatically in the composition of the poet infused with sentiment. (cf. Dhv. II. 16). Hence, if any alaṃkāra is found to be detrimental to the depiction of rasa then it should be condemned. Hence, yamaka is to be totally discarded in case of śṛṅgāra rasa (Dhv. II. 15). This being the position of alaṃkāras Ānanda feels it necessary to clarify the actual idea of rasavat and other such alaṃkāras which involve rasa and bhāva.

Rasavat and other such alaṃkāras : (1) Ānandavardhana, who has great esteem for his predecessors like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, does not altogether discard the conception of alaṃkāras where rasa and bhāva are treated as embellishments. But Ānanda offers some modifications to make those alaṃkāras suitable to his own scheme. Udbhaṭa and Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin indiscriminately relegated the rasa and bhāvas to the status of embellishments without taking note of their predominance or inferiority in a piece. Hence, Ānanda says,—“If in a kāvya the chief purport of the sentence should relate to something else, and if sentiment and so forth should come in only as auxiliaries to it, then that sentiment and so forth are figures in such a kāvya.”

pradhāne'nyatra vākyārthe yatrāṅgam tu rasādayah /
kāvyē tasmīnnaṁkāro rasādirīti me matih //

(Dhv, II 3 p 29.)

(2) The *alamkāras* which consist of *rasa* and *bhāva* as named by earlier theorists are as follows—

Dandin gives the *alamkāras*—*preyah*, *rasavat* and *Ūrjasvi* (KD II 275) *Preyah* is defined as 'priyatarākhyāna' and in both the examples of *preyas* we find the suggestion of a *prīti* for some god (i.e., *devaviṣayaka ratī*) A composition having *rasa* in any status is said to be *rasavat* (*rasavadrasaprasālam*) *Ūrjasvi* is that where there is a suggestion of *aḥamkāra* This *aḥamkāra* is nothing other than the *vyabhicāribhāva* called *garva*

Bhāmaha gives one more *alamkāra* of this type and that is *samāhita* Bhāmaha's conception of *preyas* is same as that of Dandin Compare, KD II, 276 with KL III, 5 Bhāmaha's *rasavat* desires a distinct delineation of the *rasas* like *śṅgāra* (cf *rasavaddarśitaspaṣṭaśṅgārādirasam yathā*) Bhāmaha's example of *Ūrjasvi* also suggests Karna's *garva* Cf ,

Ūrjasvi karnena yathā pāṛthāya punarāgatah /

dhvīhsandadhātī kim karnah śalyetyahirapākṛtaḥ // (KL III 7) From the example of *samāhita*, given by Bhāmaha, only this much may be conjectured that, it consists of a *bhāva-prasāma* (KL III 10) In his example, which only refers to the situation where we may have a case of *samāhita*, we get the word *prasakti*, meaning pacification, and this may refer to the *prasāma* of some *bhāva* ⁴⁵

Udbhaṭa, whose treatment of *rasavat*, etc., seems to have

45 It may be opined that Bhāmaha here actually desires a *bhāva-prasāma*, on the strength of the assumption that Udbhaṭa says explicitly only what is implicit in Bhāmaha; for Bhāmaha's influence over Udbhaṭa in respect of this group of *alamkāras* is very clear from a comparison of the definitions of *rasavat* given by both of them.

been closest to the memory of Ānanda, defines preyasvat as follows—

“ratyādikānām bhāvānāmanubhāvādisūcanaiḥ /

yatkāvyam vadhyate sadbhistatpreyasvadudāhṛtam // (KSS. IV. 2). Its example contains the suggestion of a vātsalya-bhāva (i.e., love for children) which is in fact a rati for putra, etc. Pratihārendurāja observes—“evamayaṁ ratyāt-mako bhāvo vātsalyasvabhāvaścaturbhiranubhāvādibhiratrāva-gamitaḥ” (KSS. p. 52). Udbhaṭa defines rasavat almost in the same manner as Bhāmaha. (rasavaddarśitaspaṣṭaśṅgārā-dirasādayam, etc.). But in case of suggestion of rasas in rasavat we must have the suggestion of the bhāvas rati, etc., and in preyasvat also we have the suggestion of the bhāvas rati etc. Hence there must be a distinction of the two types of bhāvas. Pratihārendurāja says that ratyādibhāvas of preyasvat include the sthāyī, vyabhicārī and sāttvikabhāvas. To distinguish between the ratyādibhāva of the two alāmkāras Vivṛttikāra points out under preyasvat—

“ratirīha devagurunṛpādiviṣayā gṛhyate /

kāntāviṣayāyāḥ stuteḥ sūcane rasavadalāmkāro vakṣyate /.”

This expression, however, clearly betrays the influence of Mammaṭa, who was anterior to Vivṛttikāra (KSS. Intr. p. XXXI). Udbhaṭa's ūrjasvī is said to be containing either a rasābhāsa or bhāvābhāsa of later ālāmkārikas like Mammaṭa (KSS. IV. 5). Udbhaṭa's samāhita is defined as “rasabhāva-tadābhāsavṛtteḥ praśamabandhanam / anyānubhāvaniḥśūnyarūpaṁ yattatsamāhitam” (KSS. IV. 7). On the strength of this definition, anticipated by Bhāmaha, we suppose Bhāmaha's samāhita as containing a bhāvapraśāma. In Udbhaṭa's definition of samāhita we hear of a rather unfamiliar object namely a praśāma of rasa (i.e., an abatement of the operation of a sentiment).

(3) Ānanda says that rasa and bhāva, etc., may be embellishments only when they are subordinate to some other meaning of the composition. Presenting an example, Ānanda

says, "tadyathā cāṣu preyo'lamkārasya vākyārthatve'pi rasādayo'ngabhūta drśyante" In the verse 'kim hāsyena'⁴⁶ we have karuna rasa as auxiliary to another meaning. The other meaning which is embellished by karunarasa is a preyo'lamkāra in the technical conception of Udbhaṭa, etc. In other words, the other meaning (i.e., vākyārtha) is a priya-tarāṅkhyāna or the vākyārtha is suggestive of a ratibhāva (love or devotion) for the person addressed, in order to present a preyasvat. Abhinava points out that the principal meaning is the statement of 'nara-patiprabhāva.' The statement is embellished by karunarasa since the plain meaning—"you have killed the soldiers"—is rendered more appealing by way of making it more delectable. Compare, "na hi tvayā ripavo hatā itī yādraganalamkrto'yaṁ vākyārthastādṛgayam, api tu sundarataribhūto'ira vākyārthah, saundaryam ca karunarasa-kṛtameva" and "nanu rasena kim kurvatā prakṛto'rtho'lamkrīyate rasenāpi tarhi sarasīkriyate so'rtha itī svasamvedyametat" (Locana, p. 194). The whole statement in its embellished form is a cāṣu (i.e., a flattering statement or eulogy), as pointed out by Ānanda in the line quoted above. In the verse "kṣipto hastāvalagna"⁴⁷ the principal vākyārtha is "tripuraripuprabhāvātisāya", as pointed out by Ānanda himself and there Irṣāvipralambhaśṛṅgāra serves only as an embellishment.

(4) By the observation "tadyathā ...drśyante" Ānanda seems to show simply how rasa and bhāva may occur also as auxiliary (i.e., subordinate, angabhūta) elements. His example "kim hāsyena" presents an auxiliary rasa and hence a rasa-vadalamkāra of the new conception. But the same verse gives us a preyasvat alamkāra and hence according to Udbhaṭa we should have the suggestion of some other bhāva of ratiyādi group. This bhāva is to appear as more predominant since

46 Dhv. II p. 193.

47. Dhv. II. p. 194

it is conveyed by the vākyārtha (i.e. the principal meaning embellished by karuṇa rasa). Now the question is, is the bhāva supposed to be suggested by the vākyārtha embellished by karuṇa rasa, a bhāva of asaṃlakṣya type? As interpreted by Abhinava, Bhāmaha's preyaślāṃkāra is a description of a prīti (love) for guru, deva, nṛpati and putra. (Locana, pp. 191-192). If it is simply a description then it may be taken as a matter of fact (i.e., vastu). This matter of fact being predominantly suggested we may finally have a vastudhvani. But ratyādi in the definition of preyas given by Udbhaṭa may seem to be ratibhāva of the asaṃlakṣya type. It is already indicated that rati of asaṃlakṣya type, that too for the nāyikā or nāyaka, will present a rasa; and as there is an alaṃkāra called rasavat, and as the example of preyas describes love for a child the rati of preyas means rati for guru, nṛpa, etc. We know that Abhinava recognises only a vyabhicāribhāva duly exited in the heart of the saṃdaya as presenting a bhāvadhvani. Hence, it appears that any delineation of love for guru, etc., would be only a matter of fact description for him. We find devādiviṣayaka rati, recognised in alakṣyakrama-bhāvadhvani only in the writings of the later theorists beginning from Mammaṭa. But Ānanda and Abhinava do not tell us of any such bhāva to be present in the verses 'kim hāsyena' and 'kṣipto hastāvalagna'. What Ānanda observes in the words—"yadā tu cātuṣu devatāstutiṣu vā rasādīnāmaṅgatayā vyavasthānam...tadapi guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasya dhvaniniṣpāda-bhūtatvamevetyuktam prāk"⁴⁸ may be found to be justified by recognising a principally suggested matter of fact regarding an eulogy of the king and the god in the illustrated verses in the manner of recognising a vastudhvani in the verse "śikharinī" where also we find a cātu as pointed out by Abhinava. Ānanda once again observes: "rasādirūpavyaṅgyasya guṇibhāvo rasavadalaṃkāre darśitaḥ; tatra ca teṣāmā-

dhikārikavākyaāpekṣayā guṇibhāvo vivahanapravṛttabhṛtyānaya
yirājavat" (Dhv III p 462) Here ādhikārika⁴⁹vākya means
the sentence as construed to have the principal vācya
(i.e., meaning) which is principal on account of leading to
the more predominantly suggested meaning such as the matter
of fact regarding the rājavaiṣayakarati in 'kim hāsyena '

(5) If in this manner rasa and bhāva are treated as
alamkāras, their very use may be justified only if they help the
suggestion of some rasa or bhāva as desired in the samkṣepa-
śloka—"rasabhāvādītātparityamāśritya" (Dhv II p 197) But
we find only vastu as principally suggested in the two verses
given for illustration of subordinate rasas. Yet the delineation
of the rasa as the alamkāra may be supposed to be justified in
consideration of their assistance for the suggestion of a more
predominant contextual rasa where the suggested matters of fact
also may serve the purpose of vibhāva, etc. Compare,—“ayam
bhāvah tadavaśyamanyenālamkaryena bhavitavyam / tatra
yadyapi vastumātramapi bhavati, tathāpi tasya punarapi
vibhāvādirūpatātparitya vāsānādrasādītātparityameveti sarvatra
rasadhvanerevātmabhāvah" (sic)⁵⁰

(6) Ānanda and Abhinava are slow in recognising devā-
divaiṣayakarati as presenting cases of bhāvadhvani of the asamī
lakṣyakrama type, possibly be ause of the fact that the bhāva
of asamlakṣyakrama must be equally experienced also by the
sahridaya through hṛdayasamvāda. But it is doubtful if any
feeling of devotion for the king occurs at all in the mind of
the sahridaya by reading the verse 'kim hāsyena '. Ānanda
and Abhinava are not prepared to call it a case of asamlakṣya-
krama be ause the reader is hardly expected to have the same

49. Ādhikārika means principal of "ādhikārikaphale svīkṛtyama
dhikārikā ca tatprabhūḥ / tasyetvittam kavibhirzīhikārikasam-
cyate" (S. D. VI) for a similar sense. Vide. also, NS² (Trans.)
Inter p. LI

50. Locana, p. 197.

ardent feeling of devotion for the king as that of the speaker. Hence, the reader simply derives the information (vastu) that the speaker is flattering the king as the principally suggested content. That in cases of the panegyrics addressed to god and kings, etc., Ānanda does not recognise any sentiment of asaṃlakṣya type as the principal content may be confirmed also by the following observation of Dr. Keith : "We are on much firmer ground regarding the Devīśataka of Ānandavar-dhana the writer on poetics (c. 850), whose hundred very elaborate stanzas hardly conform to his own theory that the poet who pays too much attention to ornaments falls into the error of neglecting the suggestion which should underlie poetry, but the deviation is excused by his own admission that in panegyrics of the gods the sentiment is of secondary importance." (HSL. p. 218).

(7) But we find that even in the verses where rasa is subordinate, Ānanda desires the suggestion of the contextual rasa. In other words, such verses, where there is the prabhāvātiśaya-varṇana in respect of a certain god with the help of subordinate rasa, as in 'kṣipto hastāvalagna,' may be helpful for the suggestion of a contextual rasa. We may have an illustration from the passages in the Mahābhārata, which describe the excess of greatness of the gods, which help the suggestion of the contextual śāntarasa by way of exhibiting the greatness of parabrahman, the realisation of which leads to the realisation of śānta. Here it will suffice for us to compare a few words from a much longer discussion of Ānanda regarding śāntarasa of the Mahābhārata, as follows : "devatātīrthatapaḥprabhṛtīnām ca prabhāvātiśayavarṇanam tasyaiva parabrahmaṇaḥ prāptiupāyatvena tadvibhūtitvenaiva devatāviśeṣāṇāmanyeṣāṃ ca" (Dhv. IV. p. 532).

(8) Mammaṭa and later writers consider also devādiviṣayaka rati⁵¹ as being suggested as asaṃlakṣyakramabhāva.

51. "ratirdevādiviṣayā vyabbicārī tathāñjitaḥ" where devādi refers also to muni, guru, nṛpa, putra, etc. (vide KP. IV).

It appears that Mammaṣa derived the idea of considering devādiviṣayaka ratī as bhāva from the definition and illustration of preyasvat given by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa. It might have been duly experienced by the time of Mammaṣa that just as the love between the hero and the heroine is excited in the heart of the reader, the love for the child as expressed by the poet may also be equally shared by the reader. In this manner there is scope for samānānubhava (i.e., hrdayasamvāda) also in the case of devādiviṣayakarati. That is why the later writers include the feeling of love for the child or the god or the friend, etc., at least in the scope of bhāvadhvani. As early a writer as Rudraṭa went even to the extent of recognising preyaś as a rasa⁵² where the sthāyibhāva is sneha. This is a love (ratī) for the child and friend, etc. The later vaiṣṇava writers took special note of the devaviṣayaka ratī for recognising also a bhaktirasa. But there is possibly a practical reason for the lack of any reference to devādiviṣayaka ratī giving cases of asāmlakṣyakramabhāvadhvani in the writing of Ānanda. It is a matter of experience that while the love for the child is more generally shared the devotion for a god referred to in a particular panegyric may be restricted only to a section of the readers. That some of the sentiments may be more generally experienced is admitted by Ānanda himself by observing—"śṛṅgāraraso ha samsārinām niyamenānubhava viṣayatvātsarvarasabhyah kamanīyatayā pradhānabhūtaḥ" (Dhv III p 397). A sincere sharing of the love (or honour) for a king by the reader is very doubtful. Some of the devotional lyrics in Sanskrit are mere enumeration of names⁵³ and in some cases the feeling of devotion may not be fully evoked in the heart of the reader because of an indifference of the reader to the particular god addressed in the piece. But

52 That rasa is given a status higher than that of bhāva is already shown.

53 Vide 'Sanskrit Devotional Poetry' in 'Aspects of Sanskrit Literature' by Dr S. K. De (p. 101)

the principle is already laid down by Ānanda and particularly by Abhinava for recognising even such bhāvas as genuine bhāvas of asaṃlakṣyā type if there be hr̥dayasaṃvāda. In our opinion, even the patriotic poems, evoking a love for the country, similar to that of the poet ⁵⁴ or the poetical character, ⁵⁵ in the heart of the reader, may be treated as cases of asaṃlakṣyakramabhāvadhvani, and as such Mammaṭa's expression 'devādi' should refer also to 'svadeśa.'

(9) Pandit Pattabhirama Sastri contends that the rasādi occupying a subordinate position should be considered only a guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and never an alaṃkāra simply because of being (indirectly) helpful to the delineation of rasa inasmuch as even guṇas will have to be considered alaṃkāra on that score. The learned editor further adds that, it is a secret that, Mammaṭa does not recognise rasavat, etc., as alaṃkāras only because of their feeble claim to be called so. Cf. "rasopakāraakatvamātrenālaṅkāratvavyavahāro guṇeṣvapi ativyāpnuvan kathaṅkāraṃ nirākāryā iti guṇībhūtavyaṅgyānām guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatvameva nālaṅkāratvam iti kāvyaprakāśādi-prāmāṇikanibandharahasyamapyatrānusandheyam" (Dhv. p. 195). But it may be pointed out that Mammaṭa himself called rasavat, etc., as alaṃkāras and the same are not defined and illustrated in the tenth chapter only to avoid repetition, and the rahasya is also pointed out only by the less dependable commentators. The subordinate rasa may be called rasopakāra in so far as it embellishes the principal vākyārtha which suggests the more predominant contextual rasa by rendering the suggestive vākyārtha more delectable. But the guṇas are never conceived as rasopakāra. As it will be presently seen, the guṇas are invariable associates of rasa and even Mammaṭa calls the guṇas invariable attributes of rasa (ye rasasyāṅgino dharmā.....syuracalasthitayo guṇāḥ. KP. VIII).

54. As in the case of Kipling's 'For All We Have and Are.'

55. As in the case of Tennyson's 'The Charge of the Light Brigade.'

(10) While discussing arthaśaktyudbhava variety of samlakṣyakramavyangvadhvani we have seen that the bhāva of the asamlakṣyaśrama bhāvadhvani should be experienced by the sahrdaya also. Like Mammaṣa Jagannātha also considers the vyabhicāribhāvas and the devādivisayarati as presenting cases of bhāvadhvani, which is defined by him as “vibhāvādivyajyamānaharsādyanyatamatvam tattvam” Here, harṣādi refers to the thirtythree vyabhicāribhāvas and rati (love) for guru, deva, nrpa and putra, etc. They make the number of bhāvas thirtyfour (‘harṣādayastu trayastrimśadvya-
bhicāriṇaḥ / gurudevanṛpaputrādivisayā ratisceti catustrimśat.” RG I.) Under the context of discussing these bhāvas Jagannātha also refers to a view according to which the bhāvas of bhāvadhvani are to be experienced by the readers also in the manner of experiencing the sthāyibhāva in case of the suggestion of rasa. Jagannātha observes, “harṣādīnām ca sāmājikaeritānāmeva sthāyibhāvanyāyenābhivyaktiḥ, sāpi rasanyāyena iti kecit / vyangyāntiranyāyenetyapare manyante” (RG I)

Position of gunas in the dhvani theory :

Bharata recognised ten gunas and same gunas are enumerated also by Dandin in the kārikā,

“śleṣaḥ prasādaḥ samatā mādhyamam sukumāratā /
arthavyaktirudārātvamojah kāntisamādhayah” // (KD I 41)

Vāmana recognised ten śabdagunas of these names and another ten arthagunas of the same names. Bhāmaha for the first time reduced the number of gunas to three. Bharata desired the use of the gunas in conformity with the rasas⁵⁶ but the gunas themselves are not conceived in terms of rasa⁵⁷. It

56. Vide sources of the theory in the first chapter.

57. Compare for instance his definition of mādhyamam which is as follows - “When a sentence heard or uttered many times does not tire or disgust (any one), it is an instance of sweetness (mādhyamam)” NS (Trans.), XVII, 101, p. 219.

was Ānanda who for the first time conceived of guṇas in terms of rasas. In his conception guṇas owe their very being to the corresponding presense of rasas. But instead of making guṇas subordinate to rasas in this manner Vāmana gave guṇas the higher status by including the rasas in the scope of one of his twenty guṇas, viz., kānti, which is defined in the words, “dīptarasatvaṁ kāntiḥ.” Bhāmaha’s guṇas are same in name to those of Ānanda but his guṇas do not have anything to do with rasas. His conception of guṇas may be had simply from the words—

“kecidojo’bhidhitsantaḥ samasyanti bahūnyapi /
yathā mandārakusumareṇupīṇjaritālakā /
śravyaṁ nātisamastārthaṁ madhuramiṣyate /
āvidvadaṅganābālapratītārthaṁ prasādat / (KL., II. 2, 3).

These guṇas are understood without any reference to rasa. But Ānanda’s guṇas hinge upon the rasas. Just as the quality of heroism depends upon the soul, the guṇas also depend on the soul of kāvya in the form of rasādi. Cf. “ye tamarthaṁ rasādīlakṣaṇamaṅginaṁ santamavalambante te guṇāḥ śauryādivat.” (Dhv. II. p. 204).

To show the relation of guṇas with rasa, Ānanda says that the rasa śṛṅgāra itself is madhura, i.e., sweet, on account of being highly delightful. This delight is characterised by a melting of the heart. The mental state of melting is called druti. Thus the quality of mādhyura, i.e., sweetness invariably owes its origin to the corresponding presense of the erotic sentiment. In practice, however, the mādhyura guṇa is said to be present in a kāvya (consisting of words and senses) which suggests the śṛṅgāra rasa. Hence, we cannot recognise mādhyura without any reference to a rasa, only on account of the softness of the sounds, which may be experienced also in case of the ojaḥ guṇa. Cf. Dhv. II. 7 and “śṛṅgāra eva rasāntarāpekṣayā madhuraḥ prahlāda hetutvāt / tatprakāśana-paraśabdārthatayā kāvyasya sa mādhyuralakṣaṇo guṇaḥ / śravyatvaṁ punarojaso’pi sādharmaṇam.” (Dhv. p. 207).

We have seen that the quality of mādhyura is intimately related with the psychological state of melting of the heart. Hence, the mādhyura is more and more conspicuous in vipralambha śṛṅgāra and karuṇa respectively because of greater and greater degree of melting.

In the same manner the realisation of the rasas, raudra, vīra and adbhuta, causes a great dipti⁵⁸ (or ujvalatā, i.e., blooming, expansion and burning) in the heart of the reader. The raudra, vīra, and adbhuta rasas are invariable causes of the dipti. Because of this relation of causality, the said rasas are themselves called dipti in a figurative manner (i.e. lakṣaṇayā). The words and meanings which are capable of suggesting (i.e., prakāśana para) such rasas are said to have the quality of ojaḥ. The earlier theorists demanded that ojaḥ belong only to a composition having long compounds. But Ānanda gives the verse "yo yaḥ śāstram" for showing that ojaḥ does not invariably depend on long compounds of a composition (anapēkṣitatīrghasamāsaracanaḥ). But, that ojaḥ solely depends on the corresponding presence of the rasas like raudra, is clear from the expression 'āśritya' of the kārīkā, II 9 (tadvyaktihetū śabdārthāvāśrityaujo vyavasthītam).

In defining prasāda, however, Ānanda does not differ much from his predecessors. Almost like Bhāmaha he says "prasādaḥ svacchatā śabdārthayoḥ" (Prasāda is the transparency of the words and meanings). It is common to all the rasas and all the types of composition, having long compounds or without having any compound. But yet prasāda is recognised only with reference to the suggested sense. Prasāda is characterised by the capacity of all the rasas to overpower the heart of the sahrdaya immediately. But this immediate effect of rasas may take place only when the rasa is instantaneously realised on account of a clarity of the expression and the sense.

58 "d p b prast parurūḥdaye vikṣiptavīrasaprajvalanavabdhāḥ"
(Locana, p. 208)

Abhinava tells us that in fact the sweetness (*mādhurya*) belongs to the *śṛṅgāra* and other such *rasas* themselves. But the same sweetness is superimposed on the words and meanings capable of suggesting such *rasas*. The technical definition of *mādhurya* is “the capacity of words and meanings to suggest a *madhura rasa*.” Cf. “*etaduktaṁ bhavati—vastuto mādhuryaṁ nāma śṛṅgārāde rasasyaiva guṇaḥ / tan-madhurarasābhivyañ-jakayoḥ śabdārthayorupacaritaṁ madhura-śṛṅgārarasābhivya-ktisamarthatā śabdarthayormādhuryamiti hi lakṣaṇam*” (Locana, pp. 206-207).

From Ānanda's words we learn that, *guṇas*, as understood in their technical implication, belong to the words and the meanings suggestive of *rasa*. (Cf. *kāvya-māśritya mādhuryaṁ pratitiṣṭhati; śabdārthāvāśrityaujo vyavasthitaṁ and prasādistu svacchatā śabdārthayoḥ*). *Druti*, *dīpti* and the mental state of being overwhelmed are the effects of the *rasas*. *Guṇas* always owe their occurrence to the corresponding presence of *rasa*.

Jagannātha's conception of *guṇa* :

Mammaṭa recognises the *guṇas* as the *dharma*s (i.e., attributes) of *rasa*. We call a composition *madhura* (i.e., having *mādhurya*) only in a figurative way (i.e., through the use of *upacāra*). With a reference to this view of his predecessors Jagannātha proceeds to question the very conception of *guṇas*. He contends that in case of the fire we perceive the burning as its effect and the hot temperature as its quality, distinct from the effect. But in case of *rasa* we cannot perceive any quality as distinct from its effects like *druti* and *dīpti*. Hence, what we can conceive are the effects of *rasa* like *druti* and not the *guṇas* like *madhura*.

Thus if we are to conceive of the *guṇas* at all then we are to conceive them only in terms of the mental conditions like *druti*. In the expression “*śṛṅgāro madhura*” (as we have in Ānanda's *kārika*, II. 7.) ; we are to understand the meaning as follows :

Śṛṅgāra is madhura and hence, śṛṅgāra has 'mādhurya'. This mādhurya is the capacity of śṛṅgāra to cause druti, which is a mental state, i.e., cittavṛtti. Hence, mādhurya has the relation of causality (prayojakatā) with druti. Because of this relation druti may be said to be identical with mādhurya, i.e., we may say that druti is mādhurya, in a figurative manner just as we do in the expression 'āyurghṛtam', where there is an identification of longevity with ghṛe on account of a causal relation (i.e., prayojakatā). Now we come to this position—

Mādhurya (i.e., the capacity) produces druti. Hence, druti is mādhurya, on account of prayojakatāsambandha.

Rasa produces druti (identified with mādhurya), i.e., Rasa produces mādhurya. Hence, Rasa is madhura.

This expression is possible in analogy with the expression, 'vāṇigandhā uṣṇā.' In fact vāṇigandhā (i.e., Physalis Flexuosa) produces warmth, when it is consumed. Hence vāṇigandhā itself is called warm in the manner of identifying a garment as warm when it is capable of producing warmth. Thus Jagannātha concludes that, the guna mādhurya is the capacity to produce the mental state of druti. Anything that is produced may have many causes, some of them being general causes, e.g., Īśvara, Īśvarecchā, prāgabhāva and adṛṣṭa. Now, when mādhurya is conceived as the causality for druti, it is to be understood not as belonging to the general causes like adṛṣṭa, but as belonging to the particular causes, viz., śabda, artha, rasa and racanā. Jagannātha does not consider this capacity to produce druti to be restricted only to the rasa, but in his opinion the capacity belongs equally to the word and the suggestive meaning also. Such being the case, he does not feel the necessity of recognising any lakṣaṇā in the expression 'madhurā racanā,' which relegates the mādhurya guna also to the words. Cf. 'evameतेषु गुणेषु रासामैरदधर्मेषु व्यवस्थितेषु रमधुरा racanā, ojasvi bandha ityādayo vyavahārā supacārikā itī mammatābhāṣādayah"

and, “*atha śṛṅgāro madhura ityādi vyavahāraḥ kathamiti cet, evaṁ tarhi drutyādicittavṛttiprayojakatvam, prayojakatāsambandhena drutyādikameva vā mādihuryādikamastu / vyavahārastu vājigandhoṣṇeti vyavahāravadakṣataḥ / prajojakatvaṁ cādrṣṭādivilakṣaṇaṁ śabdārtharasaracanāgatameva grāhyam /tathā ca śabdārthayopī mādihuryāderīdṛśasya sattvādupacāro naiva kalpya iti tu mādṛśaḥ.*” in RG. I.

It requires to be noted here that according to Dr. Sandhya Bhaduri Jagannātha revives the position of Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Bhojarāja,⁵⁹ and Prof. N. N. Choudhuri observes that Jagannātha “concludes that the theory of the old school represented by Daṇḍin and Vāmana that guṇas are the qualities of word and sense is perfectly sound and the subtleties introduced by Ānandavardhana and his followers are uncalled for scholastic devices.”⁶⁰ But in my opinion Jagannātha neither wanted to revive Daṇḍin’s or Vāmana’s conception of guṇa nor did he maintain any difference from Ānanda. For, while the earlier theorists like Daṇḍin and Vāmana conceive of the guṇas without any reference to states of mind caused by rasas, Jagannātha conceives them as the capacity of rasas to produce certain mental states like druti. In my opinion instead of differing from Ānanda he adopts Ānanda’s conception of guṇas in principle. For, it is already pointed out that according to Ānanda also the guṇas belong to the words and the meanings. For Ānanda śṛṅgāra is madhura and the quality of mādihurya belongs to the words capable of suggesting śṛṅgāra. Hence by way of suggesting śṛṅgāra the words may serve as the cause of druti according to Ānanda also. “*śṛṅgāra eva rasāntarāpekṣayā madhuraḥ..... tatprakāśanaparaśabdārthatayā kāvyasya sa mādihuryalakṣaṇo guṇaḥ.*” (Dhv. p. 207). In course of arguments also Jagannātha betrays much evidence of his being influenced by Ānanda.

59. Vide her translation of RG in Bengali, p. 137.

60. Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā, pp. 75-76.

Jagannātha's identification of *druti* with *mādhurya* reminds us of Ānanda's words "yathā raudrādīn hi prakāśayataḥ kāvyasya dīptiroja iti prakṛtipāditam" (Dhv p 315 *dīpti*=*ojah*, so, *druti*=*mādhurya*)

Without any difference with the followers of the *dhvani* theory Jagannātha also recognises only three *gunas*, viz., *mādhurya*, *ojah* and *prasāda*. Jagannātha no doubt reproduces the definitions and illustrations of the *gunas* recognised by earlier *ālamkārikas* like Vāmana. But that is only to show how the same *gunas* may be included in the scope of the three *gunas* recognised in the *dhvani* theory. Indeed Mammaṭa also refers to those older definitions only to show the propriety of reducing the twenty *gunas* of Vāmana to three. That Jagannātha also, on his own part, recognises only the three *gunas* of the *dhvani* theory is further evidenced by the fact that, after reproducing Mammaṭa's way of reducing the number of *gunas* to three, he dwells at length on the letters and compositions which are suitable or unsuitable only to the three *gunas*, viz., *prasāda*, *mādhurya* and *ojah*.

Ānandavardhana does not point out the letters that suggest *mādhurya* or *ojah*. Mammaṭa indicates them in detail and Jagannātha dwells on them at still greater length. For example, Mammaṭa observes "varṇassamāso racanā teṣāṃ vyañjakatāmīṭāḥ / ke kasya ityāha—

mūrdhni varṇāntyagās sparśāḥ aṣṭavargā ranau laghū /
avṛttirmadhyavṛttirvā mādhurye ghaṭarā tathā ||"

Jagannātha also speaks almost in the same tune as—"tatra ṣṭavargavarjitaṇām varṇāṇām prathamatītyaiḥ śarbhurantasthāśca ghaṭitā avṛttirmadhyavṛttirvā racanānupūrvyātmikā mādhuryasya vyañjikā." (RG I) But all these theories of the later writers are based on Ānanda's treatment of *saṃghoṣaṇā* and the *varṇas*, suggestive of *rasa* introduced by the *kārikā*, III 2.

Samghaṭanā in dhvani theory :

Ānanda maintains that samghaṭanā (composition) is also a factor suggestive of rasa. Samghaṭanā as shown by earlier theorists is of three types, viz., (1) composition without any samāsa, (2) composition with medium-sized samāsa and (3) composition with long compounds. (Dhv. III. 5). Conceding to this classification Ānanda adds that samghaṭanās are grounded in qualities like mādhyura and suggest the rasas. The propriety of the speaker and the contents of the speech determines it. (Dhv. III. 6). But we know that, Ānanda also determines a sentence having long compounds as the 'śabda' that reveals the quality named ojaḥ, (while the 'artha' responsible for the delineation of ojaḥ need not depend on long compounds). Since there may be a reference to the question of compounds also in time of considering the guṇas we are required to know clearly as to what is the difference between samghaṭanā and guṇa. The difference is that, a composition may have guṇas only when it possesses rasa, irrespective of the presence or absence of compounds. A sentence having long compounds also will not be said to have ojaḥ if there is no rasa. But in that very sentence we must have any of the three types of samghaṭanā which occurs irrespective of the presence or absence of rasa. Yet samghaṭanās are said to be suggestive of rasa because the propriety of using a certain type of samghaṭanā is determined by the type of rasa. The type of the appropriate samghaṭanā is, however, determined also by the theme (viṣaya). The poet is at liberty to use any samghaṭanā in that kāvya where rasa is not largely suggested. Cf, "parikathāyām kāmācāraḥ, tatretivṛttamātropanyāsenā nātyantarasabandhābhiniveśāt." (Dhv. III. p. 326). It is to be noted here that, the realisation of rasa owes its origin to the cognition of vivhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva, which may be presented by the meaning of the words. Then how can we suppose the nature of composition to be suggestive of rasa ? The reply may be had from

the words of Ānanda himself Ānanda maintains that in karuna and vipralambha śṛṅgāra the composition should not have samāsa. The realisation of these two rasas consists of a very delicate condition of the mind of the sahrdaya which may be disturbed by the slightest difficulty in grasping the meaning on account of the presence of compounds. When other sentiments like raudra are to be delineated there is no need for eschewing middle sized compounds entirely, sometimes when the exploits of a 'bravely haughty' hero are to be described it is not essential that even the composition with long compounds should be completely forsaken. For in such cases 'compounds are also not less helpful for the suggestion of the rasa. Cf. 'karunavipralambhaśṛṅgārayostvasamāsaiva samghaṭanā / tayorhi sukumārataratvāt svalpāyāmapyas vacchatāyām śabdārthayoh pratirmantharibhavati / parihāryā (Dhv III pp 320-321). This observation of Ānanda shows that, the samghaṭanās suggest rasa by way of preparing a proper psychological atmosphere for the relish of rasa. This very criterion is followed also in case of considering mere letters as suggestive of rasa.

Letters as suggestive of rasa

Ānanda maintains that, letters are also suggestive of rasa. But there may be an objection that mere letters are meaningless and hence cannot be suggestive of rasa, for, rasa can be experienced only through the realisation of vibhāva, etc., presented as the 'meaning' of the kāvya. Hence, Ānanda establishes the suggestivity of the letters on the ground of the relation of agreement and contrariety, as follows—

The letters ś and ṣ, letters conjunct with 'r', and 'dha'—all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence letters suggest sentiments (Dhv III 3-4) Compare,

'śaṣau sarephassamyogo dhakāraścāpi bhūyaś /
virodhinah syuh śṛṅgāre tena varnā rasacyutah //

ta eva tu niveśyante vibhatsāḍau rase yadā /
tadā taṁ dīpayantyeva tena varṇā rasacyutaḥ // (p. 303).

It may be noted here that in enumerating the letters ś, ṣ, etc., Ānanda had Udbhaṭa's definition of the paruṣā vṛtti in his mind. Compare, "śaṣābhyāṁ rephasamyogaistavargeṇa ca yojitā / paruṣā nāma vṛtṭiḥ syāt hla-hva-hyādyaiśca saṁyutā" (KSS. I. 4). Presently we will see that, Ānanda wants the different vṛttis also to be employed in conformity with the contextual rasa.

The question, as to how the meaningless letters may be suggestive of rasa, is very ably discussed by Abhinavagupta. According to Abhinava's aesthetics the rasas are certain psychological states and the extraordinary bliss resulting out of the very experience (pratiti) of these states. It is a matter of experience that some letters are agreeable to the ears while others are repulsive. That is why they react differently and cause different psychological states. That, meaningless sounds also may evoke sentiments is evidenced by the meaningless sounds of pure music, such as the seven primary notes regulated by the sound of the kettle drum or the sounds produced to imitate the rhythm of dances.⁶¹ Compare, "etaduktaṁ bhavati.....anukaraṇaśabdavacca." (Locana. pp. 304-305). The later writers up to Jagannātha worked out in greater detail the list of the letters which evoke different sentiments, either directly or by indicating the corresponding guṇas and it is a

61. There are variant readings of the relevant portion of Locana which runs in the KSS edn. as follows : "śrotraikagrāhyo'pi ca svabbāvo rasaniśyande vyāpriyata eva, apadagītadhvanivat puṣkaravādyaniyamita - viśiṣṭajātikaraṇaghrāhyanukaraṇaśabda- vacca" where, the kāvyamālā edn. (1928) reads 'ghrāṇādyanu- nukaraṇa' and suggests also the reading "karaṇaprabhāvādyanu- hāraśabdavat." In my opinion the most suitable meaning as shown here may be conveyed by the reading "jātikaraṇādyanu- karaṇaśabdavacca."

task for the science of psycho-acoustic to put the worked out details to a scientific test. It may be interesting to note here that, in this manner even particular metres may be recognised as suitable for particular sentiments, as it is done by a theorist like Kṣemendra. Hence compare in his *Suṣṭi-tatīlaka*,

kāvyē rasānusārena varnanānugunena ca /
kurvīta sarvavrittānām viniyogam vibhāgvita // (3/7)
śṛṅgārālambanodāranāyikārūpavarṇanam /
vasantādi tadangam ca sacchāyamupajātubhiḥ // (3/17)
vasantatīlakam bhāti samkare viraraudrayoḥ /
kuryāt sargasya paryante māhīm drutatālavat // (3/19), etc.

It may be easily noticed that in considering the suitability of the different elements like letters and metres for different sentiments the latter are broadly grouped into two classes. The two groups may be indicated as follows :

(1) 'Madhura group,' consisting of rasas admitting of mādhyama guṇa, viz., śṛṅgāra and karuṇa. This group also may include śānta and the lately recognised rasas like vatsala, which are capable of causing a melting of the heart.

(2) 'Ojah group,' consisting of the rasas admitting of the ojaḥ guṇa, viz., raudra, vīra, adbhuta and vibhatsa, which are capable of causing expansion (vistāra) and the burning of the heart.⁶²

The other rasas, viz., hāsyā and bhayānaka share the characteristics of both the groups according to the situation and the quality of prasāda is common to all the rasas.

62. A broad division of the letters into two groups, viz., harsh and agreeable, seems to be in the mind of Abhinava also when in the context of the guṇas of Bharata he observes as follows :
svabhāva o hi karuṇa varuṇa santapayanīva nīkṛtānīva
rephakakīrīḍaya iva parajayatīpūrvakāḥ, anye tu nīrvāpaya-
nīvopasagarikocīḥ, lokagocara evāyamārtikāḥ svasamvedyo'p'iti
na vīra-āhīrīḥ iva (Abhinavabhārat, NṢ. Vol. II. p. 339).

In the west also, the poems are classified into two groups, viz., tender-toned poems (corresponding to the poems of the madhura group) and aggressive-toned poems (corresponding to the poems of the ojaḥ group). In the matter of indicating the more frequent letters of these groups also there is much similarity with Sanskrit poetics. The following lines from a paper entitled "Communication in Poetry" by Iva'n Fo'nagy, will be very interesting in this context.

"The majority of the sounds occur with about the same relative frequency in both groups. All the more striking is the fact that the frequency of certain sounds shows a significant difference in the two groups. The phonemes /l/, /m/, and /n/ are definitely more frequent in tender-toned poems, whereas /k/, /t/ and /r/ predominate in those with aggressive tone. For some reason precisely these sounds seem to be the most significantly correlated with aggression—either positively or negatively. The back vowels are also generally more frequent in the aggressive poems. But the tense and high /i/, which according to Grammont may express anger, also occurs frequently in the aggressive poems.

Of course, it may be supposed that the relatively greater frequency of /t/, /k/ and /r/ in words suited to the expression of aggressive emotions reflects a peculiarity of the Hungarian language. The question poses itself whether the 'sound spectrum' shows a similar modification in a count based on French or German poems." etc. (Word, Vol. 17. No. 2., p. 195).

Mahimabhaṭṭa's conception of rasa realisation is very peculiar. He maintains that the sthāyibhāvas belonging to the characters delineated in a kāvya are inferred on the strength of the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas duly described in the kāvya. The very cognition of the sthāyibhāva produces the relish of rasa which is experienced only by the man of taste. (yatra vibhāvādimukhena bhāvānāmavagamastatraiva sahr̥dayaikaśamvedyo rasāsvādodaya iti vastusvabhāva evāyaṁ

na paryannyogapadavimavatarati prāmāṇikānām.' VV I) Mahima further holds that the letters also help the inference of the sthāyibhāva belonging to the literary character because it is a common nature of the persons subject to different psychological states to use different sets of letters. Compare, 'tathā hi ye ratīśokākrāntāntahkaranāḥ ye ca krodhotsāhāḍi vivaśāste madhurataravarnaviracitāmasamāsaprāyām rephaśa kāraṭakārikarkaśām ca dirghasamāsabhūyiṣṭhām samghaṭṭanā māsṛitya bhūmnā bhāṣamānā dṛśyanta itī svabhāva evāyam' (VV III). The weakness of this position of Mahimabhaṭṭa lies in the fact that the nature of the letters is determined by the contextual rasa also in those places where the speaker may not himself be infused with any sentiment. Rati and śoka, etc., are said to be belonging to the poetical characters, but the poetical characters may not always be the speaker. Even an impartial description of the vibhāvas, etc., may suggest rasa. Moreover, it is also a commonly experienced fact that the different sounds really have different psychological effects even without being aided by any mental process like inference. Hence, Mahima's explanation loses ground to Abhinava's stand that in poetry, the sounds help the suggestion of rasa by the description of vibhāva, etc., by way of preparing the suitable mental atmosphere for it.

It is also observed by Iván Fónagy in a very interesting way that the sounds play a double role. 'On the one hand they are elements in conventional symbols, connected with content indirectly, through the word and the sentence on the other hand they are immediately linked with experience through the natural relationship of sound and content.' (Ibid.) That experiences may be evoked by the sounds directly without any obligation to the denotative word corresponding in meaning to the said experience is very ably illustrated in the following lines—"In poetic communication the message conveyed by sounds is in fact completed in the course of transmission. In the line from Attila József's poem *Esik* 'It is raining

dunnyög motyog a cipő.....‘the shoes mumble and mutter’ the ‘moist’ palatals make the metaphor absolutely clear. The words have the meaning of mumble and mutter, as they are translated, but the Hungarian /n/ and /t/ sounds lost in the English translation give the original words a squelching and squashy quality, which really imitates the sucking sound of the wet shoes in the mud.” (Ibid. p. 214.).

A very interesting example of sound being happily wedded to the sense and as such of being suggestive of the appropriate situation may be had in the lines;

“And like a downward smoke, the slender stream

Along the cliff to fall and pause and fall did seem.” from Alfred Tennyson’s ‘The Lotos Eaters’, where the sounds not only suggest the ‘fall and pause’ of the stream but also the drowsiness of the whole situation.

It may be noted here also that the Symbolists very ably recognised this independent wealth of sounds, i.e., the capacity to suggest rasa. Compare : “But whereas the Imagists, aiming at clear, precise images, appealed almost exclusively to the eye, the aim of the symbolists was to approximate poetry to music, in particular to the music of Wagner, using words as the musician uses notes, not to convey logical meaning, but by their associations and patterned sounds to induce or evoke in the reader a state of mind which M. l ‘Abbe’ Bremond likens to the mystic trance.” (A Critical History of English Poetry, p. 507). Here ‘mystic trance’ may be said to be the same as the absorption (i.e., tanmayibhavana) of the sahṛdaya in the relish of rasa. But yet, these sounds must be the sounds of letters which belong to the meaningful words, which are capable of suggesting sentiments by way of describing the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. Otherwise it will be difficult to distinguish between the domain of music and the domain of poetry with which alone our poetics is concerned. From the view point of poetry the meaningless sounds

are only auxiliary agents for suggesting rasa as it is very rightly observed by Abhinava in the words "ata eva ca sahakāritāme vābhidhātum nimittasaptami kṛtā varṇapadādisviti / na tu varṇaireva rasābhivyaktiḥ, vibhāvādisamyogāddhi rasaniṣpatitirityuktam bahusah" (Locana, p 305)

Suggestion by order of words

To distinguish Vyañjanā from Abhidhā Ānanda again and again says that while Abhidhā belongs only to the words, Vyañjanā may belong to the word, part of a word, letters, samghaṭanā, etc. The list of the elements bearing suggestivity, given by Ānanda, is not complete. We are thus left by the theorist with the freedom of showing that even the order of words in the sentence may have a lot of suggestive potentiality. Students of Sanskrit poetics may best refer to "Word order and its stylistic value in the ISOPANISAD" by Salvador Bucca in the Professor P K Gode Commemoration Volume (p 34) for an illustration of this suggestive potentiality of the word order. Hence, compare :

"Occasional place of the subject

idam sarasam (1 a) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

te lokā (3 a) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

devā, (4 b) after the verb, at the third place of the sentence

mukham (15 b) at the end of the sentence and of the verse

caritam, (17 b) at the end of the sentence and of the verse

In all these cases the place has been determined by the emphasis laid on the elements of the sentence placed at the beginning

In the first case the word emphasized is *idam*, the logical subject of the sentence, which expresses a fundamental idea of the Upanisad. In 3a the strong place is occupied by

asūryā 'devilish,' which is a very important and meaningful predicate of the subject, for it expresses the nature of the worlds, where the slayers of the Self go. In 4b *na* is placed at the beginning; it is the negation of all the sentence, and it emphasizes the incapacity of the *devāḥ* to reach the *Brahman*."

In all these, what requires to be specially observed is that we have the idea of an emphasis in addition to the express sense of the words simply due to the occasional positions of the words in a sentence. This idea of emphasis (or excess or *atiśaya*) must be recognised as a suggested idea (*vyaṅgyārtha*), which may be compared to the idea of excess we have in respect of Rāma in "rāmo'smi sarvaṁ sahe;" but the expression must be reckoned as a case of *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya*dhvani owing to the speciality of the sentence (*vākya*). [Vide, Factors governing suggestion in *arthaśaktyudbhava*, p. 116, above.]

The suggested idea of an emphasis that we have due to word-order need not be confused with a case of *kāku*, which invariably requires a dramatic uttering of the words, whereas here the visual experience of the physical presence of the word itself is sufficient for giving the suggested content.

Compare : Not only words, but sounds and sound-clusters, morphemes bound as well as free, the syntactical arrangement, the usual word-order as well as its violation, that is to say, sound in all its myriad combinations, and, silence as well—can contribute to the final purpose of a poem : the evocation of *Rasa*, "the aesthetic sentiment." [T. N. Sreekantaiya : Meaning in Poetry : P. K. Gode Com. Vol. p. 393].

The position of *rīti* : In the opinion of Ānanda, the *rīti* theorists also scarcely understood the most essential element in the *kāvya* to be something like *dhvani*. From their treatment of *rīti*, it appears, that they were also making attempts to explain this very essence of poetry, i.e., *dhvani*. But they failed to identify and analyse *dhvani* and introduced the *rīti* instead. Ānanda observes like this possibly because of the

fact that the rīti theorists also recognised some suggested sense in kāvya, they were also charmed by the suggested sense, but in their attempts to define and analyse kāvya they failed to distinguish the dhvani element of the kāvya and instead of calling it the most essential element relegated the suggested sense to an insignificant position. Thus, for example, Vāmana named a guṇa as kānti. Kānti is the quality of having distinct rasas like śṛṅgāra (dīpta risatvam kāntih KSV III 2 15). If he would have said that kānti alone makes a kāvya or if he would have called it the most essential quality, then we would have had reasons to say that he also recognised at least a particular aspect of dhvani. But for Vāmana kānti is as good as nineteen other guṇas. Thus he relegated kānti to an insignificant position. Yet the rīti theorists for the first time enquired about a soul of the kāvya. And Ānanda recognises their naive attempt to analyse the most essential element of kāvya, which is nothing other than dhvani. Since Ānanda clearly explains what is the most essential element in kāvya by way of propounding the dhvani theory, he feels it unnecessary to explain the rīti theory anew or to adopt it to his scheme with any modification. Compare Dhv III 46 and the vṛtti thereunder. (Dhv p 517)

The position of the vṛttis. The vṛttis are of two kinds, i.e., (1) the vṛttis of drama (nāṭya) and the (2) vṛttis of kāvya. The vṛttis of nāṭya are given by Bharata and they are namely—Bhārati, Kauśiki, Ārabhaṭi and Sāttvati. The vṛttis of kāvya are given by Udbhaṭa and they are namely—Paruṣi, Uparāgarikā and Grāmyā. Ānanda adopts them to his own scheme and interprets them as the proper use of artha and śabda respectively for helping the suggestion of rasa. ("rasāḥyanu-gunatvena vyavahāro'rthaśabdayoḥ," Dhv III 33). According to Ānanda vṛtti means vyavahāra (i.e., use). Hence, the vṛttis of nāṭya mean the use of the meaning and the vṛttis of kāvya mean the use of the words. But the vṛtti must always be conceived as having a propriety by way of being helpful

to the suggestion of rasa. In fact Bharata also desired the vṛttis to be understood as related to some rasa. Cf. "kaiśikī ślakṣṇanepathyā śṛṅgārarasasambhavā" (quoted in Locana, p. 518).⁶³ But in time of presenting the vṛttis Upanāgarikā, etc., Udbhaṭa does not make any reference to any sense. He simply says that these are the three modes in which anuprāsas occur. (KSS. I. 7 and pp. 5-6). Ānanda yet feels that these three modes of the arrangement of similar consonants may be congenial for suggesting different rasas, and the vṛttis may be appreciated only as such.⁶⁴ Ānanda once again observes that after the introduction of the dhvani theory the two kinds of vṛtti assume the position of ritis. (samyagrītipadavimavataranti). In my opinion, what Ānanda means to say is that the vṛttis also appear to have been certain naive attempts to explain rasa, the most essential element, like the ritis and as such even in the dhvani scheme they are to be conceived as factors helpful for the suggestion of rasa.

The guṇibhūtavyaṅgya kāvya : Guṇibhūtavyaṅgya is defined as the kāvya, which has got an association with some suggested sense but where the expressed sense itself is more beautiful. (Kārikā III. 34). Ānanda suggests that this guṇibhūtavyaṅgya type should be skillfully employed in association with all the kāvyas having an appealing suggestion of rasa. Compare kārikā III. 35. where 'prasanna-gambhīrapadaḥ kāvyabandhaḥ sukhāvahaḥ' means the kāvya having rasas, because the prasāda guṇa is common to all the rasas and the presence of the same guṇa is indicated by prasanna-gambhīra, etc. The following points are to be noted.

63. Compare, NS. XXII. 25, XXII. 40, XXII. 47, XXII. 55. etc.

64. Abhinava observes that the unworldly nature of rasa is more strongly confirmed by the fact that even meaningless ways of alliteration are helpful for the suggestion of the same. cf. "ataśca raso'yamalaukikaḥ / yena lalitaparuṣānuprāsasyārthābbhidhānānupayogino'pi rasam prati vyañjakatvam" (Locana, p. 158).

(1) A suggested rasāḍī becomes subordinate to vācārtha as in rasavadalamkāra (p 462)

(2) A suggested vastu becomes subordinate to the vācya as in samāsokti alamkāra (p 471)

(3) A suggested alamkāra may also become subordinate to the vācya as in the case of the figure dipaka where an upamā is invariably suggested but not predominantly (p 462)

The citra type The composition which has no intention to depict any rasa, which does not have the capacity to convey any suggested sense, which has simply the charmingness of the vācya sense and the vācaka word, is called a citra That is not a kāvya proper but a mere semblence of kāvya (vide vṛtti p 494) Citra is of two varieties, namely, (1) śabda-citra, example—duṣkarayamaka etc—as in KD III 71 (p 347)

samānayāsamānayā samānayā samānayā /
sa mā na yāsamānayā samānayā samānayā //, and (2) vācya citra—as for example, an utprekṣā without any association with suggested sense or intention for suggesting rasāḍī

But the doubt arises—can there be any composition which does not present some fact ? And can there be a fact which cannot cause a feeling or mood or sentiment ? (Even if certain fact brings a passiveness of the mind that too must be recognised as a state of mind (citta-vṛtti) akin to the śāntarasa) Moreover, if a composition cannot evoke any feeling then the very purpose of the poetic composition fails Hence, there cannot be some 'citra' type of composition devoid of the capacity to arouse a feeling or mood, and the occasion of determining what citra is, does not arise Ānanda admits the validity of such an objection, and shows his own doubt as to the availability of such a composition, called a citra in the strictest sense of the term and says that the citra is simply imagined to be there Ānanda's strong conviction is that for a composition's being heavy with sentiment the poet must have the intention to compose it with that definite purpose The

reason behind such a conviction is possibly that, for Ānanda, a poet himself must have the anubhava (experience) of a certain sentiment in order to relegate it to the heart of the sahr̥daya. It is some sort of sentimental communication between the poet and the sahr̥daya. Even when the poet does not intend to convey a sentiment the vācya sense referring to some fact or other may yet cause some feeling in the heart of the sahr̥daya; but that is destined to be very remote and weak and the composition being so scarcely associated with sentiment may be deemed to be as good as without sentiment—and hence the calculation of a citra type. Let us take the case of the duṣkara-yamaka quoted above. As the commentator informs, this is the request of some nāyaka to his friend for fetching his love. There is also a description of the nāyikā that she is beautiful and learned. Here, after we understand the meaning we may have some shred of śṛṅgāra—but that is too flimsy to be counted at all. The fact is that our composition of the mind is so much perturbed by the effort to understand the vācya sense and our eyes, ears, and of all, intelligence is so much captivated by the form of the words that we do not any further have the mind congenial for an unperturbed relish of the feeling (a vītavighnā pratīti). Still worse is the case with gomutrikā, ardhabhrama, etc. It is regrettable that Ānanda finds some poets who do not have command over their speech and indulge in composing citras. Hence he imagines this type. But as determined and suggested by his new theory, a composition without suggested sentiments, etc., does not become of a poet. Dispensing thus with the citra type Ānanda proceeds to remind that when the contextual rasa is taken into consideration we cannot have an independent instance of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya also (vṛtti. p. 499). But as normally the case is, some citra also may occur in the body of a larger prabandha having a predominant and more appealing rasādi. As a matter of fact there must also be some citra aspect of the kāvya. A kāvya cannot have rasādi or any suggested sense for

every word of it. There must also be some descriptive portion for the depiction of the *rasādi*. But what is discouraged is a *citra* for *citra*'s sake. Hence, Ānanda opines that only the novice may spare to compose *citras*, but, for the mature poets *dhvani* alone is *kāvya* (cf *vṛtti* pp 499-500, *prāptaparīṇatīnām tu dhvanireva kāvyamiti sthītametat*). Ānanda observes that all good poetry possesses a suggested content, either commensurating with the small extent of it or being present in a particular portion of the *kāvya* but predominating over the whole length of the composition and serving as its soul. Hence in saying '*dhvanireva kāvyam*' he does not even leave any scope for *gunibhūtavyangya*. But for a proper analysis and for a better understanding of what *dhvani* is, through a contrast with *citra* and also *gunibhūtavyangya*, all these different types are to be examined. Tillyard also believes that postulation of 'direct' poetry which is in fact very rare is also needed for a better presentation of the oblique poetry through contrast. Compare—"the terms 'direct' and 'oblique' poetry are a false contrast. All poetry is more or less oblique there is no direct poetry. But the terms 'less oblique' and 'more oblique' would sound ridiculous and the only way to be emphatic or even generally intelligible is by exaggeration to force a hypothetical but convenient contrast" (E. M. W. Tillyard *Poetry Direct and Oblique*, p 10).

A reply to Viśvanātha's objection *prahelikā*. Ānanda would recognise a *kāvya* even with a *vastu* predominantly suggested as a genuine case of *dhvani*. In this connection it is necessary to examine Viśvanātha's criticism of Ānanda's stand. Viśvanātha writes—'*yattu dhvanikārenoktam 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' itītat kim vastvalamkārarasādīlakṣanastrirūpo dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmā uta rasādīrūpamātro vā ? nādyah prahelikā dāvatavyāpteh / dvitīyaśīlet ? omīti brūmah* (SD I).

It should be noted that for Viśvanātha the *Dhv. kārikā* 1.1 savours of a definition of *kāvya*, which it is not. Even if *dhvani* is taken as the soul of *kāvya* then what is the body for the residence of that soul? Viśvanātha says '*vākyaṁ*

'rasātmakam kāvyam' (SD. I. 3). Here the vākya is specified as the desired body for the soul rasa. This may be taken as a definition of kāvyā. But it is not logical to say that kāvyā is defined as 'a kāvyā where the soul is dhvani.' Because the doubt yet remains—'what is kāvyā, the substratum for the soul dhvani.' Hence 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' is not a definition of kāvyā and it must not be understood as determining the scope of kāvyā once for all. Viśvanātha's greatest objection is to vastudhvani, for, in his opinion if vastudhvani (and also alaṃkāradhvani) is recognised as the 'soul of kāvyā' then even the examples of prahelikā will have to be recognised as kāvyā. But Viśvanātha calls any suggested vastu vastudhvani without any reference to the predominance of it. An example of prahelikā presents a suggested vastu. But since it is a suggested vastu and not rasa, it cannot be called a kāvyā. Of the earlier theorists Daṇḍin names and illustrates as many as sixteen varieties of prahelikā and refers to fourteen other varieties. Viśvanātha would not recognise it even as an alaṃkāra, because it is detrimental to rasa. An alaṃkāra, according to him, must be an upakāraka for rasa (cf. SD. X. 1.) Prahelikā is only a charming way of speech. Compare :

'rasasyaparipanthitvānnālaṃkāraḥ prahelikā /
uktivaicitryamātraṃ sā cyutadattākṣarādikā // (SD. X. 13).

Example :

pāṇḍavānām sabhāmadhye duryodhana upāgataḥ /
tasmai gām ca suvarṇam ca sarvāṇyābharaṇāni ca //

From the peculiar verbal construction of the verse the meaning appears as that, Duryodhana was warmly received by the Pāṇḍavas; but that is simply absurd and the actual meaning is had only when we write as follows—Sabhāmadhye' (a)dur (aduḥ) yo (yaḥ) dhana (adhana), etc. This form of the sentence can be had only by a re-arrangement of the same words. And the actual meaning appears as that 'the poor man who came to the sabhā was given (aduḥ) cow, etc.'

This is a prahelikā on account of keeping the *kriyā* understood (*kriyāgupti*) Viśvanātha does not give us to learn what is the suggested sense here. Yet let us examine if this is a case of *dhvani* according to the theory of Ānanda.

(1) There are two senses. One sense related to the poor man, another related to Duryodhana. Both the senses are primary senses of the words taken separately.

(2) It is not a case of *ślesha*, because both the senses are not contextual.

(3) The words are here *anekārthaka*. In such cases Viśvanātha finds an *abhidhāmūlaśābdīvyañjanā*. (SD II 21) The non-contextual meaning, in such a case, is recognised as suggested. That is a suggested *vastu* and as such should present a case of *vastudhvanī*.

(4) But, even if the non-contextual meaning is taken as suggested, it cannot be considered as a case of *dhvani*, since the idea relating to Duryodhana is not more appealing than and predominant over the express sense relating to the poor man. Hence, we cannot apply Ānanda's definition of *dhvani* to this case.

(5) It is also not a case of *guṇibhūtavyangya*. Applying Dhv III 34, we do not find it to be so, because the idea of the poor man being received, i.e., the *vācya* sense, also does not charm us much.

(6) That it is not a *citra* is declared by Viśvanātha himself in the *kārikā* defining *prahelikā*, quoted above.

(7) We do not have both the express sense and the suggested sense as the source of *camatkṛti*. Hence, we cannot have it as a genuine case of *kāvya*. Here we simply have a puzzle or riddle, or being charmed by neither of the express sense or the suggested sense but by the mere manner of speech we must call it a case of *uktivacitrya* and must not confuse it with Ānanda's *vastudhvanī*.

(8) So far we are accepting Viśvanātha's own stand as regards the nature of the non-contextual sense relating to Duryodhana. We are supposing that Viśvanātha would recognise the non-contextual sense as suggested and presenting a suggested vastu. But as observed earlier Ānanda would recognise also the non-contextual sense as the primary sense of the words conveyed by Abhidhā. Hence, there being no suggested vastu, according to Ānanda, the confusion of the verse with vastudhvani must not occur at all.

(9) Let us suppose again that Viśvanātha finds here a case of suggested alaṃkāra of the śabdaśaktyudbhava type and thus an alaṃkāra-dhvani. But according to Ānanda there cannot be a suggested alaṃkāra here. And there is also little justification in imagining, as a critic, some sort of a relation like sādrśya, virodha, etc., between the contextual and the suggested sense. Even if we suppose that there is an alaṃkāra, it is a pretty doubtful if any sahrdaya is delighted by that. The suggested alaṃkāra being not appealing and predominant and distinctly suggested, we cannot call it a dhvani. Moreover, it is crystal clear that the composer of prahelikā does not ever have the intention to convey such a suggested sense. The intention to that effect being not there, the imagined suggested sense does not deserve any consideration. (cf. Dhv. p. 496, 'vivakṣopārūḍha eva hi kāvyē śabdānāmarthaḥ'). Hence, this is not a case of dhvani.

(10) Such verses may yet occur in the body of a genuine kāvya, and may at times serve the purpose of suggesting rasādi. For example, for delineating a buffoon or a clown causing the sentiment of laughter, a number of such verses may be put to his lips. But taken apart from the context they cannot stand as kāvya on their own merit.

It requires to be noted here that a good number of so called udbhaṭaślokaś also may be dispensed with in this manner. A dhvani is a kāvya. To be recognised as a dhvani a certain

composition or a certain group of words must first of all be recognised as a *kāvya*. But we do not call a delightful assemblage of words *kāvya* unless we get the delight really because of the sense conveyed by the words. If we do not demarcate the scope of *kāvya* like this, it would indeed be difficult to find a scope for the riddles and the puzzles and the like. Mere *alamkāras*, particularly the *śabdālamkāras*, also cannot present genuine instances of *kāvya*, but a *kāvyanukāra* because a *kāvya* is expected to appeal to heart by presenting a charming fact or an imaginary idea or a sentiment. If the composition fails to do any thing more than appealing to the intellect alone, it would not be called a *kāvya* according to the *dhvani* theory, inasmuch as the man of taste, who can appreciate a *kāvya*, is called a *sahṛdaya* and in the term *sahṛdaya* itself there is a reference to the heart (*hrdaya*). The discovery of this subjective aspect of *kāvya* is indeed a great achievement for the *dhvani* theory. Yet the *kāvyas* of different poets may vary in capacity to appeal to heart. Hence the gradation of *kāvya* is also shown. It will be observed that the amount and nature of appeal of the same *kāvya* may vary from reader to reader also. That it is a fact and that it was recognised by the theorists themselves will be shown with illustrations. Since, they admit a gradation of the *kāvya*, a *kāvya* having the capacity to arouse a sentiment is recognised as the best type of *kāvya*; and this leads us to the phenomenon of *rasa*-realisation.



CHAPTER III

THE REALISATION OF RASA

Bharata's Rasa sūtra : According to Bharata no meaning can proceed (from speech) without (any kind of) rasa (i.e., sentiment).¹ With this conviction he tells us the process of realisation of rasa in the sūtra—"vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ" of the sixth chapter of the NŚ. This sūtra plainly means "rasa results from the combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (with the sthāyibhāvas)." That the word saṁyoga means a connection with the sthāyibhāvas may be gathered from the prose exposition of the sūtra by Bharata himself or a still later verse called anuvamśya śloka running as—

bhāvābhinayasambaddhān sthāyibhāvāṁstathā budhāḥ //
āsvādayanti manasā tasmānnāṭyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ //, where 'bhāva' means 'vibhāva and vyabhicāribhāvas' and 'abhinaya' means 'anubhāvas'.²

The sthāyibhāvas are the permanent or dominant moods, which are made manifest within the heart of the men of taste by the reading of kāvya or the witnessing of a dramatic performance. These sthāyibhāvas belong to all human beings in varying degrees of intensity. They are enumerated by Bharata as rati (love), hāsa (gaiety), śoka (sorrow), krodha (anger), utsāha (enthusiasm), bhaya (fear), jugupsā (repugnance), and vismaya (wonder). Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta recognise also a ninth sthāyibhāva, viz., nirveda (passiveness). These permanent moods are connected respectively with the sentiments (rasas), viz., śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta and śānta.

1. "na hi rāsādṛte kaścidarthaḥ pravartate" (NŚ. VI).

2. Vide Abhinavabhāratī, NŚ. p. 290.

Vibhāva means the situation which evokes the dormant permanent moods (sthāyibhāvas) into operation. It has two aspects, viz., ālambana and uddīpana. The persons or the objects in relation to which the permanent moods begin to operate in the mind are known as ālambana vibhāvas (i.e., supporting objects). For example, love (rati) manifests itself in relation to a man or woman and hence the man or the woman is the ālambanavibhāva in case of śṅgārarasa. The other objects belonging to the same situation which encourage the intensity of the permanent mood are called uddīpanavibhāvas (or exciting situation). In case of love the objects like the spring season and the moon rise are recognised as uddīpanavibhāvas.

The anubhāvas are the external manifestations of the operation of the permanent mood within. In case of love (rati) the movements of the eyes and the side glances etc., are recognised as anubhāvas. Bharata does not give elaborate description or definition or any definite number of the vibhāvas and anubhāvas as they may be understood from an observation of the behaviour of the people around (cf. 'tatra vibhāvānu bhāvau lokaprasiddhau / lokasvabhāvānugatatvācca tayorlakṣa nam nocyate tiprasanganivṛttyartham' NŚ VII p. 348). The anubhāvas which are ordinarily called so can be produced by an effort also. Hence they may be called voluntary effects of the permanent emotions. There are also eight other effects of the rising of the permanent moods which get manifested in the person having an excited permanent mood automatically. These are not designated as anubhāvas but separately classed as sāttvika bhāvas. Yet, as they occur as after-effects of the permanent moods they are also 'nothing more than anubhāvas'.³ They are named as Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice, Trembling, Change of colour, Weeping and Fainting.⁴

Vyabhicāribhāvas are transitory mental states. They occur to the mind in a fleeting manner in course of experiencing a permanent mood. Although they are mental states they may be acted out in a manner so as to make others know about their occurrence. In kāvya also they may be suggested through appropriate descriptions. The anubhāvas are thirty three in number and they are like passiveness (nirveda), weakness (glāni), apprehension (śaṅkā) and shame (vṛṣṭā or lajjā).⁵

Interpretations of Bharata's sūtra : Bharata's sūtra is variously interpreted by later writers like Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta to show the way of realisation of rasa. According to Lollaṭa, rasa primarily belongs to the hero. For example, it was Rāma who had love (rati) for Sītā and as such the rasa (śṛṅgāra) belonged to Rāma. The spectator ascribes this rasa to the actor on account of the actor's clever acting. Thus the spectator's knowledge about Rāma's love for Sītā gives him pleasure. The love is sthāyibhāva; and the very sthāyī being brought to its full form (upacita) by vibhāva, etc., becomes rasa. It is called sthāyī in its undeveloped form and belongs both to the hero and the actor, who is supposed to be the same with the former. Cf. "tena sthāyyeva vibhāvānubhāvādibhirupacīto rasaḥ / sthāyī bhāvastvanupacitaḥ / sa cobhayorapī /anukāryye'nukartaryyapī cānusandhānabalāt itī" (A. Bh. p. 272). This view does not treat of rasa as a matter of the reader's or the spectator's feelings or emotions.

According to Śaṅkuka, the actor skilfully imitates the actions of the hero to whom a certain sthāyī actually belongs. The sthāyī is inferred to be belonging to the actor on account of the vibhāvas, etc., which are very skillfully presented. The sthāyī is specially called rasa, on account of its being an imitated one. Cf. "tasmāddhetubhirvibhāvākhyaiḥ..... anukartṛsthatvena līngavalataḥ pratiyamānaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhya-

5. Vide NS. VI (18-21) and VII p. 355 and NS. Trans. 125.

rāmādigatasthāyyanukarana rūpaḥ / anukaranārūpatvādeva ca
 nāmāntarena vyapadiṣṭo rasah' (A Bh p 272) It appears
 that Abhinava refers to the view of Śaṅkuka him-self when
 he maintains that, according to others, the sthāyī which is
 cognised through inference is called rasa because of producing
 a delight in the mind of the cogniser on account of its inherent
 charm.⁶ This very position is confirmed by Maṇiśa also
 when he says—" anumīyamāno'pi vastusaundryabala-
 dṛśanīyatve nānyānumīyamānavilakṣanah sthāyītena sambhā-
 vyamāno ratyādīrbhāvastatrāsannapi sāmājikānām vāsanayā
 carvyamāno rasa iti śrīśaṅkukah' ⁷

The most poignant defect of this theory is that, if the
 sthāyī is simply inferred to be occurring in the heart of the
 hero or the actor it would be as good as an inference of the
 practical world, and as such it would have other ordinary
 reactions in the heart of the spectator in stead of an unmixed
 pleasure designated as rasa, as it is observed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka
 of "na ca śabdānumānādibhyah tatpratītau lokasya sarasvā
 prayuktā pratyaksādiva / nāyakayugulakāvabhāse hi pratyak-
 sa lajjājugupsāsprhādīsvocitacittavṛttīntirodayah" etc.⁸ More-
 over, it is a matter of common experience that the relish of
 rasa is never perturbed by any process of anumāna.⁹

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's conception of rasa We have seen that
 according to Lollaṭa rasa is produced by a connection of the
 sthāyī with vibhāvas, etc., which bring the sthāyī into full
 form. Hence his view is called utpattivāda. According to
 Śaṅkuka the spectator cognises the sthāyī as belonging to the
 hero imitated by the actor, through inference. Hence, accord-
 ing to him there occurs a cognition of rasa (rasah pratīyate).

The third notable theory was the theory of suggestion propounded by Ānandavardhana. Ānanda says that in kāvya rasa can never be expressly stated. It is suggested by the expressly stated descriptions of vibhāva etc.¹⁰ Hence, according to Ānanda rasa is conveyed through suggestion. (*rasaḥ abhivyajyate*).

In Bhaṭṭanāyaka's opinion rasa cannot be realised in the aforesaid ways. If rasa as understood in the sense of a developed sthāyī is inferred or cognised as belonging to the hero or the actor or if it is gathered to have been produced in relation to the hero or the actor the spectator is very likely to take a dispassionate note of it. The question of such a sthāyī belonging to the hero is not likely to cause any relish in the heart of the spectator or the reader. It is already pointed out by quoting a few words from the A. Bh., that, the sthāyī, in so far as it is cognised as belonging to any body other than the man of taste himself, would simply cause certain personal attitudes like shame, aversion and desire and never the relish of rasa. The sthāyī also cannot be cognised as belonging to the man of taste himself; for that will be as good as supporting the utpattivāda. But it is impossible, because, for instance, if the love between Rāma and Sītā is delineated in the kāvya the man of taste cannot have the same feeling of love, as Sītā can never serve as a vibhāva (i.e., object of love) for him. It cannot be said that, let Sītā be taken as a beloved (kāntā) in a general form, because in case of the description of gods such a generalisation would not be possible. It cannot be said that Sītā would remind the man of taste of his own beloved, because in the matter of crossing of seas, etc., similar experiences of own life are not there to be recollected. It cannot be said that in such a case an enthusiastic Rāma is recollected, for such a Rāma is not an already known object. If rasa is taken to be produced in the heart of the

10. cf. "trītyastu rasādīlakṣaṇaḥ..... darśayiṣyate" (Dhv. I. pp. 78-84) etc.

man of taste then in case of karuna rasa only śoka (i.e., sorrow) would be experienced and there would be no pleasant relish

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka rasa also cannot be said to be vyangya (i.e., suggested) Because, suggestion of rasa is possible if it already remains ready made If the sthāyi is said to be there in the form of a śakti ¹¹ (i.e., an impression in the sub-conscious mind), which may be suggested by vibhāvas, etc., in proper occasion, then, there should be greater and greater efforts to have more and more of vibhāvas etc., for better and better suggestion of rasa in the manner of desiring to have more and more light for more and more distinct manifestation of the jar But in actuality, the men of taste do not try to have more and more of vibhāvas etc., in time of realisation of rasa Moreover, in the opinion of Bhaṭṭanāyaka it is not stated by the theory of suggestion of rasa as to whose sthāyi is suggested The question yet remains as to whether the rasa (i.e., sthāyi raised to the status of rasa) belongs to the man of taste himself or to some one else ? Compare "nanūktam bhaṭṭanāyakena raso yadā paragatatayā prattiyate tena na prattiyate notpadyate nābhivyajyate kāvyena rasah" (Locana, pp 180-182) and "bhaṭṭanāyakastvāha—raso na prattiyat' / svagatatvaparagatatvāda ca pūrvavadvikalpyam /" (A Bh p 276)

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's own theory rasa is neither produced nor cognised nor suggested It is in fact relished by the man of taste There are three functions of poetry (1) Abhidhā—this power presents the meaning of the poetry

11 śakti is here supposed to mean an impression in the sub-conscious mind (i.e., a saṁskāra) because according to the "Jīmīnīyaka the apūrvā (i.e., virtue) that issues out of the yōga and resides in the self as a saṁskāra is a potency (i.e., śakti) of the yōga, which is instrumental in securing svarga (Vide, Śūtra-dṛp'ka, p 106)

in the form of the description of the vibhāvas etc. (2) Bhāva-katva—This power generalises the vibhāvas, etc., by liberating them from all relations in which they stand in ordinary life. This brings forth the realisation of the sthāyī corresponding to generalised vibhāva, etc. (3) Bhojakatva—This function of poetry takes away the qualities of rajas and tamas from the self of the man of taste and renders the quality of sattva more prominent in which state the realised sthāyī is so relished so as to have the melting (druti) and expansion (vistāra) and blooming (vikāsa) of the heart and a pure bliss which is on a par with the bliss of realising the Supreme Self. Hence, 'rasa-niṣpatti' of Bharata's sūtra according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka means bhukti (i.e., relish) of rasa and his theory is known as bhuktivāda. Compare, "tasmātkāvye parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena param bhujiyata iti" (A. Bh. p. 277) and "tena rasabhāvanākhyo dvitīyo vyāpāraḥ; yadvaśādabhidhāvilakṣaṇaiva / taccaitadbhāvakatvaṁ nāma rasān prati yat kāvyasya tadvibhāvādīnāṁ sādharmaṇatvāpādanaṁ nāma / bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogaḥ yo'nubhavasmarāṇa-pratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva.....parabrahmāsvādasavidhaḥ" (Locana, p. 183). This is the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, as represented by Abhinava. We may notice that Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not make any reference to the sthāyī. He maintains that in one stage 'rasa' is realised (cf. "bhāvite ca rase") and in the final stage 'rasa' is relished (cf. "tasya bhogaḥ," etc.). But we may suppose that according to him in both the stages the term rasa means the relevant sthāyī in a generalised form on the strength of his observation as represented in the A. Bh., that, if rasa is realised as belonging to the man of taste he should be sorry in case of karuṇa rasa, instead of having any pleasure. (cf. "svagatatvena hi pratītau duḥkhitvaṁ syāt").

Although 'rasa' means the sthāyibhāva in the expression "bhāvite ca rase" which corresponds to the stage of realisation of rasa, it does not mean a personal permanent mood of the man of taste. The vibhāvas, etc., which correspond to the

sthāyī are said to be generalised. That is how they are stripped of all the temporal and spatial specialities. Sītā, when generalised, is cognised simply as a heroine. Consequently the sthāyī which is realised also becomes generalised. Thus the realisation of rasa means a simple awareness or consciousness of the sthāyī of an universal form. This realisation leads to a state of bliss in which the self takes rest within itself ("nija samvidviśrānti")

Abhinava's theory of realisation of rasa

Proceeding to present his own theory of realisation of rasa Abhinava says that rasa is a meaning (artha) of kāvya, ('tat kāvyārtho rasah') This he observes on the strength of Bharata's explanation of the term 'bhāva' as "kāvyārthān bhāvayanti bhāvah" (NS VII) Commenting on these words Abhinava observes that by the term 'bhāva' certain mental states (cīttavṛttis) are referred to, they are the sthāyī-bhāvas, anubhāvas of the ālambanavibhāva and vyabhicārī bhāvas. In NS VII 3, Bharata says that bhāvas bring the rasas to the scope of experience (" bhāvayanti rasānimān yasmāttasmādamī bhāvā ")

Hence, rasa is a kāvyārtha (i.e., a meaning of kāvya) But it is not to be understood as an express meaning. Because rasa never occurs as the lexicographical meaning of the words. But it is an artha in so far as it is desired by the meaning of words and sentences to be chiefly conveyed of 'tatra ca padārtha vākyaarthau raseṣveva paryavasyata iti kāvyasyārthāḥ rasāḥ / arthyante prādhānyenetyarthāḥ / na tvarthasīdo'bhīdheyavāci' (A Bh p 343) In my opinion this assertion that, rasa is an artha of kāvya, in the beginning of the presentation of his theory may also be due to the fact that there were some thinkers who would not recognise rasa as a sense of kāvya. Such a section of thinkers is referred to by Ānanda in the words 'yairvā sākṣātkāvyārthatā rasādī-ṁ nābhyupagamyat-, taisteṣāṁ tannimitatā tāvadaśyaṁabhyu-

pagantavyā" (Dhv. p. 373). Contrary to the view of such thinkers the dhvani theorists recognise rasa also as a suggested 'sense' of kāvya.

Some opponent may question in this stage, 'can there be such a meaning which is different from and additional to the primary (abhidheya) meanings of the words and sentences ?' Abhinava replies that in the sentences "rātrimāsata" (They lay by the night) and "tāmagnauprādāt" (He offered it to fire) the literal meanings relate to the past tense. But the hearer gathers also an additional idea (pratīti) designated as (pratibhā), bhāvanā, vidhi or niyoga as the case may be, in which the verbs are freed from the given tense and appear in the forms "āste" and "pradadāmi". This additional idea which occurs to the mind of the hearer in the shape of an action of the present tense belonging to himself (i.e., pradadāmi) in case of 'agnau prādāt' is also recognised as a meaning of the sentence. Similarly in kāvya also we may have an additional knowledge or idea (i.e. pratīti).¹² In kāvya, for example, the literal meaning of the verse "grīvābhaṅgābhīramam" gives us only the description of a frightened deer. Thence an additional knowledge (pratīti) arises in the mind of the man of taste which has a bhaya (fear) as its object, as free from its relation to the deer or the time of the occurrence of the deer in the manner of the 'action of offering' being free of its expressly stated past tense or the third person, in case of "tāmagnau prādāt."¹³ The bhaya, which is thus cognised as free from its temporal and spatial specialities (bhayameva param deśakālādyanālīṅgitam), is cognised

12. cf. "yathā hi 'rātrimāsata'... ..kāvyāt(makā) dapi

śabdādhikāriṇo'dhikāsti pratipattiḥ" (A. Bh. p. 278).

See, AE, pp. 63-64, for a more informative exposition of this passage.

13. Vide, "Philosophical explanation of elimination of time etc."
(I. Aest, p. 159).

through an unperturbed cognition (nirvighna pratigrahyaṃ) and overwhelms the heart and becomes the 'bhayānaka rasa'. In case of such a cognition of the sthāyī bhaya, one's own self is neither very prominently involved nor completely suppressed.¹⁴

The bhaya which originally occurred with the deer is experienced also by the man of taste. This is because of the sthāyī being generalised. Such an universalisation of moods is possible because of the similarity of the hearts wherein the endless impressions of the moods lie as a varnish. In other words the man of taste gets identified at a stage with the poetical character and experiences the same feelings as that of the latter on account of similarity of the heart (i.e., hrdaya-samvāda). It cannot be contended that certain feelings are peculiar only to the characters like Rāma and hence, a hrdaya-samvāda with Rāma is not possible, because the heart of every being carries the impressions of a variety of moods as it is observed in the Yoga sūtras IV, 9-10.¹⁵ The identification of the reader with the poetical character is rendered possible by the fact of the latter being freed from the temporal and spatial limitations. Once the identification is accomplished the sthāyī is experienced. In course of experience the man of taste forgets even himself and cognises the sthāyī and sthāyī alone. This cognition by an unperturbed mind (vīravighnā pratīti) gives such an unmixed joy to the cognizant that the joy can hardly be distinguished from the knowledge. In other words the act of knowing itself is the experiencing of a joy. Thus as far as the implication of the sūtra of Bharata goes "a bhāva

14 "adbhūti cītra na vācya ullāṣaḥ" (A. Bh. p. 179)

15 Vide A. Bh. p. 279, "ata eva sarvasmīkīnīmekagāna āya va pratītiḥ sūtarīm rasaparipoṣṭya sarveśmanīd vīraṇī cītrīkīrācāṣīm vīraṇīsamvīdī" and Locana, p. 187 "rīṇī dīcīrīṇī tā na sarvasya hrdayasamvīdī mahat ābhāva cītravīraṇīvīrācācā āh."

cognised by a blissful and unperturbed cognition is rasa." cf. "sarvathā tāvadeṣāstipratītirāsvādātmā yasyām ratireva bhāti... sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrahya bhāva eva rasaḥ" (A. Bh. p. 280).

We have so far been severally referring to identification of the man of taste with the poetical character. Sometimes the poet himself, with his emotional statement, may appear as the poetical character. In such a case the reader will have an identification with the poet himself.

Identification of the man of taste with the poetical or dramatic character is aided by the factors like the propriety of guṇa, alaṃkāra, etc., in kāvya and by the factors like music and the costume in drama.¹⁶ Through identification the man of taste considers himself to be in the same situation as that of the poetical character and shares the feelings of the latter. But this identification is also an object of the world of poetry and not usual to the ordinary world; for, even getting identified the man of taste retains his personality in so far as the pleasure derived from the realisation of rasa may latter on be recalled by his own self.

The unperturbed cognition of the sthāyī gives the man of taste an unalloyed joy. This joy is also called camatkāra. This camatkāra is the continued absorption in an enjoyment but not fraught with any pain on account of a sense of lack of satiety. This is indeed an unworldly state of enjoyment for all the worldly enjoyments are mixed with an element of dissatisfaction on account of lack of satiety. On the other hand when satiety is attained the same enjoyment cannot be pursued any further.¹⁷ It will be seen that this camatkāra, which cannot be distinguished from the realisation of rasa is the same as what is meant by bhoga by Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

16. Vide also I. Aest. p. 158.

17. cf. "tathā hi—sa cāṣṭipativyatiरेकेणāvicchinno bhogāveśa ityucyate" (A. Bh. p. 279).

The seven vighnas (obstacles)

The cognition of the sthāyī for the realisation of rasa is said to be an unperturbed cognition (i.e., vitavighnā pratīti) The possible obstacles are also pointed out by Abhinava ¹⁸ The obstacles are as follows—(1) Incompatibility in cognition due to lack of belief in the incidents or persons described in the kāvyā as true ¹⁹ If the situation cannot be believed to be as it is presented, the question of the man of taste's considering himself to be in that situation cannot arise In other words the man of taste must move only in the world as it is created by the kāvyā around him He would hardly find himself a citizen of that world of poetry if he is conscious of its unreality from the very beginning. This obstacle may be removed in two ways In respect of the situations which are also ordinarily possible, (lokasāmānya) a hṛdayasamvāda is enough In other words, a similarity of the heart due to the possession of similar impressions of permanent moods with the poetical characters is enough for bringing a tinge of reality (i.e., compatibility) to the poetical situation It must not be expected that there would be hṛdayasamvāda in case of all the readers. Because, it is also observed by Abhinava that although the basic mental states (i.e., the citta-vṛttis) belong to all human beings, yet they belong in varying degrees, of “ ata evānut tamaprakṛtiṣu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti ²⁰ na hye-taccittavṛttivāsanāḥ prāṇi bhavati / kevalam kasyacitkā cidadhikā citta-vṛttih kācidūnā / kasyaciducitaviṣayanīyantrilā kasyacerdānyatā ” etc., (A Bh pp 282-283)

18 Vide, A. Ph. pp 280, 282 Some editions or quotations have the reading ‘vighnādikāryam upa’ There is also some difference in indicating the seven vighnas in modern works

19 “pratipatti-vayogyatā—sambhāvanā-viraho nāma” (A. Ph p 280)

20 Vide PSR p 31, for the truth of this statement, established by a practical experiment

Again, in respect of the activities which are not common to ordinary beings of the world (alokasāmānya), the first obstacle may be removed by the presentation only of the famous personages such as Rāma,²¹ which may bring into operation a deep-rooted belief even in the extraordinary feats of such personages, based on popular tradition. The supernatural elements which we often have in the Sanskrit dramas, apparently seem to have great possibility of this obstacle of incompatibility. For example, in the third Act of the URC there is the introduction of the invisible Sītā and in the last Act of the Mālatīmādhava Saudāminī is said to have flown down from the Śrīparvata. But, these and similar supernatural elements do not generally present the said obstacle because of the poet's skill of presenting them in an appropriate situation. In a world of sylvan deities (vana devīs) where the rivers, Tamasā, Muralā and Bhāgīrathī are personified, it was quite plausible for Sītā to have been invisible through the influence of Bhāgīrathī. The spectators also can very easily put belief in the flying of Saudāminī, since in the very first Act they are given to learn that Saudāminī is practising Yoga in the Śrīparvata. Since the possibility of a lack of belief is skillfully eliminated, the obstacle does not arise even in case of the presentation of the supernatural (i.e., alokasāmānya, as called by Ānandavardhana) elements.

(2) Attributing of a temporal or spatial speciality to the situation as related to the man of taste himself or to some one else (say, the dramatic character or the actor).²² If the sentiments of pleasure or pain depicted in the kāvya or the dramatic performance be supposed to be belonging to the man

21. Ānanda also discusses this as a question of propriety and observes, "ata eva ca bhūrate prakhyātavastuviṣayatvaṁ prakhyāto-dāttanāyakatvaṁ ca nāṭakasyāvaśyakartavyatayopanyastam."
(Dhv. III. p. 331).

22. "svagatatvaparagatatvaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāḥ."

of taste, limited by his own time and place, himself then he should have other feelings like the anxiety to retain the pleasure or the anxiety to abandon the pain. Similarly, if the feelings of pleasure or pain be supposed to be belonging to some one else with own temporal or spatial limitations then the man of taste would have quite different feelings like those of indifference or disgust. But for the realisation of *rasa* the same feeling as that of the poetical character alone is desired to be experienced by the man of taste, for which the man of taste must find himself free from his own temporal or spatial distinctions and must find the poetical character as some one belonging to the situation immediately present to the man of taste. For avoiding this obstacle, or in other words, for creating the illusion of the poetical world, dance, music and costume, etc., are introduced in the drama. The elements of the theatre which help to create the illusory atmosphere, like the scenery, costumes, traditional conventions, etc., are technically called *nāṭyadharmi*. The realistic part of the representation is called *lokadharmi*. In case of *kāvya* proper, however, we do not have advantages of the *nāṭyadharmi* or the *lokadharmi* (i.e., the artificial or realistic representation). There, the plain and the figurative expressions employed for a skillful representation of the *vibhāvas* etc., serve as the *lokadharmi* and the *nāṭyadharmi* of the drama and help suggestion of *rasa*.²³

(3) The state of being subject to one's own feelings of pleasure or pain.²⁴ The person whose heart is like a clear mirror on account of being free from personal feelings is called a *sahṛdaya*. The *sahṛdaya* alone can accommodate the sentiment depicted in the *kāvya* or *nāṭya* (i.e., drama) in the manner of

23 cf. "kāvye'pi ca lokanāṭyadharmasthityena svabhāvokt-vakrokti-prakīradvay-nāṭyauktikaprasanna-madhura-udjavalabhasamar-pyāmīna-vibhāvādyogād yameva rasavācīḥ" (Locana, p. 186).

24 "nāṭyauktāvivakṣhībhāvah."

a clear mirror capable of holding images. If the heart is preoccupied with personal pleasures or pains, the sentiment of the poetical or the dramatic situation will not find any place in the heart of the reader or the spectator. In case of the theatre devices like the singing and instrumental music are employed to overcome this obstacle by making the person forgetful of his own feelings. That is how the audible art plays its part in the theatre. This role of music may be likened to the part played by the letters in suggestion of *rasa* in *kāvya* discussed in the last chapter. The efficacy of the vocal or the instrumental music, etc., for removing this obstacle is, however, somewhat limited. If the personal feeling is deeper in degree the said devices may not be totally helpful. It is also to be noted that *sahrdayatva* (i.e., the capacity to get absorbed in the poetical situation) also varies from man to man and from time to time in respect of its nature and degree.²⁵

(4) Lack of means for cognising the poetical situation.²⁶ If the means of cognition are absent how can the cognition occur at all?

(5) Along with it we can consider the fifth obstacle named as 'lack of clarity' (*sphuṭatvābhāva*).²⁷ The mere verbal references to a certain incident or situation may not present the situation in a clear form. Even after the verbal description or symbolical suggestion of a certain situation the mind of the man of taste naturally desires to have a direct cognition. And indeed 'all the forms of knowledge are based on direct perception', as it is observed by Vātsāyana in *Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya*, I-3. A thing which is directly perceived cannot be

25. Vide. I. Aest. p. 153. (Psycho-physical Condition).

26. *pratītyupāyavaikalya*.

27. I consider the fourth and the fifth obstacles separately on the strength of the words—"tasmāttadubhayavighāte'bbhinaya" etc., said in the A. Bh. (p. 281) with reference to these 'two' obstacles.

that would lead to a confusion (*saṁśaya*) in respect of the *sthāyī*. Hence, all the elements, i.e., *vibhāvas*, etc., are to be represented together. ³⁰

Some important points in Abhinava's theory :

So far we have been understanding that the *sthāyī*, which is realised in a generalised form in an unperturbed blissful state, is *rasa*. But Abhinava gives us to learn that what is cognised in this blissful state is not a *sthāyī* in the ordinary sense of the term. The cognition of this mental state consists solely of a blissful rumination. According to Śāṅkuka, the *sthāyī*, which is brought to knowledge by *vibhāvas*, etc., is *rasa* because it can be relished. ³¹ But if we follow the words of Śāṅkuka literally the *sthāyī* that is cognised in the ordinary life also should be called *rasa*, and the *sthāyī* known through inference also should be called *rasa*. But, what is in fact realised in case of *śṛṅgāra*, for example, is neither a *rati* (i.e., a feeling of love) belonging to others nor one's personal feeling of love. What happens is only a rumination ³² over the *vibhāvas*, etc., which assume a generalised form on account of the personal impression (i.e., *vāsanā*) of a *sthāyī*, appropriate to those *vibhāvas*, etc. Hence, in course of the rumination over those *vibhāvas*, etc., a blissful consciousness arises, in which, however, the *sthāyī* and one's own self also appear. ³³ That blissful consciousness lasts only so long as the rumination over the *vibhāvas*, etc., lasts. In this manner the realisation of *rasa* differs from the mere knowledge of a *sthāyī*.

The *rasa*, even if it is understood as the *sthāyī* appearing in a blissful consciousness, is not a product of the *vibhāvas*,

30. cf. "tatrānubhāvānām.....upāttaḥ" (A. Bh. p. 284).

31. "sthāyyeva vibhāvādi-prattyāyyo rasyamānātvādrasa ucyate."

32. This is called 'carvaṇā', i.e., chewing the cud.

33. "romāñcādayasca...deśakālaniyamena tatra ratim gamayanti / yasyām svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvādanupraviṣṭaḥ" (A.Bh. p. 285).

etc., for, it vanishes as soon as the rumination over the vibhāvas, etc., disappears

The sthāyī which arises in such a blissful consciousness does not stand as an already accomplished object to be made known by vibhāvas, etc. That is how the vibhāvas, etc., do not serve as a cause of cognition for the sthāyī ³⁴

Now a question arises, 'What does Bharata mean by rasa-niṣpatti?' Because, the expression 'niṣpatti' literally means production. Abhinava's reply is that what is said to be produced here is not rasa (i.e., the sthāyī, which is relished in a generalised form) but the rasanā (i.e., relish) which issues out of the realisation. If rasa (i.e., the generalised sthāyī) is said to be produced (in a figurative way) on account of being solely animated by that relish ³⁵ then Abhinava's own position is not vitiated. But the relish is nothing other than a blissful consciousness. This leads Abhinava to give the final verdict that in his own opinion the blissful consciousness itself is rasa and not the object of the blissful cognition (i.e., the generalised sthāyī). Thus rasa being a blissful relish, even in case of the karuna rasa there is the same unalloyed pleasure. The blissful consciousness is the realisation of the self by itself. The rasas are variously named as śṛṅgāra, karuna, etc., only because the consciousness is effected by the sthāyī at a certain stage of the experience. But it is not the final stage. In the final stage of the realisation of rasa, there is the relish and relish alone. ³⁶ Only in the initial stage, the sthāyī, which lies in the sub-conscious (vāsanā) is brought to the realm of consciousness by dramatic performance or poetry. Compare
 asmanmate samvedanamevānandaghanamāśvādyate / tatra kā
 dukkhāśānkā / kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane rati-śokādivāsa-

³⁴ Vide, A. Eb. pp. 284-285

³⁵ Sthāyī as far as it is an object of blissful consciousness alone is rasa and not the ordinary sthāyī

³⁶ Vide, L. Act. pp. 128-29

nāvyāpāraḥ / tadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpāraḥ /" (A. Bh. p. 292).

Further points from Locana :

So far we have been referring only to the A. Bh., for Abinava's theory on rasa. In this connection, a few references to the Locana also may give us much enlightenment. Here he observes that,—

(1) Realisation of rasa is different from other forms of knowledge because of the difference of the means. Here the vibhāvas, etc., which serve as the basis of the cognition of the sthāyī are not the things of the ordinary world. They are extraordinary (lokottara), in so far as, vibhāvas, etc., give rise to rasa only in the realm of drama or poetry. The realisation of rasa is called carvaṇā (i.e., chewing the cud), āsvādana (i.e., tasting), or bhoga (relish). cf.—“kiṁ tu yathā..... tadvadiyamapi pratītiścarvaṇāśvādanabhogāparanāmā bhavatu / tannidāna-bhūtāyā hṛdayasaṁvādādyupakṛtāyā vibhāvādisāmagryā lokottararūpattvāt” (Locana, p. 187).

(2) But the expression “rasāḥ pratiyante” (i.e., Rasas are realised) must not be understood literally. It is a figurative expression like “odanaṁ pacyate” (Boiled rice is being cooked).³⁷ Because, it is already observed that rasa does not stand as an

37. Odana means “boiled rice.” There can be the odana only when the process of cooking is over. In time of the cooking affair it does not stand as an already prepared object. Likewise rasa is also not a readymade object to be tasted later on. There is no rasa before the act of realisation. But there is also some difference between the two figurative expressions. We have odana actually when the process of cooking is over but we cease to have rasa when the process of realisation is over. We do not actually have odana so long as the process of cooking continues. But we have rasa only so long as the process of realisation continues.

already accomplished object to be realised later on. Rasa is called rasa only so long as the process of realisation goes on. The existence of a rasa prior to or after the process of knowing cannot be conceived of. This very realisation is a peculiar type of relish. cf. "rasāḥ pratiyanta iti odanam pacitū vadvyavahārah / pratiyamāna eva hi rasah / pratitireva viśiṣṭā rasanā" (Ibid, p 187) cf also, "sā ca rasanā rūpā pratitirutpadyate" (Ibid, p 188)

(3) Rasadhvani is the excess of relish resulting from a rumination over the sthāyi, which appears to the cognizant prominently on account of the connection of the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. Cf "rasadhvanistu sa eva yo'tra mukhyatayā vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyojanodita sthāyīp-tipattikasya pratipattuh sthāyīyamśacarvanā prayukta evāsvāradaprakarṣah" (Locana, p 179)

rasa and vyañjana *

Abhinava had the greatest difference with Bhaṭṭanāyaka only in respect of the functions involved in the realisation of rasa³⁸. Bhaṭṭanāyaka recognises the functions called bhāva-katva and bhojakatva which are not recognised by any other school of thought. Abhinava by way of showing that these two functions are unwarranted and uncalled for, includes them in the scope of the vyañjanā function of the words and the meanings. Kāvya itself, with its appropriate alaṃkāras and gunas, brings rasa to the realm of realisation (i.e., bhāvanā). The function with which the kāvya does so is nothing other than suggestion (i.e., vyañjanā). The relish of rasa, which is said to be due to the bhojakatva function, also can be had by suggestion. Because, what is conceived as bhāvanā (realisation) is nothing other than bhoga (relish). Hence, if rasa is said to be suggested the bhoga (relish) also happens to be suggested along with rasa. So, Abhinava's conclusion is that

38. Vide, Theory of Rasa and Dhvani, p. 104.

“rasa is suggested; and it is relished in the manner of realisation.” cf. “tasmāt sthitametad—abhivyaajyante rasāḥ prati-tyaiva ca rasyanta iti.” (Locana, p. 190).

Bhaṭṭanāyaka raised the question that if rasa is said to be suggested then it must be an already accomplished fact. As far as my knowledge goes Abhinava does not give any direct reply to such an objection. But such an objection cannot occur if vyañjanā is understood to be the function of revelation having an analogy with the jar and the lamp. In other words, something is said to be the suggestor of another thing when the former reveals the latter while keeping itself manifest. For example, the lamp suggests the jar, for the lamp also reveals itself while revealing the jar.³⁹ This conception of vyañjanā does not demand the vyaṅgya to be already existent. We have seen how it is severally observed by Abhinava that the realisation of rasa is there only so long as the perception of the situation depicted in the kāvya (i.e., the vibhāvas, etc.) is there. Hence, it is rightly said that kāvya suggests rasa.

If it is insisted that the object which is suggested (i.e., the vyaṅgya) should be an already existent object, then we may possibly have yet another interpretation. In the finest analysis of Abhinava rasa is an unalloyed relish. This unalloyed relish is identical with the self. For, in the śruti, the self is conceived as saccidānanda (i.e., real, consciousness and joy). It is already observed that in Abhinava's theory realisation of rasa means the realisation of the self by itself. Jagannātha also understands the realisation of rasa as the realisation of the self and quotes the statement—“raso vai saḥ, rasam hye-vāyam labdhvānandībhavati” from the Taittirīyopaniṣad (II. 7) in support of his doctrine.⁴⁰ That is how rasa can be said

39. cf. “tasmādghaṭapradīpanyāyastayoḥ, yathaiva hi pradīpadvā reṇaghaṭapratīṭāvutpannāyām na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate tadvadvyāṅgyapratītau vācyāvabhāsaḥ” (Dhv. p. 421).

40. But Jagannātha wrongly represents the view of Abhinava in this connection. Vide, I. Aest. p. 127.

to be suggested, even when the function of suggestion is conceived in the manner of Bhaṭṭanāyaka

Rasa and the experience of the Absolute : If in this way realisation of rasa means the realisation of the self then how does the aesthetic consciousness (i.e., rasāsvāda) differ from the mystical consciousness (i.e., brahmāsvāda) ? Abhinava does not identify one with the other. He simply says that rasāsvāda is on a par with the brahmāsvāda ⁴¹. Because, when there is the experience of the Absolute, there can be no further coming back to the realm of worldly experience. But in case of the realisation of rasa, there is the coming back of the subject to the realm of worldly experience even after the experience of the unalloyed bliss which is an aspect of the Absolute itself. This point is very clearly marked by Dr. Pandey in the words "Aesthetic experience, therefore, according to Abhinavagupta, in its final stage, belongs to the level of Vyatireka Turiyātita, in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the Subject, the Self, shines in its Ānanda aspect" ⁴².

The Vyatireka Turiyātita refers to a stage in the mystic experience, according to the Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy, of which Abhinava was the greatest exponent. Turiyātita is that stage of the mystic experience, where the subjectivity not only predominates but also rises above the objectivity. This Turiyātita is of two types. The first is called 'Vyatireka Turiyātita', in which the objectivity persists in the sub-conscious. The second is called 'Avyatireka Turiyātita'. This is the highest stage, "from which there is no descent" ⁴³. Brahmāsvāda may be called the Avyatireka Turiyātita, when we call rasāsvāda as Vyatireka Turiyātita and that is how we observe the

41. "Parabrahmāśvādaḥ brahmāśvādīva cīnvaṣya rasāśvādāya"
(Locana, p. 190)

42. I Aest p. 130

43. Ibid, p. 122

propriety of explaining rasāsvāda (or rasa itself) as “brahmā-svādasahodara.”

Rasa and the drama :

Coming again to the question of practical delineation of rasa, Abhinava observes that in certain cases only one or two of the three factors namely, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva occur. In such cases, what is not clearly depicted in the piece, occurs to the realm of imagination of the man of taste and thus completes the whole situation, suitable for the depiction of the relevant rasa. ⁴⁴ Viśvanātha also observes that in the case where only one or two of the vibhāvas, etc., occur, there may be the suggestion of rasa if an imagination of the less prominent factors is possible on the strength of the context, etc. ⁴⁵ Viśvanātha gives the verse “dīrghākṣam śaradindukānti,” for illustration, where Agnimitra simply gives a description of the nāyikā Mālavikā. Thereby, we get the description only of the ālambana-vibhāva. Yet, indeed, we complete the picture of the whole situation by imagining the vyabhicāribhāva in the form of an autsukya ⁴⁶ and anubhāvas in the shape of side glances, etc., of Agnimitra. This is how we have the relish of śṛṅgāra rasa from the said verse even in the absence of a clear delineation of the appropriate anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas. But, Abhinava observes that the best type of relish can be derived when all the three elements are adequately delineated. But the delineation of all the elements is generally not practicable in shorter parts of compositions or single verses called *muktaka*.

44. A. Bh. pp. 286-287.

45. sadbhāvaścedvibhāvāderdvayorekāya vā bhavet /
jhaṭītyanyasamākṣepe tathā doṣo na vidyate // (SD. III. 17).

46. *Autsukya* means a restlessness on account of a delay in union with the desired object, causing burning of the heart, etc., (SD. III. 159).

The situation may be presented in its entirety only in a whole composition. Of all the types of compositions the drama is the best in this respect.^{46a} Because, all the affairs (as *anubhāvas*) of the characters (who form the *ālambana vibhāvas*) and the whole back ground (which serves as the *uddīpana vibhāva*) can be vividly presented by the staging of the drama.^{46b} In course of reading a whole composition the reader draws up a mental picture of the affairs of the characters in such a manner that he gets the experience of witnessing a

46^a. Possibly because of this advantage of the drama to be most appealing with the suggestion of the greatest amount of *rasa*, it is observed that *nāṭaka* is the most appealing of all the varieties of *kāvya* in the celebrated verse : *Kṛṇyem nṛṣṭam ramyaḥ i*
tatra ramyaḥ śaṭṭṛaḥ / Tatrāpi sa satvithāto yatra ślokaśtur
itayam //

46^b. It may be observed here that the back ground scenery is a necessity in the staging of a drama. In case of a blank screen (without any picture) as in the case of many modern dramatic performances, the background requires to be duly imagined by the spectators.

In the matter of this relative advantage of the drama we may compare the following lines of John Press (though spoken in a slightly different context) : "In T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*, a similar cry is torn from Edward, driven to a desperate fury by his unloved wife :

And then you came back, you

The angel of destruction—just as I felt sure.

In a moment, at your touch, there is nothing but ruin

O God, what have I done? The Python. The octopus.

On the stage these incoherent, broken cries can be given an added force and significance by the voice and gestures of a skilled actor, whereas non-dramatic poetry must rely solely upon the words printed on the page or, at best, upon being read aloud in a room....." CS, p. 165.

dramatic performance ⁴⁷ and consequently gets the relish of *rasa* in the manner of getting it from the drama. But in cases of *muktakas*, etc., the reader has to depend on his own imagination for getting a full picture of the situation. Those who are *sahṛdayas* (i.e., men of taste) on account of constant reading of *kāvya*s and virtues of previous births, can easily form the mental picture of the whole situation and can get all that is desired from the drama, from the *kāvya* itself.

Rasa and the poet :

In pp. 66-68, we found an apparent disagreement between the views of Ānanda and Abhinava, in connection with the episode of Vālmiki. But we may have a happy solution to the whole confusion from an observation of Abhinava in the A. Bh. In A. Bh., under VI. 38, there arises the occasion for Abhinava to question like this: If according to the theory of *rasa-niṣpatti*, *bhāvas* give rise to the *rasas*, then, what is the propriety in saying that "no meaning can proceed (from speech) without (any kind of) *rasa*." ⁴⁸ Abhinava gives the reply thus: The acting (*naṭa-vyāpāra*) presupposes the *kāvya* which owes its origin to the realisation of the *bhāvas* in a generalised (i.e., impersonal) form by the poet himself. Such a realisation itself is in fact *rasa*. The process of the poet's experiencing the *bhāvas* with a sympathetic heart is already explained in connection with the episode of Vālmiki. Hence, the source of *kāvya* is the *rasa* belonging to the poet. The poet is indeed as good as a man of taste who relishes *rasa* by

47. The reader imagines as if the incidents are occurring just before his eyes. cf. "yadāha vāmanaḥ—*"sandarbheṣu daśarūpakam śreyah / tadvicitraṁ citrapaṭavadviśeṣasākalyāt"* (*kāvya-lamkāra-sūtra*, 1. 3. 30-31) iti, *tadrūpasamarpaṇajā tu prabandhe bhāṣā-veśapravṛtityaucityādikalpanāt*" (A. Bh. p. 287). In the italicized portion the reading is taken from the foot-note.

48. "na hi rasādṛṣṭe kaścidapyarīhaḥ pravartate."

reading the kāvya or witnessing the dramatic representation. This position that the poet already realises the rasa which he relegates to his kāvya is strengthened by Ānandavardhana's words

śṛṅgāri cet kavīḥ kāvyē jātam rasamayam janat /
sa eva vitarāgaścennīrasam sarvam eva tat // (Dhv. III p. 498)

(If the poet is suffused with the śṛṅgāra rasa the whole world will be suffused with that sentiment. But if he be devoid of any rasa the world also will be depicted to be void of any sentiment)

Here the emotion of the poet is said to be already a rasa. Hence, there is no impropriety when Abhinava conceives Vālmīki's śoka not as a personal śoka but as a rasa. Compare
'nanu yadi bhāva-bhyo rasāstarhi kathamuktam ahi rasādṛṣṭi-
kaseidapyarthah pravartate / tena pūrvam ta evoddeśyāḥ'
kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasamvīramūlaśca kāvyāḥ saro naṣa
vyapārah / saiva ca samvīparānātiato rasah / tadeva
mūlam vijasthāriyah kavigato rasah / kavir u sāmājatulya
e sa / tat evoktam 'śṛṅgāri cet kavīḥ' ānandavardhanā
cāryaḥ / (A. Bh. p. 294)

Ānandavardhana's conception of rasa

In the last quotation we have seen how Abhinava is referring to a view of Ānandavardhana with great esteem. Ānanda does not dwell at length on the psychology of the realisation of rasa. Yet from Abhinava's attitude towards him and from some of his stray remarks we can form an opinion that Ānanda's conception of rasa was almost like that of Abhinava. But the same conception was in a crude form and took the proper shape in the hands of Abhinava, coming down through a tradition represented by Bhāṇṇāyaka and Bhāṇṇatā. Let us now refer to some of Ānanda's statements to see how his ideas chime with those of Abhinava.

(1) We see from an analysis of Ānanda's treatment of guṇas that, he understands guṇas in terms of certain mental conditions of the man of taste like druti and dipti. From this we may conclude that Ānanda understands rasa not as the knowledge about sentiments of the characters but as a mental condition (cittavṛtti) of the sahr̥daya (i.e., man of taste) himself.

(2) Ānanda does not recommend a composition having compounds for depicting the delicate rasas like the karuṇa and vipralambha śṛṅgāra. His argument is that these rasas are very delicate and hence the realisation (pratīti) of them may be hampered even by the slightest haziness regarding the composition and the idea. "taylorhi sukumāratvāt svalpāyāmapyasvacchatāyām śabdārthayoḥ pratītirmantharībhavati" (Dhv. III. p. 321). If the rasas be understood as mere informations regarding the sentiments of others then the question of certain rasas being delicate does not arise. Hence, the rasas are understood as certain cittavṛttis of the sahr̥daya himself.

(3) That the readers (or spectators) generally share the sentiments of the hero may be gathered from the following statement made in connection with the question of rasavirodha (i.e., clash of sentiments) : "kiṁ ca nāyakasyābhinandanīyodayasya kasyacitprabhāvātiśayavarṇane tatpratipakṣāṇāmyaḥ karuṇo rasaḥ sa parīkṣakāṇām na vaiklavyamādadhātī pratyuta prītyatiśaya-nimittatām pratipadyata." etc. (Dhv. III. 375). The question of the reaction of the sorrow of the villain in the heart of the reader occurs only because of the conviction that the sentiments of the characters usually have similar repercussions in the heart of the men of taste also.

(4) For sharing the sentiments with the characters the men of taste should already have impressions of similar sentiments. This idea of Ānanda may be gathered from his statement that, the śānta rasa (conceived as a cittavṛtti in the form

of an excess of joy due to loss of desire) cannot be denied on the score that it is not a citta-vṛtti experienced by all. (cf. "yadi nāma sarvajānānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti naitāvatā-sāvalokasāmānya mahānubhāvacittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptum śakyah," Dhv. III. p. 393)

Then again, the śṛṅgāra rasa is said to be the most appealing and most important, as it is invariably within the experience of all persons. "śṛṅgāraraso hi samsārinām viyamenānubhava-viśayatvāt sarvarasebhyah kamantiyatyā pradhānabhūtaḥ" (Dhv. III. p. 397). This also shows that for Ānanda also hrdayasamvāda is a prerequisite for the realisation of rasa.

(5) An imaginary opponent raises an objection in connection with the citta-ras follows⁴⁹. "All the kāvya's must describe something or other of the world. All the things described in the kāvya must serve at least as the vibhāvas for some rasa or bhāva. Because the rasas and bhāvas, etc., are certain mental states. There cannot be any object of the world which does not cause some mental state. Hence the kāvya's embodying the descriptions of different objects invariably have rasa. That is why, a citta variety of composition as free from rasa can never be conceived of." Here, the opponent conceives rasas as certain citta-vṛttis (cittavṛtti viśeṣaḥ hi rasādayah). From the occasion of argument it may be gathered that the citta-vṛttis are conceived as belonging to the reader and not as belonging to the poetical characters—because, the kāvya, where the citta variety is apprehended, is said to have the delineation of only ordinary objects or at least of vibhāvas. The question of the rasas being conceived as the citta-vṛttis of the vibhāvas does not arise at all.

The opponent is an imaginary opponent and his arguments betray the conception of Ānanda himself. That is why Ānanda concedes to his arguments; but finds other arguments to

establish the citra variety. It is at least clear that Ānanda does not question the opponent's conception of rasa which is much after the heart of Abhinava.

The objective correlative :

It appears to me that the theory of the suggestion of rasa, which has been so very briefly stated by Bharata in his sūtra "vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogādrasanispattiḥ" is once again very briefly presented by one of the greatest theorists of the present century in T. S. Eliot in his theory of "objective correlative." It is interesting to note that this great poet-theorist, who desires that poetry should "evoke" an "emotion" in the heart of the reader discusses the process of this evocation so precisely nowhere other than in his paper on the *Hamlet*. In the passage, quoted below, embodying his theory, in my opinion, "set of objects" correspond to "ālam-banavibhāvas," "situation" to "uddipana-vibhāvas" and the "chain of events" either stands for anubhāvas or suggestion of vyabhicāribhāvas. The concluding line of the quotation, as it appears to me, desires an appropriateness (aucitya) and adequacy of the vibhāvas, etc., in respect of the desired sentiment. Hence, compare : "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative", in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion, so that when the external facts, which must turn in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked..... The artistic "inevitability" lies in the exact equivalence of the external to the emotion." [The Sacred Wood, pp. 100-101].

F. O. Matthiessen in his ATSE (p. 56) explains and analyses Eliot's theory of 'objective correlative' in such a manner that his analysis may stand as a very strong support to my interpretation. This theory, propounded in the context of the method of expressing emotion in poetry, prefers the dramatic poetry. "Perhaps the most important thing that

is revealed by applying Eliot's conception of the 'objective correlative' to his own work is the essentially dramatic nature of all his poetry," observes Matthiessen (Ibid, p 67). It is observed in the section entitled 'Rasa and the drama' in this chapter above, as to how Vāmana and Abhinavagupta also have singled out the drama as the best type of kāvyā on the ground of presenting the entire object and the situation and the chain of events in their entirety for a full communication of the sentiment. The dramatic poem also presents the characters, their speeches and the description of the situations in a manner so as to evoke sentiment in the heart of the reader and thereby to make it a piece of art more beautiful than the poem which simply informs the reader about an idea or the personal sentiment of the poet. The following observation of Matthiessen would show how the theory of 'objective correlative' is applicable also to the drama proper.

"These reflections perhaps make clear why it is accurate to say that Donne is a dramatic poet but not Spenser, that the songs of Campion and Shakespeare are dramatic but not those of Swinburne, or why Keats at the time of his death was increasingly absorbed with the desire to write plays, or why, among poets of seemingly equal nature like Wyatt and Surrey the ability to cut through graceful Renaissance decoration of sentiment to a bare statement of immediate emotion is what gives a few poems of the former their heightened vitality" (ATSE pp 68-69).

Here, in my opinion, "ability to ——— decoration of sentiment" may refer to rasadhvani and 'bare statement' of immediate emotion" to vastudhvanī of a type that we have in case of "evam vāḍini devaṛṣau" (Vide p. 118 above).



CHAPTER IV

THE VYANJANA FUNCTION

The attitude of earlier theorists :

We have seen that the theorists like Bhāmaha and Vāmana, who were earlier to Ānanda also recognised a sense other than the express sense. They have referred to this additional sense (anyo'rtha) in their definitions of the alaṃkāras like samāsokti and paryāyokta. But none of them clearly explained as to how the additional meaning differs from the primary or the secondary meaning of the words and expressions. That is how they left much scope for confusing the additional (i.e., suggested) sense with the express or the secondary sense. They also did not discuss about the power (i.e., vyāpāra) of the words involved in the communication of an idea other than the conventional image (i.e., the vācyārtha). The dhvani theorists call the additional meaning vyañgya and the power of the words involved in the communication of said meaning vyañjanā. Ānanda establishes the existence of a meaning other than the primary and the secondary meanings in the first uddyota itself with the help of so many illustrations. In the third uddyota of the Dhv., he establishes the vyañjanā function as distinct from the abhidhā (i.e., the denotative function).

Implications of the terms śākti and vyāpara :

The words are supposed to convey the different types of meaning with the help of different vyāpāras or śaktis. For example the word 'gaṅgā' of the expression 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' is supposed to convey its primary meaning as 'the current of the waters' with the help of abhidhā vyāpāra; its secondary meaning as 'the bank of the river' with the help of lakṣaṇā-vyāpāra and the idea of 'the holy calm of the bank of the Ganges' with the help of vyañjanā-vyāpāra. The vyāpāras

are also called śaktis and the Naiyāyikas designate abhidhā simply as śakti. What then do the terms 'śakti' and 'vyāpāra' mean? —

The Mīmāṃsikas conceive śakti as a different category (i.e., padārtha). It is an imperceptible potency to occasion an effect by the adequate cause¹. Hence, śakti of the word is a latent potency of the word to convey the primary meaning. Pārthasārathi observes that a word denotes a meaning by its natural power just like the visual organ revealing a coloured shape. It is the uncommon power of the visual organ with which the colour is revealed. Likewise the word also possesses its uncommon potency to convey the meaning². Lakṣanā vyāpāra, in this manner, means a secondary potency which operates on the occasion of the failure of the primary potency to convey the proper meaning. But while it is easy to conceive abhidhā as an inherent or natural potency it is not so in case of lakṣanā. Hence, Viśvanātha calls lakṣanā an artificial potency (i.e., lakṣanā śakti rāpitā).

The Naiyāyikas do not conceive śakti as a different category (i.e., padārtha). What is conceived by the Mīmāṃsikas as śakti is explained as kārinatva (i.e., the state of being a cause). Udayana observes, 'na hi no darśane śaktipadārtha eva nāsti / ko sau tīrthi? kārinatvam' (Kusumāñjali I 13). They call the abhidhā and lakṣanā also as vṛtti. For them vṛtti means the relation³ between the word and the

meaning. While abhidhā (i.e., śakti) is an eternal relation tracing its origin to the will of the God, the secondary relation owes its origin to the intention of the speaker.

When we analyse the term vyāpāra ⁴ we have to understand that abhidhā and lakṣaṇā are functions of the word. They have the word as their samavāyikāraṇa (since in the form of an act they inhere in the words) and the meaning which is conveyed by them as their effect. (The function is a cause on account of being an unconditional invariable antecedent of the meaning conveyed.)

Ānanda uses the terms śakti, vṛtti and vyāpāra, etc., indiscriminately. For example,

(1) On p. 415, vācakatva is called a vyāpāra and vyañjakatva is called an additional vyāpāra. (2) Vyāpāra is also called as śakti. cf. ".....na hi yaivābhidhānaśaktiḥ saivāva-gamaṇaśaktiḥ." (p. 417). (3) Again, abhidhāna is conceived as a sambandha (i.e., relation) in "prasiddhābhidhānāntara-sambandhayogyatvena..... yuktā." (pp. 418-419). (4) The term vṛtti is, however, used only with reference to lakṣaṇā which is called guṇavṛtti but apparently without any special implication. (5) Ānanda also uses the term 'dharma' in the sense of vyāpāra as in "apī ca vyañjakatvalakṣaṇo yaḥ śabdārthayor-dharmaḥ....." etc. (p. 436). (6) He conceives the suggestive capacity also as a śabdavyāpāra on a par with the denotative and indicative capacities. cf. "śabda-vyāpārāgo-caratvaṁ..... vyañgyatvenaiva na vācyatvena." (p. 418).

All these references would be enough to show that Ānanda conceives vyāpāra as a capacity (i.e., śakti) but he does not understand śakti as a different padārtha. He recognises it in general as a kāraṇatva or a dharma and recognises the admission also of a relation (sambandha) in the conception of the same. If the conception of śakti be as rigid as that of

4. "tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvaṁ vyāpīratvam."

the Mīmāṃsaka then śakti should mean a self-sufficient potentiality of the word to convey the meaning instantaneously without the intervention of any other mental process.⁵

We can trace the working of this very conviction when Viśvanātha argues that we cannot arrive at the meaning Bhāhika from the expression "gaurbāhika" because of the relation of 'non-separation (avinābhāva)' since the desire to have another meaning for completing the verbal judgement must be fulfilled by the word 'itself'. Viśvanātha does not allow the admission of any mental reasoning or mental process to intervene in between the cognition of the word and the cognition of the meaning.⁶

But presently we will see that Ānanda's conception of śakti or vyāpāra was so liberal as to allow at times the intervention of some other mental process also.

Ānanda's arguments in favour of vyañjana function :

Ānanda apprehends that some one may raise an objection like this : Let there be the cognition of a meaning other than the primary meaning (i.e., vāc्यārtha) of a sentence. But why should such an additional meaning be designated as suggested sense (i.e., vyaṅgya artha)? Let that vyaṅgya artha also be designated and considered as the vācya artha, when that is mainly intended to be conveyed. The original primary meaning which occurs to the mind before the cognition of the suggested sense may be relegated to the position

5. Compare : "ta ra pratyakṣa va-kalpanameva jñāya / śakti-ranarām arhapratyayaśāmanit taryatra ta ra kṛtāntvam kalpayitum yuktam / na tu śabdāt smṛktirodbodhas aśeṣārtha-pratīkṣit yuktam / pra-jñāyati pramāṇābhāvāt" (Nyāyaraśana-mūlā, p. 107).

6. cf. "av ant hīvalabdhvanyatibhāya śabd-āntay-pravṛttānābhāvāt / śabd-āntāntānti śabdāna va pūryat" (SD II).

of the meaning of the words, being instrumental for the said suggested meaning in the manner of the word-meanings which are instrumental for the usual primary meaning of a sentence. cf. "satyamevaitat;..... padārthapratītiriva vākyārthapratīteḥ" (Dhv. III. pp. 414-415).⁷

Ānanda, with this apprehension in his mind, proceeds to argue that the suggested sense should never be confused or designated as the vācya sense. Because, the vācya and the vyañgya senses are conveyed by two entirely different functions (vyāpāras) of the words. If the suggested sense is conveyed by a distinct function it will not cease to be different from the vācya even being put at the position of the usual vācya sense in case of being chiefly intended to be conveyed. Hence, he presents the following points to bring out the distinct features of the vyañjanā function :

(1) Vyañjanā is distinct from abhidhā, because they have different scopes (i.e., viṣayabheda). Abhidhā conveys the vācya sense directly related to the word and vyañjanā conveys the meaning which is related to the related vācya. Had the suggested sense been directly related, it would not have been designated as a different sense at all. ("arthāntara-vyavahāra eva na syāt," Dhv. III. p. 417. Compare 'anyo'rtha' of Bhāmaha).

(2) Vyañjanā is different from abhidhā because of difference in form (i.e., rūpabheda). Words alone convey the conventional meanings with the help of abhidhā śakti. But even the meaning-less musical sounds may convey senses in the form of rasa, etc., with the help of vyañjanā (p. 417).

(3) The vyañgya artha also cannot be relegated to the position of the vācya artha. Because, the relation between the vācya and the vyañgya is not like the relation between the meaning of the words (padārtha) and the meaning of the

7. We will observe that Dhanika actually raised a similar question in his Avaloka on the DR.

senten e (vākyaṛtha) Be ause, the very analogy is not an apt one. The grammarians take the sentences as indivisible and do not conceive of words as parts of the sentence. Even those who recognise the words as distinct parts of the sentence (say the followers of Kumārila) must take note of the fact that the meanings of the words yield completely to the total meaning of the sentence. When the meaning of the sentence is cognised, the meanings of the words cease to be cognised distinctly. But the vācya sense does not cease to be cognised even when the suggested sense is cognised. The vācya sense suggests the vyañeya and it is the very nature of the suggestive factor to appear along with the suggested content. The relation between the vācya and the vyangya is like that between the lamp and the jar. Compare, "na hi vyañeye pratīyamāne vācya buddhirdū bhavati vacyā vabhāsaḥ" (Dhv. III pp. 420-421).

(4) Abhinava says that the opponent, who wants to have the vyangya ṛtha as the vācya sense when chiefly desired to be conveyed, wants, in fact, to identify vyañjanā with 'tātparyasakti' if not abhidhāsakti.⁸ But it will be helpful to note here that, Ānanda does not conceive of a tātparyasakti. He conceives tātparya as the intention of the speaker in respect of the meaning of the sentence. This tātparya is relegated even to the word and the meaning, which are intent upon conveying the suggested sense. This tātparya is not conceived by Ānanda as a function of the words of the same status as that of abhidhā, lakṣanā or vyañjanā. There is also reason to believe that although Kumārila was the first exponent of the abhihiñśayavāda which conceives tātparya as a separate function he also conceived tātparya not as a function but as an intention in respect of the meaning of the sentence. The status of a śakti was given to tātparya by the writers like Jayantabhaṭṭa, who were

8 "nānvevā mī bhīdvīcakāśaktiḥ tathāpi tātparyasaktirbhav. sya
tītya. kṛtā" (Locana p. 419)

all latter than Ānanda. Abhinava conceives tātparya as a function; for, as we will see again, he utilised the Nyāyamañjarī to a great extent in his treatment of the functions of the word.

(5) Another point of difference between vācakatva (abhidhā) and vyañjakatva (vyañjanā) is that abhidhā resides only in śabda, whereas vyañjanā resides both in śabda and artha. (p. 423).

(6) Now a doubt arises, that the guṇavṛtti (i.e., the secondary function) also in its two varieties, namely, upacāra and lakṣaṇā, depends both on śabda and artha. Hence, the distinction of the vyañjanā from guṇavṛtti also should be clearly shown. (p. 423).⁹

(7) Vyañjanā is different from lakṣaṇā because of rūpabheda (i.e., difference in form) and viśayabheda (i.e., difference in scope). Vyañjanā conveys a sense, which is direct (i.e., mukhya) and lakṣaṇā conveys a sense, which is secondary (i.e., amukhya). Guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā behaves as the abhidhā in a secondary way (inasmuch as the secondary sense is only a substitute for the primary sense, when the latter is unsuitable to the context). But vyañjanā is different, because, the suggested sense is not a substitute for the primary sense. The primary sense completely yields to the secondary sense. But the primary sense reveals itself along with the suggested sense like a lamp. For example, in the verse “evaṁ vādini” the primary sense of the sentence reveals itself along with the suggested sense. If here the suggested sense be supposed to

9. It may be noted that the secondary function is said to be resident in śabda alone by some theorists like Viśvanātha. cf. “sā śabdasyārpita...śaktirlakṣaṇā nāma.” (SD. II). But some other theorists relegate it, in some cases, to the primary meaning also. cf. “kevalaṁ śabdastamarthaṁ lakṣayitvā...artho vārihāntaraṁ lakṣayitvā...karoti.” (Locana, I. p. 152). Thus it may be noticed that the secondary function also was variously conceived.

be conveyed by lakṣaṇā then at that rate lakṣaṇā itself will appear to be the principal function of the sentences, because, the sentences often convey certain meanings, other than the primary sense, as the contents actually desired to be conveyed by the sentence ("yasmāt prāyena vākyaṇām vā yavvyatiriktatātparyaviṣṭyārthāvabhāsitvam," p. 424) It is to be noted here that Ānanda calls the primary meaning consisting of description of counting of petals as 'vā-ya' and the meaning relating to Pārvatī's lajjā as the 'tātparyaviṣayārtha' But those who recognise tātparya as a śakti would call the primary total meaning of the sentence as the 'tātparyaviṣayārtha.' Ānanda does not refer to any tātparyaśakti but what he means is that the suggested sense is actually intended to be conveyed.¹⁰

(8) There is difference between the suggestive and the secondary function also in respect of their scope (i.e., viśvabheda) Lakṣaṇā conveys the meaning only in the form of a vastu, whereas vyañjanā may convey vastu, alaṅkāra and rasādi alike. But, indeed, nobody can claim to have the suggested figure or rasādi with lakṣaṇā (p. 425) ¹¹

(9) Vyañjanā sometimes depends on abhidhā and sometimes on lakṣaṇā. Hence, because of depending separately on both of them Vyañjanā is not identical with either of them. Moreover, vyañjanā also belongs to certain elements which are quite free from abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. For example, the meaning-less musical sounds suggest rasas with the vyañjanā function (p. 428)

10. Contrast, "For in general, every sentence possesses the power of conveying a purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words" (Dhv. Trans p. 103) for, there is no reference to individual words in the relevant portion of the text and a power is not meant by 'tātparya'.

11. We will see later on that Mukulabhāṭa proposed to have all the varieties of the suggested sense with lakṣaṇā itself.

(10) In the *avivakṣita* type of *dhvani* there is, however, some association of *lakṣaṇā*; but, yet *vyañjanā* is not identical with *lakṣaṇā*. Because, we may have certain secondary senses also without any suggested sense occurring at the wake of it. (pp. 431-433).

(11) The denotative capacity of the word is an invariable attribute of it. From the day of learning it (i.e., *vyutpattikā-lādārabhya*) the word conveys its primary meaning without fail and without the help of any other factor. But the suggestive capacity is a variable capacity as it is superimposed on the word. It operates only with the help of certain variable factors like the context and the speciality of the speaker (pp. 436-437).

(12) The *Mīmāṃsakas* believe in a natural and eternal relation between the word and the meaning. But, the suggested sense is not inherently and eternally related to the word. Hence, such a meaning cannot be recognised by them as it appears. But *Ānanda* says that even the *Mīmāṃsakas* have the necessity to recognise a suggested sense. Because, they distinguish between the sentences of the *vedas* and the sentences uttered by men. Such a distinction is due to the unreliability of the sentences uttered by men. The unreliability is on account of the fact they convey also certain variable meanings which are super-imposed on the words by the speaker himself. These superimposed meanings generally consist of the desires of the speaker. But such meanings must be recognised as *vyaṅgya*, since *they are not invariably related with the words* (pp. 438-443).

(13) Now, one may raise the objection that, since all the sentences uttered by men suggest also the intention (i.e., *abhiprāya*) of the speaker all such statements should be considered as *dhvani*. *Ānanda* replies that the suggested content in the form of the desire of the speaker is so organically bound up with the express sense of the sentence (i.e., *vācya*) that they can hardly be distinguished from the *vācya* in respect of

their importance.¹² If, however, the said intention of the speaker be the principal (i.e., mainly intended or *vivakṣita*) content that would present a case of *dhvani*. But, yet, the suggested content in the form of intention of the speaker will not be the only determinant of *dhvani*. Such a content would present us only a suggested *vastu* (i.e., matter of fact). But *dhvani* has yet other two varieties of suggested sense, viz, *alaṅkāra* and *rasādi*. That is how *dhvani* is free from any confusion with the statements, made in course of the practical conversations. Hence, the *vyākṣanā* function should be up to the approval of the *Mīmāṃsakas* also

(14) Ānanda says that the question of any difference or agreement with the grammarians does not arise at all; for, the very propriety of using the term '*dhvani*' depends on their views (pp. 443-444)¹³

(15) Ānanda does not apprehend any objection from the logicians as regards the existence of a suggested sense, because, he has the conviction that logicians hardly indulge in any dispute as regards the actually experienced things. No body can, indeed, gainsay the experience of a suggestivity of the expressive words, musical sounds and the movement of hands, etc (pp. 445-447).

A confusion of *vyākṣakatva* with *liṅgitva* :

(16) But the only objection of the logician, which is possible, is that the suggested sense is not conveyed by a *śabdavyāpāra* (i.e., a function of the word), but by a mental process of inference (i.e., *anumāna*). *Śabda* serves as the probans (i.e., *liṅga*) and the suggested sense as the *liṅgi* (i.e., probandum) Ānanda himself admits that the intention of

12. "tasmā vācakatvānna bhidyate vyākṣyam hi tatra nītiar'yakataḥ vyavasāyam."

13. The relation of the *dhvani* theory with grammar is already discussed in the first chapter.

the speaker is suggested. But according to the logicians that can be nothing other than an inferred fact.¹⁴ (pp. 447-448).

(17) The reply is that there may be cases of vyañjanā being confused with anumāna. Vyañjanā may wrongly be called anumāna also. Certain senses conveyed by vyañjanā may be arrived at by anumāna also, but yet the position remains unperturbed that vyañjanā is a śabdavyāpāra, a function of the word (or the senses), other than abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. The great truth is that vyañjanā is not identical with anumāna and the knowledge of the suggested sense is not always the knowledge of the liṅgi, i.e., inferred object (vide vṛtti p. 449, “na punarayaṁ paramārtho yadvyañjakatvaṁ liṅgatvameva sarvatra vyaṅgyapratītiśca liṅgapratītireva”). From the utterance of a certain pauruṣeyavākya an abhiprāya may be inferred but not all abhiprāyas.

The purpose (i.e., scope) of a word is two fold—inferable and denotative. The inferable is the speaker's intention (abhiprāya). The intention of the speaker, that can be inferred, is either his desire to utter a word or his desire to convey a meaning by the word. These two inferred desires never constitute the sense of the word. The sense, which cannot be inferred, is again two-fold, viz., expressed or suggested. These meanings of the word (pratipādyo viśaya) are never inferred (vide vṛtti p. 451, sa tu dvividho'pi pratipādyo śabdānāṁ na liṅgitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate, api tu kṛtrimeṇākṛtrimeṇa vā sambandhāntareṇa).

(18) It may once again be argued like this : When the suggested sense is apprehended, its validity is arrived at with the help of anumāna. Hence, the vyaṅgyārtha once again becomes anumeya. In reply to this it is said that the validity of even the vācya sense is arrived at with the help of anumāna; but, yet we suppose the vācya sense to be had by a verbal function. Similarly the suggested sense also should be held

14. Vide points 12 and 13 above.

to be within the purview of a verbal function (viz, vyangya) even when its validity is established with anumana. Moreover, the suggested sense which we relish in the *Lāvya* is, in fact, never put to any taste of validity of "yathā ca vācya viṣaya sampadyat" (pp 454-455)

It may be noted here that the verbal testimony is regarded as identical with inference by the Vaiśeṣikas, because, they arrive at the validity of the knowledge derived from the statement with an anumāna ¹⁵ But their view is duly criticised by the Mīmāṃsakas ¹⁶ The weakness of the Vaiśeṣika's stand is pointed out by Abhinava in the observation that the meaning of the words is not inferred, but only the validity of the meaning is inferred of "na caitāvatā vācyasya pratitirānumā niki kintu tadgatasya tato'dhikasya satyatvasya, tadvyangye'pi bhaviṣyati (Locana, p 454)

(19) Although the scope of vyañjanā is distinguished from that of anumāna as shown above, there are yet certain expressions of Ānanda which savour of a confusion of *linguva* (i.e., the state of being a probans) with *vyañjakatva* (i.e., the state of being suggestive) The expressions are as follows

(1) "tasmādvaktrabhiprāyarūpa eva vyangye lingatayā śabdānām vyāpārah" (pp 452-453) That, for which the śabda plays a probans is also at the same time called a vyangya. Thus the intention of the speaker is inferable, but it is also called vyangya. It is no doubt vyangya, for, the śabda behaves like a vyañjaka in respect of it ("svarūpam prakāśayann-va parāvabhāśako vyañjaka ityu yate") The intention, which is inferred from a statement is of two types, viz., the intention to utter the words and the intention to convey meanings. But these intentions are not meanings of the statement, strictly

¹⁵ 'Idam anumanavivartitā sptavikyatvāt' is the form of inference

¹⁶ Vide *Ullāsiya*, p 484, for the relevant quotations from the *Śekharāṣṭaka* and vide *Śāstra*, p 12, pp 27-28 for further information.

speaking. The meaning which is intended to be conveyed may itself be either vācya or vyañgya. These two meanings are, in deed, conveyed not through any inference but through a natural or an artificial relation. ("sa tu dvividho'pi pratipādyo viṣayaḥ śabdānām na liṅgitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate, api tu kṛtrīmenākṛtrīmeṇa vā sambandhāntareṇa" p. 451). But yet, the hint is there that the intention, which is inferred, may be called also suggested. Hence, anumāna is also a case of vyañjanā. But vyañjanā cannot be included in the scope of anumāna as it has a wider scope. For instance, there is suggestion in case of the lamp and the jar also, but no anumāna.

(ii) "Tasmāt liṅgipratītiरेva sarvatra vyañgyapratītiriti na śakyate vaktum" (p. 455) confirms the position that in some cases the cognition of the suggested content may be a case of the probandum itself.

(iii) "Yattvanumeyarūpavyaṅgyaviṣayaḥ śabdānām vyañjakatvaṁ taddhvanīvyavahārasyāprayojakam" (pp. 455-456), shows that, what is inferred may also be called suggested.

(iv) But, while the probans (liṅgi) may be treated as a suggestive factor (vyañjaka), all the suggestive factors may not be treated as probans (i.e., liṅga). That is why the lamp is not a liṅga in respect of the jar, the musical sound is not a liṅga in respect of the sentiments.

(v) In some cases suggestion is aided by inference or in some cases by casuality. In this manner suggestion may be found to have a much wider scope than that of inference. cf. "taddhi vyañjakatvaṁ.....ārabdhaḥ" (Vṛtti, p. 456). Abhinava distinguishes the scope of anumāna even more clearly. Cf. "yata eva hi..... tadevamiti" (Locana, p. 456).

(20) It may be observed from the foregoing points that Ānanda was very liberal regarding the scope of vyañjanā. Hence, it is very likely that Ānanda really means that the

relation of similarity between the contextual and the non-contextual meanings in 'atrāntare, etc', is to be inferred (i.e., kalpsyatavya) In this manner, in case of 'evam vādinī' also we may apprehend the admission of an anumāna Cf "api tu smaranena tatra pratipattim karottukrama vyangyataiva" (Locana, pp 249-250) But except in case of holding the intention as anumeya, in other cases there is an effort to distinguish vyañjanā from anumāna in their very essential form Abhinava observes that in case of gathering the suggested sense an accurate mental process of suggestion does not take place Cf "na ca tatra śabdasya kāranatve yaiva lingasyetikartavyatā pakṣadharmatvagrahanādikā sāsti" (Locana, pp 450-451) and "atha yatra yatraivam śabdaprayogastatra vācyaṃ" (Locana, p 60) and "sahakāribhedācca śaktubhedah spaṣṭa eva anumāpakatvavyāpārṣh" (Locana, p. 63) Abhinava demands that in order to explain cases of suggestion as inference there must be the recollection of universal concomitance, etc Knowledge of universal concomitance is instrumental (sahakāri) for inference If such instrumental factors differ, the function also differs Thus the difference in the thought procedure involved in vyañjanā and anumāna respectively results in the distinction of the two

(21) But it may be observed that the difference in thought procedure (i.e., sahakāribheda), which is taken as the basis of distinction between anumāna and vyañjanā, is very subtle In fact in the whole field of epistemology a good amount of difference of opinion may be observed in respect of different cases of inference For example, in śrutarthāpatti a fact is postulated on the strength of a verbal statement In Advaitavedānta and Bhāṣyamīmāṃsā it is a different pramāna But according to nyāya¹⁷ it is nothing other than anumāna

17 Cf "śrutarthāpattirapi varāhi mīmāṃsāśūlkyā c" (The poor śrutarthāpatti also does not differ from anumāna), (Nyāya māñjarī, Pratyakṣaprakāraṇa, p 42)

Abhinava would take the postulated idea as suggested; but according to him the verbal statement in śrutārthāpatti will not present a case of dhvani only because the statement is not embellished with figures or endowed with qualities.¹⁸ Hence, from the Naiyāyika's point of view, cases of anumāna in the guise of śrutārthāpatti may be identified as cases of vyañjanā at ease (Vide, Śāstradīpikā, pp. 100-108).¹⁹

Difference is found to be very little also between Naiyāyika's jñānalakṣaṇa perception and inference, because of which the Advaitavedāntin includes the former in the latter. There are many cases of 'complicated' perception which claim to be reckoned as inference. For example, J. S. Mill is strongly of the opinion that, 'the perception of distance by the eye is, in reality, an inference grounded on experience; though in familiar cases it takes place so rapidly as to appear exactly on a par with those perceptions of sight which are really intuitive, our perceptions of colour' (A System of Logic, p. 4). But, however subtle the distinction of vyañjanā might be, Ānanda would not hesitate to uphold it or to bring it to a bolder relief, as it is evidenced by his statement that, "it is not possible to discard the usefulness of detailed definitions of particulars, simply because general definitions are already there." ("na hi sāmānyamātra-lakṣaṇenopayogi-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇānām pratikṣepaḥ śakyaḥ kartum," p. 457).

(22) Both for Ānanda and Abhinava the realisation of rasa and bhāva is not a thing to be arrived at through a process of inference or any type of reasoning. It is maintained that the meaningless musical sounds also suggest sentiments. The realisation of the sentiments is a spontaneous and almost instantaneous effect and it does not come in the wake of any

18. Cf. "...tenaitanniravakāśam śrutārthāpattāvapi dhvaniivyava-
hāraḥ syāditi" (Locana, p. 105).

19. Vide also point, 4, under "Mammatā and Vyañjanā" ahead.

inference. That there is the absolute absence of any process of reasoning in case of the suggestion of sentiments is the greatest argument for distinguishing *vyāñjanā* from *anumāna*. But as we have seen, some amount of reasoning is admitted in case of *śabdaśaktimūla* and *arthaśaktimūla*. Possibly taking clue from this loophole, Mahima demanded that all the *dhvanis* may be brought under the scope of *anumāna* (V V. I 1). Because of this amount of allowance to reasoning in *dhvani*, the later supporters of the *dhvani* theory could draw a very thin line of demarcation between *vyāñjanā* and *anumāna*. For example, they endeavoured to show that the process of reasoning, involved in the verse "nīhśeṣa cyuta," is grounded on fallacious probans. That is why it does not present a case of *anumāna*. But *vyāñjanā* may hold ground despite of a fallacy in the process of reasoning. Cf. "evamvidhādarthādevamvidho'rtha upapattyanapekṣatve pi prakāśata itī vyaktivā dīnah punastadadūṣanam" (KP V) 70. This argument for distinguishing *vyāñjanā* from *anumāna*, with the admission to some amount of reasoning, is on a par with Prābhākara's arguments for distinguishing *arthāpatti* from *anumāna* against the will of the Naiyāyika, who identifies the former with the latter (Vide, *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 100-101). But it is a matter of opinion. The Naiyāyika identifies *arthāpatti* with *anumāna* at all cost. Likewise, Mahima also jumped to the conclusion that all varieties of *dhvani* may be included in *anumāna*.

To sum up, Ānanda's views are as follows:

(1) Although in some cases *vyāñjanā* appears in the form of an *anumāna*, it is a verbal function (*śabdavyāpāra*) different from *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. (2) *Vyāñjanā* has a scope, wider than that of *anumāna*. Hence, the former is distinct from the latter. (3) At least in case of the suggestion of sentiments *vyāñjanā* does not admit of any reasoning or *anumāna*.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's attitude towards vyañjanā :

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭanāyaka gets the suggested sense in the form of rasa with the help of the function bhāvakatva and bhojakatva. We have also seen how these unfamiliar functions have to yield to the vyañjanā function in the exposition of Abhinava's theory of rasa-realisation. We may notice that Bhaṭṭanāyaka also recognises some meaning other than the vācya (i.e., anyo'rtha) in forms other than that of rasa. But the anyā artha which would have been a suggested content for the dhvani theorists is included by him either (i) in the realisation of rasa (and hence supposed not to be conveyed by vyañjanā but to be realised with the functions of bhāvakatva and bhojakatva) or (ii) in the vācya sense itself and hence considered to be conveyed by the abhidhā itself. (iii) Sometimes he denies the presence of the suggested sense altogether and explains that the beauty of the piece is due to some expressed idea.

Evidence to (i) above is had from Locana pp. 68-69. "yattubhaṭṭanāyakenoktamiha dr̥ptasimhādīpadaprayoge ca dhārmikapadaprayoge ca bhayānakarasāveśakṛtaiva niṣedhāvagatiḥ tadīyabhīruvīratva-prakṛtiniyamā-vagamamantareṇaikāntato niṣedhāvagatyabhāvāditi tanna kevalārtha-sāmarthyāniṣedhāvagaternimittamiti, etc." These words have a reference to the verse 'bhama dhammi' (Dhv. p. 52), where, from an expressed vidhi we get the suggestion of a niṣedha. Bhaṭṭanāyaka possibly means to say that the reader of the verse would have the experience of bhayānaka rasa (with the help of bhojakatva and bhāvakatva, etc.) and whoever would have the experience of bhayānaka rasa would also certainly feel (timid and) prohibited as regards going to the Godāvarī-tīra, etc.

Abhinava's reply to this contention of Bhaṭṭanāyaka is very interesting. Vide the continuation of the quoted Locana (pp. 68-69). Of Abhinava's arguments the strongest is, however, that there is no experience of bhayānaka rasa from the

verse at all. If one be obstinate about the suggestion of a rasa in the said verse then that must be recognised as śṅgāra rasa. Evidence to (ii) above is furnished by Locana, p 72, "yattvāha bhaṭṭanāyakaḥ ahamityabhinayaaviśeṣenātmadaśāvedanācchābdametadapīti / tatrāhamiti śabdasya tāvannāyam sāksādarthah, kākvādisahāyasya ca tāvati dhvananameva vyāpāra iti dhvaner bhūsanametat /" These words have a reference to the verse, 'attā ettha nimajjaḥ' (Dhv p 71), where an express niṣedha suggests a vidhi. Bhaṭṭanāyaka says that the vidhi (i.e., the invitation of the pathika to her cot) is expressed by the word 'aham', because, the word being uttered in a dramatic manner (i.e., abhinaya viśeṣena) tells about her love-lorn condition and hence also the invitation (vidhi).

The argument against his position is that the vidhi is not the primary sense of the word 'aham', the vidhi is not conventionally related to the word 'aham', so to say. Moreover, it is said to have expressed the idea of the woman's condition and the invitation because of the dramatic way of uttering the word. Hence, the abhinaya is sahakāri and this abhinaya is nothing other than a kaku (i.e., a modulation of voice) due to the peculiarity of which we should get no primary sense but a suggested sense only. Evidence to (iii) above is furnished by Locana, p 171 "yattu hṛdayadarpana uktam 'ha hā hetu samrambhārtho'yam camatkārah' iii / tatrāpi samrambha āvego vipralambhavyabhicāriti rasadhvanistāvadupāgataḥ / na ca rāmaśabdābhivyaktārthasāhāyakena vinā samrambhollāso' pi / aham saha tasyāḥ kim vartata ityevamātmā hi samrambhah /" This passage has a reference to the verse "snigdhaśyāmalakānti" (Dhv p 167). Bhaṭṭanāyaka means to say that the interjections 'ha hā hā' mean a samrambha (i.e., an agitation) and that samrambha is the source of charm. He possibly demands that the meaning relating to samrambha is a primary (i.e., abhivṛta) meaning. But even conceding to this position, Abhinava would raise the objection that samrambha is simply an 'āvega' and 'āvega' is a vyabhicāribhāva for

śṛṅgāra rasa. As such the charm is finally due to śṛṅgāra rasa, and according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka himself it would be a case of rasadhvani. But the idea of 'saṁrambha' itself does not occur from the mere interjections if the suggested sense of the word rāma does not precede. And the saṁrambha understood, here, is really an agitation of the mind, i.e., a concern over the pitiable condition of Sītā standing in contrast with Rāma's own ability to face the adverse situation as suggested by the word 'Rāma' in 'ramo'smi.'

Mahimabhaṭṭa's attitude towards vyañjanā :

Mahimabhaṭṭa says that abhivyakti (i.e., suggestion) is defined as follows :

"Suggestion is the revelation of an object, whether it be already existent or otherwise, by a revealer, which does not look for the help of any relation between the revealer and the revealed, along with the revelation of itself (i.e., the revealer).²¹

The revelation (abhivyakti) of the already existent (i.e., sato'bhivyakti) is of three types. They are as follows ²² :

(1) When the effect, that lies latent and hence as imperceptible in the cause, becomes perceptible we have one variety of the 'suggestion of the real'. For example, when the milk becomes the curd we have this type of abhivyakti.

(2) When a revealer, remaining subordinate, reveals a perceptible (i.e., already manifest) object, temporarily obscured by some other factor, while revealing itself, we get the second variety. For example the revelation of the jar by the lamp.

(3) We have the third variety, when the residual traces of already experienced objects are revived by an object which

21. "sato'sata eva vārthasya prakāśamānasya sambandhasmarāṇāna-
vekṣiṇā prakāśakena sabaiva prakāśaviśayatāpattirabhivyaktiriti
tallakṣaṇamācakṣate" (VV. pp. 76-77).

22. cf. "tatra sato'bhivyaktistriavidhā.....śabdācca gavadeḥ" (VV.
pp. 77-78).

is invariably concomitant with the experienced, or by some object or word which symbolises or stand for it. (a) For example, when we see the smoke our idea of the already experienced fire is revived by the relation of invariable concomitance between the smoke and the fire. (b) We have this type of suggestion also when our idea of cow is revived by its symbolical representations like picture, plastic art,²³ image and imitation. (c) We have this type of abhivyakti also when simply the word 'cow' revives the image of the cow in our mind.²⁴

(4) The revelation of the unreal (asato'bhivyakti) is of only one type. We have such an abhivyakti, when the rainbow is revealed by the rays of the sun.²⁵

Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that the first type of sato'bhivyakti cannot be had in case of poetical suggestion because the suggested meaning is not directly perceptible like the curd. The second type of sato'bhivyakti also cannot be had in case of the suggested sense because the suggested and the express sense cannot be cognised simultaneously, in the manner of a simultaneous perception of the lamp and the jar. ("vācārthasahabhāvenedantāpratīterasambhavāt").

The definition of third variety of abhivyakti is applicable only to anumāna and not to vyakti (i.e., suggestion). The example, (a) will be recognised as anumāna by all. The example, (b), which corresponds to upamāna (i.e., comparison), is also nothing other than anumāna, since, according to Mahimabhaṭṭa, upamāna also falls within the purview of

23. Vide, I. Aest, p. 302.

24. The three examples indicated by the letters, a, b, and c, correspond to the third, fourth and the fifth varieties of Ruyyaka's analysis, which will be referred to below.

25. "asatavivakṣaprakṛtiḥ ... yathārktlokaśca nandracapīḍaḥ"
(VV. p 78).

anumāna. The example, (c) is dubious.²⁶ Taking all the examples together Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that the third variety of abhivyakti is actually anumāna. Cf. "tṛtīyasyāstu yalla-kṣaṇaṁ tadanumānasyaiva saṅgacchate, na vyakteḥ..... upamānādīnāṁ ca tatraivāntarbhāvāt" (VV. p. 78). Here he does not explain, as to how inference takes place in case of understanding a cow from 'word' ('śabdācca gauḥ'). Then he proceeds to argue that the consciousness of the additional (i.e., suggested) meaning from the vācya sense is not possible without the consciousness of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. That is why one and all cannot understand the suggested sense. Moreover, the consciousness of the other meaning is not simultaneous with the vācya sense. There is a sequence of consciousness like that in case of knowing the fire from the smoke. Hence, suggestion in poetry is nothing other than inference.

If it is argued that there is simultaneity of consciousness in case of the suggestion of rasa then the definition of abhivyakti will have the fault of being very widely applied. For, in case of the suggestion of vastu and alaṅkāra there can never be any simultaneity of consciousness.

Mahimabhaṭṭa further contends that in case of the suggestion of rasa also the vibhāvas, etc., do not get revealed simultaneously with rasa. Since, there is a relation of cause and effect between vibhāvas, etc., and the unreal and image-like sthāyī which being brought to the realm of the consciousness of the men of taste is called rasa. Cf. "na ca rasādiṣvapi vibhāvādi-prakāśanasahabhāvena prakāśanamupapadyate, etc." (VV. p. 79).

26. Mahimabhaṭṭa says "śabdācca gavādeḥ." Ruyyaka understands it as "vācaka śabda" (i.e., denotative word). But there cannot be any inference in respect of the denotation of the cow by the word cow. Hence, 'śabda' in the present expression of Mahimabhaṭṭa means the descriptive or suggestive composition. Dr. Pandey calls it the 'poetical art'.

Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that even in case of the suggestion of rasa there is an imperceptible sequence (i.e., an *asam'akṣya-krama*) according to the dhvani theorist himself

Now, if for avoiding all these discrepancies the condition of simultaneous cognition of the suggester and the suggested be excluded from the definition of *abhivyakti*, then *abhivyakti* would include *anumāna* also, because, in case of the fire and the smoke also, the latter reveals the former remaining subordinate to the same. If for excluding cases of *anumāna* (like that of the fire from smoke) it is claimed that only the unreal is revealed in case of *abhivyakti*, then the definition will not include the case of the lamp and the jar, as the jar is existent.²⁷

If for including the case of the jar and the lamp the revealed is not desired to be unreal then the case of the rainbow and the sunrays will not be included.

If both the alternatives regarding the nature of the revealed be excluded from the definition then the definition will cease to be a definition of *abhivyakti* and will be nothing other than a definition of *anumāna*. Mahima holds that, in fact, the expression '*sato'sata eva vā*' (i.e., 'of the real or the unreal') in the definition of *abhivyakti* is redundant, for, we cannot conceive of a third thing, still different from the real and the unreal.

In this manner Mahimabhaṭṭa endeavours to show that in *kāvya* there cannot be, in fact, any suggestion (i.e., *abhivyakti*), but if there be the consciousness of an additional idea from the consciousness of the *vācya* sense, then that is nothing other than a case of inference (i.e., *anumāna*)

The definition and classification of *abhivyakti* (i.e., suggestion) elaborated above, are attributed to the dhvani theorist

27 Mahimabhaṭṭa does not tell us separately that the fourth type of *abhivyakti* is not possible in *kāvya*. But he would possibly argue that the fourth type of *abhivyakti* is not desired in *kāvya* for fear of the failure of the analogy of the jar and the lamp.

by Mahimabhaṭṭa himself. Mahima's contention is that although the dhvani theorist conceives abhivyakti to be of the four types as explained by Mahima, yet the poetical suggestion corresponds only to the third variety. But Mahimabhaṭṭa's own conception of abhivyakti is different. Abhivyakti must be an automatic revelation as in the case of the lamp and the jar. But poetical suggestion does not belong to the second variety, of which the case of the lamp and the jar is an example as there is the intervention of the recollection of some relation between the suggestive meaning and the suggested content. Because of this admission to the recollection of relation poetical suggestion is a case of anumāna like that of the fire from the smoke and can be called a suggestion (i.e., vyaṅgya) only in a figurative way. Compare :

svābhāvikaṁ dhvaneryuktaṁ vyañjakatvaṁ na dīpavat /
dhūmavat kintu kṛtakaṁ sambandhāderapekṣaṇāt //

(VV. I. 74).

Ruyyaka's criticism of Mahimabhaṭṭa's view :

Ruyyaka analyses Mahimabhaṭṭa's classification of abhivyakti to have six different varieties. Ruyyaka finds the six varieties by classifying the third variety of Mahimabhaṭṭa into three types according to the nature of the factor which revives the residual traces of the already experienced. These three varieties correspond to the examples a, b, and c, referred to above. Thus classifying abhivyakti into six varieties in his own way Ruyyaka contends that the dhvani theorist recognises only one variety of abhivyakti, i.e., the second variety. There is no impropriety in applying the definition of this type of abhivyakti to the poetical suggestion. The question of applying the definition of other five varieties for explaining poetical suggestion does not arise, since the other five varieties are not at all recognised by the dhvani theorist. Compare : "iha ca sadasadviṣayatvenābhivyaktirdvidhā pratipādītā /tatra vyaktivādinā ghaṭapradīpanyāyena sadviṣayā vyaktiraṅgīkṛtā /

yathā ca na dosastathopapāditam / śiṣṭam tu paksapāṇcakam
anabhyupagamāparāhatameva." (VVV. pp 76-77)

In this quotation we find a reference to an earlier argument of Ruyyaka in defence of the dhvani theorist's conception of vyañjana

Ruyyaka contends that the analogy of the jar and the lamp is applicable to the suggestion of rasa by the vācya sense. Because, there is the simultaneity of cognition of the vibhāvas, etc., and rasa (i.e., the generalised sthāyi, brought to the realm of realisation) ²³

Replying to Mahimabhaṭṭa's contention that there is a causal relation between the vibhāvas, etc., and rasa and hence a sequence of cognition and so there is no simultaneity of cognition (i.e., sahabhāvena pratīti), Ruyyaka says that, a case of sequence of realisation does not vitiate the case of a simultaneity of cognition. Let the vibhāvas, etc., be cognised earlier. But what is desired by the dhvani theorist is that in time of realisation of rasa the consciousness of the vibhāvas, etc., (i.e., the situation) also must be there. That is why the dhvani theorist says—"na hi vyangye pratiyamāṇe vācyabuddhirdūribhavati vācyāvinā bhāvena tasya prakāśanāt." instead of "na hi vacye pratiyamāṇe vyangyabuddhirdūribhavati, etc." Compare "vyañjaka pratītikāle hi niyamena vyangyapratītitī nāsmākamāśayah / vyangyapratītikāle tu niyamena vyañjaka pratītibhavyeveyāśayenākramatvam vyaktiśca samartham," etc (VVV I. p 58)

Ruyyaka further contends that the four varieties of abhivṛkti are unduly attributed to the dhvani theorists. For, dhvani theorists recognise only the 'jar and the lamp' type of abhivṛkti. It is quite improper to criticise the views of others with definitions cooked up by oneself

23 This simultaneity of cognition is very clearly pointed out by Matambara in his exposition of Abhinava's theory of rasa relation in the expression "vibhāvād vicitravadbhī" (KP IV)

The contention that, in case of recognising the poetical suggestion as an *abhivyakti* of the 'milk and the curd' type, the suggested object should be directly perceptible, may be raised also in case of including the poetical suggestion in the 'jar and the lamp type.' As such, the realisation of *rasa* cannot be called a case of *abhivyakti*; since, *rasa* is not a directly perceptible object.

By way of solving this tangle Ruyyaka says that, this objection is invalid; because, the *dhvani* theorist understands by the term *abhivyakti*, only a revelation in general. The *dhvani* theorist never talked of any *abhivyakti* where the suggested must be a directly perceptible object. Hence, even being directly imperceptible, *rasa* can be said to be suggested (i.e., *vyaṅgya*).²⁹

Ruyyaka concedes to the objection that in case of the suggested *vastu* and *alaṅkāra* there is an order of cognition of the *vācya* and the *vyaṅgya*. But, that is not a very strong argument for dismissing the *vyañjanā* function. The position of the *dhvani* theorist, according to Ruyyaka, is that, the two functions, viz., *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* are recognised in respect of the primary and the secondary sense. But, these two functions cannot proceed up to the third stage (of the suggested sense). For example, the idea of the holy calm of the bank of the Ganges falls to this third stage of meaning. In case of *rasa*, which stands on a par with this third stage, the *vyañjanā* function is recognised. Hence, it is proper to recognise the same *vyañjanā* in case of *vastu* and *alaṅkāra* also. The *vācya* sense is cognised in time of the consciousness of the

29. cf. "yattu sadasadvīṣayatvena caturvidhā vyaktīratronmīlītā tadapi na saṅgatam ghaṭa-pradīpanyāyasyātreṣṭatvāt / yopīn-driyagocaratāpattiprasaṅga udbhāvitah so'pyasamañjasaḥ / na hyātmīyena lakṣaṇena paramatam dūyate / ...sāmānyena dhīgocaratāpattilakṣaṇatvādvyakteḥ / tataśca rasādaḥ vyaṅgya-tvamanavadyameva" (VVV. I. p. 59).

suggested sense also in case of vastu and alaṃkāra. There is, however, no harm if in time of cognising the vācya the vyangya does not happen to be cognised ³⁰

Suggested vastu cannot be had through anumāna :

Here we may notice that, the intervention of the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance in case of suggestion ³¹ is not duly refuted by Ruyyaka also. It is also true that some amount of reasoning preceds the cognition of the suggested content in the form of the consideration of the speciality, etc. But, we have already noticed that, the latter theorists dismiss the admission of any anumāna in case of arriving at the suggested vastu on the ground of fallacious probans. For example, Mahimabhaṭṭa would infer the absence of roaming (abhramanam) from the presence of the lion in the bank of the Godāvarī (godāvarītre simhopalabdheh), which is expressly stated. Viśvanātha contends that the presence of the lion is a fallacious probans (anaikāntika h-tu) Because, even a timid person may roam even after learning about the presence of the lion, because of direction from the master or out of love for the beloved. Further, the probans is dubious (saṃdigdhāsiddha) on account of the bad character of the speaker cf. "tathā-hyatra 'bhama dhamma' ityādaṃ grhe śvanivṛtṭyā vihitam bhramanam godāvarītre simhopalabdhera-bhramanam anumāpayati itī yadvaktavyam tatrānaikāntiko

30. cf. "yatpunarvastvalaṃkārayoranyamena vācyaṇantarakṣābhāvitena pratiteravyaṅgyatvamasaṃśayaṃ bhavatyuktam, tatra pratividhiyate / ita śabdāryābhāṣakṣaṇābhedaṇa dvivadbho vyāpārācīrantanaśrabhyupagataḥ / na ca tritīyakakṣaṇakṣipte-rithe pragalbhaḥ hi tatra vyāpārāntaramabhyupeyam / rāṣṭrau ca tattulyakakṣye vyaḥ arāṃupapāditamītibhiḥ tadva samīrayitum yuktam / .. na cājanamītyuktam-va" (VVV. I. p. 69).

31. Mahīma contends, "na ca vācyaḥ darśadāntarapratiśravinābhāvanābandhanamāntarānāva sambhavati, sarvasyāpi, tatpra tiprasaṅgi" (VV. I. p. 79.)

hetuḥ / bhīrorapi guroḥ prabhavā nideśena priyānurāgeṇa vā gamanasya sambhavāt / puṁścalyā vacanaṁ prāmāṇikaṁ na veti saṁdigdhāsiddhiśca" (SD. V.).

The case of inference of alaṁkāras :

Mahimabhaṭṭa does not recognise the presence of any suggested alaṁkāra in the cases of the śabdaśaktimūla dhvani. For lack of adequate reason he cannot arrive at the non-contextual meaning and hence the question of recognising a suggested alaṁkāra for rendering the non-contextual meaning congruous, does not arise for him.³² At this rate there should be no suggested alaṁkāra also in the verse "durgālaṁghita" (SD. II.). Hence, Viśvanātha says that it would be a foolishness similar to that of an elephant to deny the presence of the suggested alaṁkāra in the verses like "durgālaṁghita" which is, indeed, a matter of experience. Cf. "durgālaṁghita ityādaucā dvitīyārtho nāstyeva—iti yaduktam mahimabhaṭṭena tadanubhavasiddhamapalapato gajanimīlikaiva" (SD. V).

In case of the verses like "prāpta-śrīreṣa kasmāt"³³ Mahimabhaṭṭa arrives at the 'basic idea' of the suggested figure through a process of anumāna. The process of anumāna is as follows : The activities which are widely known to be the activities of Lord Vāsudeva are said to be not proper for the king on account of his having already achieved the desired objects. Hence the king is identical with the Lord : This inferred idea of identity is the suggested rūpaka of the dhvani theorist.³⁴

32. Cf. "evam cāśya vācyātirekiṇo'rthāntarasya pratītiṛeva na samastīti yatrāprastutābhidhānaprasaṅgabhayāt tayorupamānopameyabhāvaprakalpanam tadapi nirmūlamevetyavagantavyam" (VV. III, p. 419).

33. Dhv. II. p. 261.

34. Cf. ".....bhagavato vāsudevasyāmi vyāpārāḥ prasiddhāssanto yadanyatra rājādāvāropya tasya samīhitapṛāptyā niṣidhyante tena tatkāryatvāt kāraṇabhūtabhagavadrūpatāropameva tatrānumāpayantīti rūpakānumitirīti vyapadeśaḥ pravarttate" (VV. III, p. 430).

But the *alamkāra* is also an imaginary type of matter of fact. Hence, it may be supposed that the *dhvani* theorists would dismiss the admission of *anumāna* on the ground of fallacious probans, here also

The case of inference of *rasa*

We have seen in the first two chapters,³⁵ how Mahimabhaṭṭa realises *rasa* through inference. In this connection Viśvanātha questions: Does Mahimabhaṭṭa recognise the knowledge of the love of the poetical characters like Rāma, which may be derived through inference, as *rasa*? Or does he recognise the exquisite joy of the man of taste, in which his self sees itself, derived through a rumination over the mental state of love as *rasa*? The followers of the *dhvani* theory do not accept the knowledge of the love of poetical characters as *rasa*. If the second alternative is accepted then it is evidently clear that, the proposed probans is fallacious on account of the lack of the knowledge of invariable concomitance and hence, there cannot be any inference. Moreover, the mere knowledge derived through the reasoning "wherever there is the express statement or dramatic presentation of such and such *vibhāvas* and *vyabhicārībhāvas*, there is the origin of the *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra*"³⁶ is also not considered as *rasa* by the followers of the *dhvani* theory. A perfect process of *anumāna* cannot operate in respect of the realisation of what is understood as *rasa* by them. Compare SD V 4, and *vṛtti* thereunder.

It may be noted here that, in the matter of aesthetics Mahimabhaṭṭa is a follower of Śrīśaṅkara, but he effects an improvement on the latter's inferential theory by (1) recognising a distinct subjective condition of the aesthetic experience,

35 Vdc, p. 54 and p. 141

36 "yatra yatra varovadbhāvaṃ vābhāvinaḥ bhāvaśūnya bhāvaśūnya
bhāvaśūnya bhāvaśūnya vā yatra yatra śṛṅgāraḥ rasavibhāvaḥ"

and by (2) distinguishing between the practical inferential experience and the aesthetic inferential experience.³⁷

It may also be noticed here that, Abhinava also apprehends an opponent like Mahimabhaṭṭa and contends that the mere inference of a mental state belonging to others is not a *rasa*. Viśvanātha, in the foregoing argument appears to have derived the spirit from the relevant portion of the *Locana* which runs as follows : “*nanvevaṁ.....kimatra paracittavṛttimātre pratipattireva rasapratipattirabhimatā bhavataḥ ? na caivaṁ bhramitavyam; evaṁ hi lokagatacittavṛtṭyanumānamātramiti kārasatā ? yastvalaukikacamatkāratmā rasāsvādaḥ kāvyagatavi-bhāvādicarvaṇāprāṇo nāsau smaraṇānumānādisāmyena khilī-kārapātrīkartavyaḥ*” (*Locana*, p. 155).

Mammaṭa and vyañjanā :

Mammaṭa was the most robust writer after Ānanda and Abhinava to place the conception of the *vyañjanā* function in a very sound footing. We will have several occasions to refer to the strong arguments of Mammaṭa in the later sections. In the present section we are trying simply to trace his intellectual background.

He discusses the necessity of recognising *vyañjanā* as a distinct function in the second and the fifth *ullāsas* of the *KP*. (1) In the second *ullāsa* his arguments for distinguishing *vyañjanā* from *lakṣaṇā* are based on *Locana* on *Dhv.* I. 17. (2) The arguments for recognising *vyañjanā* in case of the non-contextual meaning of the homonyms are based on *Locana* on *Dhv.* II. 21, etc. (3) In the fifth *ullāsa* Mammaṭa applies the whole wealth of his knowledge of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* for establishing *vyañjanā* as a distinct function. His arguments against ‘*naimittikānusāreṇa nimittāni kalpante,*’ ‘*so’yamiṣoriva dīrgha-dīrgha-vyāpāraḥ*’ and ‘*yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdārthaḥ*’

are based on Locana on the illustrative verse 'bhama dhammā' under Dhv. I. 4 (4) It is noticed that Abhinava's conception of 'tātparya-śakti' is based on Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī. It may also be noticed that, the arguments which are presented to be directed against śrutārthāpatti by the Prābhākara in the Nyāyamañjarī are taken in the Locana to be as good as arguments directed against vyañjanā. The prābhākara wants to have the idea gathered through śrutārthāpatti as an ordinary (express) meaning of the word itself. In order to convey the additional idea the word itself is said to have longer and longer functions. cf. "prābhākarāstu dṛṣṭaḥ śruto veti bhāṣyam .. tamartham śābdameva pratijānate..... ..vākyārthapratitā- viṣoriva dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ, etc." (NM. p. 43). The plausible argument against this further potential capacity (dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ) is that if the additional idea had by śrutārthāpatti is put on a par with the primary sense then the primary sense may claim identity with the gauna and lakṣya sense also. The relative validity of the śruti, liṅga, sthāna, etc., also would cease to exist. cf. "nanvevaṁ sati.....bhavi- syati." (NM. p. 44). These very arguments are presented by Mammaṭa in defence of vyañjanā in the fifth ullāsa. While Jayanta gathers the idea conveyed by śrutārthāpatti with a process of anumāna, Abhinava and Mammaṭa derive it because of vyañjanā. Abhinava and Mammaṭa agree with the Prābhā- kara in the matter of recognising the idea derived through śrutārthāpatti as a meaning of the word itself but they differ in respect of the function involved in arriving at the said idea. (5) Arguments of Mammaṭa on the question of the tātpar- yārtha of "viṣaṁ bhakṣaya, etc." are directed against Dhanika. (6) That, Mammaṭa thoroughly remembers the Dhv. III, can be seen from most of his further arguments in the fifth ullāsa. (7) Refutation of the claim to include vyañjanā in anumāna is evidently meant for Mahimabhāṭa. (8) Mammaṭa wrote a full-length book named Śabdavyāpāravicāra to refute Mukula- bhāṭa's arguments for including vyañjanā in lakṣanā.

Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and vyañjanā :

Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśrūpaka and Dhanika, the author of Avaloka, the commentary on the former, flourished earlier than Mammaṭa. They contend that the vyañjanā function is redundant. The so called vyaṅgya artha may be had as the tātparyārtha (with tātparyaśakti) as it is also a meaning of the sentence.

Dhanañjaya concedes to the fact that the suggested sense may not have a denotative word for it. But that should not be the reason for not calling it as vācya, he contends. The sthāyibhāva, which is said to be suggested by the express description of the vibhāvas, etc., is not conveyed by any expressive words. But, yet it should be considered as the vācya sense itself of the sentence. The sthāyibhāva is indeed the 'vākyārtha' the vākya being intent on conveying the same. Dhanañjaya says :

vācyā prakaraṇādibhyo buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā /
vākyārthaḥ kārakairiyuktā sthāyibhāvastathetaraiḥ //

(DR. IV. 37).

Dhanika, by way of commenting on this point, explains their position more clearly.

There is no expressive word (i.e., denotative word or vācaka śabda) for conveying the idea of the sthāyī bhāva which is designated by the dhvani theorist as vyaṅgya. But, yet we may call that sthāyī as the vākyārtha (i.e., tātparyārtha or the intended meaning of the sentence). Because, the meanings of all the sentences are to be conceived in terms of a kriyā (i.e., action) even if there be no word in the sentence for faithfully denoting the same. For example, in the sentence, 'gāmabhyāja', the action of carrying the cow is expressly stated by a word denotative of the action. But the sentence, 'dvāraṁ dvāraṁ' which also conveys the idea of an action to be performed, does not have the word 'pidhehi' (close) to

denote the desired action. Even then, the closing of the door is the intended meaning of the sentence. Similarly, the sthāyībhāva also may be taken to be the total intended meaning (i.e., tātparyārtha) of the sentence, but not a viangya sense. This is what is hinted by the kārikā IV 37. On the basis of this kārikā, Dhanika presents a series of arguments as follows.

A vākyārtha is the meaning of a sentence conveyed by its tātparyasakti. It cannot be argued that we cannot have such a vākyārtha for which there are no denotative words. Because, all sentences result in some effect (i.e., all sentences are kārya para). The ultimate effect in case of the sentences of the kāvya is the relish of rasa. This relish of rasa renders it necessary to recognise the sthāyībhāva as the vākyārtha. In respect of such a vākyārtha the vibhāvas etc., stand on a par with the word meanings (padārtha) which are usually instrumental for conveying the total meaning of the sentence. Cf. 'tatra vibhāvādayah padārtha sthānīyāstatsamsrṣṭo ratyā dirvākyārthah / tadetat kāvyavākyam yadyam tāvimaṁ padārthavākyārthau' (DR IV p 298). This argument is the same with what is apprehended from the opponent by Ānanda vardhana in the words 'tasmāt tātparyavisayo yō'rthah vākyārthapratīteh' (Dhv p 415). This argument is however, duly refuted by Ānanda in his own way (Vide, p 189, above).

It is apprehended by Dhanika that the opponent may argue as follows. Rasa is, in fact, a relish. The musical sounds also may produce a similar relish. But the relation between the musical sound and the relish can never be called the relation of the denoter and the denoted. (It is undoubtedly the relation of the sugrester and the suggested). Likewise the relation between the kāvya and rasa is not the relation of the denoter and the denoted. In reply to this argument Dhanika says that, the analogy is not an apt one. For, the relish caused by the musical sound may be derived also by the illiterate person, whereas the relish of rasa can be had

only by the literate. Cf. "na caivaṁ.....svānandodbhūteḥ"
(DR. IV. p. 240).

Dhanika reinforces his arguments with certain quotations from another work of his, viz., Kāvyanirṇaya, as follows :

(1) Dhanika argues—As the so called vyaṅgyārtha is conveyed by tātparya (i.e., within the scope of the intention of the speaker) there cannot be really a vyaṅgyārtha (as additional to the tātparyārtha) and hence, there cannot be any dhvani.

(2) The dhvani theorist argues—But how can you call the meaning as tātparyārtha when it is not conveyed by denotative words ?

(3) Dhanika replies—There may be a tātparyārtha even when there is no word as denotative for it. As for instance, in the sentence, "viṣaṁ bhakṣaya" (take poison), we have, as the tātparyārtha, something which is quite different from what is denoted by the words 'viṣaṁ' and 'bhakṣaya'. The tātparyārtha does not ask to take poison. But even such a tātparyārtha, as we have in 'viṣaṁ bhakṣaya', not conveyed by denotative words, is not called the vyaṅgyārtha by the dhvani theorist himself.

(4) The dhvani theorist may say that, even a meaning which is not conveyed by denotative words may be the tātparyārtha when the denoted meaning is inconsistent (or where the sentence does not rest after communicating simply the denoted sense). But where, there is a meaning, additional to the consistent denoted meaning, we can have dhvani (i.e., a vyaṅgyārtha). Where the purpose is not fulfilled by the ordinary denoted sense, the denoted sense is discarded and the apparently additional meaning is accepted as the tātparyārtha.

(5) Dhanika replies—This argument is not proper. For, it cannot be claimed that the purpose of the sentence is

fulfilled by conveying the denoted sense itself and the suggested sense remains outside the scope of *tātparyaśakti*. How can it be claimed that, the *tātparyaśakti* will cover only to the extent of the denoted sense and the suggested (i.e., *dhvani*) will remain out of its scope ? The purpose of the whole sentence (i.e., *kāvya*) will be fulfilled only when the so called suggested sense is conveyed. The communication of the suggested sense is the intended result of the sentence and such a result (i.e., *kārya*) is always intended by the sentence and the *tātparyaśakti* necessarily functions upto that desired sense, be it immediately denoted or additionally conveyed. The extent of the *tātparyaśakti* is never measured by any measuring rod.³⁹

(6) That, even the so called suggested sense is within the scope of *tātparya* can be illustrated by the verse 'bhama dhamma' where the prohibition is really intended by the speaker.

(7) Lastly, Dhanika explains the process of the communication of *rasa* to be as follows. Through our observation of the couples in love in the practical life we are familiar with the relation of invariable concomitance between *vibhāvas*, etc., and the *sthāyibhāva*. When in *kāvya*, *vibhāvas*, etc., are presented we conclude that such and such a behaviour of the couple is not possible without a feeling of *rati* (i.e., the *sthāyibhāva* for love). Hence, from the *kāvya* which gives us a description of *vibhāvas*, etc., we gather the idea of the *sthāyibhāva* with the help of *lakṣaṇā* aided by the relation of *avinābhāva* (i.e., non-separation). Compare " loka tathāvidha-ceṣṭā-yukta-stripumsādisu ratyādyavinābhāva darśanādihāpi tathopani-bandhe sati ratyādyavinābhūta ceṣṭādiratipādakaśabdaśra-

29 "caturatyeva v īrṣā" sūtparyasyeti kimkrtam /

yāvatīkīryaprasāritvātātparyam na tulidhrtam /"

(DR. IV. p. 242).

vaṇādabhidheyāvinābhāvena lākṣaṇikī ratyādipratītiḥ.....”
(DR. IV. p. 244).

An analysis of Dhanika's position :

In the last mentioned point we may notice that Dhanika is dragging us to a hopeless confusion of tātparyaśakti, lakṣaṇāśakti and anumāna (i.e., avinābhāva). For Dhanika the idea of sthāyī is not conveyed by vyañjanā. It is conveyed by lakṣaṇā with the help of avinābhāva (i.e., a process of inference). But according to his earlier arguments, what is said to be vyaṅgya by the dhvani theorist is within the scope of tātparya itself. We cannot understand 'tātparya' of Dhanañjaya as merely an intention like the tātparya of Ānanda. Because, he calls it tātparyaśakti, indeed. Compare : “na cāpadārthasya vākyārthatvaṁ nāstīti vācyaṁ kāryaparyavasāyitvāttātparyaśakteḥ” (DR. IV. p. 238). That is how we are to admit two functions (i.e., śaktis) and a process of anumāna also. But, it is quite precipitate for Dhanañjaya's conception of rasa to drag in the avinābhāva, since that would make him a supporter of the inferential theory. But, in fact, Dhanañjaya is a follower of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the matter of aesthetics.³⁹

Here, we may, however, notice that, Dhanika's conception of the vākyārtha is based on the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. The position of the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that the total meaning of the sentence is communicated by the meanings of the individual words through implication (i.e., lakṣaṇā) is very clearly represented by Pārthasārathi in the following verse :

tasmanṇa vākyam na padāni sāksād
vākyārthabuddhiṁ janayanti kintu /
padasvarūpābhīhitaiḥ padārthaiḥ
saṁlakṣyate'sāviti siddhametat // (Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 125).

But when the meaning of the sentence is thus taken as a

lakṣyārtha by Dhanika it would be wiser to recognise 'tātparya' not as a function but simply as the intention of the speaker. And in fact, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, tātparya, understood as the intention of the speaker is an invariable factor for the operation of lakṣanā.⁴⁰ But from the admission of avinābhāva Dhanika's conception of lakṣanā seems to be like what is embodied in an un-identified quotation in the Tattvapradīpikā which is as follows :

mānāntaravirodhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe /
mukhyārthenāvinābhūte pratīrilakṣanocyate // (p 262).

(Lakṣanā is the cognition of a meaning, which is related to the primary sense through the relation of avinābhāva, on the occasion of the recognition of an incongruity of the primary meaning with the help of some other source of knowledge)

Dhvanivādin's reply to Dhanika's arguments :

Mammaṭa feels that Dhanika is not properly understanding the Mīmāṃsaka's conception of tātparya and hence he is making a wrong application of the same for criticising the conception of vyañjanā. Hence, for refuting the position of Dhanika, Mammaṭa clearly explains the very theory of tātparya.⁴¹ The relevant rules and their implications are as follows :

(1) Yatparaḥ śabdah sa śabdārthah—Whatever is intended by the word is its meaning.

(2) Yadeva vidheyam tatraiva tātparyam—Only what is desired to be done (i.e., enjoined) is the intended meaning (tātparya).

(3) Why this restriction ? Because, even only a few words in the sentence (or a part of the sentence) may tell about what is particularly desired to be done. If a certain thing is already enjoined elsewhere, then with reference to the import

40. Cf. "Lakṣaṇī lakṣyasambandhaśtātparyānupapattih" (Phrasa-paricchede, Śabdakhaṇḍa).

41. Vide, KP. V.

of the sentence at hand that need not be taken as desired to be conveyed (i.e., *tātparyārtha*). The fire burns only what is not already burnt. Similarly the sentence also enjoins what is not already enjoined. “*adagdhadahananyāyena yāvada-prāptaṁ tāvadvidhīyate.*”

(4) If there be any injunction that must enjoin only an action. At that rate all the sentences should imply some action. Mammaṭa says yes, ‘*bhūtabhavyasamuccāraṇe bhūtaṁ bhavyāyopadiśyate.*’ ‘*Bhūta*’ means ‘*kāraṇapadārthas*’ (i.e., ideas not ordinarily implying any action; i.e., they are not *sādhya* but *siddha*) and ‘*bhavya*’ means ‘*kriyāpadārthas*’ implying action (i.e., *sādhya*). But when these are uttered together the *kāraṇapadārthas* also assume the form of *sādhya*s and imply some relevant action.

(5) Thus, in the sentence, ‘*lohitosṇiṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracaranti*’ the ‘moving about of the priest’ (i.e., *ṛtvikpracaraṇa*) is an injunction already known from elsewhere. Hence, only the red head-dress (i.e., *lohitosṇiṣ*), which is a *kāraṇapadārtha* assumes the form of a ‘*bhavya*’ and enjoins the act of wearing the red head-dress. So, the sentence is said to have *tātparya* only to that effect. This is what is the actual implication of the maxim “*yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ.*”

(6) From the fore-going exposition, it will be clear that only used (i.e., *upātta*) words may have *tātparya* in respect of what is enjoined. ⁴² If words, which are not uttered or used in the sentence but simply learnt from some other source, are also supposed to convey *tātparyārtha* then sometimes the expression “*pūrvo dhāvati*” (The former runs) should have *tātparya* indiscriminately in respect of a meaning as “*aparo dhāvati*” (The latter runs). But, infact, it does not happen to be so, only because, only the used words can convey the *tātparyārtha*.

42. cf. “*yadyapi.....śrūṭayoreva parasparaniyamaḥ*” (*Nyāyaratna-mālā*, p. 103).

(7) Now, some one may argue that the sentence, 'viṣam bhakṣaya' (Literally, 'Take poison') means 'etadgrhe na bhoktavyam' ('Do not take food in his home') The 'prohibition of taking food' alone being desired to be conveyed, that alone should be recognised as the meaning of the sentence, having tātparya. Hence, here we do not have the used words (i.e., upātta śabdāḥ) conveying the tātparyārtha. That is how the suggested sense also, which is not the literal meaning of the used words, should be recognised as tātparyārtha.

(8) Mammata gives the reply with utmost economy of words. He means to say that, we must not take 'viṣam bhakṣaya' as an isolated sentence. It is a part of an entire sentence running as 'viṣam bhakṣaya mā cāsyā gṛhe bhukthāh', where the use of the particle 'ca' connecting the two clauses, makes it a single sentence.⁴³ Taken as a whole, the statement

43 " tatra cakṛa ekavākyatādīcanārthah / na cākhyātavākyayordvayoraṅgibhīva illi viṣabhakṣanavāksaya subrdvākyatvenāṅgāḥ kalpanīyetai " (KP V.) It appears to me that, this is after an observation of Pārthasarathi, which runs as follows: " nīvaśyamavinābhāvanimittatva lakṣaṇā / ekavākyatāpi tatra nimittam / " (Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 125) In the Nyāyaratna commentary, 'ekavākyatā' is explained as "pādīnāṃ paraparasmābhivyañhīrah" (i.e., juxtaposition of words). Pārthasarathi further observes that, sometimes the 'ekavākyatā' may be apparent (i.e., pratyaṅgī) and some times it is inferred from the context (i.e., prakaraṇādyaṇumeyā). In the latter case an apparently complete sentence is connected with another principal statement through the relation of the principal and the subordinate (aṅgibhīva). Mammata with the anxiety to deny the status of a sentence even as the subordinate clause so 'viṣam bhakṣaya' means to say that there the ekavākyatā is apparent and that is not because of any aṅgibhīva. cf. "ekavākyatā ca kvacitpratyaṅgī yathā so meva yaçeti / kvacit prakaraṇādyaṇumeyā yathā darśapūṣa-

being that of a well-wisher, the clause, 'viṣaṁ bhakṣaya' will not convey its literal meaning at all. This clause forming a part of the entire statement will simply contribute to a secondary meaning of the entire statement as—'viṣabhakṣaṇādapi dūṣṭametadgr̥he bhojanamiti sarvathā māsyā gr̥he bhuñkthāḥ' (The taking of food in his home is worse than taking poison and hence never take food at his home). When, thus a secondary meaning is recognised in place of the literal meaning, the secondary meaning itself is taken to be the *tātparyārtha* of the used words. The secondary meaning is not additional to the literal meaning. But it is only a substitute for the same.

(9) Thus *tātparya* covers only upto the minimum consistent meaning of the sentence. Hence, in the sentence 'bhama dhammā', *tātparya* may mean only the *bhramaṇavidhi*. If there be any additional meaning, that will not fall within the purview of *tātparya*, but that will be a *vyaṅgyārtha* conveyed by yet another function of the words and senses called *vyañjanā*. Hence, the idea of *niṣedha* in the said verse is not a *tātparyārtha* but a *vyaṅgyārtha*.

(10) Even if we understand 'vidhi' as the *tātparyārtha*, that will imply an action. The beauty of the verse lies in the fact that we have the idea of *vidhi* as the *tātparyārtha* and then the idea of *niṣedha* not as the *tātparyārtha* but as the *vyaṅgya*. We may assume that the *dhārmika* understands the *vidhi* as the *tātparyārtha*. But for us it is suggested that there is a *niṣedha*, and it is simply expected that the *dhārmika* also would derive the idea of the *niṣedha* additionally.

(11) Viśvanātha points out that 'tātparyam na tulādhṛtam' is not a very happy argument, because of the maxim that, the verbal functions can operate only in respect of one meaning. .

māsābhyāṁ yajeta samidho yajatītyanayoḥ samidupetā darśa-
pūrṇamāsabhāvanā kartavyetyevamrūpaikavākyatā . kalpyate"
(Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 125).

The same function cannot be rejuvenated for conveying meanings of different stages. ⁴⁴ And this is the reason for recognising a lakṣaṇā function as different from abhidhā.

(12) Another argument of Viśvanātha is that, the tātparya-śakti of the Mīmāṃsaka helps in having only the minimum consistent meaning of a sentence. Hence, for having any meaning beyond that we must recognise vyañjanā. If to avoid this difficulty Dhanika says that his tātparya is different from the tātparya of the Mīmāṃsaka, then in his opinion also there will be a fourth function, additional to the already accepted three of the Mīmāṃsaka (namely, abhidhā lakṣaṇā and tātparya) Let this fourth function be named not as tātparya but as vyañjanā. cf. "yat punaruktam .tanmate'pi turya-vṛttisiddheḥ" (SD V.)

Mukulabhaṭṭa and vyañjana :

Mukula was the son of Bhaṭṭakallāṭa and the teacher of Pratiḥarendurāja. He flourished in the first half of the tenth century. ⁴⁵ Mukula, in his Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā, tries to show that (1) all the suggested senses can be had by lakṣaṇā. He refers to the 'atyanta-tiraskṛta vācya' and 'avivakṣita-vācya' types without giving a direct criticism of them but wrongly including a vivakṣitavācya type also in the same footing as that of the former (A. V. M. p. 28).

(2) He names the capacity of the word to convey the meaning as abhidhāvyāpāra, classifies it into mukhya and lākṣanika abhidhāvyāpāra, and tries to show that the suggested sense is had by six forms of lakṣaṇā.

44. cf. "... . tayoṃpari śabdabuddhikāmanāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāvāḥ iti vāc bhīreva pīṇāṇi dandaḥ" (SD V) Here, Viśvanātha understands tātparya as śabdāśakti in the strictest sense of the term.

45. HSP. Kane, p. LXXVI.

(3) He recognises the three conditions of lakṣaṇā as mukhyārthabādhā, mukhyārthapratyāsatti (relation with primary sense), and prayojana; classifies prayojana into two types and adds that both the varieties of prayojana also become the object of cognition along with the respective lākṣaṇika senses. cf. "etacca prayojanadvitayaṃ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā pūrvapradaśītena sambandhapañca-kenāvagamyamāne lākṣaṇike'rthe yathāviśayamanusartavyaṃna hi tatpūṇyatvamanoharatvādisvaśabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṃ śakyate avyāptyativyāptiprasaṅgāt." (AVM. p. 17.)

(4) Strangely enough, Mukula also refers to some 'vyaṅgya dharma' ⁴⁶ in connection with 'rāmo'smi' of the verse "snigdhaśyāmala" (which the dhvani theorists take as the prayojana of lakṣaṇā and hence as suggested) ⁴⁷ but he says elsewhere that the same dharmas are conveyed by lakṣaṇā. Compare : "atastenāpi rājyabhraṃśavanavāsasītāpanayanapitṛmaraṇādayaḥ svābhīdheyabhūtārthaikagāmīno'sādhāraṇaduḥkhaḥetavo dharmā viśiṣṭasāmagryanupraviṣṭeva lakṣitāḥ" (AVM. p. 11). From this he may be said to be advocating for 'viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā', referred to by Mammaṭa.

(5) Mukula's endeavour to show that, all the three types of suggested sense namely, vastu, alaṃkāra and rasādi are conveyed by lakṣaṇā, is evidenced by his treatment of the three illustrative verses given in AVM. pp. 12-14. Illustrating a case of lakṣaṇā due to the speciality of the speaker (vaktṛni-bandhanatvena) he gives the verse "drṣṭīm he prativeśini" (AVM. pp. 12-13). According to him lakṣaṇā conveys the idea of the fact that, "the speaker would have erotic dalliance with the parapuraṣa." He comments that the express sense,

46. AVM. p. 20. The printing, however, wrongly reads 'vyaṅgyam dharma' for 'vyaṅgya dharma', which is evidently correct.

47. In the dhvani theory the 'dharmāntaraparīṇatarāma' is the secondary sense whereas the dharmas themselves are suggested.

(Dhv. p. 169).

telling that there would be scratches by the reeds (nala), etc., is false (asatya) and hence, bādhita. Hence, the secondary sense, observed above occurs to make it consistent. Compare, "atrahī parapuruṣa tenātra vaktṛviśeṣaparyālocanayāsatyārthe niṣṭhāyā upādānātmikāyāḥ pratipattiḥ /" etc

(6) Illustrating lakṣanā due to the speciality of the whole sentence he gives the verse, "prāpta śrīreṣa kasmāt" and adds that prāptaśrīḥ, etc., refer only to Lord Vāsudeva. Hence, the doubts (saṁśaya vitarka) as regards the activities are inconsistent unless there be identification of the king with Vāsudeva. Hence, it is also a case of upādānalakṣanā which conveys the idea of the identification of the king with Vāsudeva, which, helps in making the statement consistent. Compare

"te ca vitarkāḥ prāptaśrīṇityādinā bhagavadvāsudevasya vyākāraṇaviśeṣaviśayaḥ / yāvacca tasya nṛpaterbhagavadvāsudevata na samasti tāvatkatham tadīyeṣu vyākāraṇaviśeṣeṣu saṁśayaḥ samupajāyate prāptaśrīṇityādiṣu ca trisu vitarkeṣu bhagavadvāsudevaviśayeṣu yathāyogam tattatkāryanirākarana-hetugarbhatayā pravartamāneṣu nṛpaterbhagavadvāsudevata kṣiptā tenātropādānātmikā lakṣanā" etc (AVM pp 13-14)

(7) Illustrating lakṣanā due to the consideration (paryālocana) of the express sense, Mukula gives the verse, "durvārā madaneṣavo diśi diśi" Here the express sense is that the five things namely, the arrows of Cupid, the spring season, etc., are of the nature of fire and are unbearable. When the express sense is taken into consideration vipralambha śṅgāra is conveyed by lakṣanā. Without this vipralambha śṅgāra the words in the sentence are inconsistent. It is also a case of upādāna lakṣanā due to the (nature of) express sense. Compare, "ityatra hi smaraṣara prabhrūṣām pañcāṅgmadhyārop tavahni bhāvanāmasahyatvam vākyaṁtibhūtam / atastasya vā yata / tatparyālocanasāmāthyā ca vipralambhaśṅgārasyākṣepa ityu pādārātmikā lakṣanā vā yanibandhanā nāpi ca vākye pādānām vipralambhaśṅgārākṣepamantarenānvayopapattiḥ etc (AVM p 14)

Mukula's position and prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā :

Mammaṭa gives a counter criticism of Mukula's views sharply but in brief in the SVV and in a general way in the KP. Mukula's views may be refuted, from the stand point of the dhvani theorists, in the following manner.

(1) Mukula recognises a prayojana of lakṣaṇā but does not explicitly say how it can be arrived at, but implicitly says that it occurs along with the secondary sense, decidedly being conveyed by lakṣaṇā, as evidenced by his sporadic statements.

In case of lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā, as in the sentence 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ'—the suggested idea of coolness (śītatva), etc., cannot be conveyed by abhidhā, inasmuch as the word gaṅgā does not have a conventional invariable relation with the ideas as coolness, etc. (nābhidhā samayābhāvāt. KP. II. 24). Moreover, we cannot have the sense of coolness, etc., with the help of lakṣaṇā; because, as regards this sense the three conditions of lakṣaṇā are not present (hetvabhāvānna lakṣaṇā, KP. II. 25). We have already arrived at the secondary sense 'taṭa' from the inconsistency of the primary sense 'current' with the lakṣaṇā function residing in the word gaṅgā. Naturally, the same function will not work again to convey the idea of śītatva, etc., due to the maxim "śabdabuddhikarmaṇām," etc. Then again, since the primary sense of the current is already out of picture we must take the secondary sense of 'taṭa' (bank) as the primary sense, with regard to a fresh lakṣaṇā function. But the secondary sense is certainly not the primary sense. It is also not inconsistent or incongruous ('nāpi bādhaḥ') The secondary sense also does not have a definite and invariable relation with the sense of śītatva, etc., which is desired as a lakṣyārtha. Since, there is no conventional relation of the word gaṅgā with śītatva, it cannot be a case of rūḍhimūlā-lakṣaṇā. Hence, it can at best be a case of prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā. But to be a prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā with regard to the sense of śītatva, etc., which is desired as the secondary

sense, we must have another idea as the prayojana. We do not have such a prayojana. But it is also an experienced fact that, the word gangā does not fail to convey the idea of the prayojana also. Compare, laksayam na mukhyam etc (KP II 26). Then since the word is supposed to convey the idea of prayojana with lakṣanā, let us forcibly imagine of some other prayojana. But the prayojana of the original prayojana śitatva, etc., will also have to be explained as conveyed by another lakṣanā with the imaginary presence of still another prayojana. In this manner there will be the fault of anavasthā (i.e., regressus ad infinitum). Cf "evamapyanavasthā syāt yā mūlaksayakārini" (KP II 27) ⁴⁸

Then let us suppose that the lakṣanā function itself conveys the idea of the bank as having its holy calm (i.e., the pāvana tvādidharmayuktataṭa). Such a lakṣanā is designated by Mammaṭa as "viśiṣṭe lakṣanā" (cf "viśiṣṭe lakṣanā naivam" KP II 30). Mukula may be supposed to cherish such a view. But Mammaṭa replies that we cannot have (from lakṣanā) the secondary sense along with the prayojana, because of the dictum that, the viśaya (object) and the phala (fruit) of jñāna (knowledge) are different from each other, "jñānasya viśayo hyanyah phalamanyadudāhṛtam" ⁴⁹. The object of perception is nilaghaṭa and the fruit thereof is some such idea as 'nilaghaṭo jñāyate mayā' (the black jar is known by me). Now if the lakṣyārtha be taken as including the prayojana or phala of lakṣanājñāna then the viśaya and phala of jñāna will not be different from each other. For, the viśaya or the object of knowledge which is taken to be 'pāvanatvādiviśiṣṭataṭa' in the sentence 'gangāyām ghoṣah' is not different from pāvana tvādi, the recognised phala of lakṣanājñāna.

48 (The foregoing arguments of Mammaṭa are based on Locana, pp 148-150)

49 KP II 29

Implication of 'jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ', etc.

There is, however, some controversy as to the proper implication of the said words of Mammaṭa, i.e., "jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ phalamanyadudāhṛtam / pratyakṣāderhi nīlādirviṣayaḥ phalaṁ tu prakāṣatā saṁvittirvā" (Vide, Pradīpa quoted on p. 71, KP. CSS.). The point of objection is that, just as saṁvitti or prakāṣatā is a jñāna, similarly the phala of lakṣaṇā-jñāna is śaityādipratīti and not śaityādi. Hence the māxim is not aptly applicable where the suggested sense or prayojana is only śaityādi. Pradīpa suggests an interpretation of Mammaṭa's stand as follows : ⁵⁰

The object of knowledge (jñānasya viṣayaḥ) being the cause (janaka) of jñāna is different from the jñāna and similarly the phala (say, a knowledge, saṁvitti or the knowledge of śaityādi in case of lakṣaṇā) is also different from jñāna, being the effect (kārya) of it. Now naturally there being a sequence of occurrence between the cause of knowledge (i.e., viṣaya) and the effect of knowledge (i.e., phala) the two are different from one another, and hence, cannot be put in the same footing. Mammaṭa's words, "prayojanānena sahitaṁ lakṣaṇīyaṁ na yujyate," preceding the dictum, "jñānasya viṣayo hyanyaḥ," etc., may be understood to say that, the viṣaya and the phala must not be put on a par by having both of them as related with the same lakṣaṇā function at the same instance. Pradīpa seems to opine that though "śaityādi jñāna" above is the phala yet the term phala is loosely applied to śaityādi itself and the dictum is rendered applicable. Hence, if the knowledge of the secondary sense includes also the knowledge of the śaityādi, etc., then no phala would be had as distinct from the object of knowledge (i.e., lakṣaṇā-jñāna-viṣaya, viz., taṭa) and then there would be no necessity of postulating a vyañjanā vyāpāra for the cognition of a phala (i.e., prayojana) distinct from the secondary sense. But the

50. Vide, KP. CSS. p. 71.

difficulty is that the viṣaya and phala are always different and the latter cannot be included in the former. Pradīpa also suggests a simpler solution for the problem of distinguishing the scope of lakṣanā from that of the phala (thus showing the necessity of recognising the vyañjanā function) as follows :

'Lakṣanā is based on anvayānupapatti (incompatibility of the conventional meaning of a word with the rest of the sentence) and hence, the lakṣyārtha will include the minimum requisite for removing this incompatibility (anupapatti) and hence the lakṣyārtha is gangā-taṭa and not viś ṣṭa gangātaṭa.' ⁶¹ Lakṣanā is not meant to have as its object also what is not vitally necessary for removing the incompatibility. Thus, it does not have śaitya, pāvanatva, etc., as its object. Compare "jñānasya janakibhūto viṣayo yathā jñānādanyastathā phalamapi tasya svato bhinnam, kāranasyeva kāryasyāpi bhinnakālatvaniyamāt śaityādau tu kvacit phalapadmaupacārikam dṛśyate. tathā ca lakṣyajñānameva yadi śaityajñānam tadā prayojanam na syādit्यार्थाः / . anvayānupapattiyā hi lakṣanā prasaranti yāvanvayopapādakam tāvadeva viṣayīkaroti natvanupapādakamapiti katham taṭe pāvanatvamapi viṣayīkuryāt" etc. (KP. CSS. p. 71)

Thus lakṣanā cannot convey the prayojana. But the secondary sense is found to have certain speciality, the idea of which must be conveyed by some function of the word itself, which the dhvani theorists name as vyañjanā, dhvanana or dyotana etc.

(2) From Mūkula's words—"etacca prayojanadvitayam mukhyārthāsambhave satī mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā... . avagamyamāne lākṣanike'rttho yathāviṣaya manusartavyam" (AVM. p. 17), it also appears that, when the secondary sense is had with lakṣanā the prayojana is to be understood by some other process of reasoning (anusartavyam, i.e., to be followed). The necessity of such a process of reasoning as regards the

⁶¹. Dr. Thakur's "short analysis," KP. CSS p. 31.

prayojana seems to be supplied by the following words also (in continuation of the above quotation), "tatra sambandha-lakṣaṇā yathā gaṅgāyām ghoṣa iti. atra hi śabdābhidheyasya srotoviśeṣasya ghoṣādhikaraṇatvānupapattyā mukhyaśabdārthabādhe sati yo'sau samīpasamīpibhāvātmakaḥ sambandhastadāśrayeṇa taṭam lakṣayati / atra ca lakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanam taṭasya gaṅgātvaikārthasamavetāsaṁvijñānapadapūṇyatvamanoharatvādipratipādanam, na hi tatpūṇyatvamanoharatvādi svaśabdaḥ spraṣṭum śakyate / avyāptyativyāptiprasaṅgāt (AVM. p. 17). From this quotation we learn that taṭa alone is said to be conveyed by lakṣaṇā and pūṇyatva, etc., (i.e., the prayojanas) are said to be beyond the scope of expressive words. (Since, both the mukhya-vyāpāra and lakṣaṇā are abhidhā for Mukula, we should understand both the vācaka and the lākṣaṇika words from the expression svaśabda).

Possibly apprehending such a position of Mukula, Mammata contends that in prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā a function other than the lakṣaṇā itself must be recognised. We have lakṣaṇā in those cases only when the prayojana is there. That prayojana cannot be cognised by the instruments of knowledge i.e., pramāṇas (other than the śabda itself) such as the cause of the incongruity of the primary sense. We do not think that, the primary sense fails, it must have a cause, and the cause is the understanding of prayojana. Why? Because the prayojana is not so unimportant to be arrived at by the reasoning of the said manner, rather the word is used in the secondary sense to convey the same prayojana more smoothly. (Compare, Locana, p. 150; prayojanāvagamasya sukhāsampattaye hi sa śabdaḥ prayujyate tasminnamukhyārthe). Pratyakṣa does not precede the meaning of word. No anumāna occurs before its cognition (with any pratyakṣa preceding it). We cannot establish an anumāna in this case with the help of another anumāna because that would lead to anavasthā. There is also no smṛti involved in the cognition of the meaning of a

word because the idea (had from a śabda) was not experienced before. Even where smṛti is present it cannot be said to be invariably associated (or it does not relate to any thing definite) Thus śabda alone is the pramāṇa (i.e., source of valid knowledge) there. Śabda does not convey the sense without a vyāpāra (i.e., function) The function is not abhidhā due to so many reasons. It is none other than vyañjanā for having the phala. Compare "saprayojanāyām ca lakṣanāyām tadatirikto vyāpāro'vaśyam anekartavyaḥ / tathā ca satī prajoyane lakṣanā / tacca na mukhyārtha bādhanamittavat pramāṇāntarādboddhavyam / tadarthameva lakṣanā-śabda prayogāt na khalu śabde'rthe pratyakṣam kramate / nāpi tatpūrvakamanumānam / nānumānāntaram anavasthāpatteh tadanubhavābbhāvāt // (SVV pp 5 6)

Refutation of Mukula's position

(3) In the verses illustrating lakṣanā due to speciality of speaker, etc., we cannot have the suggested senses because of lakṣanā. In the verse, "dṛṣṭum he prativeśina" there is no inconsistency or incongruity of the primary sense (mukhyārtha bādha) Hence the question of lakṣanā does not arise at all. We do not indeed reject the primary sense as inconsistent or false here. We accept the primary sense and aided by the speciality of the speaker (vaktṛvairīṣṭya) have the suggestion of her actual intention to meet the lover.

In the verse 'prāptaśṛṅgeśa' the sense of inconsistency of the doubt does not arise. Hence, Mammaṣa observes that there is no mukhyārthabādha and also no scope for lakṣanā. Abhinava very lucidly points out the consistency of the doubt.⁵⁷ He says that, the ocean thinks that, only those who have not acquired Lakṣmī and those who have yet to conquer the whole world and those who desire to sleep should come to perform churning, etc. But, this king (who is addressed

in the eulogy) has already acquired Lakṣmī (i.e., the royal fortune); hence, he need not churn the ocean; he has already conquered the whole world and so he need not erect any setu; he is very enthusiastic and hence he need not feel sleepy also. Then, why should this king come to the ocean and purturb it? Thus, the doubt is quite consistent in respect of the king also. Abhinava adds that, the expressions like punaḥ, pūrvam and bhūyaḥ alone are not responsible for the suggestion. Because, these expressions need not necessarily mean an identity of the subject. But the express sense of the whole verse is so peculiar that it suggests an identity of the king with Vāsudeva and hence a rūpakālaṃkāra is derived as the suggested content of the verse. Similarly, in the verse “durvārā madaneṣavo” also, an expressed sense, without appearing inconsistent (bādhita) suggests the rasa. Mukula does not show why there should be anvayānupapatti of the express senses of the words. The dhvani theorists would explain that, there is no mukhyārtha-bādhā. All that is had as express sense is really meant by the speaker. Here, there is no inconsistency in the nāyikā’s calling the arrows of Cupid, etc., the five fires. Because it is a very natural way of stating things for such a nāyikā in the lovelorn condition. In these last two verses the iota of inconsistency that appears can be done away with by considering the fact that these are the words of the nāyaka and nāyikā, specially delineated by the poet with a special way of expressing ideas (Vide, p. 115, above). Compare also Mammaṭa in SVV. p. 5, “dṛṣṭīm he.....duḥsahāḥ // ityatra ca nādeyapānīyānayanena parapuruṣasaṃbhogasya naḍagranthilekhanena saṃbhāvyamānanakhadaśanakṣatānām ca nihnavātmaśāntam vastu, bhavān haririti rūpakālaṃkāraḥ vipralambhaśṛṅgāraśca raso lakṣyate iti nodāhāryam / mukhyārthasya bādhābhāvāt /ākṣiptasyālaṃkārasya lakṣyatve ca bahnyānayanane pātrānayanasya lakṣyatvaprasaṅgāt / abādhitasyaiva vācyasya rasapratīkṛtītvāt /” The argument of Mammaṭa about the suggested alaṃkāra in “prāptaśrīreṣa” is

very interesting Mukula says that the doubts of the ocean are not consistent if we do not have the idea of the identification, because, that alone removes the sense of inconsistency in the express sense of doubts. The counter argument is that we really have a lakṣyārtha when there is incongruity of the express sense. But, do we again apply the secondary sense to bring consistency to the inconsistent express sense? Moreover, the inconsistency that Mukula finds in "prāptaśrīreṣa" is also not a very conspicuous one. If there is any inconsistency here, then we should find an inconsistency also in the expression bahnyānayaṇa, because, bahni cannot be brought with a bare hand. So, to remove this inconsistency we must gather the secondary sense of bringing a pātra (i.e., a container of the fire) also according to the way of arguments of Mukula. But we do not have any laksanā involved in the realisation of the sense of the expression "bahnyānayaṇa." Similarly we must not drag in any lakṣyārtha to find consistency in the express sense of "prāptaśrīreṣa." The idea of rūpaka occurs to our mind only as the suggested sense.

Jayantabhaṭṭa and vyañjanā.

Jayanta is a very prolific Naiyāyika of the 9th century. His words and arguments are repeated even by as great writers as Abhinava and Mammaṭa to their best advantage.

Jayanta includes the śrutārthāpatti as in "pīno devadattah divā na bhunkte" in anumāna. On the strength of the same arguments he discards the distinction of dhvani (i.e., suggestion) of the niṣedha in the verse "bhama dhammā" or of the vidhi in the verse "māsma pāntha gṛham viśa" from anumāna. But significantly enough, scarcely introducing the argument for including dhvani in anumāna, he desists from any further argument with the poet. It may be conjectured here, that, while it is easy to include the suggestion of the matter of fact in anumāna, it is not easy to include rasa in anumāna even for Jayanta. Hence compare,

etena śabdasāmarthyamahimnā so'pi vāritaḥ /

×

×

×

×

athavā nedṛśi carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate /

vidvāṁso'pi vimuhyanti vākyārthagahane'dhvani //

tadalamanayā goṣṭhyā vidvajjanocitayā ciram

paramagahanastarkajñānāmbhūmirayaṁ nayāḥ /

(Nyāyamañjarī, Pramāṇa Prakaraṇa, p. 45).

Jagadīś'a and vyañjanā :

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra, the author of the Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā flourished in c. 1700, and by that time it was fully realised and established that rasa is a blissful state of the mind of the sahṛdaya himself. Possibly because of a recognition of this subjective aspect of rasa realisation, Jagadīśa had to introduce the conception of a 'mental cognition' (i.e., mānasa-bodha) at the cost of the vyañjanā function, which he endeavoured to dismiss in a manner represented below :

(1) In "mukhaṁ vikaśitam", etc., the idea of a fragrance of the mouth similar to that of the flower is suggested. The Ālaṁkārika cannot arrive at that meaning with lakṣaṇā because, there is no failure to have a syntactical relation between the primary meanings of the given words. (.....upasthitārthānvayānupapattidhīrūpasya lakṣaṇābījasya tatrāsattvādityālaṁkārikā vadanti, SSP. p. 146). But Jagadīśa would like to have the suggested meaning also with the help of lakṣaṇā; because, according to him the knowledge of the failure to have a syntactical relation between the primary meanings of the used words is not the only cause of lakṣaṇā. In "yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya" (Get in the lances), he says, there is apparently no inconsistency, but, yet we have lakṣaṇā.

(2) In case of the use of anekārthakaśabdas (i.e., homonyms), Ālaṁkārikas (like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha) would have the additional meaning with vyañjanā. There is no scope of lakṣaṇā at all. Abhidhā also cannot operate to the

extent of the second meaning, since, it is arrested in respect of the first meaning itself by the *prastāva* (i.e., context), etc

In reply to this contention Jagadīśa would say that, the restriction of *tātparya* or context, etc., should not be the reason for recognising an additional function called *vyañjanā*. Because, according to Jagadīśa, the knowledge of the *tātparya* or the context, etc., is not the invariable requisites for the cognition of a verbal judgement. As such the second meaning of the homonymous words also may be arrived at with *abhidhā* itself in the manner of having the first meaning. Compare “*tātparyadhiyo hetutvasya pūrvam⁵³ parāstatvāt, ata eva prakaraṇādīnāmananugatānām kvacidāsatve⁵⁴pi kṣatyabhāvāt*” (SSP. p 151)


(3) Another argument of Jagadīśa is that, it is doubtful if we really have a second meaning from the homonymous words at all. The knowledge of lack of *tātparya* in respect of the second meaning itself will hamper the cognition of the same. Compare, “*vastutaḥ .. tattadarthakāśabdasāmānyam pratyeva tattadarthanistātparyakatvadhiyah pratibandhakatvāt*” (SSP. pp 152-153)

(4) Then, he continues that, if at all the idea of an additional meaning occurs to the mind, then, that must be recognised to have been derived through a mental process of an association of idea. For the relish (*camatkāra*) caused by *kāvya*, which can be explained as a variety of mental process itself may be as good a cause as the verbal cognition. Hence in respect of the suggested sense, either in the form of the second meaning of the homonyms or in the form of *rasa* (?), we need not take the word itself as the immediate antecedent. Instead, a mental reflection may be taken as its cause. That is how the additional *vyañjanā* function may be shown to be

53 “*śabdaprimāṇyavicitre nirastatvāt,*” *Kṛṣṇakāṇṭi*.

redundant. Compare, "tattadarthānām yathā kathañcidupanayavaśena manasaiva viśiṣṭadhī sambhavāt mānorathikasukhaprabhedaparyyavasitaṁ camatkāraṁ pratyapi śābdasyeva mānasasyāpi bodhasya viśiṣya hetutāyāḥ suvacatvāt, atiriktasya vyañjanākhyapadārthāntarasya pramāṇavirahenāśattvāceti samkṣepaḥ" (SSP. pp. 153-154).

(5) According to Jagadīśa, only that is the meaning of the word which has the knowledge of the words as its invariable and immediate antecedent. (cf. "yatrānvayavyatirekābhyāmākāṅkṣādimmattayā śābdasyāvagamaḥ hetuḥ," etc., SSP. p. 7). But, it may be pointed out that, the mental reflection (mānasabodha) of Jagadīśa itself results from a cognition of words and as such the mānasabodha at least must be recognised as a meaning of the word, the knowledge of the word being invariably antecedent to it. It is, however, a matter of opinion as to whether the pleasure (camatkāra) and the reflections caused by the reading of kāvya can be recognised as meanings of words. If ideas (i.e., reflections) are closer to the words, then they may be explained as meanings of words. But if they are separated by a series of ideas, they may not be considered meanings of words. But the dhvani theorists themselves, who recognise a series of suggested senses in the verses like "viparīta suraa samae" or "ua ṇiccala," do not give us any definite limit to the communicative capacity of words. A similar question of the limit of ideas evoked by kāvya is discussed also in the next chapter under the heading of "reflectional feelings."



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

See what the *kavya* actually suggests :

We have observed in the second chapter that, according to Ānanda, all the types of *dhvani* can appeal. We may explain the appeal of all the good *Kāvyas* to be due to some predominant suggested sense. Of the three main varieties of the suggested sense viz *vastu*, *alamkāra* and *rasādi*, *vastu* may be of innumerable types. Of course, to make *kāvyā* a *dhvani*, the suggested matter of fact must be predominant and most appealing. *Alamkāras*, i.e., the basic imaginations involved in the *alamkāras* may also be of many types. The *rasas* are nine in number but they may also have innumerable sub-varieties according to the nature of the *sthāyībhāva* and the nature of the *vibhāvas* etc. The same *sthāyī rasā*, may be for the beloved or for the guru or the king or the child or the motherland, etc. Thus the same *sthāyībhāva* may develop into different types of *śṛṅgāra rasa* or different types of *bhāva* of the *asamlakṣyakrama* type. Along with these we must take into account the thirtythree *vyabhicārībhāvas* which being principally suggested in *asamlakṣyakrama* may present different types of *dhvani*.

Since there are innumerable things to be suggested in innumerable ways, we must be slow in naming the suggested sense of a particular *kāvyā*. Particularly in time of determining the *asamlakṣyakrama vyangya* of *dhvani* we must ask ourselves, if we are really having the corresponding feeling or emotion for it. In other words, we should have the proper *hṛdayasamvāda*. Let us take a concrete example. In the beginning of the *Uttararāmacarita*, Muralī says :

• vadhū-parityāgāt prabhṛti-

anirbhinno gabhīratvādantargūḍhaghānavyathāḥ /
putapākapratikāśo rāmasya karuṇo rasaḥ //

(III. 1; URC. p. 67).

As regards the expression 'Karuṇo rasaḥ' of the given verse commentator Vīrarāghava says, "Karuṇo rasaḥ iṣṭajana-viyogajanya-duḥkhātīśayātmakarasaḥ." But although there is the mention of the term 'Karuṇo rasaḥ' yet we must not suppose that this particular verse suggests Karuṇa rasa for the sahr̥dayas. This verse which refers to a pathetic state of Rāma due to the separation from his beloved, in fact, suggests Muralā's sympathy for Rāma and generates a similar sympathetic feeling in the heart of the sahr̥daya also which may be best explained as a rati for Rāma. Since there is a suggestion of rati for one of the devādī class of Mammāṭa (KP. IV. 48), we must take the kāvya as a bhāva-dhvani. It should be noted that, here and in other similar cases, Bhavabhūti does not use the expression, 'Karuṇo rasaḥ' in the technical sense of Abinava.

Let me cite another example;

In URC. III. 47 (p. 99) Tamasā says :

"aho.sāmvidhānakam—

eko rasaḥ karuṇa eva nimittabhedād

bhinnaḥ pr̥thakpr̥thagivāśrayate vivartān /

āvarta-bud-buda-taraṅgamayān vikārān

ambho yathā salilameva hi tatsamastam //"

Here, commentators like Haridāsa Siddhānta-vāgīśa think that apparently there is doṣa due to naming the rasa by svaśabda. (Vide, URC. with his com. p. 222). Siddhānta-vāgīśa also tries to defend the doṣa in some precarious way. But to me it appears that there is no conspicuous doṣa in the verse even though the rasa is distinctly named. Because we must not jump to the abrupt conclusion that the verse suggests Karuṇa

rasa⁵⁴ In case of Karuna not being the principally suggested rasa, here, we cannot call its being named a doṣa. Ānanda also believes that we may determine the anitya doṣas like śruti-duṣṭa, etc., only with reference to the principal rasa of the pieces (Dhv II 11 p 214) But the svaśabda-vācyaṭva, etc., are said to be direct defects of the rasa (Vide, SD I) Moreover, Viśvanātha observes that in certain cases the naming of the vyabhicārībhāvas may not be a doṣa,⁵⁵ but he does not say anything like that about the naming of rasa itself Hence, apparently it remains a doṣa But, in my opinion even in this case we must take into account the suggested sense desired to be principally conveyed by the poet We must, being in the position of a critic, see what the poet desires to be the principal sense of the piece Ānanda also says—"Vivakṣop-ārūḍha eva hi kāvyē śabdānāmarthaḥ" (Dhv III p 496)

54 We find this eagerness to discover the presence of a suggested sense, which is not actually suggested, even in the earlier commentators Even as celebrated a commentator as Rāghavabhaṭṭa proceeds to discover the suggestion of Śṛṅgīrarasa in Śakuntalā I, 1 because of the familiar gendre in all the eight 'forms, referred to as "yā" etc., and called "tanu," which may also mean lean and thin (krīḍ), giving the idea of the behaviour of a nīyaka (hero), who is in association with eight nīyikās (heroines), through Samśokti of "atha ca yetyādi sarvatra sthūlīganīrdeśīttanubhīḥ kṛīḍhīḥ samśoktyāṣṭānīyikāyukata- nīyakavyavahīrasamāropīcchrīṅgīraraso'pi vyajyate" (com. on Śakuntalā, I 1) Rāghava continues that suggestion of Śṛṅgīra in the very first verse is due to the presence of Śṛṅgīra as the principal rasa of the drama (tatpradhīnatvādasya rūpa- kasya) But in my opinion, we can hardly have any *śruti* of Śṛṅgīra rasa in this verse and, at best we may recognise here a matter of fact suggestion (vastudhvani) regarding the presence of Śṛṅgīra as the principal sentiment of the drama.

55, SD VII 29-30

And in the verse “eko rasaḥ” we find that the principally suggested sense is a rati (sympathy) for Rāma in the asaṁlakṣya-krama. Hence here is a bhāvadhvani. The apprehended karuna rasa being out of picture, the question of the doṣa does not occur. Moreover, the expression ‘karuno rasaḥ’ does not diminish the relish of the suggested bhāva and hence the general definition of doṣa “rasāpakarṣakā doṣāḥ” (SD. VII. 1) does not apply here.

In this manner, we are to take sufficient caution in time of determining the suggested senses of dhvani. It is also to be remembered that a dhvani need not have a definite magnitude. Even muktakas (i.e., single verses with poetical beauty) may be considered as dhvanis due to the predominant and appealing rasādi suggested therein. Thus, the single verses of Amaruka (i.e., of the Amarusaṭaka) may be considered as very good specimens of dhvani (Dhv. p. 325). Then again even as large compositions as the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata may be considered as dhvanis each, with reference to the principal rasa of the whole composition. Such long compositions may have different rasas suggested in different parts, but yet, one particular rasa should be principally suggested. (Dhv. Kārikā. III. 21, p. 378). With reference to such a principal rasādi the whole prabandha is a dhvani.

Applicability of the Theory :

That, the dhvani theory, if understood in its true spirit, may be applied for the literary criticism of all the genuine kāvyas may be shown by way of examining the views of a modern nonconformist writer. Thus, Dr. Rākeśagupta in his Introduction to PSR (p. 3) declares that a great convention of the Indian poetics has been broken by his new theory on poetic relish. In order to establish a new theory he shows a good deal of flaws in the conventional theory. But I will show here that his doubts can be solved and objections can be refuted by the contents of the conventional theories of Ānanda

and Abhinava themselves, and the same theories may be accepted as standards for literary criticism.

Dr Gupta writes in the Introduction—"Now it was but natural for the exponents of Rasa theory, who should have synthesized both the above sense of the terms, to make Rasa mean relish of the emotional literature only and to call a combination of the different factors operating in the portrayal of an emotion (Vibhāvas etc) the cause of its consummation ("vibhāvānubhāva vyabhiçārisamyogād rasanispattiḥ" NŚ, Chap VI) The earliest critics, however, could have reason to limit their theory of Kāvya Rasāśvāda (Relish of Poetry) to this extent, for, fixed as their attention was on the dramas alone, they sincerely believed that poetic relish consists solely in emotional appeal ("na hi rasādṛte Kaścīdapyarthah pravartate," Ibid, Chap VI) But, the position of the later writers on poetics, who laid down unambiguously that poetry is not only the emotional kind, has been surely very unsafe in carrying on the old narrow tradition of Rasa theory" (pp. 2,3).

But, it must be noted here that, like the 'earlier critics, Ānanda also recognised that the relish of dramas consists solely in emotional appeal Compare Vṛtti p 326, "abhinayārthe tu sarvathā rasabandhe'bhiniveśah kāryah," etc What Dr Gupta means by "carrying on the old narrow tradition of Rasa theory" is vague. Abhinava presented his theory of rasa primarily while commenting on the NŚ, and as such in connection with the drama. He also referred to the theory of rasa, in the Locana, only in connection with rasādi as suggested Hence, his theory of rasa, cannot be expected to explain pleasure had from all the varieties of kāvya As Dr. Gupta himself observes—Ānanda also speaks of other varieties of kāvyas devoid of rasa, Ānanda does not carry on the narrow tradition of rasa-theory to explain all the varieties of Kāvya. There is also no justification in criticising and reshaping the theory of rasa as given by Abhinava and as anticipated by

Ānanda to explain the pleasure (or in the words of Dr. Gupta-interest) had from all the kāvyas.

A Word on sādhanānīkaraṇa :

Dr. Gupta says that generalization (sādhanānīkaraṇa) of characters and their mental conditions is psychologically impossible (Vide PSR. pp. 52, 53, 54, 62, 63, etc.). But it occurs and there is sufficient explanation for it in Abhinava's theory itself. It is also observed that, "unless he⁵⁶ clearly cognizes that it is love between Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta, he shall not at all follow the play all of which will only be Greek and Latin to him" (PSR. p. 55). But the view of the dhvani theorist is that, when the spectator gathers an information about the love between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā that is merely a suggestion of matter of fact, i.e., a vastu-vyañjanā for him. The state of having the suggestion of such a matter of fact need not be confused with relish of rasa. But when at moments the realisation of rasa occurs, then there is cognizence of the rasa and rasa alone. In the given example, there is rati for Śakuntalā generalized, if the spectator is male and rati for Duṣyanta if the spectator be a lady. This state refers to the 2nd. obstacle. This is an absorbed state of the mind i.e., a state of tanmayībhavana, according to Abhinava. It is very transitory, because, this state is 'vibhāvādijīvitāvadhiḥ' and is sure to be over soon along with the change or absence of vibhāvas, etc.; and in the play or in the poetry situations are gradually changing from one to another. In this connection we may refer with profit to an example of absorbed relish given by Abhinava himself (Vide, p. 163 above).

Dr. Gupta says—"We have seen.....that it is not necessary that even an absorbed perceiver would not think of anything else during his perception of a literary phenomenon.....etc." (PSR. p. 62). But, I contend that, just in the absorbed moment the perceiver would certainly not think of anything else.

56. The spectator.

According to Nyāya and Vaiśṣika the atomic mind cannot afford to do so—and according to modern psychology also—it is not possible on the part of the mind to get absorbed somewhere and to think of something else. If at all the mind does so then it will not be called an absorption at all.

On pp 63, 64, etc., of PSR, Dr Gupta presents further objections to the theory of generalization. He questions, "The Anubhāvas etc. suggest that the emotions are there, but how are they able to pass them on to the perceiver?" In reply to this question it must first be clarified that when the perceiver gathers the information that, "the emotions are there," that would not be a case of suggestion of rasa but a case of suggestion of vastu, i.e., a matter of fact. Since it is a vastu-vyañjanā, a question as to the process of the emotions being passed to the perceiver does not arise. Dr. Gupta further questions, "The Vibhāvas etc. are directly related to the Āśraya or the character in whom the emotion resides, and not to the perceiver. How are they able to kindle the same emotion in the perceiver?" The reply in brief is that it is due to hrdaya-samvāda (i.e., similarity of experience) and according to the theory, kāvya has the capacity (śakti) of suggestion (vyañjanā) which relegates or kindles the emotions in the heart of the reader who finds himself in the described situation. It is usual only with the kāvya and the occurrence of a similar emotion does not happen in the world (loka), that is why, this phenomenon of kāvya is called extraworldly (alaukika).

The problem of the villain :

Dr. Gupta further contends—"Also in actuality we do not find people experiencing the depicted emotions ... There is the villain, for instance, with whom a perceiver in his emotional moods feels displeased or antipathetic. Whenever this villain even attempts to make love with the heroine, he feels offended and annoyed; and whenever a misfortune befalls him, he feels a sort of satisfaction." etc. (p. 64). It happens so

because the emotions of the hero alone are relegated to the spectator or the reader. Just as in case of the male spectator there is the experience of Duṣyanta's rati for Śakuntalā—here is also the experience of the hero's (i.e., nāyaka's) antipathy for the villain (pratināyaka). Since the misfortune of the villain cannot make us sorry, his lamentations or the situation depicting his misfortune must not be supposed to suggest a karuṇa rasa for us. Instead, in that case we have the suggestion of a matter of fact, a vastu, a happy information that, the villain is experiencing sorrow.

Ānanda and also Bharata were cognizant of such situations. In Rāvaṇa's offering love to Sītā, Bharata would not like to have a suggestion of śṛṅgāra but 'hāsyā'. Compare, Locana, p. 178. 'Śṛṅgārānukṛtiryātu sā hāsyāḥ iti muninā nirūpitam' etc. It is hāsyā because the perceiver is almost sure that Rāvaṇa would be laughably repudiated. In other situations it may also cause disgust as apprehended by Dr. Gupta under the influence of the perceiver's sharing the emotions of the hero; for Rāvaṇa's offering love to Sītā would not certainly cause laughter to Rāma.

Ānanda refers to almost a similar situation in Vṛtti. pp. 374, 375. "kiṃ ca nāyakasyābhinandanīyodayasya kasyacit prabhā-vātiśayavarṇane tatpratipakṣāṇām yaḥ karuṇo rasaḥ sa parīkṣakāṇām na vaiklavyamādhadhāti pratyuta prītyatiśayanimitatām pratipadyata ityatastasya kuṇṭha-śaktikatvāt tadvirodhavidhāyīno na kaścīd doṣaḥ," etc. The karuṇa rasa (strictly speaking the feeling of sorrow) of the pratināyaka gives satisfaction to the perceiver as observed also by Dr. Gupta. In the Vṛtti, 'kuṇṭhaśaktika' possibly implies that the feeling of sorrow as observed in the case of the pratināyaka is only a bit of information i.e., a vastu suggested, which augments the effect of vīrarasa and the consequent delight of the nāyaka and the sympathetic perceiver also. The feeling of sorrow, when not equally experienced by the perceiver also, does not rise to the level of rasa—according to the theory of Abhinava

and my assumption is that, Ānanda also takes it to be nothing more than a suggested vastu, seems to be supported by the Vṛtti, on p 377 "tadatra tripurayuvatinām śāmbhavaḥ śarā-gmūrārdrāpārādhah kāmī yathā vyavaharati sma tathā vyavahṛtavān ityanenāpi prakārenastyeva nirvirodhatvam," etc., where, the behaviour of the Kāmī, which, when relished could have been a rasa, is presented as a vastu, i.e., a matter of fact

In the case of the villain and the hero, only one emotion i.e., the emotion common to the hero alone is relished, but, Ānanda is puzzled with another case where two conflicting emotions belong to the same character. Vide Vṛtti on pp 376-7 "athavā vākyaṛthibhūtiśāpi kasyacit karunarasaviśiṣṭasya tādṛśena śṅgāra vastunā bhangiviśeṣāśrayena samyojanam rasaparipoṣāyīva jāyate / yataḥ prakṛtimadhurāḥ padārthāḥ śocanīyatām prāptāḥ prāgavasthābhāvibhiḥ samimarvamānair vilāsair adhikātaram śokāvesamupajanayanti / yathā ayam sa rasānotkarṣi, etc." Here both the feelings belong to the same āśraya—the nāyikā. She feels in turn the emotions of śṅgāra and karuna. Correspondingly the sympathetic perceiver also gets the relish of śṅgāra and karuna. The sex of the nāyikā need not present an obstacle, because, the perceiver relishes rati and śoka in abstract form. Ānanda aptly observes the efficacy of śṅgāra to augment the effect of karuna.

A similar psychological phenomenon of an emotion being intensified through contrast is observed also by Keats in his 'Happy Insensibility' (Golden Treasury, IV p 29). Compare also Bhāsa's,

'sukham hi duḥkhānyanubīdya śobhate
ghanāndhakāreṣvita dīpadarśanam /
sukhāntu yo yāti naraḥ daridrīyatām
dhṛtaḥ śritena mr̥ṣa sa jīvati // (Cāṇḍaliya, I)

'Component feelings of poetic relish'

Dr Gupta observes—"Poetic Relish is a mental phenomenon and is composed of the feelings which are evoked in the

mind of the perceiver as psychological reaction to his perception of poetry. Feelings thus evoked cannot always correspond with the emotion depicted in poetry" (PSR. p. 83). His complaint seems to be that the traditional theory of rasa realisation is not competent to explain the phenomenon of such component feelings. My reply is that, such feelings may occur, but all of such feelings need not be expected to be explained by the traditional theory of rasa realisation. The dhvani theory can be applied for explaining the occurrence of such feelings to a great extent. Some of such feelings are so casual and accidental that the theory in general is not responsible for them. Let me consider those feelings one by one.

Sympathetic feeling :

Dr. Gupta observes, "It should be carefully noted that to feel sympathy does not mean to feel the exact emotion of the person or the character, with whom sympathy is felt. When we see a person in misery, what we mostly feel is pity and not miserableness" (p. 84). Dr. Gupta's word 'mostly' itself indicates that sometimes we also feel miserableness. In that case that is the suggestion of *karuṇarasa* i.e., a relish of *rasa*. But when we feel sympathetic, that is the suggestion of *bhāva*. Because, as observed by Mammaṭa, love or affection for gods etc., is called a *bhāva*. Compare, "ratirdevādiviṣayā vyabhicāri tathāñjitaḥ bhāvaḥ proktaḥ" (KP. IV). Here the word 'ādī' includes muni, guru, nṛpa, putra etc., also. *Bhāva* falls under *rasādi* and must be fit to be explained by the theory of *rasa-niṣpatti* which requires *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* of the *rati*. *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* being a relative term requires some one other than the perceiver to share the emotion. In most cases it is the poet himself, with whom the emotion primarily occurs, (cf. Dhv. p. 318. "tanniyame heturaucityam vaktrvācyayoḥ / tatra vaktā kaviḥ kavinibaddho vā, etc."). The poet need not be physically present; even in his absence he may be deemed to be physically present and the emotion is generalised and shared

with him. Example, "The Bridge of Sighs" by T. Hood, where we feel the poet to be the sympathetic speaker (Golden Treasury, IV, p. 71)

Antipathetic feeling

To illustrate this feeling, Dr. Gupta writes, "We feel only hatred and anger when we find the villain trying to win the love of the heroine by all fair and foul means, and laugh when he is slapped by the dauntless maiden chaste to her real lover" (PSR p. 85). It may be noted here that, Dr. Gupta comprehends different emotions under the term of antipathetic feeling. As in the given example, the so called antipathetic feeling may be broken into the emotions of hatred or anger and laughter. When it is the feeling of hatred there is *jugupsā* leading to *vibhatsa* and in case of anger there is the relish of *raudra rasa* and in case of laughter there is *hāsyā rasa*.

Recollection or Reminiscent feelings : (Vide PSR pp. 85, 86)

The cases given by Dr. Gupta, would present the cases of the third obstacle of *rasa* realisation. The Sanskrit original for the 3rd obstacle is '*nija sukhādivivaśibhāvaḥ*'. When in time of the perception there occurs *nijasukhādivivaśibhāva*, according to the theory, there cannot be a relish of *rasa*. When a perceiver is finding similarity of the situation with the past events of his life he is no longer a *sahṛdaya* in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, these effects of *kāvya* discovered by Dr. Gupta are not universal and invariable. Such effects are only casual with certain perceivers. Hence these feelings, though not altogether deniable, cannot be taken as determining factors (*lakṣaṇa*) of a *kāvya*. Moreover, the *kāvya* cannot be taken as the immediate, unconditional and invariable antecedent of such feelings. The perceivers certainly do not start having such feelings from the perception of *kāvya*. Above all, these feelings, although they occur in case

of certain perceivers, cannot disprove of some pleasure had from the perception of the same kāvya.

Feeling pertaining to curiosity : (Vide, PSR. pp. 86-87).

This curiosity can be explained as 'āvega' or better as 'autsukya' of the conventional theorists. These are vyabhicāribhāvas and as such can be principally suggested and relished. In the detective novels as illustrated by Dr. Gupta there may also be a good amount of 'vismaya'—giving rise to the adbhutarasa.

Reflectional feelings : (Vide PSR. pp. 87, 88).

These feelings 'set us to think about a problem connected with some aspect of life.' "Evocation of such feelings and the like has become very frequent in the modern times with the growth of such species in contemporary literature as problems and satire plays and novels, which either suggest to the perceiver a social, political or economical problem or ridicule a prevalent malpractice of the society." Here the observation of Dr. Gupta is quite perfect; but he does not give a clear description of what this feeling is. Since the 'feelings set us to think'—the thinking itself cannot be a feeling. The feeling precedes the thinking. So let us repeat his example, "when we see an unfortunate accomplished girl.....committing suicide.....we may grow critical towards this evil conventional practice of our society and may either feel a strong urge to root it out or brood over the problem to find an effective solution to it."

'Growing critical towards the evil of our society' can be explained as 'jugupsā' for the society and may be said to be a case of vibhatsarasa ('doṣekṣaṇādibhīrgarbā jugupsā'). 'Feeling of the strong urge to root out the evil' is utsāha giving the relish of vīrarasa. 'The brooding over the problem' is cintā, a vyabhicāribhāva giving the relish of bhāva ("dhyānaṁ cintā hitānāpteh sūnyatāśvāsātāpakṛt"). These are to be taken

as rasa and bhāva only if these are felt while the perception of the vibhāvas, etc., are there (Cf Vibhāvādijīvitāvadhih, etc) If we are set to these feelings after we finish the perception then as in the previous case we would not possibly take the kāvya as the immediate cause, and if any pleasure and pain occur because of these feelings, later on, the theory would not think them to have any relation with poetic relish

When a social problem is suggested as such, that is nothing other than vastudhvanī

It must be noted here that even in time of the traditional theorists themselves there were kāvyas giving rise to such 'reflectional feelings' Even Ānanda cognized a didactic aspect of poetry Compare, Vṛtti, pp 398-399 'sadācāropa-deśarūpā hi nāṭakādigoṣṭhi vineyajana hitārthameva munibhiravasthītā' etc

Critical feelings (PSR pp 88, 89)

Dr Gupta discovers certain critical feelings Let me reproduce his examples,—“A particular arrangement of words, the use of a particular poetic figure or some such other things may be sometimes felt by us as excellent or worthless ”

It must be admitted that this component feeling 'may' occur But if we feel certain aspect of the kāvya as worthless that may be due to our individual taste, and thus it may not be an invariable characteristic of kāvya When it is generally felt, it is certainly a blemish, a doṣa It should be avoided and the conventional theory also desires the avoidance of blemishes The psychological aspect of a doṣa is also noticed by the theory A doṣa is that which hampers in the realisation of rasa (rasāpakarṣakā doṣāh. SD VII 1) But for understanding what poetry is, or in other words, for explaining what poetic relish is, the presence of doṣa (i.e., worthless aspect of poetry) need not necessarily be taken into account Viśvanātha very convincingly deals with the question in course of criticising Mammata's definition of Kāvya Cf "satī sambhave

īṣaddoṣāvīti cet / etadapi kāvyalakṣaṇe na vācyaṁ, ratnādī-
lakṣaṇe kṛtānuvedhādīparihāravat / na hi kṛtānuvedhādayo
ratnasya ratnatvaṁ vyāhantumīśāḥ kintu upādeyatāratamya-
meva kartum / tadvadatrāpi śrutidūṣṭādyāḥ kāvyasya” etc.
(SD. I.).

When we feel the arrangement of words, etc., as excellent that will contribute to the *camatkāra* or *camatkṛti*,⁵⁷ which we have from the *kāvya*. Only in so far as this feeling, i.e., recognition of excellence contributes to the *camatkṛti*, it can be included in the purview of poetic relish. The traditional theorists were also cognizant of such excellences. Compare Viśvanātha's remarks on his definition of *anuprāsa*—‘*svara-mātra-sādṛśyantu vaicitryābbhāvānna gaṇitam*’ (S. D. X). If we are to explain the appreciation of excellence as something independent of *camatkṛti* then, I am afraid, many more feelings remotely related or hardly related with the poetic relish also will have to be included within the scope of poetic relish.

Thus in my opinion Dr. Gupta's objections may be shown to be unfounded and most of his novel ideas may be explained in terms of the much despised traditional theory itself.

Purpose of *kāvya* :

In the *dhvani* school of poetics the aims of *kāvya* are examined from two angles of view, viz. the poet's and that of the reader. There can be no difference of opinion with the *dhvani* school which states that *kāvya* brings fame and wealth to the poet. The aims of *kāvya*, as observed from the stand point of the reader are viz. pleasure (i.e., *prīti*) and knowledge (i.e., *vyutpatti*). But the *dhvani* theory recognises *prīti* as the chief goal. Abhinava observes : “*śrotrṇām ca vyutpatti-prītiḥ yadyapi stah.....tathāpi tatra prītiḥ pradhānam*”

57. *Camatkāra* is the unworldly pleasure derived from the reading of *kāvya*. It is also called as *ramaṇīyatā* or *lokottarāblāda* by Jagannātha in RG. I. Vide chapter III above for Abhinava's conception of *camatkāra*.

(Locana, p. 40) Because of considering *prīti* as the main aim of *kāvya*, the *dhvani* theorists give the status of the best *kāvya* to the single stanzas of *Amaru*, which are decidedly devoid of any moral lesson.⁵⁸ And, really the miniature poems of *Amaru* are exquisite pieces of art. Amongst the followers of the *dhvani* theory, *Mammaṭa* for the first time classified *kāvya* into three grades, viz., *uttama* (best), *madhyama* (mediocre) and *adhama* (worst). From his definition of *uttama* we simply learn that it should have a predominant suggested sense. In other words *dhvani* is said to be the best type of *kāvya*. But this classification refers only to the form (i.e., technique) of *kāvya* but not to the contents. *Mammaṭa* does not tell us that the standard of *kāvya* may vary according to the quality of the contents also.

Ānandavardhana does not explicitly speak of the quality of contents. But from his treatment of *aucitya* in the third *uddyota* we gather that, according to him poetry must not propagate deplorable ideas.⁵⁹ What we can gather from a study of the theory is that, according to it *dhvani* is a good art. The theory is immediately concerned only with the artistic (or say aesthetic) aspect of *kāvya*. But, the same good art may be a great art if the contents be of a higher order. The greatness is undoubtedly due to the instructive aspect of the *kāvya*, which may be designated as the *śāstric* aspect as only the technical works and the *Vedas*, meant for imparting instructions are called *śāstra*.⁶⁰ In my opinion, *Ānanda* draws a

58. Vid., HSL. Keith. p. 183 and Dhv. III, p. 325.

59. cf. "tasmādaḥbhīnocyāśrībe'nabhbhīnocyāśrībe vā kīrye yaduttamapra-
kṛte cā, śāstruttamapra-kṛtibhīnocyāśrīkṛtibhīh saha grāmyamāmbhoga-
vānaram tasyaśroṇaḥ samābhogavānaramiva suvarīmanasābhyam,"
etc., Dhv. p. 332.

60. cf. KP. Vṛtti on I, 2 "prabhuṣaṁsaśābdaśāstrāvedāśā-
śrīreḥbhyaḥ" and *Pratyaśyaka's*, "śābdapṛatīkṣayamāśrītya
tatra śāstram prabhaviḥ," (Quoted in Locana, p. 87), etc.

line of demarcation between these two aspects (i.e., the śāstric and the artistic or aesthetic or poetic aspect) when he explains the presence of śāntarasa in the Mahābhārata. When the Mahābhārata is considered only as a śāstra and the relish of rasa caused by it is not taken into account, we find that, the most important suggestion of it is that, 'mokṣa (i.e., salvation) is the highest goal of human life.' When we consider the Mahābhārata as a kāvyā, we find that its most predominant suggested sense is the śānta rasa which is 'an excess of bliss on account of loss of desires.' Compare, "tadevamanukramanīrirdiṣṭena vākyena bhagavadvyatirekiṇaḥ sarvasyānyasyānityatām prakāśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇa evaika paraḥ puruṣārthaḥ, śāstranaye, kāvyanaye ca tṛṣṇākṣayasukhaparipoṣalakṣaṇaḥ śānto raso mahābhāratasyāṅgitvena vivakṣita iti supratipāditam" (Dhv. IV. p. 433). ⁶¹

A similar distinction between the good art and great art may be observed in the writings of Walter Pater who observes in the Renaissance as follows : "Only be sure it is passion—that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake." ⁶² But this speaks only for his con-

61. That the distinction is based on the presence or absence of a relish caused by the reading of the same kāvyā is pointed out by Abhinava as follows : "tatrasvādayogābhāve puruṣārthyata ityayameva vyapadeśaḥ sādaraḥ, camatkārayoge tu rasavyapadeśa iti bhāvaḥ" (Locana, p. 533). It may also be noted here that Ānanda introduces the whole discussion by stating that the Mahābhārata is a śāstra having the colour of a kāvyā. Cf. "mahābhārata' pi śāstrarūpe kāvyacchāyānvayini.....mokṣalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣārthaḥ śānto rasaśca mukhyatayā vivakṣāviṣayatvena sūcitāḥ" (Dhv. IV. p. 530).

62. The Renaissance, pp. 238-239.

ception of good art. The greatness of poetry is said to be dependent on the quality of its contents. Cf. "the distinction between great art and good art depending immediately, as regards literature at all events, not on its form, but on the matter. Thackeray's *Esmond*, surely, is greater art than *Vanity Fair*, by the greater dignity of its interests. It is on the quality of the matter it informs or controls, its compass, its variety, its alliance to great ends, or the depth of the note of revolt, or the largeness of hope in it, that the greatness of literary art depends, as the *Divine Comedy*, *Paradise Lost*, *Les Misérables*, the *English Bible*, are great art." 63

Even granting that *kāvya* may have an instructive utility it must not be out and out a propaganda. It must primarily be an art, appealing not to the intellect but to the heart. For rendering the composition a genuine art the poet must delineate the basic human feelings. Even the instructive purpose can be best served only when the *kāvya* is more appealing and more artistic. That is why Ānanda recognises the *kāvya* having the delineation of the *śṛṅgāra* rasa (i.e. erotic sentiment) as the best medium for imparting instructions. Cf. "śṛṅgāraśaṅgairun-mukhikṛtāḥ santo hi vinayāḥ sukham vinayopadeśān gṛhṇanti" etc. (Dhv. III pp. 398-399). The necessity of depicting the basic human feelings like that of love in poetry cannot be gainsaid even by the communist movement as it is evidenced from the following words of Alexander Ĭirillov, a Russian writer.

"Yes, now as then the moon will shine down on the world and lovers will always sit hand in hand, cheek to cheek, gazing at the moon. And what about the poet? After all, they will sit and gaze just as they did three thousand years ago." 64

It may be finally noted that, even when *kāvya* is taken to be imparting some lesson, the lesson must lead to dharma and

63. *Appreciations: Style*

64. *Soviet Literature*, 1961, No. 9 p. 147.

mokṣa. Abhinava very rightly observes that the ultimate result of all the four goals of life, viz., dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, is pleasure. Hence, pleasure is the ultimate aim even of the instructive kāvya. Cf. “caturvargavyutpatterapi cānanda eva pāryantikaṁ mukhyaṁ phalam” (Locana, p. 41).

Pleasure is the chief end of kāvya :

In the foregoing section we have observed that Ānanda has a preference for the śṛṅgāra rasa. Does it mean that some rasas are more pleasurable than the other? This question is indeed raised by some traditional writers also. Dr. Raghavan informs us that Rudrabhaṭṭa, the author of Rasakalikā (which is yet in manuscript form) holds that, ‘some rasas are pleasurable and some are painful.’ “The Nāṭyadarpaṇa also says in s. 109 (p. 158) sukhaduḥkhātmako rasaḥ and proceeds to elaborately prove in the vṛtti that some rasas are certainly painful and that our seeing them and enjoying them is really due to the excellence of the art of either the dramatist or of the art of the actors.”⁶⁵ But, that, not to speak of other rasas, even karuṇarasa gives as much pleasure as may be given by śṛṅgāra, may be inferred from the fact that the people do have almost the same desire to read kāvyas having both the types of rasa. From the very fact of their desire to go through a tragedy knowingly, we may infer that they find pleasure in reading the same. Because it is the normal nature of human beings to undertake to do only what is pleasurable. This is observed by Gotama also, as follows : “idaṁ sukhasādhana-miti jñātvā sukhāptaye pravartate, idaṁ duḥkhasāadhanamiti cādhigamya duḥkhaṇāyayeti / sukhaduḥkhaṇayoravāptihānābh-yāmayam lokam prayujyata iti” (Uddyotakara’s Nyāyasūtra-vārttika, I. 1. 24). Dr. Rākeśagupta does not believe in this logic. He observes that it is a “wrong pre-supposition that we undertake to do only pleasing things” and with so many examples endeavours to show that people take interest also in

65. Number of Rasas, p. 159.

unpleasant affairs. He gives the example of the people who collect round the spot of a motor accident causing the death of a young man who leaves behind a young widow married only a month ago. Seeing the sad incident and knowing more and more about the extent of tragedy they feel pain. But, "inspite of all the pain that they are having they are still ready to welcome and to hear with interest any other detail about him, even though it may add to their sympathetic sorrow," he observes.⁶⁶

In reply to Dr Gupta's contention, it may be pointed out that the people do not like the tragic accident itself and as such the accident and the tragedy are painful and cause *duhkha*. But they have 'interest' in 'knowing' more and more about the deceased and his relatives. This knowing part of the activity is pleasant and that is evidenced by the 'interest' discovered also by Dr Gupta. Will the people say that they want to know more in order to get more pain? Or, why should we assume that the further informations relating to the deceased will give them only pain and not relief. The people in fact make the enquiries to get a relief from the pain by learning, if possible, that the extent of the tragedy is not very great. But above all, do men want more and more such accidents to occur because they want to get interested in more and more of such tragedies?

They do not. Because on the long run it does not give pleasure. But the case of *kāvya* is just the reverse. Will any *sahṛdaya* be unhappy to learn that a new author of Shakespeare's or Saratchandra's talent is writing new volumes of high class tragedy?

A new approach to *Karuna rasa*

It will be interesting to note here that K. N. Watwe offers a new theory to solve the problem of the *karuna rasa*. According to him *Karuna* "is only a derived emotion arising in the

course of the operation of a strong impulse of attachment under certain conditions. The fact that *Karuṇa Rasa* is partly or wholly enjoyable cannot be gainsaid. What the sorrowing person does, in his woe, is that he dwells on his subject of attachment, remembers the many occasions of affection, recollects his virtues and admires his excellences that evoked his attachment for him. It is neither the event of death nor a long separation from a beloved person, nor the sorrow evoked by such an occasion, but it is rather the love for the person that is at the bottom of the pleasure."

The author further observes :

"When the same object of love is placed in different conditions, love gives rise to different derived emotions. It gives rise to despair, when it is beyond hope of recovery and to sorrow, when it is completely lost. If there be any pleasure in thinking of the object under those conditions and in inducing the desired emotions named above, it is due to the fact that the person, every time, has an occasion to revolve in his mind the emotion of love for the object." [The Problem of the *Karuṇa Rasa* and its solution, P. K. Gode Com. Vol. Part. II, pp. 468-470 .

In consideration of this new solution, we may observe that, if the recollection of the earlier associations with the object of love should give pleasure of the relish of *Karuṇa Rasa*, then that should hold good even in the ordinary world. But to have any amount of pleasure in the case of a worldly sorrow (*śoka*) is *normally* impossible. But in the case of the *relish* of *karuṇa rasa*, in the realm of poetry alone, we can pass on to a state of *aesthetic* pleasure through the experience of a sorrow. The theorists who opine that all the *rasas* lead to an aesthetic pleasure also acknowledge that *śoka* consists of an unalloyed sorrow. But through rumination (*carvaṇā*) that very sorrow (*śoka*) becomes *Karuṇa Rasa* and gives pleasure in the manner of the painful bitings in the time of an erotic dalliance leading

to an inexplicable joy. Since in the ordinary life emotion of love for the lost object does not make the sorrowful situation pleasurable, in poetry also we must account for the pleasure in some other way. The sorrowful is equally sorrowful both in the ordinary world and in the poetry. But in the latter we pass on from the ordinary experience to a state of aesthetic experience, where there is the unalloyed bliss.

In reply to the view of the Nāṭyadarpaṇa, referred to earlier, it can easily be pointed out that the pleasure derived in case of Karuṇa Rasa is not due to any appreciation of the dramatist or the actor, for, in time of the aesthetic relish of even the Karuṇa Rasa, the absorbed spectator cannot afford to think of the dramatist or the actor or any thing outside the dramatic situation which has a mesmeric effect on his mind.

Dhvani Theory and the New Poetry *

The dhvani theory has a utility for us even in the contemporary phase of literary development as it serves a very appropriate defence also for the New Poetry.⁶⁶ By new poetry, I mean the type of poetry produced by the twentieth century poets like Eliot and Empson of England and Mallarmé,

66 In the 20th century drama also a technique of suggesting ideas through the use of symbols is very largely employed by the dramatists like Tennessee Williams of America. For example, in his first success, *The Glass Menagerie*, "Williams has shown how a cripple girl, Laura, nurses the illusion of her own fragile childhood through a collection of little glass animals, one of which is different from the others by having a horn. When this horn is broken, she sees the symbol as her chance to live an ordinary life" (TTD p. 195). This shows how suggestion has come to be honoured also in the stage. But I do not propose to deal with this suggestive trend of the modern drama as it relates to physical symbols. The suggestive language of the drama, however, comes under the context of suggestive poetry itself.

Rilke and many of the continent.⁶⁷ In India the new trend has come to the poetry of the regional languages like Assamese, Bengali and Hindi as a result of the overwhelming impact of the modern western poets particularly Eliot. Writers like Abu Sayeed Ayyub⁶⁸ clearly show how the modern Bengali poets like Jivanananda, Bishnu De, Sudhindranath and Amiya Chakravarty are influenced by the different aspects of the new poetry of the west. The young modern Assamese poet also writes more with contemporary western thought in his bones than with his own literary heritage. In the expression of the new poets we find the echo of the western contemporaries. Their 'moon-light' darkness and tears give out odours,' the 'sun teases with shrieks', their 'sky is soft' and their 'earth is rough like the rough skin of an old man,' etc., appear like echoes from the poetry of Dame Edith Sitwell or Rilke. "In the poetry of Hem Kanta and Navakanta one notices the adoption of images, symbols and music such as one meets with in the poetry of Baudelaire, Paul Valery, Stephenne

67. These new poets are classified under the different group designations such as the Imagists, the Satirists, the Metaphysicals, the Left-Wingers, the Symbolists, the Surrealists and the New Apocalyptic according to their poetical ideals and contents. But in respect of the diction and employment of suggestion they may all be discussed under the general designation of new poets. For example, in Hindi, as far as the content is concerned, the Pragativādi poetry is based on the Marxian ideology and the Prayog(a)vādi poetry hinges on the Freudian psycho-analysis. But as far as the metre, diction and figures are concerned, both the schools show almost similar trends. (Ādhunik Hindī Kavita-men Prem Aur Saundarya, pp. 442-440). We may bring both these types of modern Hindi poetry under the head of "New poetry" since we are concerned with their way of communication irrespective of the ideal communicated.

68. Vide his 'Modern Bengali Poetry' (Longman's Miscellany, 1943), or Dr. Dipti Tripathy's "Ādhunik Bāṅlā Kāvya Paricaya."

Mallarmé and Rainer Maria Rilke" "Navakanta has been influenced more deeply by T S Eliot than by others. Like Eliot he also believes that poetry requires a language rich in suggestions both to senses and the intellect" ⁶⁹

The most notable characteristic of the new poetry under the context of the dhvani theory is its technique of communication. Because, the language of the new poetry is also suggestive. This diction is also variously called symbolical, oblique and ambiguous. But while the votaries of the new poetry demand that the suggestive language is the only language for the new poetry some critics like Richards, Ogden, Tillyard and Empson endeavour to discover a special role played by suggestivity in the poetry of all ages.

We may remember that Ānandavardhana was also inspired to formulate his theory on dhvani because he observed the predominant presence of suggestion in the bulk of poetry already present before him since the days of Rāmāyana, the ādikāvya. Cf " atha ca rāmāyana mahābhārataprabhṛtini lakṣye sarvatra prasiddhavyavahāram lakṣyayatām sahrdaya-nāmanando manasī labhatām pratiṣṭhāmīti prakāśyate" (Dhv p 38) and " lakṣye tu parikṣyamānā sa eva sahrdaya-hṛdyāhlādakāni kāvyatattvam" (Dhv pp 106-107) We may also remember the case of the Irish symbolist W B Yeats, who emulated in his own poetry the suggestive art of the earlier poets. In the *Autumn of the Body* he described (in 1898) how he found 'in the art of every country those faint lights and faint colours and faint outlines and faint energies' to which he had himself turned. It is also interesting to learn that 'Shelley's poetry became palatable to him only when he realised the symbolism inherent in the recurrent images of leaves, boats, stars, caves, the moon. In his own verse the rose, white birds, foam, the wind, became means

69 'Anamem Poetry To day' by Dr B K. Barua (Hindustan Standard, Poona Annual, 1959)

of conjuring moods rather than sensations." (TMP. p. 30). It hardly requires to be pointed out that the forms of literature which could evoke sentiment were unquestionable cases of suggestive *kāvya* (i.e., *dhvani*). Other forms of literature, such as allegory and satire, which were there from earlier times, also presented cases of suggestion. Satire as a rule, is so rich in suggestion that its very designation is "*vyāṅgya*" (i.e., suggestion) in Assamese, Bengali or the Hindi language. Leroux, a French critic, defined allegory, in 1834, as "a discourse, or in general a sign expressing something other than what it states directly.....In this sense, *metaphor*, *symbol*, *myth*, are but different degrees of allegory" (IPF. p. 222). Regarding the suggestive element of the other types of poetical composition of even the early 17th century Margaret Gilman observes — "The abundant production of odes and elegies during the early seventeenth century is marked by frequent preciousity, a wealth of versified maxims, often allied indeed with a wit and charm, *a concise and suggestive quality*, which have won for it in recent years a revival of popularity somewhat akin to that achieved by the English Metaphysical poets." (IPF. p. 4). But a tendency for the deliberate employment of only the suggestive language evolved as a theory in the west only in the middle of the 19th century as it is evidenced by the following observation of the French critic Sainte-Beuve, who wrote in 1866 :

"Today we want something different. For us the greatest poet is the one who in his works has given the reader the most to imagine and to dream about, who has most moved him to be himself a poet. The greatest poet is not the one whose work is the most accomplished : he is the one who suggests the most, with whom at first one does not grasp entirely all that he has meant to say and express, and who leaves one much to ask, to explain, to study, much for one to finish. There is nothing like these incomplete and inexhaustible poets to arouse and foster our admiration ; for hence forth

we want poetry to be in the reader almost as much as in the author. Since criticism was born and has grown up, since it has invaded everything, has outdone everything, it cares little for poetic works bathed in a clear and perfect light, it will have nothing to do with them. The vague, the obscure, the difficult, if they are combined with some greatness, are what it prefers. It must have material which it may itself construct and work on. For its own part it is far from displeased at having its skein to untangle, and at being given from time to time, if I may say so, a tricky job to do. It is not displeased at feeling that it has its share in a creative work" (IPF pp 200-201)

The following observation on these lines of Sainte Beuve also deserves quotation

"Here are the words which were to recur so often in symbolist theory "imagine," "dream," "vague," "obscure," "difficult," and above all "suggest." For it seems to me that the great poetic change which took place about the middle of the century can be summed up as a passage from a poetry of statement to a poetry of suggestion. The change is not so clear-cut, to be sure, as Sainte-Beuve's passage implies. Surely all great poetry, even all good poetry, is to some extent suggestive, in the sense that it implies more than the literal and prosaic meaning of the words" (IPF. p 201)

In her notes (IPF. p 304) Margaret Gilman refers also to the observation of Tillyard that "All poetry is more or less oblique, there is no direct poetry" (Vide *supra*, p 150) Margaret Gilman's observation that suggestion is a mark of all great poetry, it is hoped, would lead the reader to recall Ānandavardhana's observation in the context of the *Citra* presented in p 148 above

The new poets employ different devices to make their poetry suggestive, to communicate what cannot be communicated in the ordinary language. The new poetry in India also

betrays the same trends in technique and texture. But it is very interesting to note that the most of the devices employed for an oblique communication and even the evils of the new technique may have parallels in the very many concepts of the dhvani theory.⁷⁰

The reason for employing an indirect suggestive language in the new poetry was very lucidly given by T. S. Eliot in the following lines in 1921.

"We can only say that it appears likely that poets in our civilisation, as it exists at present, must be difficult. Our civilisation comprehends great variety and complexity and their variety and complexity, playing upon refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect in order to force, to desolate if necessary, language in to his meaning."⁷¹

It is also observed that the ambiguous language of the new poetry is effective not only in respect of conveying complex ideas but also in respect of suggesting and evoking complex emotions. Compare : ".....a poetry which by means of myths and symbols seems to convey rather than to describe the ex-

70. The Imagists (1908-1917) in England, for example, rigorously demanded precision of expression and introduced the doctrine of the image. Ezra Pound, one of the chief Imagists, defined Image as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (TMP. p. 81). Herbert Read, another chief Imagist wrote that " the Image discovers one thing with the help of another, and by their resemblance makes the unknown known. But it is not a logical resemblance" (CS. p. 172). An examination of the use of the Images is expected to show that it presents cases of vastudhvani in the manner of Aprastutaprasāmsā.

71. Selected Essays. p. 289.

tremely complex, emotional and intellectual state whence an experience similar to that of the poet will arise." 72

The conventional language is not adequate for achieving this end of conveying complex ideas and emotions. Hence new words are coined. Words are employed to convey an entirely new import. The statement may even appear to be, logically speaking, obviously incorrect. 73 Poets like Edith Sitwell attribute unusual sensations and experiences to the different sense organs 74 All the devices like these may be explained in terms of the two varieties of the *avivakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani* and Edith Sitwell's queer sensibilities may find parallel in expressions like "nṛhśvāsāndha ivādarśaḥ candramā na prakāśate" 75 (Dhv. p. 172). Symbols, allusions and quotations employed for conveying greater volumes of ideas also may be explained, in most cases, as cases of *vastudhvanī*

72 Contemporary French Poetry, p. 1.

73. Word p. 208

74. "But the most distinctive feature of her style in these years was in her use of sense impressions. She often gave to one sense the attributes of another as had been done by Milton in the famous phrase "blind mouths" in *Lycidas*. In particular what we see she often described in terms of hearing, as in "crackling green," "braying light," "jangling rain," or, in reverse, "the brass band's smothering stabs the sky" A. S. Collins, (*English Literature of the Twentieth Century*, p. 85).

75 We can admit a *lalāṣaṇī* and then an *avivakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani* in Edith Sitwell's 'Crackling green,' for example, in the matter of the perception of the green only if we do not admit the possibility of an auditory perception of the green in the manner of *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception (referred to above, p. 100). In "surabhī candanaṁ paṭyāmi" the *surabhī* (fragrance) may belong to the *candana*. But here we must yet admit a *lalāṣaṇī* as crackling does not normally belong to the green.

But in employing allusions, quotations and symbols, etc., the new poets utilise such a wide range of their learning and so strange and outlandish intellectual references that the contents become quite out of the grasp of the ordinary reader. The desire of the new poets to convey greater amount of information and more complex emotions results in an undesirable obfuscation of the message. Some critics link Mallarme's obscurity simply to his ambition to be concise.⁷⁶ And what is all the more deplorable is that some new poets create difficulty simply for the sake of difficulty as a religion.

Happily, along with the development of the technique of the new poetry an opinion against its "obscurity" also has gained ground both in respect of the western poetry⁷⁷ and its Indian counterpart. But the pioneers of the new poetry are themselves conscious of this possible complaint. And indeed, along with an apology for their obscurity they also present a commentary of their own to their own compositions as did Eliot do in case of his *Waste Land* and Empson does in case of his *Collected Poems*. Eliot not only recognised but also duly analysed the question of difficulty of the new poetry as may be evidenced from the following observation in the "Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism."⁷⁸

".....The difficulty of poetry (and modern poetry is supposed to be difficult) may be due to one of several reasons.

76. Word, p. 212.

77. Compare the following remark on Hopkins, who is found to have considerably influenced the modernists in England—"We may forgive his use of dialect words and invented words, but not his maltreatment of order and syntax—not such timeses as "wind lily locks—laced," such contortions as, "Commonwel, Little I reck ho ! lacklevel in, if all had bread" (*A Critical History of English Poetry*, p. 508).

78. The numbers are inserted by me.

(1) First there may be personal causes which make it impossible for a poet to express himself in any but an obscure way. (2) Or difficulty may be due just to novelty we know the ridicule accorded in turn to Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats, Tennyson and Browning—but must remark that Browning was the first to be called difficult, (3) Or difficulty may be caused by the reader's having been told, or having suggested to himself that the poem is going to be difficult (4) difficulty, caused by the author's having left out something which the reader is used to finding, so that the reader, bewildered, gropes about for what is absent, and puzzles his head for a kind of 'meaning' which is not there and is not meant to be there" (pp 150-151)

What is observed by Eliot under point 1, may be explained as "asaktikṛtadoṣa (i.e., a defect due to poet's want of genius) of Ānanda referred to in the parikarāśloka,—

"avyutpattikṛto doṣaḥ śaktyā samvṛiyate kaveḥ /

yastvaśaktikṛtastasya sa jhaṣṭiyavabhāṣate //" (Dhv III p 316)

[A poet's defect resulting from ignorance will be hidden from view by his genius, but a defect due to his want of genius will attract one's attention instantaneously. Dhv Trans p 64]

The difficulty of the poem due to the obscurity of the suggested matter of fact is recognised as a doṣa by the followers of the dhvani theory as in case of the obscurity of the suggested matter of fact in the aprastutapraśamsā is called a doṣa, viz., kaṣṭhārthatva (Vide, SD VII 12)

The second point of Eliot is an optimistic defence of the difficulty in so far as it advocates that the difficulty of the new poetry may be lessened by a greater familiarity. It is said by the votaries of the new poetry that although the new poetry is not readily intelligible to the mass because of remote intellectual references, etc., it is hoped that the masses themselves would develop a greater range of information and better familiarity with the new diction through more and more

reading of the new poems. It appears to be very much an echo of Bhavabhūti's,

ye nāma kecidiha naḥ prathayantyavajñāṁ
jānanti te kimapi tān prati naiṣa yatnaḥ /
utpatsyate'sti mama ko'pi samānadharmā
kālo hyayaṁ niravadhir viśālā hi pṛthivī // (MM. I. 8).

But it appears to be going to much ahead of time and the general run of the men of taste may hardly appreciate an attitude like that of Bhaṭṭi who boasts that his poem is intelligible only with the help of a commentary. It may be observed here that, although the later pervert Indian tradition calls Bhaṭṭi a mahākavi⁷⁹ there is reason to believe that the dhvani theory itself was promulgated as an antidote to a pervert taste as evidenced in the Bhaṭṭikāvya. It is also significant to note that in the whole of the Dhvanyāloka there is no reference to Bhaṭṭi in any way.

John Press observes in his "Chequer'd shade" that difficulty may be due to more than one reason. It may be due also to the employment of a difficult vocabulary and syntax (CS. p. 7) and the difficulty of the Bhaṭṭikāvya, I think, may be put under this head. But happily the difficult poets themselves become in course of time critical of the obscure expression. We find that Eliot in the later part of his poetical career repented for his earlier love for an obscure expression. William Empson also has realised the undesirability of obscurity. The first word of "Mr. Eliot's Sunday Morning service," "Polyphiloprogenitive," suggests a wilful pedantry. "Among the many gifts handed on by Mr. Eliot from the Metaphysicals was a poetry involved with farfetched erudition. The fashion was a salutary reaction against contemporary mindlessness; it was pursued with something of the naive enthusiasm of the Renaissance, a love of new words, strange instances, subtle

79. Keith. HSL, p. 117.

allusions In practice the frequent use of unattributed allusions demanding a close knowledge of even the accepted "classics" strains the reader's attention Poetry comes to depend on scholarship In *The Waste Land*, Mr Eliot did not conquer this tendency of *Poems* 1920, yet it comes near to being a great poem

I that was near your heart was removed therefrom

To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition,
said *Gerontion* aptly describing the poet's attitude during what may be called his second period' (TMP pp 158-159)

But in Part V of the *East Coker* (The Four Quartets) "the poet turns to his art and confesses his failure to achieve perfect expression after twenty years

' Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it." (TMP p 176)

Here we may also refer to the following observation of John Press

"No poet has revelled more unashamedly in the pleasures of intellectual virtuosity than William Empson who, in a characteristically tart commentary upon his own poetry, explains why he has included so many pages of notes in *The Gathering Storm*

Partly they are meant to be like answers to a crossword puzzle, a sort of puzzle interest is part of the pleasure that you are meant to get from the verse The fashion for obscure poetry came in at about the same time as the fashion for crossword puzzles, and it seems to me that the revival of puzzle interest in poetry, an old fashioned thing, has got a bad name merely by failing to know itself and

refusing to publish the answers. (*The Gathering Storm*, 'Note on Notes', p. 55)." ⁸⁰

Empson wrote like this in *the Gathering Storm* in 1940. But by 1955 he grew more considerate to admit that the better poetry requires fewer notes, for, he says—"There is a feeling, often justified, that it is annoying when an author writes his own notes, so I shall give a note about these notes..... Of course there are queer forces at work, to write notes at all is to risk making a fool of yourself, and the better poems tend to require fewer notes." (*Collected Poems*, p. 93).

That the dhvani theory cannot allow this craze for puzzle-making in the name of suggestion is already discussed in the second chapter in the section, "A reply to Viśvanātha." The puzzle will appear as the flaw (doṣa) named kaṣṭārthatva, referred to above.

"Some good poets believe that they owe allegiance only to their Muse, and that in our present form of society any attempt at communicating with a mass audience would involve a betrayal of that allegiance. Robert Graves states this belief unequivocally in the Foreword to his *Poems*, 1938-45 :

I write poems for poets, and satires and grotesques for wits..... To write poems for other than poets is wasteful." (CS. pp. 159-160). Thus the belief that poetry is only for a coterie of initiated fellows breeds the danger of unintelligibility and unpopularity.

Ānanda also apprehended the possibility of dhvani being the property of a few intellectuals; that is why he prefers the dhvani that may appeal to a greater circle. He recognises śṛṅgāra as the best rasa on the same score. Significantly enough he not only demands that the quality of Prasāda should be present

80. CS. p. 41. Also Vide TMP. pp. 185-186, for a similar comment on Empson's quoted words.

in all types of composition⁸¹ but also leaves the following words of caution

"yatra pratiyamāno'rthah pramliṣṭatvena bhāṣate /
vācyasyānṛtaya vāpi nāsyāsau gocharo dhvaneḥ //

(Dhv. II, 31 p 281)

(If in an instance the implied sense is such that it can be caught only with great difficulty or if it is only subordinate to the Expressed sense, in either case it will not be an instance of Suggestion) ⁸²

"sarvesv-eva prabhedesu sphuṭatvenāvabhāsanam /
yadvyangyasyānāibhūtiāya tatpūrnam dhvanīlakṣanam //

(Dhv II 33 p 286)

(The full definition of Suggestion in all its varieties includes clarity of manifestation and principal importance of the suggested element) ⁸³

But the clarity of the meaning is not something mathematically measured. Moreover, the saṃhṛdayatva or the capacity to appreciate poetry may vary from time to time. It also remains an undeniable fact that a single critic like Ānanda cannot be expected to determine all the dhvanis ⁸⁴. The final court of appeal in this regard is the circle of saṃhṛdayas; in other words, it is the society which would best criticise kāvya. Thus the universal appeal of the Rāmāyana and the Mātā-bhārata makes them the greatest kāvyas. Yet, what we best

81 "prastāsaḥ svaccharitāśca śabdāntahayoḥ," Dhv p 213,

"sarbhāḥ ca saṃghaṣṭāntaḥ prastāśchyo guṇo vyāpti," etc
Dhv p 321

82 Dhv Trans p 52

83 Dhv Trans p 54.

84 Cf. " but every effort to formulate the common element is limited by the limitations of particular men in particular places and at particular times and these limitations become manifest in the perspective of history" (The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, pp 141-142).

derive from Ānandavardhana is the dhvani theory in principle and that indeed embodies a pretty good criterion for literary criticism and instructs how by delineating the basic human emotions like love and sorrow the poetry of sustained appeal may be created. We may observe here that while in the matter of the diction the new poetry claims the designation as dhvani, it lacks mostly—and surely with good many exceptions—in a sincere and passionate appraisal of the human sentiments. In other words, it appeals more to the intellect than to the heart. In the beginning of this work I proposed to use the word kāvya indiscriminately for all the varieties of composition such as poetry, drama, prose fiction and prose short stories. There can be no gainsaying of the fact that of the varieties of literature that I have named above poetry is the least popular type to day. In comparison to fiction and short stories poetry is less sold. The reason is not far to seek. The fiction or the short story deals with human characters and their actions and delineate their sentiments under described circumstances. “We are human beings, and in what are we more interested than in human action and human attitudes?”—says Eliot (ATSE, p. 67). With the description of human characters and their attitudes the fiction or the short story also comes out with all the aesthetic appeal of a drama. The poetry which can evoke a sentiment in a similar manner is the dramatic poetry and such a poetry is bound to be popular. But if with all the wealth of symbolism and imagery the poetry does not do more than conveying a matter of fact (vastu dhvani) in the form of an ideal or a metaphysical theory, it is bound to lack in aesthetic appeal. We have also to draw a line of demarcation between the poem which informs us about the state of mind of the poet and one which actually evokes a sentiment in our mind (Vide ATSE, p. 80 for a commendable attempt at distinguishing between dramatic and reflective poetry). Communication of lofty ideas may win the appreciation as an intelligent or a valuable work but in order to win

the heart the poem must evoke some sentiment in the heart of the reader. Thus when it is not shorn of the poet's sympathy for the human sentiments even the difficult but suggestive new poetry triumphs



APPENDIX

An extract from a Paper entitled "Some Observations on the Theory of Sphoṭa," Read in the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists in New Delhi in January 1964 by the same Author

So far we have seen how the theory of Sphoṭa or One-undivided Real Word is recognised and respected by the works on grammar, religion and philosophy alike. It is curious to note that it invaded the field of poetics also where it enjoys a very honourable recognition. Ānandavardhana designates the suggestive type of kāvya as Dhvani only on the analogy of the audible sounds which are called Dhvani by the grammarians and which also suggest the Real Word, Sphoṭa. The audible-syllables or letters (śrūyamāṇavarṇas) are called śabda in an ordinary sense. But with reference to the Real Śabda they are called Dhvani. Compare :

pratyayairanupākhyeyairgrahaṇānugūṇaistathā

dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpamavadhāryate. (VKPD. I. 83: That the relation between the audible syllables (nādas) and Sphoṭa is that of the suggestor and the suggested is explicit from the VKPD. I. 97. :

grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā niyatā yogyatā yathā

vyāṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvena tathaiḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ.

Ānandavardhana observes that the suggestive poetry also possesses suggestivity (vyaṅjakatva) and hence the designation Dhvani is applied by the rhetorician also to the suggestive poetry. Compare : prathame hi vidvāṁso vaiyākaraṇāḥ te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvaniriti vyavaharanti tathaiḥ... kāvyamiti vyapadeśyo vyaṅjakatvasāmyād dhvanirityuktaḥ (Dhv. pp. 132-135).

Of the three types of suggested content viz. vastu (matter of fact), alaṁkāra (figure of speech) and rasādi (sentiments),

the first two may also be expressly stated. But the third variety, namely, sentiment, can never be expressly stated. It must always be suggested. Ruyyaka, commenting on the Vyaktiviveka, very rightly observes that we must recognise the *vyañjanā* function, as a rule, for arriving at the *rasādi* variety of the meaning of poetry. And once we recognise *vyañjanā*, for having *rasādi*, under compulsion, there is no harm in enlarging its scope also to *vastu* and *alaṅkāra*, which also casually happen to be different from the express sense and the secondary sense. Compare -

“iha śabdasyābhīdhālakṣaṇābhedenā dvivīdho vyāpāraś-
cirantanairabhyupagataḥ. na ca tṛtīyakakṣānikṣipte'rthe pra-
galbhate iti tatra vyāpārāntaramabhyupagatam. rasādau ca
tattulyakakṣe vyāñjanamupapādītamitihāpi tadeva samāśrayitum
yuktam” (VVV. I. p. 59).

Now we may observe that the position of the suggestive poetry is analogous to the position of *śrūyamānavarnas* also because of the fact that the position of *rasa* is analogous to that of *Sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is the *Śabdabrahman* or the Supreme Self itself. Then again the realisation of *rasa* also means the realisation of the Supreme Self; for, *rasa* is the Supreme Self as propounded by Jagannātha on the strength of the expression “*raso vai saḥ*” of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (II. 7). Because of the Real Word being of the nature of Brahman, a knowledge of the correct words leads to emancipation. Cf. “*īyam sā mokṣamānānāmajihmā rājanapaddhatī*” (VKPD. I. 16). This spiritual service of grammar is very admirably put forth by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanaśaṁgraha*. But it must be noted that both in case of the realisation of *Sphoṭa* and the realisation of *rasa*, which are nothing other than the Parabrahman, we cannot have final emancipation instantaneously. That is how aesthetic consciousness (*rasāsvāda*) and the realisation of *Sphoṭa* differ from the mystical consciousness (*brahmāsvāda*) on the one hand and from the mystical experience of the *Parāvāk* on the other. Possibly this is why Abhinava does not

identify rasāsvāda with brahmāsvāda but simply says that rasāsvāda is analogous to brahmāsvāda (i.e., brahmāsvāda-sahodara). This point is clearly observed by Dr. K. C. Pandey in the words : “Aesthetic experience therefore according to Abhinavagupta, in its final stage, belongs to the level of vyatireka turīyātīta in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject the self shines in its Ānanda aspect (I. Aest. p. 130) [Vide, *Supra*, p. 176].

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
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1	15	at par	on a par
5	8	a	an
6	27	at par	on a par
7	1	Nāṭyaśāstrā	Nāṭyaśāstra
10	10	śṅgāra	śṅgāra
13	19	warrented	warranted
.	35	o	to
15	27	Vāman	Vāmana
16	30	Ānand's	Ānanda's
19	26	saṁgrah-	saṁgraha-
50	1	vakrakti	vakrokti
61	8	basie	basic
63	1	Vivhāva	Vibhāva
64	13	Abhiava	Abhinava
82	8	Śrūyamavarnas	Śrūyamānavarnas
103	1	an a par	on a par
105	1	Thue	Thus
112	30	ubhayaśaktyud- bhava	ubhayaśaktyud- bhava
113	27	varse	verse
119	8	in	is
132	31	my	may
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157	6	anubhāvas thirty three	vyabhiçāribhāvas thirtythree
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224	11	abhidā lakṣanā	abhidhā, lakṣanā
265	f n 3	we	we